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Summary
This thesis is about the processes of creating renewable electricity systems in new
locations. Specifically it addresses the challenges and drivers of building-up renewable
energy system in a ‘fast follower’ country, Ireland. With increasing scientific, political,
civil society and private sector agreement on the need to reduce green-house gas emissions
from the provision of electricity, the rolling out of complex, renewable electricity systems
from countries in which initial system building activities have taken place to others is an
important issue. The primary research question posed is ‘what explains the growth of the
wind electricity system in Ireland?’ This question is reflected upon by asking ‘what does
the Irish experience tell us about why and how these systems spread to new locations?’
The thesis addresses an innovation studies audience, making a theoretical contribution
to the field of sustainability transitions. It contributes to recent research integrating theor-
ies from human geography by offering new insights on how location influences building of
large scale renewable electricity systems in new jurisdictions. It contributes findings about
the rapid development of the Irish wind system that challenge two dominant perspectives;
roll-out in Ireland has been driven by EU policy push and the development of the industry
is fundamentally about the extent of national subsidies. We find both perspectives are
partial; what they omit is likely to be essential to reproducing the Irish experience.
This thesis takes as its unit of analysis the wind energy system itself, and using a
‘technological innovation system’ framework, examines and evaluates the structure of the
system; the complex arrangement of institutions, actors and technologies; and the dynamic
innovation processes or ‘functions’ of the system. An inquiry into the substantive histor-
ical contexts of the development of the system make possible insights into the locational
characteristics and relations within and between the system; drivers, barriers and influ-
ences of direction of the system processes; and the contexts in which decisions are made
and technological change takes place. The thesis finds the development of a renewable
electricity system in new locations is simultaneously heavily influenced by transnational
dimensions of system actors relations and institutions, and shows that while the direction
of the emergent technological pathway is influenced at multiple spatial and governance
levels, legitimation of the technology is highly localised.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is about the emergence of renewable electricity systems (RES) in new locations.
Specifically it addresses the challenges and drivers of constructing an onshore wind-based
electricity system in a ‘fast follower’ country, Ireland. The topic is relevant to societal
debates on transitions to low-carbon electricity generation such as the consequences of
making major social investments in renewable energy technology in advance of other na-
tions even when that investment will not transform the ‘latecomer’ into a leader in the
production of that renewable technology. Research pertaining to the innovative activity
that forms a large part of constructing a RES may lead to new insights to better dir-
ect the transformation of energy systems and infrastructures. In turn we might expect
these to contribute to climate change mitigation agendas and a greater understanding of
firm, policy and society dynamics in the area of energy policy. The topic is also relevant
to contemporary academic debates about the processes by which new technologies come
into widespread use within the innovation studies and sustainability transitions literature,
where the emergence of novel energy and electricity systems has been a major focus of in-
vestigation. The processes by which established RES emerge in new countries has received
considerably less attention than the generation of novelty and change. In summary, this
thesis contributes to that debate by outlining the innovation processes that were produced
to support and develop the wind electricity system, both in Ireland and trans-nationally.
21.1 Background motivations
In recent years there has been increasing scientific, political, civil society and private sec-
tor agreement on the need to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions from processes such as the
generation of electricity. This was exemplified at global level by the multilateral Paris
Agreement signed at the 21st UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in 2015 (United Na-
tions, 2015). The mitigation of climate change together with concerns for the security of
national energy supply have been dominant rhetorics employed in calls for the ‘transition-
ing’ or ‘transformation’ to renewably generated energy at global, European, national and
sub-national levels. Two aspects of this problem are relevant to this thesis. First, this
potential transformation is not one of only technical plant and infrastructure, but also
of political interests and culture (Giddens, 2009). In short, this presents societal chal-
lenges that extend beyond the relatively narrow domain of national energy policy. These
challenges necessarily involve changes to policy, infrastructure, end-user behaviour and
supplier practices and the re-orientation of social, economic and technological systems in
more sustainable directions (Hughes, 1983; Unruh, 2002). Second, the climate is a public
good. According to Stern (2007, p. 25) “those who fail to pay for it cannot be excluded
from enjoying its benefits and one person’s enjoyment of the climate does not diminish the
capacity of others to enjoy it too.” This ‘market failure’ argument is based on a strand
of work in economics stretching back to Sidgwick (1883) through Pigou (1920), and has
profound implications for responses to the problem of climate change. Stern suggests
‘markets for relevant goods and services (energy, land use, innovation, etc.) do not reflect
the consequences of different consumption and investment choices for the climate” (ibid.).
Simply put, if firms will not pay for a ‘clean’ climate, government must, often through
subsidising ‘clean’ technologies or green practices. These problems have stimulated public
intervention at several different governance levels.
European Union energy policy over the past two decades has been influenced by the
dual agendas of the Single Market project and EU environmental and climate changes dir-
ectives. The EU has committed to creating a policy regime to encourage member states
to ‘decarbonise’ electricity generation. Financial resources have been mobilised by the EU
and national governments to subsidise emerging renewable technologies against ‘cheaper’
incumbent fossil fuel based electricity generation. Directives have focussed on targets for
renewable electricity generation at EU and member state level. Three interrelated issues
are relevant to the thesis. I) Targets such as the EU 2030 Framework are relatively blunt
instruments, concerned with acceleration in a pre-determined direction, that is how fast
3(e.g. by 2030) rather than by whom or for whom. This becomes a salient point when the
distribution of benefits is discussed. II) The implicit technological focus of these targets
has been predominantly on the rapid diffusion of generation technologies such as turbines
and photovoltaic arrays, subsidised through feed-in tariffs, tradable green certificates or
other instruments, the implementation of which occurs at national level, often through
contested political processes. Rather less attention has been paid to managing systemic
infrastructure and regulatory changes (Hiteva, 2014). III) EU energy frameworks and
target models tend to underplay the influence of national context, including issues of
regulatory change, significant infrastructure changes in the shift from centralised to dis-
tributed generation, political confrontations with often powerful incumbent interests and
in the later stages of development, the appropriation of subsidy as rents.
Much of the detailed, political work in rolling-out RES and meeting European tar-
gets is devolved to member state level. Member states have considerable leeway, within
frameworks set by targets and state aid rules. Thus it is appropriate for this thesis in
its investigation of the emergence of renewable electricity systems in new locations, to
take note of developments at the EU level and also between the EU and the roll out in
Ireland of policy and technology. In a small number of countries the roll out of renew-
able electricity systems has been rapid. Germany, Denmark and Spain for example have
been much studied as ‘leaders’ or ‘early movers’ in the deployment of technologies such
as onshore wind and solar photovoltaics to national centralised grids and in distributed
configurations. Influential factors and processes have been the gaining of legitimacy and
the setting of future directions of technology pathways through policy or societal rhetorics,
new economic actors such as farmers and neighbourhood coops entering energy systems,
the creation of markets for renewable technologies and the availability of capital finance
and subsidy for the production of electricity. However, a single explanatory technological
deployment pathway has not emerged (Stenzel and Frenzel, 2008), and the reasons for
slow diffusion have been numerous (Negro, Alkemade, et al., 2011). This thesis however,
is about developments in countries that come next, of which Ireland is one. The thesis is
concerned not only with the re-production in new countries of legitimacy, direction and
the creation of markets, but also the processes by which RES emerge in new locations1. It
is thus highly relevant to the debate on sustainability transitions and transformations to
examine the transfer of knowledge, flows of technology, and access to extra-jurisdictional
resources which are implicated in the construction of renewable electricity systems in new
1‘Location’ and ‘locally’ are on some occasions used as synonyms for country in the thesis. Any
geographic level or scale other than country is made explicit.
4locations. This thesis contributes to this debate by focussing on what is re-produced; which
aspects of energy system construction are built-up in new countries, which are accessed of
transferred from abroad, and how local energy system and institutional structures influ-
ence processes of reproduction.
1.2 Academic relevance and audience
The processes of creating renewable electricity systems in new locations is also a topic that
is relevant to numerous contemporary academic debates. This thesis addresses primar-
ily an innovation studies audience, making a theoretical contribution to debates within
the developing field of sustainability transitions. Transitions scholars are concerned with
long-term changes in the configurations of ‘socio-technical systems’, at least in theory, priv-
ileging neither technological or sociological deterministic explanations of change. A major
sub-field within the transitions field has been the development of the technological innova-
tion systems framework, drawing heavily on the innovation systems literature. Innovation
systems are sets of public and private sector institutions and actors whose activities and
interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies (Freeman, 1987; Lun-
dvall, 1992). Freeman and Lundvall’s concept of National Systems of Innovation has had
significant policy impact since its formulation in the 1980s and 1990s and a number of
its core tenets have been adapted to focus on regions, industrial sectors, and on techno-
logy systems (Martin, 2012). The technological (innovation) systems framework initially
was developed as an approach to investigate the emergence of novel technological systems
through explanations based on the systemic interplay of firm actors, and their institutional
settings (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991; Bergek, Jacobsson, Carlsson, Lindmark, et al.,
2008; Hekkert, Suurs, et al., 2007). The adaptation of many of the analytic concepts and
protocols of NSI to TIS means a reorientation of focus from technological innovation as
a driver of national economic growth, to a focus of often radical technologies as a gen-
erative component of fully fledged socio-technical transitions (Markard et al., 2012a).
The framework has been applied extensively to energy systems and developed accord-
ingly. Strongly orientated towards policy advice, the framework supplements the concept
of market failure with system failure and suggests that market failure cannot be fixed
through the simplistic heuristic of ‘getting the price (incentives) right’. Contributions
have focussed on failure of infrastructure, poorly aligned institutions, deficiencies of actor
networks and insufficient financing (Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000; Weber and Rohracher,
52012a; Bergek, Jacobsson, Carlsson, Lindmark, et al., 2008; Karltorp, 2014). Using an
innovation systems approach, the thesis takes as its unit of analysis the wind renewable
electricity system of production, distribution and innovation, in short the Irish wind RES.
The thesis contributes an analysis, evaluation and discussion of the structure of the Irish
wind RES – that is the complex arrangement of institutions, actors and technologies –
and the dynamic innovation processes or ‘TIS functions’ which influence the emergence
and growth of the RES.
In recent years, scholars have sought to develop greater attention to location, place and
space2 within the transitions literature (Hansen and Coenen, 2014; Markard et al., 2012b;
Coenen, Benneworth, et al., 2012). This has allowed national-level diversity, variations,
interpretations and institutional contexts to be brought into explanations of why systems
emerge in one country and not another (Raven, Schot, et al., 2012). Of course, attention
to the emergence of technologies in new countries is not new. The literature on diffusion,
technology transfer and internationalisation, has made significant contributions in this
regard. However the socio-technical and systems approach has integrated concepts which
allow us us to simultaneously address the market failure and systemic aspects of change
in a complex technology as a distributed renewable energy system. This point is further
elaborated upon in Section 3.1.
As part of the geographic turn in the sustainability transitions literature, some schol-
ars have sought to extend the theoretical and analytic capabilities of the TIS framework
by integrating ideas from human geography. Broadly, these ideas fall into two modes of
inquiry relevant to this thesis: investigating the territoriality of emergent innovation pro-
cesses and systems; and exploring the often transnational inter-organisational links and
relations between actors (Hansen and Coenen, 2014).
These ideas include perspectives on institutional influences at international levels (Gosens
et al., 2015), how global developments in a specific field effect innovation system devel-
opments in national contexts (Binz, Truffer, and Coenen, 2014), multi- governance-level
nested system structures (Wieczorek et al., 2013) and the territorial embedding of systems
2Location is used in a positivistic sense to indicate a specific bounded geographic space. Space is used
in positivistic or Newtonian sense, as an empty geographic container waiting to be filled with (economic)
activity. A broad definition of place is used after (Devine Wright, 2009, p. 427) who writes place is the
“physical aspects of a specific location as well as the variety of meanings and emotions associated with
that location by individuals or groups.” In the relational or Leibnizian view, according to Agnew, “space
is relational, in the sense that it has no powers independent of objects and events but can be construed
only from the relations between them” (Agnew and Livingstone, 1995, p. 320). Relational concepts of
space are explicitly clarified when invoked in the thesis.
6(Coenen and Truffer, 2012). There are two significant implications for this thesis. First,
it necessitates the focus of inquiry is extended beyond the initial emergence of novel tech-
nologies to explicitly include the formation of RES in new locations. Second, this focus of
inquiry follows that of innovation systems in context (e.g. national, regional, global and
multi-scale) (Bergek, Hekkert, et al., 2014).
This thesis engages in and builds on these discussions and contributions. It acknow-
ledges the national (empirical) bounding of the Irish wind RES where appropriate (e.g.
national policy domains, island based material infrastructures), but does not reify or in-
appropriately background national structure and context. Rather than delimiting system
boundaries ex ante, we start with a technological boundary (analytically) and then recon-
struct whether sufficiently coherent sub-systems overlap with specific regional or national
boundaries. This is achieved with a custom ‘build-up and touchdown’ heuristic which
seeks to avoid privileging explanation based on endogenous system activity, or innovation
processes at a national level, with those taking place transnationally.
Furthermore, the framework of analysis deliberately seeks to challenge uni-directional
framings of races, leaders, laggards, and catching-up. On the one hand the metaphor of
a ‘race’ is being run against climate catastrophe is a certainly of some value. On the
other, being amongst a small number of winners – in the sense of a country that is able
to gain from its investments in this race – is rather less important than trying to avoid
a large number of losers. This is a situation that that will not only lead to technological
opportunities being missed, but will also have much more dramatic consequences for future
human welfare. Given the contested and political nature of climate and energy targets
at EU and national level, we argue the success or failure to meet these targets is not
a clear indicator of success in addressing the greater societal challenges introduced in
the proceeding passages. In other words, the thesis rejects uni-directional framings as
assuming a common and uncontested goal to which all actors are committed so that all
deviation from efficient paths to attainment are viewed as barriers or blockages and all
initiatives that are not ‘in the plan’ are viewed as diversions. Guarding against tendencies
to equate success and failure against such targets, the thesis employs a heuristic and
research framework that is attentive to the direction of technological pathways that may
be set at EU level, while also being sensitive to national and sub-national processes. The
intention is to avoid undue analytic attention on whether an arbitrary race is being won,
and focus instead on local emergence. Given this focus, the attention shifts to being about
how a RES is built up from resources to hand, and taking advantage of resources from
7afar.
1.3 Research questions
Bringing together the background motivations and the chosen analytic approach high-
light three specific tensions, or core problems, each of which are addressed explicitly by
the research questions, and implicitly within the analytic framework (collectively referred
to here as the research framework). First, the research framework addresses why wind
innovation happened in Ireland. Simply put, the framework addresses why the analytic
decision to categorise the Irish wind sector as an innovation system rather than attempting
to explain the take up of renewable electricity technology in Ireland as a case of technolo-
gical diffusion. Second, through narrative analysis, the research framework addresses why
the political, firm and societal support in Ireland for wind energy existed. In addressing
these tensions the framework explains indigenous RES emergence and associated levels
of societal support relevant to the RES. Finally, the framework identifies relations within
and between indigenous and transnational innovation sub-systems, processes and actors,
and provides a foundation for explaining these dynamics. Considering these tensions, the
thesis answers the following question:
RQ1.What explains the emergence and growth of the wind electri-
city system in Ireland and what does this tell us about why and how
renewable electricity systems emerge in new locations?
This question starts with a clear problem orientation but it also indicates the aspiration
to a generalisable contribution as one of the main aims of the thesis, the explanation
of why new renewable electricity systems emerge in new locations. As discussed in the
previous section, this broad question has been addressed using several analytic approaches.
Question two takes into account the discussion on academic relevance and audience and
engages directly the technological innovation system framework, without privileging an
overtly functional or structural explanation.
RQ2. How can the emergence of a wind-based renewable electricity
system in Ireland be explained by the formation and development
of technological innovation system functions?
In order to address the background motivations and further elaborate on locationally
specific policy issues, we pose two further questions.:
8RQ3. Why are certain aspects of the RES re-produced in the new
location and why?
RQ4. What is the balance of influence on the RES of indigenous
versus overseas structure and TIS functions in the Irish context?
Questions three and four set out to establish the influence location plays on the emergent
system, its components and functions.
1.4 Contributions of the thesis
This thesis contributes an understanding of why and how the the Irish wind RES emerged
and who participated in crucial episodes that influenced its relatively rapid growth. In ex-
plaining this story, the research extends our knowledge of why and how renewable energy
systems emerge in new locations. The findings supports and extends prior findings in the
literature that the emergent system functions may be distributed across space, and spe-
cifically that the direction of the search is a crucial early function and may be fulfilled at
multiple levels. And crucially, not all TIS system functions are required to be reproduced
at a national level. The findings contribute directly to the ongoing efforts to understand
innovation systems in context. We interpret the process of take up or diffusion through
a heuristic that opposes, on the one hand, localised and customised building-up and ac-
cumulation processes with, on the other hand, the idea of ‘touchdown’ by which external,
incumbent, and previously developed approaches, capabilities, and actors enter into a loc-
alised RES. This opposition is designed to assess the processes and the flows of resources
that are fundamental to the global proliferation of renewable technology systems. Indeed
we find that the direction of the search for new technologies is influenced at multiple levels
such as the EU, global technology networks, and at national and sub-national levels.
The thesis makes two methodological contributions. The build-up and touchdown heur-
istic itself is a novel approach to analysing distributed system functions. In analysing the
evidence, we propose a novel analytical approach, in order to appropriately assess system
processes in context. We do this by focussing analytic attention on the generative aspect
of narratives. This attention on the generative aspects of narratives is a complement to
an event history. Finally the empirical findings in this study contribute a new explana-
tion of how and why the Irish wind energy system has developed in the manner it has.
This takes the form of a systemic, socio-technical history of a small island grid system,
and its integration of a wind generated electricity. The findings address two explanatory
9narratives found amongst actors in the system, that ‘Europe drives everything’, and that
the development of wind can be explained through the distribution of subsidy, specifically
the Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff. We find both of these explanations tell only part of
the story, which has been elaborated significantly in this thesis.
1.5 Overview of the thesis
The thesis is set out across eight chapters. In Chapter 2 the context for the research is
established by introducing and discussing aspects of the Irish wind electricity system and
notable historic decisions that have influenced its development.
In the third and fourth chapters the theoretical framework and scheme of analysis are
introduced and discussed. The conceptual building blocks upon which the framework is
constructed are introduced through a review of the literature. Data collection, methodo-
logy and the strategy for operationalising the theoretical framework are then outlined.
Chapter 5 contains an extended account of the case narrative, organised in a periodised
chronology. The narrative systematically introduces the reader to theoretically relevant
case details and contexts while organising the evidence and components of the system in
chronological order. Chapter 6, presents appropriate findings of the structure analysis
and discuss implications for the theory. The structural analysis provides a foundation
for the discussion of the function analysis, significant findings from which are presented
in Chapter 7. The contribution to the Irish wind energy system of each TIS function is
discussed individually before elaborating upon enlarging and attenuating mechanisms both
endogenous and exogenous to the RES. The mapping and fulfilment of system functions
over space and time is graphically illustrated in a series of function maps, and two virtuous
cycles of functions identified in the analysis are introduced.
Chapter 8 synthesises the results of the function analysis, and discusses findings with
regard to the thesis hypothesis and observations from similar research found in the liter-
ature. The research questions are directly answered before contributions of the thesis are
addressed. Finally, a brief set of recommendations for policy makers and other relevant
actors in industry and wider society are offered.
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Chapter 2
Research context and background
This chapter establishes the research context ahead of the discussion on theory and method
in Chapter 31. The chapter describes case-appropriate aspects of the Irish wind RES, in-
troducing the relevant technologies, actors and institutions. The chapter establishes a
logical path for narrowing the context of the thesis. Its focus is on questions of what and
who; for example, what are the notable characteristics of the Irish wind RES in 2014, the
final year of the period of this study, and who are influential actors. Questions of how
and why suggested by this introductory context are are addressed in later chapters. Sec-
tion 2.1 discusses national and international wind electricity statistics and introduces the
generation technology, infrastructure and indigenous research base. Section 2.2 introduces
players within the wind industry and relevant non-firm actors and networks as well as dis-
cussing finance in the sector. Section 2.3 discusses the wider electricity industry, markets,
governance structures and incentives. It describes the mix of national and regional policies
and technology support available to wind actors. I then reflect on the contemporary wind
RES by considering historic decisions, innovation processes and contingencies in order to
discuss the support available and the challenges to maintaining and further developing
the industry and its technologies. By doing so the aims are to offer an understanding of
the extent to which the wind RES in Ireland is influenced by government policies, and
national and transnational firms, research professionals and other actors.
1An extended analytically focussed narrative history of wind technologies in Ireland is presented in
Chapter 5.
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2.1 Ireland, turnkey technologies and the grid
“Wind Energy Meets 50% of Ireland’s Weekend Electricity ”2
This statement headlined a press release from the Irish Wind Energy Association
following Hurricane Gonzalo’s landfall in Ireland over the weekend of October 18th and
19th 2014. The weather it brought was energetic, wet, and most significantly, windy,
supplying notable contributions of renewable electricity to Ireland’s grid. Record breaking
wind generation that weekend is illustrative of the contribution wind technologies now
make to Ireland’s energy system, at the time or writing peaking on 23rd February 2015
when wind turbines supplied 1,969 MW of electricity to the grid (ERC, 2015). A decade
previously, Ireland had only a handful of operating wind farms, illustrated in Figure 2.1.
The pace of roll out of these technologies is remarkable, all the more so when we consider
the European context. By the end of 2014 in the Republic of Ireland, wind had become a
significant source of electricity (see wind statistic highlights for 2013 in Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Wind statistics 2013. Source: IEA (2013); Howley et al. (2014)
Total installed wind capacity 1,991 MW
Total electrical output from wind 4.5TWh
Wind generation as % of national electric demand 16.30%
Average capacity factor 30.50%
Operational wind farms 166
National EU Renewable Energy Directive target 32% of Ireland’s electricity require-
ments by 2020 (∼3,566 MW)
Wind power is playing a significant role in electricity supply in an increasing number of
countries. By 2013 Ireland was one of 24 countries globally which had at least 1,000MW
of installed wind capacity and world wide wind capacity reached 282 GW, just under
half of which was in Europe (GWEC, 2012). Within the EU, the share of wind in the
mix of fuels used in the generation of electricity was about 7.5% in 2014 with several
countries having met significantly higher shares of their electricity demand supplied by
wind. These included Denmark (39.1%), Portugal (27%), Spain (over 20%) and Ireland
(19%) (IEA, 2013). Relative to the population of the county, Ireland’s installed wind
capacity is amongst a group of nations after Denmark. This roll-out across a select group
2IWEA (2014)
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Figure 2.1. Installed wind generating capacity Ireland. Annual installed capacity is shown via the vertical
blue bars, Ireland’s growing cumulative installed capacity via the red line. Source author’s compiled data
of European countries is illustrated in Figure 2.2. Here we see wind installation per
capita growth over time, with Germany and Spain first to ‘follow’ Denmark’s roll-out,
then Ireland, Portugal with Sweden starting later but accelerating growth faster, a group
of ‘fast followers’. Other EU nations, including those not shown, are bunched in the third
group which include the UK, France, Italy and Poland. This is a remarkable achievement,
for although Ireland has amongst the best onshore wind resources in the EU (see wind
map Figure 2.3),3 it is faced with a number of technological limitations associated with
integrating wind onto a low density small island grid (as discussed below). Supporting
current generation and future goals is a complex system of technology, infrastructure, firms,
a wider energy industry, skilled workers, innovation processes, finance and support policies
at multiple governance levels. For example, the EU Renewable Energy Directive (2009/
28/EC) set a target for Ireland to meet 16% of the country’s total energy consumption
from renewable energy sources by 2020. In order to achieve this, the Government set a 10%
renewable transport target, a 12% renewable heat target and a 40% renewable electricity
target, 32% by wind. In the remainder of this chapter we introduce these features by way
of a snapshot of the contemporary Irish wind industry and relevant energy sector details
3The selection criteria was the top nine countries by cumulative installed capacity plus Ireland.
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as of the end of 2014.
Figure 2.2. Cumulative installed wind capacity for selected EU nations, 1998 to 2014. Source Pineda
and Wilkes (2015); Eurostat (2015)
Figure 2.3. Wind field data after correction for orography and local roughness (80 m onshore, 120 m
offshore) Source: EEA (2009)
Ireland’s wind generated electricity is produced on approximately 190 wind farms.
These have been developed predominantly on the western seaboard, utilising prevailing
14
North Atlantic winds coming from the southwest. The quality of wind resource although
strong throughout the county generally declines from west, eastward (see Figure 2.4 which
shows the geographic dispersal of current and planned wind farms), with western locations
typically having an average annual wind speed of 9 m/s at 75 m hub height compared to
7 m/s on the east coast (SEI, 2003b). However in recent years, more developments
have taken place in Eastern counties, as prime western locations have been occupied and
generation technology improvements have meant commercially competitive returns can
be made from plant at a wider range of locations (Duffy and Cleary, 2015). Typically
turbines operate at 30.5% capacity factor - the electricity generated as a percentage of the
maximum possible under optimal wind speeds and grid export conditions. This is a high
capacity factor by international standards (IEA, 2013) and indicative of Ireland’s well-
endowed wind resources (Vitina et al., 2015). Wind farms range in production size from
single turbine installations with less than one mega-watt capacity, to sites with tens of
turbines and cumulative capacities over 50 MW. The average size of a wind farm completed
in 2013, was 13 MW4. Ireland’s wind industry is onshore, only a single 25 MW installation
lies offshore, in the Irish Sea off the coast of County Wicklow. Onshore projects in Ireland,
are generally in the form of clusters of turbines locally referred to most commonly as wind
farms. While Ireland has a very low population density by European standards, the highly
dispersed nature of rural settlement coupled with planning restrictions devolved to regional
level limit the land that can be used for individual wind project development in Ireland
presenting a significant challenge to developers.
The supply of electricity from wind at utility scale relies on two distinct but interrelated
sets of technologies, the generating plant and the electricity system infrastructure.We can
examine the former by considering Tursillagh wind farm in County Kerry. It is typical of
the wind farms built in the early 2000s, consisting of 23 Danish-built Vestas V47 turbines,
each capable of generating 0.66MW of power with 47m rotors5. Each standalone unit
includes the turbines, blades, towers, gearboxes, generators and transformers. These are
shown on the right hand bar in Figure 2.5 which illustrates typical capital costs and
activities of a wind farm build. In 2013 capital expenditure on turbine technology averaged
4This figure is around the European average. However it is useful to consider strikingly different average
plant sizes throughout Europe (Vitina et al., 2015). For example, Germany has predominantly smaller
sized wind farms (∼7–10 MW), often owned by local firms or communities. Spain on the other hand has
bigger developments (23–29 MW) with a significantly higher ownership by utility firms. Ownership models
in Ireland are discussed in the next section.
5By 2013 the average size of onshore wind turbines for new projects had risen to 2.16 MW (IEA,
2013).
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The location of connected and contracted wind farms, Ireland
Figure 2.4. The location of grid-connected and (future) contracted wind farms in Ireland. County and
municipality boundaries shown. Sources: EirGrid, IWEA, Meithel na Gaoithe.
in the range of AC 0.8m to AC1m per installed MW6 for medium-to-large projects involving
multiple turbines with total development costs in the order of AC1.5m per installed MW
(IEA, 2013).
There are two notable characteristics of this plant common to almost all installations
in Ireland. First, generating technology is imported. Due to lack of heavy engineering in-
frastructure and small market size, no manufacturing of utility scale (greater than 100kW)
wind turbines, or any major components takes place in Ireland. Second, the technology
is turnkey in nature meaning a Vestas V47 operating in Kerry is not notably different
a version of the same model deployed in Jutland, Denmark. As can be seen in Figure
2.5, the turnkey components represent an average of two-thirds of the capital investment
6There is a continuing downward trend in the price per installed MW of wind turbines towards the
lower end of the price range, however newer large-rotor, low-specific-power models, which represent the
upper end of the cited cost range
16
Figure 2.5. Allocation of wind capital investment in millions of Euros. Imported turnkey components
make up right hand side bar. Source FitzGerald et al. (2014); IEA (2013).
required for a wind farm development7. Between them, Vestas, ENERCON, General Elec-
tric, Nordex and Siemens models account for over 90% of the turbines deployed in Ireland
(Figure 2.6). These firms typically have sales and engineering services offices in Dublin and
often ancillary offices on the west coast employing staff for operations and maintenance
contracts as well as installations. Given the capital intense nature of renewable energy
technologies (where marginal production costs approach zero and capital costs represent
a large percentage of total cost of generation), Irish investment or subsidising of wind
generation represents a considerable national outward bound flow of finance.
In addition to the imported turnkey technologies, the development of a wind farms
requires connection to the national transmission system, the ‘grid’. Wind energy is in-
termittent, output generation fluctuates with wind and other climactic factors. In other
words, it cannot be easily turned on to meet surges in demand8. Because of this, adding
high levels of electricity generated by renewable sources to the grid creates a number of
technical challenges including the ability of generators to operate through periods of low
voltage and controlling the balance between grid generation and load (Bazilian et al.,
2004). This situation is exacerbated by the relatively small size of Ireland’s grid9 as the
7IWEA’s The Value of Wind Energy to Ireland report lists the import intensity of wind developments
as 66%, a figure derived from Irish I-O tables (Billington and Mohr, 2014).
8This is termed non-dispatchable generation. Fossil fuel generation on the other hand is generally
dispatchable, a combined cycle gas turbine plant may be turned on specifically to handle peak loads on
the network, usually when the population is making dinner between 17:00 and 19:00 hours.
9To put this into international perspective, Ireland’s power system is nine times smaller that that of
17
Figure 2.6. Cumulative installed turbines per manufacturer. Source: author’s collated data.
cost of the balancing and back-up is linked to the flexibility of the existing system (Fo-
ley, O´ Gallacho´ir, et al., 2013). While there is no theoretical upper limit to wind power
levels on Ireland’s grid according to Gardner et al. (2003), transmission reinforcement,
other technical system constraints and operating costs are limiting factors in practice.
As levels of integrated wind capacity on the grid increase in Ireland, integration at the
margin becomes more challenging than is the case with other larger systems due to tech-
nical constraints arising from intermittency. This is further exacerbated by low levels of
interconnection between Ireland and neighbouring grids (Holttinen et al., 2009).
In Ireland, the systemic mitigation of a number of technological constraints are the
responsibility of the system operators who are responsible for the transmission and dis-
tribution of electricity from generators such as wind farms and coal plants to end-users
such as homes and businesses. The physical grid connection is carried out by EirGrid the
transmission system operator (TSO) and ESB Networks, the distribution system operator
(DSO). These operators have attempted to address these constraints first by means of
specific grid codes (sets of rules) for manufacturers and generators, second by setting out
access rules and processes for grid access applicants, and third through research and de-
velopment aimed at finding technological solutions to constraints. The grid codes specify
robust wind power prediction requirements that are needed to integrate the current levels
of wind power (EirGrid, 2015). Grid access by new generators is determined centrally
Great Britain, which in turn is 30% of the Nordel system in the Nordics. Significantly larger than Nordel
is the UCTE system which covers much of the remainder of continental Europe. (Foley, O´ Gallacho´ir,
et al., 2013).
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in Ireland by way of a Group Processing Approach, in which applicant projects for grid
connection are batched together and offers made in series of ‘gates’. By December 2013,
the total amount of wind capacity contracted for connection in upcoming years under the
latest round, Gate 3, was 1,230 MW with 534 MW of remaining live offers to wind projects
not yet accepted. This brought the total wind capacity contracted for future connection
at the beginning of 2014 to 3,293 MW—almost double the additional capacity required to
deliver the EU 2020 target.
Funding for wind related technology research is less than that for ocean energy, solar
and bioenergy10; research into wind generation technologies is not a stated priority area
for government funding11. However, despite national policy, bibliographic analysis12 of
research outputs (as well as strong anecdotal evidence from interviews conducted by this
author) shows that system integration became a significant research focus during the early
2000s, at the same time as roll out of generation technology accelerated. These data also
suggests strong links between industry and university research at this time. In particular,
EirGrid played a role in collaborative research aimed at increasing renewable penetration
on the grid and is a significant employer of graduates of Ireland’s small number of energy
research groups. Focal research areas within this domain include work on increased grid
interconnection (Vestergaard et al., 2010), mitigation strategies for system security issues
associated with frequency response (O’Sullivan et al., 2011; Dudurych et al., 2006) better
forecasting models (Foley, O´ Gallacho´ir, et al., 2013) and mitigating grid curtailment
(Mc Garrigle et al., 2013). Research on wind energy systems in Ireland has implicitly
10This compares with funding for ocean energy (e.g. marine or wave based generation technologies), a
stated research priority area, of AC5.2 million. Solar, bioenergy and geothermal energy research received
funding totalling AC1.3 million, AC2.2 million and AC9,500 respectively. Energy efficiency funding accounts
for the majority of annual energy research budget. In 2012 this totalled AC30.7 million. All budget data
sourced from SEAI (2013).
11Aggregate research, development and demonstration spending on energy in 2012 was approximately
AC46 million. In terms of Euros per gross domestic product, this figure is similar in scale to recent aggregate
UK energy RD&D budgets. Of this, funding for renewable energy sources was AC9.9 million and specifically
wind AC887,020 while power and storage technologies and other cross-cutting research received funding
totally AC5.6 million (SEAI, 2013). This compares with funding for ocean energy (e.g. marine or wave
based generation technologies), a stated research priority area, of AC5.2 million. Solar, bioenergy and
geothermal energy research received funding totalling AC1.3 million, AC2.2 million and AC9,500 respectively.
Energy efficiency funding accounts for the majority of annual energy research budget. In 2012 this totalled
AC30.7 million. All budget data sourced from SEAI (2013).
12Bibliographic database Scopus was queried for outputs such as journal papers and conference proceed-
ings by analysts at Irish universities and firms. Research methods, data sources and collection techniques
are described in detail in Chapter 4.
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addressed the dominant national characteristics of the industry, those being that turn-
key generation technology is manufactured overseas and that integration onto the grid is
the major challenge. Indeed, little evidence has been found of Irish-based research into
generation technology itself.
Already we have identified a number of intriguing aspects of the case. We note that
the turnkey nature of the technology imported and installed contrasted with the place
specific nature of the technological integration required to maintain growth rates. These
technological characteristics underpin the rapid integration of wind technologies onto a
small island grid. Furthermore, the rate of installation itself has been been remarkable in
international terms. Consider that in terms of scale, the all island grid is one ninth the
size of Great Britain’s, which in turn is 75% the size of the Nordic network, Nordel while
the UCTE system which covers continental Europe is larger again (O´ Gallacho´ir, Guidi,
et al., 2007). This indicates the scale and also relatively unique aspect of the integration
issues faced by Irish system operators, where learning from other small island integrations
was not possible because few, if any, existed. Furthermore, given the relatively small size
of the Irish electricity market, Irish actors did not to have large leverage with overseas
manufacturers to create bespoke technology variants.
2.2 Industry, firms and finance
Ireland’s wind farms are owned in a roughly equal distribution of energy utilities and
small wind farm operators. The four largest electricity utilities own approximately 38%
of installations (Figure 2.7 (a)) however the installed capacity of their wind farms are
typically larger. Thus, these utilities account for 58% of the country’s wind generating
capacity (Figure 2.7 (b)). Of these utility actors, Airtricity, Bord Ga´is Energy (BGE)
and Energia are owned or controlled by parent firms outside of the republic (by SSE plc,
Brookfield Renewable Energy Partners L.P. and Viridian Group plc respectively). Only
one of these firms, Hibernian Wind Power, remains a majority Irish owned enterprise (a
wholly owned subsidy of ESB, the state owned electricity supplier). The small firms are a
heterogeneous collection of small and medium businesses, farmers and investor developers.
Until the recession of 2008, the funding of developments in Ireland involved ‘project
financing’ models. This involved debt funding by banks of up to 70% to 80% of the capital
costs over 15 year payback periods, with the remainder met by equity finance from a range
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Figure 2.7. A) Wind farm ownership in Ireland, total wind farms by firm. Source: author’s collated
data. B) Wind farm ownership in Ireland, cumulative installed capacity by firm. Source: author‘s collated
data from IWEA, SEI.
of actors and institutional lenders. Duffy and Cleary (2015) estimate return on equity and
debt interest rates across the sector to be 14% and 6% respectively. Following the recession
of 2007 and subsequent financial crises, both the number of Irish lenders and the capital
they were willing to lend declined significantly. According to one interview participant:
“...the Irish Republic banks certainly up to very recently have not been open to
this sort of investment for about four or five years. They basically shut down.
People like ehm Deutsche Bank, Nord LB, BNP . . . they have been open for
business and then other companies like ESB, Bord Ga´is, SSE have been able to
do it off the balance sheet they go, they can issue their own debt for cheaper,
when they take that down they build. So in terms of our exposure, if you are
project financing you are slightly more exposed to the current crisis, if you are
a very large multi national utility such as SSE you can raise money relatively
cheaply yourself. If you are someone like ESB or Bord Ga´is I think recently
their credit rating has been slightly better in the States and they look to do it
off balance sheet, which, is effectively a concession from the government.”13
Evidence gathered from interview participants suggests financing projects dispropor-
tionately for smaller firms in Ireland who are less integrated into transitional finance
networks, while those with or able to develop relationships with international financiers
have had access to overseas investment or alternative funding models. Furthermore, utility
13Interview 130103
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players are less reliant on financing from Irish banks as they may also have the option of
funding capital expenditure from their balance sheet. Even if this option is not pursued,
the availability of balance sheet funding can influence perceive risk and accordingly lower
interest rates from lenders. Indeed, over recent years, a number of European investment
and development banks have entered the Irish sector. For example, ESB acquired long
term project finance from Bank of Ireland for a development at Garranereagh, and from
Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, London Branch (Nord/LB) and KFW Ipex-Bank
for Monaincha wind farm. In addition, Bord Ga´is Energy and ESB Networks secured large
scale finance from the European Investment Bank (EIB, 2012; Windpower, 2015).
Despite a relatively even historic distribution between utility and small firm project
ownership, construction and connection of wind farms since 2011 been by larger firms,
at capacities tending towards the utility scale14. This situation is illustrated in Table
2.2, a comprehensive list of wind farms newly connected to the grid over the 24 months
to the end of 2014. New entrants to the sector in Ireland have tended to be overseas
firms entering the market through acquisition of indigenous firms (purchasing fixed assets
at either completed or late pipeline stage)15. For example ABO Wind Ireland, promote
themselves as a ‘one-stop-shop’ who can take a project from development stage to oper-
ation, maintenance and management, in which they manage “all technical and business
planning, arrange international bank financing and deliver turnkey wind farms16”. Simil-
arly Invis Energy are a joint venture between a UK based private equity partnership and
an engineering consultancy, again promoting their financial expertise and ability to project
manage. BlackRock17, on the other hand is an “institutional investor”, who purchased
near-to-completion projects from Irish developer Element Power to add to an emergent
global wind power and solar PV investment asset portfolio (Doom, 2015).
14I differentiate here between scales of technological installations. Small operators have less than three
wind farms, utilities have a larger number, by wind farm and cumulative installed capacity, while medium
operators may have several wind farms.
15We also note two relatively anomalies in 2013. First the completion of the Ireland’s only community
wind farm, Templederry Wind Farm, comprising of two 2.3-MW wind turbines. Despite a number of
earlier successes in other countries, Irish groups employing community-owned models had not successfully
launched a wind farm previously in Ireland (Comhar, 2011; Seyfang et al., 2014). Second was the
initiation of work to install three 3-MW wind turbines by adjacent transnational pharmaceutical firms to
supply their operations in the Lower Harbour area of Cork City. While not a major contribution to the
national electricity resource, “merchant plant” developed for local industrial utilisation has enjoyed some
success.
16Source: ABO (2015).
17BlackRock are one of the world’s largest asset management firms, by capital.
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Table 2.2 Firm ownership of wind farms launched over 24 months to December 2014
Firm Windfarms
deployed
2013-14
Cumulative
capacity
2013-14 (MW)
Scale of
operations
Firm
ownership
Bord Ga´is
Energy /
Brookfield
Renewables
7 199 Utility scale Foreign parent
firm
Invis Energy 3 85 Utility scale Significant
foreign
ownership stake
BlackRock 3 45 Utility scale Foreign parent
firm
Bord na Mo´na 1 42 Utility scale State-owned
utility
Airtricity 1 34 Utility scale Foreign parent
firm
ABO Wind Ireland
Ltd.
1 15 Utility scale Significant
foreign
ownership stake
Energia 3 13 Utility scale Foreign parent
firm
Knocknalour Wind
Farm Ltd
2 9 Small wind
operator
Irish
Gaelectric 1 6 Small to medium
operator
Irish
Wind Source 1 5 Small wind
operator
Irish
Ballynancoran
Wind Farm Ltd
1 4 Small wind
operator
Irish
Templederry Wind
Farm Ltd
1 4 Community
energy
Irish
DePuy Cork
Harbour
1 3 Merchant plant Irish
Janssen Cork
Harbour
1 2 Merchant plant Irish
Sheeragh Wind
Ltd
1 0.4 Small wind
operator
Irish
Whilst historical data gathered is insufficient to indicate a trend, evidence from other
regions suggests BlackRock’s entry into the market may be the vanguard of a sectoral shift
towards a ‘yieldco’18 model of asset management and ownership. This model is based on
18According to (NC Economy, 2014, p. 219), yieldcos are firms “which own portfolios of low-risk,
long-term projects are equity vehicles that can go a step further than infrastructure bonds by effectively
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the predictable cash flows that energy generation in general, and guaranteed renewable
technology support schemes such as feed-in tariffs specifically may offer (NREL, 2014).
Changes to wind farm finance models in Ireland took place at a time when finance models
across Europe were changing. Longer-term institutional investors such as such as pension
funds, insurance companies and wealth managers have increased investment in renewable
generation assets. Underlying factors for the entry into the wind sector by these new
actor groups include the increasing stability and predictability of project yields at around
6% compared with relatively low government bond yields of 2 to 3% coupled with some
protection against inflation and regulatory guarantee (FS-UNEP, 2014). Bloomberg New
Energy Finance reports that in 2013, these firms had invested approximately AC3 billion in
renewable energy private equity and infrastructure funds, project bonds, or directly into
equity or debt in specific development projects, a three-fold increase from 2008 (2014).
This evidence correlates with case evidence which suggests a number of new business
models emerging in the Irish wind sector which have evolved with this changing global
landscape. Two Irish firms, Element Power and Mainstream Renewable Power, have
emerged from Ireland as global players, capable of developing projects, raising finance,
and creating diverse revenue streams. For example, Mainstream Renewable Power led the
development of the $70 million, 33MW Negrete Cuel wind farm, financed in 2013 with
debt from China Development Bank and equity from Mainstream19 (FS-UNEP, 2014).
These developments in the financing of the industry point to a number of intriguing
insights analysis of the Irish case offers. As the industry has developed, the risk-adjusted
return has shifted from relatively high levels associated with private equity towards rel-
atively lower, long-term, stable infrastructure type returns, indicating a maturing of the
wind sector and something of a legitimising effect having taken place in the offices of
investment professionals assessing the cost of risk. This suggests that from the perspect-
ive of an institutional portfolio manager, wind investment is now a ‘reliable’ investment.
Second, the evidence presented so far suggests that the characteristics and composition
of actors in the industry is dependent on a complex set of historical and contemporary
factors, both within and outside of the country. Third, we can see that not only do fin-
bundling equity and debt together in one package. By bundling projects together, the project finance
premium for single projects can be avoided. Moreover, for a portfolio of projects with risks comparable to
corporate bonds, the result for investors can be a higher-yielding, bond- like instrument that nevertheless
reduces the overall financing cost for the projects in question.”
19Furthermore, this has occurred without subsidy support or power purchase agreement. Instead,
Mainstream has relied on revenue through merchant power sales, indicating a strong belief in what they
have called ‘underlying financial fundamentals’.
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ancial players enter a territory, but financial innovation that occurs by actors within the
territory may then be diffused elsewhere. While wind generation technology is not an ex-
port commodity for Ireland, financial models have been developed in Ireland, or by Irish
actors, are being diffused transnationally. Yet while a small number Irish firms develop
and exploit discrete links in the global wind technology supply chain, in Ireland we have
seen that overseas firms own, operate and maintain an increasing percentage of generation
plant. The trans-national inter-penetration of ownership is a feature of modern capitalism,
however it brings with it some background questions for policy makers in Ireland. First,
is it societally better to divert domestic capital formation from projects where more local
knowledge is needed – e.g. housing and office buildings to the ‘utility’ sector? Second,
do Irish investors benefit from access to international markets, i.e. do they have returns
abroad? (e.g. The Netherlands has a lot of income from overseas investment while also
having similar patterns of international capital investment inflows (Belderbos, 1992)).
2.3 The electricity market and energy policies
Many of the disparate actors, technologies and fuels of the wind RES are brought to-
gether in Ireland’s electricity market (see the energy flow for the electricity system in
2013, illustrated in Figure 2.8.20 The market fulfils a number of roles beyond simply ‘sup-
plying’ electricity from generators to consumers. First, the market serves as a location for
transactions between actors, in this case generators, market suppliers or wholesalers and
end-use consumers. Several ‘vertically integrated’ actors fulfil numerous roles in the mar-
ket. For example, Airtricity (owned by SSE plc) own and operate generator plant, they
supply that electricity to the market itself, and they then act as a distributer managing
individual commercial relationships with households and businesses. On the other hand,
many smaller wind farm operators contract with single suppliers who in turn manage mar-
ket arrangements. Second, the market may be understood as a political arena, in which
regulative priorities are exercised. For example, the Renewable Energy Directive requires
the system operators to prioritise renewable energy generation over fossil fuels. This pri-
oritisation is enacted through market mechanisations and dispatch-down rules21 (EirGrid
20Despite the growth of indigenous wind generation, Ireland is highly dependent on imported fuels, in
2013 importing 89% of its overall energy requirements (Howley et al., 2014). Ireland has approximately
7,500 MW of grid-connected installed electricity generation capacity in addition to wind plant (EirGrid,
2015).
21Where measures are taken to turn-off or “dispatch-down” renewable energy for system security reas-
ons, EirGrid must report to the regulator (CER) on those measures and indicate which corrective measures
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and Soni, 2014). Third, market rules and arrangements ensure the continuous operation of
the system and constant supply of electricity is maintained. As discussed in the previous
section, the characteristics of a given fuel source impacts the grid structure and thus the
economic architecture of the market. In other words, the operation of the grid is some-
what contingent and interdependent on the fuel sources consumed and the structure of
the market and, this thesis will argue, the market exerts a core technological, and social
influence on the Irish wind RES.
Figure 2.8. Energy flow, electricity generation, kilotonnes oil equivalent. 2013. Source SEAI (Howley
et al., 2014)
All electricity generated or imported onto the island of Ireland (the Republic and
Northern Ireland), must be sold into a common pool, the Single Electricity Market (SEM),
operational since 2007. All electricity for consumption within Ireland, or export is pur-
chased from the pool. The electricity market prices are set by the Single Market Operator
(SEM-O) and published on half-hourly basis, calculated after the event, with all generat-
ors receive and all suppliers pay the same System Marginal Price (Leahy and Tol, 2011).
The price is based on many different factors, however the predominant influence is the cost
of the energy used for that period. In theory, ‘market forces’ ensure sufficient capacity
is built up for demand at any time and that this mechanism will lower prices over time
(Kee, 2004). Suppliers of wind generated electricity receive a number of special incentive
payments. Capacity payments are made to all generators in order to ensure capacity is
available when required. Capacity payments are fixed annually by the regulator (CER)
and are intended to encourage investment and mitigate risk of uncertain revenue. The
benefit for generators is that if they make plant available when capacity margins are tight,
they intend to take in order to prevent future inappropriate dispatching down (EirGrid and Soni, 2014)
26
revenues can be earned, which are greater than the short run costs (Leahy and Tol, 2011).
Curtailment payments are made to wind generators to compensate for wind power pro-
duced which cannot be taken on to the grid due to network system issues. These issues
occur predominantly in situations where there is a surplus of wind power with regard to
the demand on the grid. The aim of such payments is to increase certainty of revenues,
encourage investment and ensure that capacity is made available when it is required. The
SEM, along with major actors and flows of payments and electricity are illustrated in
Figure 2.9. This diagram illustrates the central position the system operators and mar-
ket suppliers have intermediating flows of electricity and finance between generators and
consumers respectively.
According to Di Cosmo and Malaguzzi Valeri (2014), the decision to add generation
capacity in a deregulated market such as that of Ireland’s rests with individual firms and
investors. This suggests that the government is na¨ıve with regard to the effect of these
deals on capacity. Yet clearly if the government believes more capacity is needed, they can
stimulate its creation by signing deals or introducing incentives that will be attractive to
individual firms and investors. In this regard the Irish government incentivises firms to add
wind capacity primarily through the Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff. The first REFIT
instrument was introduced in 2006 and REFIT 2 in 2012. The REFIT is the primary
instrument by which the government, on behalf of the people of Ireland, incentivises the
production of renewably generated electricity over ‘lower cost’ fossil fuel which is deemed
less socially desirable. It does this by guaranteeing generators (via market suppliers) 15
years power purchase agreements, with a specified fixed payment for the period of the term.
In effect, this transfers some quantum of risk associated with uncertain future demand,
from the wind farm investor to the bill payer, on which the Public Service Obligation
(PSO) is levied. The effect of wind on the cost of electricity generation is illustrated in
Figure 2.9. In this figure, Clifford and Clancy (2011, p. 4) show graphically that by 2011,
wind generation was expected to reduce Ireland’s wholesale market cost of electricity by
around AC74 million. They argue that this “reduction in the wholesale market cost of
electricity is approximately equivalent to the sum of PSO costs, estimated as AC50 million,
and the increased constraint costs incurred, due to wind in 2011.” In other words, the
net electricity cost does not increase with the addition of wind capacity on the grid in
2011 when compared with a model scenario of a ‘no-wind’ market. What is not clear from
these figures is whether the comparative cost of renewable energy technology electricity
relative to combustion based electricity is only possible through subsidy. If so, there is
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Figure 2.9. Schema of the Single Electricity Market
another investment risk factor to add to those discussed in the previous subsection, that
is the ongoing government commitment to the subsidy level.
28
Figure 2.10. Projected Cost of Electricity Generation in 2011. Source: Clifford and Clancy (2011, p. 4)
Electricity market suppliers take payments, including subsidies, from the SEM and
aggregate delivery of electricity supply though individual supply contracts with whole-
salers. The average wholesale market price during 2013 was AC107/MWh, as compared
to the REFIT tariff of AC69.235/MWh for wind farms larger than 5 MW and AC71.664
/MWh for wind farms smaller than 5 MW, as calculated from the annual sum of 2013
half hourly single electricity market transactions, plus generation capacity payments, plus
dispatch balancing costs, divided by the total generated electricity in 2013 (Duffy and
Cleary, 2015). Electricity suppliers then (e.g. the wholesalers rather than the generators)
are afforded strong positions by the architecture of the Single Electricity Market.
A number of structural, market and technological challenges remain in the Irish system
with regard to increasing the penetration of wind though 2020 and beyond. Here, several
commentaries on the implications of the discussion in this section are summarised. First,
the age profile of thermal generating plant is old (Valeri and Tol, 2006) and substitution
of new for old thermal plant has been delayed by the recession of 2007 in addition to
permitting issues. This is problematic for the wind industry as high wind penetration
requires parallel investment in fast-dispatchable generation technologies, such as open cycle
or combined cycle gas turbine. Second, current policies, targets and infrastructure plans
29
have been guided by research built on techno-economic based models.22 These studies were
carried out before the recession of 2008, and none, at the time of writing, account for the
drop in electricity demand in the years following 200823. Third, because of wider economic
conditions and forecasts, the current market structure is failing to sufficiently encourage
competition or new entrants with suitable generating technology (Foley, O´ Gallacho´ir, et
al., 2013). This contrasts with the situation of traditional generators, including renewables,
who entered the market in the early 2000s. It is in the interest of these incumbents to
retain the current status quo of guaranteed payments of the current SEM/PSO settlement.
As discussed by Lyons et al. (2007, p. 77):
“to achieve the best long-run outcome, the SEM’s regulators need to ensure
that the capacity mechanism accommodates a set of strategies by all play-
ers (incumbents, entrants, government) that will lead to the highest possible
societal welfare.”
Foley, O´ Gallacho´ir, et al. (2013) suggest that if in the long term, CER and SEM-O allow
the current status quo of market suppliers and generators to continue, the marginal price
paid by either the government (and by extension citizens) or electricity consumers will
be expensive technical fixes such as heavy grid reinforcement and further interconnection.
Here then is something of a conundrum. On the one hand the government has latitude in
encouraging such entry or competition by the structuring of long-term supply agreements,
as discussed in the previous paragraph. Yet Foley et al. explicitly draw attention to
the the powerful position of market suppliers and system operators and implicitly the
relatively weak position of that of the government (see also Hunt (2012)). Fourth and
finally, addressing this issue Foley et al. remark on the relatively narrow basis of policy
interventions to date in ‘supporting’ wind technology roll-out. In particular the role of the
retail electricity market and modernisation of the distribution system has been neglected,
and have been little discussed in studies. These commentaries indicates a relatively narrow
or focussed research and policy agenda, influenced by system operators and suppliers
resistant to deviate from established sectoral operating norms.
22Perhaps the most influential of these is the All Island Grid Study (Department of Communications
Energy and Natural Resources, 2008)
23A drop in overall demand, coupled with increasing penetration of intermittent electricity exacerbates
systemic grid integration issues we have already discussed.
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2.4 Historic decisions, processes, and contingencies
Already in this brief description of the contemporary Irish wind energy sector, we have
encountered a number of different technologies, governance rules, institutions, instruments,
resources and activities which collectively make up a the Irish wind sector. These include
the generating and infrastructure technologies and technological constraints contingent on
Irish gird dynamics and wind resources. The actors, typically firms, in industry, but also
the finance, legal, regulatory and government ministers and civil servants. Many of these
actors have formal roles in the electricity market, which is a site of transactions, relations
and rules, including the REFIT and other subsidies. Two underlying tensions are worth
noting. The first tension is locational in nature, it should now be clear that this Irish wind
RES contains components from within Ireland, and from overseas.
The previous development of the technological innovation systems literature has, in a
similar fashion to national innovation system literature, primarily focused on innovation
systems developed and operating in single countries24. It is therefore not only necessary
but useful to extend this framework by taking into account elements of the TIS that are
not nationally located. How this is done has implications for the nature and units of
analysis. The perspective taken in this thesis is centred on a national view so interna-
tional elements of the TIS are taken as external elements that ‘touch down’ and become
integrated in processes that are considered in this thesis. An alternative, which is not
pursued here, is to treat the ‘foreign’ elements in a more comprehensive analysis which
would consider how they involve internationalisation and their own dynamics of develop-
ment. This approach would clearly preclude the depth of attention devoted here to the
national elements of the wind RES25. Thus, here we introduce an heuristic concept of
build-up and touchdown. Respectively these are the activities resources, technologies and
institutions of the Irish wind RES originating (generally) outside Ireland and within the
country. In Figure 2.11 we illustrate some of the activities, resources, technologies and
regulations relevant to the contemporary Irish wind RES. The thesis will account for the
build-up and touchdown of the Irish wind RES, and use the heuristic as a container for
locationally explicit explanations.
The second tension in this is what may appear as a narrow policy focus of wind
24The history and evolution of this literature is expanded upon in Subsection 3.1.3.
25The thesis explicitly avoids using the nomenclature ‘TIS’ to refer to the system of renewable electricity
production and delivery in Ireland. Rather the TIS framework is employed to analyse the structure and
innovation processes within Ireland and transnationally. The analytic framework is described in some
detail in Chapter 3.
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Figure 2.11. A basic scheme of build-up and touchdown
electricity in Ireland. We can think of the development of the technologies and relations as
innovation processes. For example, we might ask how sectoral operating norms established,
and why deviance from these norms is not common. What is unclear from this snapshot
is where decisions that affect the material nature of the wind RES are made. On the
one hand low emissions energy production contributes has public good characteristics,
keeping greenhouse gasses out of the atmosphere. Some of the rhetorics of Ireland’s wind
developers have emphasised these, and other societal benefits, differentiating themselves
from new combined cycle gas turbine technology for example. On the other hand metered
electricity is a homogenous good. From the prospective of the end user, the quality of
a ‘flow’ of electricity into a home or office does not notably differ according to whether
the electricity is generated from spinning steam turbines (through the burning of fossil
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fuels) or rotating wind turbines. At one extreme, decisions about which generator to
draw electricity from are made within the SEM every 30 minutes based on a 24 hour
ahead market. Often, the consumer does not have a direct choice of which generation
technology is supported. Politicians are elected and run energy department, and sign off
on policies design by civil servants and lobbied for by NGOs or actors in firms. We have
been introduced to policy at European and national level working on multi-year target
models. So who decides? This is a choice, often made on the basis of previous, historical
decisions, advances in technology, or because (relatively) powerful actors say it has to
be made. We have already discussed the powerful role market suppliers occupy in the
system, we might ask how they got where they are, and how they sustain their position.
Furthermore what are the stories and how do these work with the processes of innovation.
Finally, the aim of this thesis is to explain the development of the wind energy system
in Ireland. By it’s very nature, that research task demands we examine the historical
decisions, processes, and contingencies that have led to the contemporary situation. A
fundamental part of this research is about changes over time, therefore we place the
heuristic in a dynamic historical context. In doing so we reject an a priori leader - follower
metaphor for the roll-out of the Irish wind RES. This allows us to build the case for
indigenous processes of innovation, regulation and system building, if and when supported
by data, evidence and findings in the analysis. This has already been backed up in areas
introduced in this chapters such as power systems research in Ireland and the innovation
and outward diffusion of new financial models. In what sense then are the builders of a
wind RES in Ireland following a template laid out by others and in what sense does there
exist the autonomy to create a path of their own? What role does sequencing play in this?
Certainly this brief exploration of the contemporary wind RES, and historic decisions and
processes indicates that there is more to the story than the acquisition of turnkey kit,
imposition of a consumer levy and the granting of subsidies.
Wrapping up
In this chapter we discussed aspects of the Irish wind RES appropriate to the case, in-
troducing the relevant technologies, actors and institutions. We found that wind power
has become a significant component of the national electricity generation mix despite a
number of barriers: technologies being constrained by an island grid infrastructure, no
significant indigenous manufacturing capabilities, and a relatively small research and de-
velopment sector. While turnkey technology was readily available for import, challenges
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of integration were highly location specific. Yet rate of installation of plant has been been
remarkable in international terms given these technological challenges. In assessing the
actors in the sector, we found that characteristics and composition of actors is depend-
ent on a complex set of historical and contemporary factors, within and outside of the
country. With regard to industry, firms and finance, we found that wind investment is
now classed as ‘reliable’ or bankable investment. While the manufacturers and suppliers
of turnkey technologies have historically come from overseas, increasingly the firms at the
generation end of the supply chain are also transnational companies. Furthermore, Ire-
land is an exporter of some wind business innovations Alongside the diffusion of turnkey
plant, significant regulatory change has taken place and new markets have been construc-
ted within Ireland. Finally, evidence in the literature has suggested a new status quo of
electricity suppliers has emerged, in which the feed-in tariff and other support payments
have been, according to some scholars, appropriated as rents. This evidence from the
literature indicates a relatively narrow or focussed policy agenda, influenced by system
operators and suppliers resistant to deviate from (relatively recently) established sectoral
operating norms.
This characterisation of the historic and contemporary Irish wind RES has clarified
and focussed the research context and is used to inform research framework decisions.
The relevance of location, the need for a research framework that aids our inquiry into
dynamic processes should now be clear. In Chapter 3 we address the issues of location by
introducing a number of conceptual building blocks derived from human geography. In
Chapter 4 we discuss a process theory approach to explaining technical change, well suited
to unpacking the institutional and actor strategy issues we have discussed here. Chapter
5 organises an extended case narrative using a periodisation scheme. Finally, in Chapter
8 the thesis will account for the build-up and touchdown of the Irish wind RES, and use
the heuristic as a container for locationally explicit explanations. With this we address
the pace and scale of technological roll-out as well as levels of support attained by the
industry, why innovation happened in Ireland and the balance between indigenous and
overseas development.
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Chapter 3
Relevant research literature
This chapter contains a review of the literature, which is employed to construct an ana-
lytical framework with which to address the research questions. The focus of this review
is on identifying relevant prior published research in order to evaluate and synthesise ex-
isting theory for innovation systems, and identify the concepts required to explain wind
developments in Ireland. This is achieved through the application of existing theory to
new contexts and by bridge building between concepts (Randolph, 2009). I build on the
research context identified in the previous chapter, adapting theory and findings to the
purpose of studying wind energy innovation in Ireland.
The chapter shows that the research questions can be addressed using a technological
innovation systems approach. In Section 3.1 I introduce concepts with which to consider
renewable energy technologies and means of production. Concepts of technological change
are examined to explore the process of ‘rolling-out’ of these technologies across space and
time, including diffusion, technology transfer and internationalisation. In section 3.2 I
introduce the core framework, scheme of analysis and state why it is appropriate for this
thesis. As noted previously, systems approaches, such as TIS, often privilege systems in a
situated space and, with some limited exceptions, do not consider plural spaces1. Having
1Some attention in the TIS approach is given to the localised nature of knowledge which becomes a
systemic impediment that needs to be overcome in order to improve on system performance. At least
two further ideas come from this perspective. First, constraint — some impediments arising from the
localisation of knowledge will remain regardless of efforts to mitigate these impediments. The second
possibility is a bit more alarming — efficient mitigation of these constraints removes constraints to the
expansion of a system and creates the possibility of a totalising and all-consuming innovation system which
subordinates all activities in the technological area. The first rather than the second perspective is more
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introduced a systems perspective, I mobilise geographic perspectives for applying it to Ire-
land; the formation of a complex innovation system that is not new to the world, but that
is new to a given country or location. I then discuss the reasons for analytically bounding
the system by a focus on a specific location, and introduce the structural analysis. In Sec-
tion 3.3 I introduce each system function in turn, summarising the theoretic basis for its
inclusion, its applicability to the case and explain the indicators used to identify evidence
of the function in the case data. Finally, in Section 3.4 I explain how the structural and
functional analyses are brought together to account for system level change. I then present
the specific theoretic framework and drawing on the literature reviews, offer a number of
hypotheses for the formation of the wind RES in Ireland.
3.1 Explaining technical change
3.1.1 Renewable energy technologies and systems
The threat of climate change, concerns about the security of supply of fossils fuels, and
the increased perception of risk following disasters such as Fukushima have contributed to
increased attention to radical innovation in energy systems (Truffer, Markard, et al., 2013).
Over recent decades, considerable public and government effort and funding have been
invested in developing, implementing and diffusing renewable energy technologies (RETs).
However, experiences in many countries show that this is often a slow and uncertain process
(Foxon and Pearson, 2008; Johnson and Jacobsson, 2000; Negro, Alkemade, et al., 2011;
Raven, 2004). Despite this, as discussed in the previous chapter, in a number of countries
including Ireland, technologies that were considered niche at the turn of the millennium
now play a significant role in the electricity supply mix. How are we to understand the
uneven roll-out of RETs and how their use is adopted across space and time?
We start with the technology itself. We have discussed that wind turbines are com-
prised of many interactive parts that work together to convert kinetic wind energy to
electromagnetic energy (Garud and Karnøe, 2003). The design and deployment of wind
turbines requires knowledge of electronics, mechanics, hydraulics, advanced materials and
aerodynamics. These technologies not generally based on new or dramatic inventions or
recent scientific discoveries (Golding, 1955; Shepherd, 1990), rather they embody the
steady accumulation of inputs from many actors. Furthermore, turbines and towers form
common in the literature.
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only one part of a wider socio-technical assemblage of artefacts, infrastructures, knowledge,
rules, regulations and actors that turn wind flows into electricity services for consumers
(Rip and Kemp, 1998).
Let us consider the systemic nature of an onshore wind development, again returning
to the example used in Chapter 2, the Tursillagh onshore wind farm in County Kerry,
which went into production in November, 2000. The installation consists of 23 0.66MW
Danish-built Vestas turbines with 47m rotors. The project was originally operated and
developed by a Kerry-based firm, Saorgus Energy Ltd, in partnership with Wind Prospect,
a United Kingdom based consultancy and development firm with global experience of wind
farm installations2. Finance was acquired from private funding and a national government
technology support scheme, the Alternative Energy Requirement III. Development of the
wind farm required the construction of access roads for plant installation and ongoing
maintenance work. Further project elements included accessible land with requisite wind
conditions and planning permission, skilled workers, experienced project management,
new grid infrastructure and access to the existing transmission grid and electricity market
as well as the long-term terms of trade, such as regulated pricing mechanisms.We can
understand these different rules, regulations, actors and resources as part of the socio-
technical system (Geels, 2004), of which the Irish wind renewable electricity system
(RES) is an example, and the unit of analysis of this thesis.
The field of sustainability transitions has emerged in recent years to analyse and explain
the historical transformation processes of socio-technical systems such as energy supply
and transportation (Bergh et al., 2011; Markard et al., 2012a). A number of approaches
to explaining these transformation processes have been outlined by innovation scholars,
typically taking one of two approaches (Markard and Truffer, 2008a). In the ‘sustainability
transitions’ approach, change is accounted for through the substitution of the established
technologies and a change of socio-technical structures. This is investigated the level of
the overall electricity sector and society. Rooted in the historical analysis of technological
change, the multi-level perspective addresses interactions between structure and agency
across levels (niches, regimes, landscapes) of societies (Geels, 2005; Geels and Schot,
2007; Raven, Schot, et al., 2012). Strategic niche management has focussed on how
2‘Location’ is used in a positivistic sense to indicate a specific bounded geographic space where ‘space’
is also used in a positivistic or Newtonian sense, as an empty geographic container waiting to be filled
with (economic) activity. A broad definition of ‘place’ is used in the thesis, after Devine Wright (2009,
p. 427) who says place is the “physical aspects of a specific location as well as the variety of meanings and
emotions associated with that location by individuals or groups.”
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emergent technologies survive and scale-up over time (Kemp et al., 1998; Raven and Geels,
2010; Smith, 2007) and transition management, a policy model which aims at structural
interventions in socio-technical systems (Rotmans et al., 2001; Kern and Smith, 2008).
An alternative approach focuses inquiry on the dynamics of a particular innovation or
technological innovation system, such as fuel cell or wind generation technology (Carlsson
and Stankiewicz, 1991). This perspective is concerned with identifying influential drivers
and barriers of diffusion and production of a technology, typically one that has elements
of novelty and that can be called emerging.
3.1.2 From socio-technical systems to innovation systems
The technological innovation system according to Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1991, p. 93)
in their classic definition, is a
“dynamic network of agents interacting in a specific economic/industrial area
under a particular institutional infrastructure and involved in the generation,
diffusion, and utilisation of technology”.
An approach based on this definition would appear readily applicable to the research prob-
lem at hand; a dynamic set of actors in Ireland and internationally, working in a sector
of the electricity industry, attempting to generate, diffuse and utilise wind technologies.
The technological innovation system framework is amongst a number of approaches built
upon ‘innovation systems’ theories which hold that relationships between actors such as
governments, firms and researchers suppliers and customers or users, under institutional
conditions influence how technologies are created and diffused. Innovation system ana-
lysts focus on the economic and innovation processes of firms and on the systemic contexts
which act as barriers or drivers to their innovation activities or capabilities (Weber and
Rohracher, 2012b). Freeman’s book on the innovation3 processes and characteristics of
Japan (Freeman, 1987) is credited with being the first to introduce the concept of national
systems of innovation (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1994; Edquist, 1997). These are the sys-
tems of institutions used to create and store the knowledge and artefacts which make up
3Innovation consists of the practice of developing and implementing new ideas (Freeman and Soete,
1997) or according to Dosi “concerns the search for, and the discovery, experimentation, development,
imitation, and adoption of new products, new production processes and new organizational set-ups” (Dosi
et al., 1988, p. 222). As Freeman (1994, p. 479) suggested, “innovation should not be viewed as a linear
process, whether led by market demand or by technology development, but as a complex interaction linking
potential users with new developments in science and technology”.
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new technologies (Carlsson, 2006, p. 58). Other innovation systems approaches have fo-
cussed on a range of analytic and geographic levels including regional (Cooke et al., 2004)
and sectoral (Malerba, 2002; Dolata, 2009). Rather than a priori bounding of the focal
system at a specific geographic level, TIS analyses bound the analytic system with regard
to a specific technology4. These perspectives break with neoclassical economic theories in
several different ways including the the rejection of perfect information assumptions, the
existence of non-market relationships between actors and the role of government policy
which is not necessarily based upon a rational public choice framework. Economic the-
ory, even when treating technology as endogenous, has little to say about the origins of
innovation or the role of organisational change beyond the idea of market based selection
of those arrangements that are most fit.
The technological innovation system is a meso-level framework. The framework takes
account of both the technologies and the application contexts. We have seen from the case
a number of situations in which the application context matters, such as the role of national
resource endowments and capabilities of firm and research actors. This level of analytic
aggregation is capable of examining technology generation and diffusion at the level of a
specific territory where – relevant to this case – we have geographic overlap of technological
infrastructure, market architecture and national and sub-national institutions. Contrary
to a prospective analysis using the MLP, we are concerned with how imported generation
technologies are integrated into the infrastructures and markets of the production location
rather than with a niche selection environment or niche-regime interactions.
According to Markard and Truffer (2008a) the TIS framework has utility in this regard
by allowing us deal more explicitly (e.g. vis a vis the MLP) with firm strategies and agency.
Thus we avoid teleological tendencies in which advances in the technologies or system are
taken to be self-evident in retrospect and countervailing forces that might deflect or stall
the process in the Irish or other contexts are somewhat obscured (Shove and Walker,
2010). Findings from the case context discussion indicated an intriguing mix of strategies
were relevant, and did not apparently easily align with fuel type or generation technology
used, two possible niche-regime types. Indeed, a technological innovation system may be
regarded as encompassing several niches and for these reasons the TIS framework is well
suited to the analysis of nationally specific innovation, diffusion and production processes
and with respect to this thesis offers a number of advantages over MLP or strategic niche
4In practise, we will see that an analytic agnosticism of national borders, in practise, many, if not most,
analysts have carried out case studies of particular technologies in a certain country, such as the fuel cell
innovation systems of Austria.
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management approaches.
3.1.3 The geography of innovation systems
The technological innovation systems framework was initially developed to conceptualise
systems ex ante without considering territorial borders, instead focusing on knowledge or
products which existed in a globalised innovation system (Carlsson, Jacobsson, et al.,
2002). One motive for this was to address critiques that the NSI and regional innovation
systems literature paid insufficient attention to transnational processes of knowledge or
technology creation5 (Bergek, Hekkert, et al., 2014; Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991;
Hekkert, Suurs, et al., 2007). In practice however, many empirical cases have implicitly
bounded their focal system at a national scale (Carlsson, 2006; Coenen, Benneworth, et al.,
2012; Truffer and Coenen, 2012). Location has often been treated as a passive background
variable providing little causal explanation or theoretical weight (Coenen and Truffer,
2012). The implicit focus on the national level may be justified in some of these cases as
the focal technologies were predominantly produced and diffused in a national context or
were fundamentally influenced by policy support applying within national jurisdictions.
Often these studies were oriented towards national policy audiences. However, this is not
an appropriate approach in the case of the Irish wind RES, where an explicit focus on
transnational flows is required.
Recent contributions have sought to add geographic explanatory power to the sustain-
ability transitions literature through dialogue with the field of human geography, and in
particular economic geography (Bulkeley et al., 2010; Coenen and Truffer, 2012; Cooke,
2013; Hodson and Marvin, 2009; Truffer, Voß, et al., 2008). A subset of this work has
specifically addressed the geography of technological innovation systems. Two broad clas-
sifications of categories can be made; first the consideration of the territoriality of innov-
ation, and second, the geography of inter-organisational linkages in order to understand
socio-economic and environmental relations (Hansen and Coenen, 2014). An example of
the former approach to analysing geographic aspects of technological innovation systems
has been to strengthen the analysis of system context within the framework itself. Bergek,
Hekkert, et al. (2014) suggest that analysis of function strength reflects structural compon-
ents which are external as well as internal to a system. Hence the analysis of functions they
5The early National Systems of Innovation work was itself a response to earlier models of technical
change such as those proposed by Arrow (1962), which according to proponents of NSI, failed to account
for explanations of why the global diffusion of technology was neither automatic nor easy (Bell and Pavitt,
1993).
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argue “involves understanding not only the incentives for entry at the industry and sector
level, but also the structural features of (for example) capital markets and the university
sector at the national systems of innovation level” (p. 5). These findings support the
inclusion of locational characteristics in the structural and functional indicators utilised.
With regard to inter-organisational linkages, analysts have conceptualised the form-
ation and expansion of relations and processes between systems and across geographic
levels6. Binz, Truffer, Li, et al. (2012); Binz, Truffer, and Coenen (2014) show how region-
ally bounded systems in China are connected by knowledge networks of researchers and
universities to components of global systems. In examining the Dutch national offshore
wind sector, Wieczorek et al. (2013) propose a set of nested innovation system structures
in which the national system is heavily influenced by higher-order policies associated with
a European system and weaknesses in Dutch market formation activities were in part
offset by transnational linkages with UK actors. Institutional influence has been shown
to act not only at national levels, but increasingly at international levels through global
trade tariffs and environmental regulations (Gosens et al., 2015). These studies share
a common theoretic perspective that emergent nationally specific innovation systems are
often dependent on distributed system formation processes (see also Fornahl et al. (2012);
Lovio and Kivimaa (2012)).
Before beginning detailed discussion of how the TIS framework might account for the
emergence and growth of the wind RES in Ireland, I consider a number of theoretical ap-
proaches that have specifically analysed technical change of renewable energy technologies
or systems. These can be broadly categorised as diffusion, internationalisation, technology
transfer and catch-up. Each of these brief overviews could be extended, however, the dis-
cussion here is sufficient to convey the sense that none is suitable on its own to address the
aim of this thesis, to account for the rapid emergence of a RES in a fast follower context.
6In the literature the terms “scales” and “levels” are used interchangeably to refer to spatial containers
such as region, nation and the EU. For clarity, I use the word “level”. It follows that where some authors
such as Binz et. al. may use the term multi-scale to refer to processes which cut across levels, I translate to
multi-level. Scale I reserve for discussions on technology, such as scaling-up wind farms. For the avoidance
of doubt, multi-level does not refer to levels of structuration, as per the “multi-level perspective”, which
of course is concerned with changes to structure over time and is somewhat geographically naive despite
its spatially influenced terminology.
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3.1.4 Diffusion of renewable energy technologies
Diffusion is the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels
over time among members of a social system (Rogers, 1983, p. 5). It is only through
diffusion that inventive and innovative potentials are translated into actual changes in
social practice, artefacts and infrastructures. Diffusion phenomena are at the heart of all
changes in society and its material structures (Gru¨bler, 1998). Diffusion, or the rate of
diffusion, of renewable energy technologies (RETs) is often tracked in terms of aggregate
deployment of the given technology, or cumulative technology output, over time. For
example, the IEA produce annual reports tracking the global diffusion of wind generating
technologies, e.g. IEA (2013).
In a review of the literature on the diffusion energy technologies, Wilson (2012) dis-
cusses two approaches to explaining the diffusion of RETs; learning and up-scaling. Ad-
dressing technological change in the energy system at the industry level, growth is charac-
terised by falling units costs associated with increasing experience, a relationship described
by learning phenomena. Learning, originally associated with doing (Arrow, 1962), is a
descriptive label for processes of knowledge generation, application and exchange. As
firms acquire development and production experience, the cost per unit of a given tech-
nology decreases. However, learning is not merely an outcome of increasing production,
but rather is contingent a range of innovation processes and efforts (Gru¨bler, 2010). If
these efforts and processes have influence, then the predictive content of learning based
only on cumulative production experience will be limited or misleading. Up-scaling is a
second prominent characteristic of technological diffusion in the energy sector. Many elec-
tricity generating technologies have increased in size and energy conversion capacity over
the past decades (Smil, 2008). While the number of generators may increase or decrease
depending on characteristics of the energy fuel and generation technology (e.g. we can
compare the characteristics of highly centralised nuclear generation with those of wind),
typically the size, or scale of the generating technology increases per unit cost. By captur-
ing available scale economies, up-scaling can lead to reductions in average unit costs and
may encourage substitution of incumbent technologies. The upscaling perspective adds
an additional dimension to diffusion analysis that requires explanations of the influences
affecting scaling that may or may not be consistent with the conception of diffusion as a
process of successive adoption or theories concerning what determines adoption.
Recent analysis by Duffy and Cleary (2015) show up-scaling effects of wind generation
technologies in Ireland. The upscaling of turbine capacity rating is shown in Figure 3.1.
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The authors show evidence of similar upward trend with regard to newly installed turbine
hub height yet a downward trend with regard to average wind speed attained at these hub
heights7. While this is fascinating research and contributes to explaining cost and revenue
related questions such as historic expected rates of return on investment, it illustrates
a problem with regard to how diffusion can account for the research questions posed in
this thesis. Our concern is not in the diffusion of homogenous (or nearly homogenous)
artefacts such a mobile phones or even wind generation plant. Rather, we seek to explain
the rapid increase in installed wind capacity per capita in Ireland which, as we discussed in
the previous chapter, involved a complex set of technologies, innovations and institutional
change. While some disaggregation of individual learning and scaling may be possible,
it would be difficult to distinguish what portion of this diffusion is attributable to scale
effects and what should be attributed to learning and, perhaps most important, how each
of these effects have contributed to overcoming integration problems. In short, adopting a
diffusion approach would reduce the complexity of the learning process which is connected
with the ‘building-up’ of a capacity or capability to achieve growth in the wind RES. Of
course, one can index cumulative production or time, but in so doing the advance of the
technology is taken to be self-evident in retrospect and the forces that might deflect or
stall the process in the Irish or in other context will be obscured.
Innovation studies on the other hand offer an alternative approach to identifying drivers
and barriers of diffusion, from an institutional and systemic perspective (Edquist, 1997;
Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). Rather than disaggregating scale and learning effects, we
examine the set of distinct institutions and system components and processes which cu-
mulatively and discretely contribute to the development and diffusion of new technologies.
These institutions and processes in turn provide, and are shaped by, the institutional
framework within which governments and industries form and implement policies to in-
fluence the innovation process.
7This is an interesting counter intuitive finding. Ceteris paribus, we would expect greater windspeed
at higher hub positions. Duffy and Cleary interpreted the finding as an indication that more wind farms
are being sited at locations with poorer wind resources, either at lower altitudes or more easterly locations.
Intriguingly, average capacity factors for new wind farms installed in the same period are increasing year
on year. Given capacity factors are a function of both technological variables (e.g. rotor diameter and hub
height) and wind conditions, Duffy and Cleary suggest that the larger wind turbines with increased rotor
diameters and hub heights are successful in achieving a viable energy yield from newer locations and that
technological advances are staying ahead of the supply of viable installation locations.
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Figure 3.1. Wind turbine nameplate capacity trends in Ireland, 2007 to 2012. Source Duffy and Cleary
(2015, p. 81). A box and whiskers format is used to represent the capacity of installed turbines in a given
year including the median (red horizontal line), average (diamond), 25th to 75th percentile (box), and
minimum and maximum (whiskers).
3.1.5 Technology transfer and internationalisation
Technology transfer and internationalisation approaches differ from diffusion in the level
of analysis and the type of questions posed and analytic perspective taken by analysts.
These fields share a number of foundational concepts inherited from the national systems of
innovation literature. The focus in these domains is on the accumulation of technological
capabilities by firms in recipient countries. Technology transfer analysts are typically
concerned with recipient firms in developing country contexts (Reddy and Zhao, 1990;
Bell and Pavitt, 1993) while with internationalisation studies the focus is on the degree to
which transnational firms ‘internationalise’ research and development activities (Carlsson,
2006).
The process of technology transfer occurs between technology suppliers and technology
recipients, with the role and modes of technology transfer in this process subject to many
studies (Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Correa, 1994; Radosevic, 1999). A principal focus of
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the body of literature relates to the relationship between technological capabilities and
industrialisation (Lall, 1992; Cimoli et al., 2009) and how wider economic industrialisation
and development occurs through the accumulation of technological capabilities (see Bell
1990; Cimoli et al. 2009, in Byrne, 2009) and the absorptive capacity of firms (Cohen
and Levinthal, 1990). Technological catch-up studies discuss the narrowing (or widening)
of gaps between the technological capabilities of firms and economies from one country to
another (Bell and Figueiredo, 2012). According to Fagerberg and Godinho (2005) catch-
up relates to “the ability of a single country to narrow the gap in productivity and income
vis-a`-vis a leader country” (Majidpour, 2011, p. 514). The analytic focus is on the flows of
technology between a recipient catch-up region or country and a lead industrial country.
The ability of the recipient country to generate indigenous innovation is an important
measure of success.
Location and proximity are important concepts in technology transfer and internation-
alisation approaches; technological knowledge is inherently difficult to move across space
due to the importance of tacit knowledge built up in cumulative and path dependent ways
(Lema and Lema, 2012; Madsen et al., 2008). Perhaps most usefully with regards to this
thesis, the literature underlines the accessibility of foreign technology and international
technology flows from early adoptors to followers, moving beyond recipient accumulation.
But while useful in the manner discussed, these studies do not in general address the nature
and the details of dynamics of innovation processes (Majidpour, 2011). Rather than fol-
lowing flows of knowledge, whether they be from the prospective of the recipient country
or innovating firm, this thesis aims to examine amongst other things, the processes by
which actors in given locations go about drawing down these flows and turning them into
material and institutionalised activities, such converting wind into electricity and moving
that to users across grids. For example, in the case of wind technology manufacture, we
are less concerned about the internationalisation of R&D in the global turbine industry,
and more concerned with how actors in Ireland access finance and knowledge sources in
order to bring this plant to Ireland. Because firms are key actors in technology develop-
ment, diffusion and transfer, the micro-level focus accorded by technology transfer and
internationalisation is useful, particularly as we examine processes of knowledge creation
and diffusion. However this understanding is better situated in a locational and sectoral
context, including policies and other institutions (Lema and Lema, 2012). Therefore ques-
tions of what, how, when and why actors get access to these flows are better addressed,
in this instance, within a systems perspective.
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3.2 Technological innovation systems
3.2.1 The TIS framework
Having made the case for examining the development of RETs in Ireland from the techno-
logical innovation system (TIS) perspective, it is now useful to consider how the elements
of this perspective can be assembled into a framework (the subject of this chapter) that
can be implemented as a research design (the subject of the next chapter, Chapter 4).
The development of a renewable energy innovation system is influenced by competition
with both incumbent energy technologies and other emerging systems (Bergek, Hekkert,
et al., 2014). Jacobsson and Johnson (2000) suggest there are a multitude of forces which
favour an incumbent energy system, which are likely to reinforce one another in a process
of cumulative causation (p. 638). (Carlsson, 1997, p. 303) accounts for these forces as
the result of strong inertia in a number of dimension as
“firms, institutions and networks become ‘locked in’ to ‘old’ technologies, thus,
the cumulativeness and path dependence of innovation lead to risks of lock-in
into technological, institutional and networking cul-de- sacs.”
The TIS framework explains dynamic system change through analysis of these struc-
tural components (the actors, networks and institutions), both endogenous and exogenous
to the focal system. The utility of the framework with regards this thesis is in specifying
historic, current or potential contributions of actors such as firms and intermediaries, to
evolving innovation system dynamics (Markard and Truffer, 2008a).
The unit of analysis in the framework is the focal system, i.e. the wind-based renewable
electricity system in Ireland – the Irish wind RES. Innovation with regard to the system
is understood as a set of complex evolving processes involving actors, often acting in
networks, influenced by institutional contexts. Innovation and diffusion processes are both
an individual (firm) and collective act (Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000; Saxenian, 1994).
Because of this, our search for explanations of technology choice should look not only at
individual firms, but also at actors and processes distributed throughout the system and
common identities and cultures. We have encountered examples of these actors and other
system components in our discussion in the previous chapter (e.g. actors include wind farm
developers and manufacturers, relevant institutions are technology support mechanisms
and networks include industry associations such as the Irish Wind Energy Association).
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We can explain the emergence and evolution of the wind RES in Ireland by analysing
interactions within and between these actors and other system components. The analysis
of these interactions begins with the structure of the innovation system, the actors, actor
networks, and institutions. As a new technology first emerges many of these structural
components are not yet in place. These elements evolve and agglomerate in a formative
phase which involves the formation of networks, alignment of actors and system institutions
as well as the entry of firms and other actors into the system (Bergek, Jacobsson, and
Sande´n, 2008). These processes of system formation are cumulative, contain many small
changes and virtuous cycles, and may last for decades. The dynamic interactions between
structural components may be delineated by focussing on specific system functions.
Assessment of micro-meso processes, or functions, in the industrialisation of new sys-
tems is a core analytic approach in the field (Bergek, Jacobsson, Carlsson, and Lindmarki,
2005; Johnson and Jacobsson, 2000). Functions are influenced through the system level
activity8 of actors, and by the structural components of the system. For example, the
resource mobilisation function identifies the process of strengthening actors’ capabilities
to access financial or human resources. In the Irish case, the resource mobilisation func-
tion was ‘strengthened’ as banks in Ireland became increasingly confident in the ability of
wind farm developers to meet pay back criteria and therefore made conditions of lending
easier to meet. Functions can be seen as emergent properties of the system rather than
merely aggregates of system level activity. A list of generic functions has been developed
by researchers located primarily in two schools, Chalmers University of Technology and
Utrecht University (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2000; Bergek, 2002; Hekkert, Suurs, et al.,
2007; Bergek, Jacobsson, Carlsson, Lindmark, et al., 2008). Originally Johnson proposed
six functions which was built upon by Hekkert, Suurs, et al. (2007) who after empirical
testing suggested the seven employed in this thesis (see 3.1). Bergek, Jacobsson, Carlsson,
Lindmark, et al. (2008) also list seven system functions which though slightly different in
naming, overlap significantly9. The functional approach has been developed into a tool to
assess barriers and inducements or drivers of the system as it evolves. It allows us to scan
and identify ‘bottlenecks’ that hinder the progression of an emergent Irish wind industry
towards a fully functioning innovation system (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2000; Smits and
Kuhlmann, 2002; Bergek, Jacobsson, Carlsson, Lindmark, et al., 2008; Jacobsson and
8In other words, the sum of all system level activity (Markard and Truffer, 2008a)
9The Chalmers functions aggregate knowledge development and diffusion and add a “creation of pos-
itive externalities” function. Given the analytic focus of this thesis on processes of diffusion, I utilise the
Utrecht set in the analysis.
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Bergek, 2011). By mapping the functions, we can identify how systems co-evolved over
time and why system components were influenced by endogenous and exogenous elements
and contexts. Explanation then rests in accounting for why these functions developed in
the ways that they did and the ways in which development bottlenecks were overcome, or
not.
Table 3.1 Functions of the TIS, adapted from Bergek, Hekkert, et al. (2014)
Function... ...is the process of
Knowledge creation technological learning by actors in the system and the
breadth and depth of the knowledge base
Knowledge diffusion the distribution of the knowledge base and how that know-
ledge is utilised in the system
Influence on the direction of the
search
the incentives and/or pressures for actors to enter the sys-
tem. These may come in the form of visions, expectations
of growth potential, regulation, articulation of demand from
leading customers, crises in current business, etc.
Entrepreneurial activity the performance by actors of commercial activities or ex-
perimental projects around a new technology or in a new
location.
Market formation the factors driving the formation of new markets or new
market segments. Factors include the articulation of de-
mand from customers, institutional change, changes in
price/performance.
Legitimation the acceptance and compliance with relevant institutions.
Legitimacy is not given but is formed through conscious ac-
tions by organisations and individuals
Resource mobilisation the extent to which actors within the system are able to mo-
bilize human and financial capital as well as complementary
assets such as network infrastructure.
3.2.2 The scheme of analysis
Having introduced the structural and functional aspects of the framework, we now consider
the general scheme of analysis. A basic scheme for this analysis has been documented in
the literature and is illustrated in figure 3.2 (Bergek, Jacobsson, Carlsson, Lindmark, et
al., 2008; Hekkert, Suurs, et al., 2007). This approach has been developed into a scheme
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of analysis aimed at goal-orientated10 policy advice (Hekkert, Negro, et al., 2011). A TIS
policy analysis aims to suggest innovation process improvements rather than specifying
end-point goals such as, in the case of wind power, annual cumulative installed capacity
targets or total investment figures. Indeed, according to Hekkert et al., “the whole purpose
of using the concept of functions of innovation systems is to understand processes of
technological change and innovation” (Hekkert, Suurs, et al., 2007, p. 427). This is
particularly useful when a socio-technical endpoint is uncertain or cannot be known, as in
cases of the roll-out of emergent renewable energy technologies. In these situations, it is
often the case that societal pressures call for the utilisation of technologies before these have
matured into stable socio-technical systems. It is somewhat inevitable, given the explicit
orientation of many TIS analyses towards pragmatic policy advice, that the discussion
of the framework begins to address some issues of research design. The framework aims
to produce conclusions regarding innovation system development and performance and it
cannot be made apparent how this will happen without providing some information about
implementation. In providing this information (in this subsection, in Subsection 3.2.4,
3.2.5 and in Section 3.3) I am raising issues that will be dealt with in greater detail in
Chapter 4 on research design, where I will justify how the specific project design involves
a robust plan for implementing the framework for the case.
This assessment of ‘system needs’ is useful in historical analysis, whereby we can trace
systemic development over time. Again, rather than specific system end-points, we analyse
how barriers to system development were overcome (or not) and how innovation processes
were accelerated (again, or not). Two sets of tasks are essential to this this analysis. First,
given the unit of analysis is the RES, to account for change in wind energy development,
the analyst must examine influential system components, which may be endogenous or
exogenous to the system. Structural and contextual perspectives are gained by assessing
the influence and alignments of the system’s actors, networks and institutions as well
as exogenous factors at levels such as national or sectoral innovation systems (Bergek,
Jacobsson, and Sande´n, 2008).
The second major task is the mapping of the ‘strength’ of individual functions followed
by a system level analysis of how the system functions interact, with the purpose of
using this to explain the evolving state of wind energy development and deployment and
its characteristics (i.e. The Irish wind energy system can be explained by the analysis
functions and their interaction). An assessment of the strength of each function is achieved
10The goal of the policy advice being the successful implementation of the system. This should not be
confused with any assumed goal-orientation within the system itself (Jacobsson and Jacobsson, 2014).
49
Figure 3.2. The basic scheme of analysis. Based on Bergek, Jacobsson, Carlsson, Lindmark, et al. (2008)
by explicitly relating actor level characteristics such as innovation strategies and resource
endowments to system level dynamics such as actor configurations and overall system
processes. System level patterns of functions may be mapped for evolving phases of
development in a periodisation scheme. These patterns may then be compared across
time and with TIS in other locations or other technologies. The analysis takes place over
the course of six steps:
1. First the system is defined by the analyst, bounding the technology and often geo-
graphy of the system.
2. The structural components and alignments between actor goals and institutions are
assessed.
3. The functions of the system are mapped, and system level functional patterns are
delineated
4. Consideration is made of the evolution of functional patterns.
5. System level inducement and blocking mechanisms are identified
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6. Where policy recommendations are required, guidance for matching process goals
with enhancing inducement mechanisms and overcoming blocking mechanisms are
made.
For each of these steps, the underlying theory and suitability of application to the case is
considered over the course of the remainder of this chapter11.
3.2.3 Structure analysis: actors and networks
Actors and actor groups within the focal system are identified. Actors include but are not
limited to firms, researchers and research institutes, policy makers, lobbyists, engineers,
financiers, and civil society organisations. Collaboration amongst actors is common and
firms often ‘run in packs’ (Van de Ven, 1993), forming industry associations, interest
groups and networks with collective strategic goals such as gaining influence over institu-
tions or other actors. The creation of these organisations often leads to non-commercial
institutions which in turn may influence expectations and confidence in new technologies
(or technologies in new places) and may facilitate the emergence of societal norms and
customs (Jacobsson, Sande´n, et al., 2004). The creation of such internal institutions
which are internal to the focal system is a key process in the formation of a technological
innovation system (Markard and Truffer, 2008a).
Clarity here is required; according to Jacobsson and Jacobsson (2014, p. 5), “in an
abstract sense, such a system has a goal” e.g. the generation and diffusion of a technology.
Thus are we to consider the technological innovation system, sui generis, a thing to be
explained, or rather as discussed so far, an analytic framework? To be clear, in this thesis
the TIS is used specifically as an analytic construct to explain a process of historical
development. In other words, the task at hand is not to explain the TIS, but to use
the TIS framework to explain the development of the wind-based renewable electricity
system in Ireland. However, only in the broadest sense can this system be said to have
a goal. Actors in the system then do not necessarily share specific goals and we expect
that whilst agency is distributed through the system, this distribution will be uneven (a
point Jacobsson and Jacobsson highlight, 2014). Thus in the analysis we pay particular
attention to ‘prime movers’ or ‘system builders’ (Hughes, 1983; Jacobsson, Sande´n, et al.,
2004). These are firms or other actors that are technically, financially and/or politically
powerful, so that they can strongly influence the development and diffusion process, often
11The ‘consideration’ and ‘identification’ processes by which these tasks are carried out are elaborated
in Section 4.3.
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fulfilling a number of tasks in the system.
Networks are the results of relations between actors. Networks facilitate the exchange
of information and knowledge. In an innovation system, this information according to
(Gosens et al., 2015, p. 383) is “not limited to purely technical aspects, but includes
exchanges between actors from industry, government, advocacy coalitions etc., amongst
others, on the current phase of development of the technology and the best way forward”.
In a spectrum from informal links to dense configurations, different types of actor networks
have been examined and characterised (Musiolik and Markard, 2011). Learning networks,
for example, link suppliers and users, universities, industry, etc., and constitute important
modes for the sharing and transfer of knowledge (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991; Weber,
2002). Political networks consist of actors who share certain norms, beliefs and share an
agenda to influence the institutional architecture of the system (Bergek, Jacobsson, and
Sande´n, 2008; Weber, 2002).
An approximate distinction can be made between formal and informal networks. Formal
networks have been shown to create system resources such as user-supplier linkages that
are crucial for maturation and diffusion of new technologies (Musiolik and Markard, 2011).
Often formal networks adopt the political agendas of their constituent actors, influencing
actors and the institutional settings (Bergek, Jacobsson, and Sande´n, 2008; Sabatier,
1998; Suchman, 1995). Formal networks such as industry associations are easily identi-
fied. Members of the network are identified through interviews, membership lists, and
conference proceedings. The innovation systems perspective stresses also the role of in-
formal networks (Musiolik and Markard, 2011). In this study, the linking of actors and
the exchange of knowledge and information rather than the execution of specific tasks
at the system level are the focus. While these linkages and exchanges are challenging to
identify, bibliographic research identifying public-private research partnerships as well as
interview questions are a means to uncover them. For example in the Irish case we see
evidence in the bibliographic data of informal networks between the system operators and
university research departments12. We might expect that an innovation network would
form in a location before the necessary components are in place for a more complete innov-
ation system, as such network activity may also be a precursor to learning and evidence
of this network activity may indicate the early stages of an emergent innovation system
(Hekkert, Suurs, et al., 2007).
Actors and networks are influenced by geographic factors. Geographic proximity often
12This evidence is discussed in section 4.2. and in Chapter 5.
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aids the formation and rapid growth of networks, all the more so within a small island
country. Furthermore, relational proximity (e.g. closeness attained through professional
ties) also influences network formation. For example, we would expect workers in the legal
or accountancy professions to more readily network with other actors within the profes-
sions than outside them. Knowledge of national geographies and cultures gives nationally
established actors certain advantages over actors new to the country or specific location.
Thus in some cases we expect indigenous actors to have certain structural advantages over
overseas actors through, for example, knowledge of the political institutions and the ability
to lobby them. In other cases, we might expect geographic factors to explain differences
in the intensity of motivation of actors. Furthermore, some overseas actors bring with
them knowledge gained from learning in lead system context. For example, in Ireland we
might expect Danish or German engineering firms to have greater relevant tacit knowledge
compared with Irish firms during emergent stages of the wind RES. Transnational net-
works can help actors in national systems overcome problems of geographic distance the
diffusion of knowledge. Associations such as the European Wind Energy Association, the
Global Wind Energy Association, or non-governmental organisations such as Greenpeace
can enhance processes of transnational diffusion of knowledge of technological possibilities
and ways to legitimise them (Gosens et al., 2015, p. 383). They may do so by exchan-
ging insights and building advocacy based on experiences developed elsewhere. This can
include information on suitable targets, best (policy) practices and regulatory design. For
example, Binz, Truffer, and Coenen (2014) suggest that the increase in technological cap-
abilities in the field of water membrane bioreactors in China was accelerated by Chinese
academics accessing global knowledge networks during a period of rapidly growing inter-
national cooperation. It follows that gaining access to international networks becomes an
important step towards the establishment of a well-functioning system.
A number of recent studies have shown how aspects of network formation can influence
the emergent system. Vasseur et al. (2013, p. 208) show:
“in the Japanese PV TIS a great variety of actors are present that form strong
networks. Both learning networks, which build up and exchange knowledge,
and political networks that formulate uniform messages to the government
and put PV on the political agenda play an important role in the Japanese PV
TIS.”
On the other hand in a comparative study of a Dutch innovation system the authors found:
“national and international learning networks are present but the build-up
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of strong political networks is missing, and because of the lack of unanim-
ity between the actors, lobbying activities have little impact on the political
agenda.”
These findings suggest that the composition of actors in the system, as well as the nature of
the networks they form influences system development. Binz, Truffer, and Coenen (2014)
argue that the location of the system’s underlying actor networks can shift considerably
and that innovation processes in national (sub-)systems might be more strongly intercon-
nected and influenced by a ‘global TIS’ level than could be assumed from existing studies.
Furthermore, Binz et al, claim:
“knowledge created in networks spanning transnational companies and their
research partners (as in the nursing phase of membrane bioreactor technology)
is clearly of a different quality than knowledge created in small world networks
connecting different trans-disciplinary subsystems in a multi-scalar setup (as
in the consolidation phase of MBR technology).”
In other words, the location where knowledge is created may influence characteristics of
the subsequent innovation system. This suggests that aggregation and geographic location
of actors and networks underpins, and is in certain circumstances a crucial factor for the
institutional structural analysis and the functional analysis in the study.
3.2.4 Structure analysis: institutions and alignment
The institutions of an innovation system are the ‘rules of the game’, the cultures, norms,
regulations and routines associated with a technology (North, 1990). Institutions play a
crucial role the creation and diffusion of knowledge through networks by codifying, sta-
bilising and transmitting tacit knowledge (Truffer, 2008). Institutions shape actor and
firm behaviours by influencing opportunity structures, (Carlsson, 1994), influencing re-
source access and thus influencing profitability and research and development behaviour
(Breznitz, 2007). Incentives may be institutionally set to influence whether and how actors
perform certain activities and avoid others (Markard and Truffer, 2008b). Thus in the
analysis, we consider these rules as ‘signposts’ which guide system building actors towards
possible technological futures. These signposts, directing actors towards certain techno-
logical outcomes, can aid, or hinder, the diffusion processes by de-risking firm activities
or enhancing certainty of future market conditions, important for investors or research
funders.
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Institutional alignment is at the heart of large-scale transformation processes (Freeman
and Louc¸a˜, 2001) and includes alterations in norms, beliefs and regulations (Fuenfschilling
and Truffer, 2013). Institutional conditions may or may not be ‘aligned’ to facilitate the
realisation of the goals of system actors (Negro et al., 2008). For example, technology
support payments in the form of feed-in tariffs may be considered well-aligned to the
needs of wind farm operators as they facilitate a competitive advantage over non-wind
electricity generators. Innovation system functions strengthen as a result of alignment
between institutions and the aim or goals of system actors. The shaping of institutions
and institutional alignment is often a strategic act by firms competing not only in a
market, but also for political or regulatory influence (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Van
de Ven, 1993). This process involves actors at multiple geographic levels across multiple
technological domains. For example, the actors in a wind innovation system may lobby
for regulatory advantage over a competing generation technology, such as fossil fuels.
In the analytic framework, we begin by delineating this competition along jurisdictional
lines, following indigenous actors vying against overseas competitors. The evidence of
these institutional contexts can be found in records of policy process, lobbying of and by
policy actors, and through historical accounts. Analysing this alignment of institutions
and system actors is a core analytic task within the structural analysis which involves an
examination of the co-evolution of institutional structure and technological development
(Coenen, Benneworth, et al., 2012).
Incorporating geographic factors into the analysis of institutions, according to Coenen
and Dı´az Lo´pez, provides “a forceful explanation for the uneven distribution of innovation
across countries and regions” (Coenen and Dı´az Lo´pez, 2010, p. 1153). Institutions relev-
ant to the Irish wind RES are situated at and between a number of geographic levels such as
the European Union, transitional energy markets, national energy policy and regulations
and regional rules. For example, policy objectives and visions promoting future renewable
energy systems have for many years been a part of policy frameworks in the European
Union and throughout its member states (Helm, 2014; Lauber, 2007; Mitchell, 2008;
Szarka, 2007). Conversely, despite increasing internationalisation of innovation activities,
national and regional characteristics of innovation remain essential (Carlsson, 2006). The
influence of education systems, industrial relations, scientific institutions, government and
sub-national policies, cultural traditions and many other national institutions are funda-
mental to systems of innovation (Freeman, 1994). According to Carlsson (2006), these
institutions are what make each system unique, many change only very gradually and
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provide strong path dependence. Recent work has explored the influence on innovation
systems of informal territorial institutions (Wirth et al., 2013a). Institutions such as
nationally situated professional culture, finance culture, attitudes to entrepreneurship and
risk influence (or not) industry support schemes and policy instruments such as those
discussed in this chapter. The authors show the influence of geographical differences in
professional culture among Austrian farmers on the extent and character of biogas tech-
nology diffusion. Their findings suggest that endogenous territorial norms and values have
important influences on the uneven geographic distribution of innovation system develop-
ment, in particular where new technologies are transferred to follower countries (Wirth
et al., 2013a).
The challenge of the institutional analysis is to explain the cumulative influence of
these institutions on the speed and nature of the formation of the wind RES in Ireland.
To accomplish this we gather (analytically) an ‘ensemble’ of relevant institutional forms,
situated at different spatial and governance levels13 (Martin, 2000), with which to assess
alignment against the goals of actors in the Irish wind RES. Our focus is on the one
hand territorially specific, taking as the starting point political institutions that influence
the system in Ireland, then broadening the analysis beyond policy and regulations to
include what Asheim and Coenen (2006, p. 166) calls “dynamic ensembles of mutually
reinforcing sets of institutions”, to include national informal institutions such as culture
and behaviours. This ensemble, and the Irish wind RES is illustrated in Figure 3.3. Here
we observe our two heuristic components, the global (touchdown) and , national formal
institutions and national, regional and sectoral informal institutions (build-up in Ireland).
These levels are useful during identification of evidence and in geographically focussing
the evidence. Whilst potentially a complex task involving a wide variety of institutional
forms, the geographic bounding focusses on alignment of system actors and institutions as
central, ensuring adequate analytic focus. This approach accounts for influencing factors
on the innovation system such as lending practices by financial organisations, attitudes to
risk by entrepreneurs and lenders, and the nature of the market economy with respect to
13In an abstractly similar fashion, the Varieties of Capitalism literature attempts to aggregate configur-
ations of institutions and address implications for innovative performance (Nooteboom, 2001). However,
as Asheim and Coenen (2006) point out succinctly that “despite the emphasis on institutional complement-
arities, it takes predominantly institutions at the national level into consideration leaving ‘the multi-scaled
set of institutional forms’ Martin (2000, p. 89) relatively unaddressed”. To be clear, my ambition is not
to address this critique of the varieties of capitalism literature. Instead I simply acknowledge the idea of
assembling institutional influence, although in doing so in this case, I seek to offer no generalised claims
with regard to aggregated institutional influence and national economic or innovation characteristics
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industrial development and provides a systems-appropriate explanation of the nature of
Irish specific innovation processes, not achievable by, for example, by an exclusive analysis
of policy specifications.
Figure 3.3. Ensemble of multi-level institutions with regard to a focal system
The synthesis of theoretical discussions in the literature, and empirical institutional
studies of industry in Ireland suggest a number of explanations for the evolution of the
institutional structure in Ireland’s wind RES (see Table 3.2 for a list of relevant institu-
tional, indicators and examples). First, we expect some actors will be able to influence
and alter institutions through lobbying and processes of institutional entrepreneurialism14.
Furthermore, we expect these processes to be influenced by the location of the actor and
actor groups involved. Second, in situations where we observe rapid system growth, we
would expect some degree of pre-existing institutional alignment, or relatively fast institu-
tional change processes. One explanation for sudden change is exogenous system shocks.
In Ireland over the period of study, two examples of rapid institutional change relevant to
this study have been observed. First the marketisation and privatisation of state owned
energy firms and assets. Second the economic crash and subsequent recession of 2007 and
14Institutional entrepreneurialism is action performed by “actors who have an interest in particular
institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existing
ones” (Maguire et al., 2004, p. 657).
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2008. These are cases of general disruptions that throw up opportunities and problems
for different energy actors in different ways. We address these disruptions by assessing
whether and how they assist wind energy developments. Mapping the institutional align-
ment over time and space is on its own of limited explanatory value with regard to the
research aims of this thesis. However, it is a crucial foundation for the functional analysis
which follows contributing rich locational explanation for a number of system processes.
3.3 System function analysis
3.3.1 Mapping patterns of system functions
The initial step of the functional analysis is detailing the ‘functional pattern’ of the system
(Bergek, Jacobsson, Carlsson, Lindmark, et al., 2008). In other words, describing how the
system is behaving in terms of overall set of functions. This involves first assessing the
‘strength’ or ‘performance’ of each function within the system (see 3a, Figure 3.4) by
examining an associated set of indicators in the case evidence. Qualitative and quantit-
ate indicators are employed and have been arrived at through insights gained from the
synthesis of theory, previous cases and emergent findings. For example, by tracking the
number and geographic character of investors and lenders in the system, we can investig-
ate how the resource mobilisation function is influenced by Irish actors in the early phases
of the national RES development, but becomes influenced by overseas investors later on.
The functions used in the analysis are detailed in the following subsections. For each, the
relevant indicators are listed and methods of assessment explicitly stated.
Having assessed the strength of each function at given periods of wind development,
we account for the achieved functional pattern in the innovation system. That is, how the
functions are influencing each other, co-evolving, and cumulatively influencing the wind
energy system (this is represented by step 3b in figure 2.33.4). Hekkert, Suurs, et al.
(2007) argue “that acceleration in system change may occur when functions interact and
lead to virtuous cycles. System change only takes place when certain thresholds of function
fulfilment are reached”.
We illustrate this proposition by returning to the hypothetical example of the mobilisa-
tion of financial resources in the Irish wind RES. An increase in financial resources in the
system leads to a virtuous cycle by further legitimising development activities within the
system, leading to more actors entering the system seeking commercial opportunities who
in turn bring with them finance raising capabilities and networks. The functional pattern
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is often illustrated as maps which when used in combination with a periodisation scheme
can visually represent the evolution of functions in the system over time (an example of
mapping over time is illustrated in fig. 3.4 and 3.5). However., mapping in itself does not
hold generalisable theoretically robust explanation, instead we need to move to the level of
system explanation which offers an evaluative perspective on the system and is discussed
in section 3.4.
Figure 3.4. Phase 1. Illustrated example of system function mapping for early emergent phase of
development. In this example the direction of the search function is shown influencing legitimation and
entrepreneurial activity
Figure 3.5. Illustrated example of system function mapping for take-off phase. In this example the
direction of the search function still strongly influences the formation of markets and entrepreneurial
activities such as firm creation. New firms are founded by new actors to the system, who bring with them
ability to raise venture capital, strengthening the resource mobilisation function.
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The literature suggests that a well-functioning system is one in which all system func-
tions are contributing to the system when required. Recent studies integrating ideas from
geography into the TIS framework have examined distributed system functions, that is,
cases in which system functions operating at distinct geographic levels contribute to a
nationally specified system. Bento and Fontes (2014, p. 176) found that in the case of
Portugal, the knowledge diffusion from a transnational wind RES during the (national)
formative phase allowed the fulfilment of functions that strengthened absorptive capacity.
Binz, Truffer, and Coenen (2014) show how transnational research networks facilitate
distributed knowledge functions in a number of membrane bioreactor system in China.
These studies suggest not all functions are required to be operating in the same jurisdic-
tion. Synthesising these results and integrating with evidence from the Irish case, we assess
locational and geographic aspects of system functional patterns by integrating geographic
characteristics into the function indicators. Rather than the focus being on how transna-
tional system components and functions affect the national, the point of this research is
to determine the causes, activities and processes of rapid system emergence and growth
in a given country. For the purpose of this thesis, the analysis of RES components and
innovation system functions is expanded to incorporate and differentiate Ireland-specific
and transnational aspects of RES formation. Geographic indicators and relevant theory
is discussed with regard to each TIS function below.
3.3.2 Creating knowledge
As we have already discussed, learning is at the heart of process of innovation system devel-
opment and diffusion15. The function of knowledge creation is the process of strengthening
technological learning by actors in the system. The creation of knowledge in the system
generally is necessary to encourage and facilitate the entrepreneurial activity by firms and
to assess how technologies can be optimally configured for a given market, the later is of
specific relevance in the case of Ireland’s import of turnkey technologies (Vasseur et al.,
2013). Studies have shown how different knowledge development activities have focussed
on various aspects of the value chain. For example, Jacobsson, Sande´n, et al. (2004)
showed that in the emerging innovation system for solar cells in Germany, initial know-
ledge development was limited to research and design of cell technology. Later, knowledge
creation activities were broadened as firms experimented down-stream with new applic-
ation design concepts (Bergek, Jacobsson, Carlsson, Lindmark, et al., 2008). Thus, we
15Given the focus on geography and location, developmental and diffusion aspects of this function are
presented separately, as per Hekkert et al’s list of TIS functions (2007).
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would expect that the nature of the knowledge development activities of a system are
related to the aspects of the value chain. Given the role of turnkey technologies in the
case, our interest is particularly focussed on national and context setting learning.
We have seen that transnational firms operate in Ireland throughout the value chain.
However, even in the case of very large corporations, studies of internationalisation suggest
that that knowledge development that give firms competitive advantage is less interna-
tionalised than other aspects of corporate activity, Carlsson (2006) suggests that all things
being equal, even large firms tend to perform R&D activities at home. Hence in the Irish
case, we would not expect to find significant upstream R&D activities situated in Ireland.
Indeed, Carlsson points out that smaller countries are at one end of the spectrum, with
high levels of flows of scientific and technological knowledge and embodied technology
crossing their borders, while larger countries are more self-sufficient and thus less affected
by international technological and scientific flows. This resonates with our observation of
the Irish wind RES is highly reliant on imported turnkey technologies which can be un-
derstood in system function terms as the acquisition of codified or explicit knowledge. On
the other hand, the creation of tacit knowledge (that is, learning by doing) is strongly con-
text dependent and difficult to move across space (Lema and Lema, 2012; Madsen et al.,
2008). Therefore, where there is the system requirement for tacit knowledge generation,
we might expect this to take place within Ireland. Furthermore, given the NSI perspective
that the distinctive national character of innovation systems is influenced by the country’s
economic development and the composition of its economic and social activities, we might
expect this development of tacit knowledge to take on a nationally specific character.
The strength of this function within Ireland can be assessed by mapping knowledge
indicators16 such as national innovation reports, bibliometrics analysis of the field and
other activities (see table 3.3). For transnational activity, we analyse technology imports,
movement of skilled personnel and transnational networks and programmes.
3.3.3 Diffusing knowledge
The diffusion of knowledge in an innovation system is closely related to the presence
and nature of actor networks. The learning process often involves multiple actors and
therefore knowledge exchange or the diffusion of knowledge through systems or networks
is a key process. Indeed, the primary function of networks in the innovation system
16The geographic and locational aspects of these indicators, and the indicators listed in subsequent
subsections follow contributions made by Bento and Fontes (2014), Binz, Truffer, and Coenen (2014),
Gosens et al. (2015), Vasseur et al. (2013).
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Table 3.3 Knowledge creation
Locational relevance and im-
plication from the literature
Indicators of system activity in
Ireland
Indicators of transnational
activity influencing Irish wind
system
Local institutional context influ-
ences knowledge development of
local firms. Codified or expli-
cit knowledge can be easily trans-
ferred. E.g. public goods created in
the scientific system. Tacit know-
ledge is strongly context dependent
and more likely to be generated in
Ireland.
National innovation reports
Bibliometrics (citations, volume of
publications, orientation)
R&D projects (orientation, num-
ber, other characteristics)
Patents (in different competing
designs, applications and along the
whole value chain)
National knowledge exchange (e.g.
workshops, conferences, joint pro-
jects)
Imports of knowledge embedded
technology International scientific
cooperation
Global mobility of skilled personnel
Transnational corporations
Global technology markets
Institutional transfer programmes
is the exchange of knowledge and information (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991). This
is especially relevant in an innovation system context where knowledge creation activities
such as research and development meet policy decisions relating to national energy targets.
According to Hekkert et al. these should be “consistent with the latest technological
insights and, at the same time, R&D agendas should be affected by changing norms and
values” (2007:423). In this manner knowledge diffusion through network activity can be
regarded as a precondition to ‘learning by interacting’ and ‘learning by using’ in the case
of user producer networks, both relevant to the fast follower context (ibid.). In this way
we expect the knowledge diffusion function to have a strong co-influence on the network
structure of the wind RES.
For many small countries, processes of diffusion are more relevant than other aspects of
innovation (Edquist and Hommen, 2008) as smaller nations have less capacity, capabilities
and resources with which to develop wider range of industries, research expertise and
networks. Hence in Ireland we might expect processes of diffusion of knowledge to play a
more significant role than in either larger territories or lead markets. Bento and Fontes
(2014, p. 176) found that the development of wind power in Portugal took advantage
of the assimilation of knowledge spillovers from lead nations such as Denmark. In the
case of Portugal, firms were able to take advantage of national production capabilities and
through joint ventures allowed local firms to access best available global technologies whilst
developing Portuguese production capabilities. Furthermore, capacity building activities
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such as education and general R&D expenditure are likely to improve absorptive capacity,
and thus the of new innovation system, in functional terms, thus improving the ability
of system actors to diffuse overseas technologies into Portugal. Given these findings,
we expect a close interaction between knowledge creation nationally and transnational
diffusion.
Indicators of system knowledge diffusion activity within Ireland and across its national
borders are listed in table 3.4. The function can be assessed by mapping the number of
workshops and conferences related to the field, and by mapping network activities and
size over time (Hekkert, Suurs, et al., 2007). The import of turnkey technologies gives an
indication of transnational activity as as well as accumulated codified knowledge in the
system.
Table 3.4 Knowledge development
Locational relevance and im-
plication from the literature
Indicators of system activity in
Ireland
Indicators of transnational
activity influencing Irish wind
system
Codified or explicit knowledge can
be easily transferred. E.g. public
goods created in the scientific sys-
tem or turnkey technologies. Tacit
knowledge is strongly context de-
pendent
Assessments by managers and oth-
ers
Workshops
Conferences
Network size and intensity
Stocks of imported turnkey plant
International knowledge exchange
(e.g. workshops, conferences, joint
projects)
Trade in equipment, licenses, pat-
ents, technical consulting
3.3.4 Influencing the direction of the search
The ‘influencing the direction of the search’ function relates to the clarity with which act-
ors articulate demand and shape expectations for the future development of technologies
within the innovation system. The function can be fulfilled by a number of components
such as the government, firms, or in aggregate through markets. From an evolutionary
perspective, while knowledge creation performs as a variation mechanism in the system,
the guidance of the search function is akin to a selection mechanism (Hekkert, Suurs,
et al., 2007). This selection is typically encapsulated in visions of actors in the system
regarding desired future, often influencing regulation and policies. Visions reduce uncer-
tainty whilst stimulating focus on a technological future (Vasseur et al., 2013). Whilst
it has often assumed that national level policy and visions are best suited to articulating
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technology goals and futures, this remains largely unproven (Binz, Truffer, Li, et al.,
2012). Visions are also set at super-national levels such as those in UN treaties and EC
directives. Articulation of demand from leading customers may also be influenced by
higher order societal or economic concepts such as climate change or recession. Similarly,
we would expect industry trends such as marketisation or privatisation to influence the
direction of the search for technologies which are compatible with such signposts.
Expectations often are influenced by development in systems in other countries. Bergek
and Jacobsson (2003) show how direction of the search in the emergent German wind power
system was influenced by developments in Denmark and the USA. A number of recent
studies give examples of how national policy influences renewable technology innovation
systems. In a study of the German solar PV TIS, Hoppmann et al. (2014) show that
the PV feed-in tariff (FIT) has evolved in a highly iterative manner, with policy makers
adjusting the design of the FIT over time. The authors show that while some of the policy
changes were influenced by powerful actors with vested interests, policy makers correcting
perceived flaws in previously legislation also played a significant role. However, they also
found that the evolution of the German FIT for PV was strongly driven by technology
developments such as efficiency improvements indicating that policy analysis told only
part of the story. Vasseur et al. (2013) show that in the Dutch solar PV TIS, inconsistent
and short-term policies confuse and discourage investors. Meanwhile, their findings with
regard to a Japan study show that a longterm roadmap triggered investment and the
entry of researchers into the national system. While these findings indicate that national
policy or institutional context influences the direction of the search, it is less clear how the
function may be influenced by factors outside the country of the focal system. Bento and
Fontes address this in their study of Portugal showing that the increasing profitability
of investments in the Portuguese wind industry caused a virtuous cycle in the system,
whereby further investment flowed into the system from both national and international
firms. Thus we expect national and international finance and lending environments to be
influenced by the direction of the search function, and in turn influence the mobilisation
of resources. In a similar fashion, Binz, Truffer, and Coenen (2014) conclude that the
geographic influence of this function is far from restricted to a specific level.
The examples discussed provide useful indicators of how nationally specific policy may
evolve with technological progress which can be turnkey or highly place specific. Specific
indicators of system activity within Ireland and across its national borders are listed in
Table 3.5.
65
Table 3.5 Influence on the direction of search
Locational relevance and im-
plication from the literature
Indicators of system activity in
Ireland
Indicators of transnational
activity influencing Irish wind
system
Regulation and long term goals set
by government assumed but not
often verified that national insti-
tutions are the best context for
policy interventions (e.g. EU,
UN, UNFCCC). Creation of vision
and expectations by system actors
who may be influenced by devel-
opments in systems in other coun-
tries. Therefore the spatiality of
this function is not restricted to a
specific spatial scale
Visions and beliefs that raise
expectations
Targets set by the government
The extent of regulatory pressures,
e.g. regulations on minimum level
of adoption (‘green’ electricity
certificates etc) and tax regimes
(study of regulatory frameworks,
secondary data)
Incorporation of guidance in county
level plans
Belief in growth potential (inter-
views)
Incentives from factor/product
prices, e.g. taxes and prices in the
energy sector (secondary data)
The articulation of interest by
leading customers
Press articles that raise expecta-
tions
Perspectives of profits in the future
for the new technology vs. conven-
tional
New entrants in the market
EU renewable energy production
targets
Technological standards and certi-
fication
Global industry platforms and en-
vironmental groups
Selection of foreign technologies
that better fits domestic needs
Degree of preference for foreign or
domestic manufacture
3.3.5 Entrepreneurial activity
This function is variously referred to as entrepreneurial ‘experimentation’ and ‘activity’,
redolent of the initial focus many TIS studies had on the emergent phase of radical tech-
nology development. In this regard, entrepreneurial activities are another form of tech-
nological variety creation mechanism, in this instance by means of experimenting with
and producing new configurations of technology (Vasseur et al., 2013). For Hekkert et
al. entrepreneurs, while not the only actor in the innovation system, are the most central
to its functioning; ‘there is no such thing as an innovation system without entrepreneurs’
they claim (2007:421). Entrepreneurs they suggest ‘turn the potential of new knowledge,
networks and markets into concrete actions’ (ibid, 2007:421) and by carrying out ex-
periments, carry much of the burden of societal risk associated with new and uncertain
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technologies. Indeed, ‘the presence of active entrepreneurs is a first and prime indication
of the performance of an innovation system’ (ibid, 2007:421).
The focus on entrepreneurial activity and business formation adds a useful aspect to
the study of the diffusion of innovations, which has traditionally focussed on supply side
dynamics (Carlsson, 2006). However, the pertinent challenge with regard to this study
is, accounting for how entrepreneurial activity matters in a follower country context. We
would expect certain proximity advantages (and disadvantages) to be present in relation to
the difficulty of transferring tacit knowledge, the learning by doing part of developing the
TIS (Binz, Truffer, and Coenen, 2014). First, from our discussion on Ireland’s small island
grid we know that integrating turnkey technologies there offered unique challenges when
compared with renewables integration on other European networks. These challenges
may somewhat negate advantages overseas firms enjoyed due to experience built up in
first mover locations. Second, we might expect indigenous new entrant firms, through
spatial and network proximity to national first mover firms to have certain advantages over
overseas firms. Third, entrepreneurs may go about deliberately altering the composition
and structure of the innovation system (Hekkert, Suurs, et al., 2007), for example, they
may lobby the government for regulatory support, or invite new actors such as investors
into system networks. It follows that Irish actors, familiar with political systems and
cultures may have some advantages in this regard.
The research focus on location demands that in collating this data, we go beyond
quantitive measures of how much entrepreneurial activity is taking place to. In addition,
we examine who is performing these activities and what access they have to indigenous
and overseas resources and networks. Further indicators of these activities are listed in
Table 3.6.
3.3.6 Forming markets
Market structures play a decisive role in the long term growth and success of innovation
systems (Dewald and Truffer, 2011). Markets according to Fligstein “imply social spaces
where repeated exchanges occur between buyers and sellers under a set of formal and in-
formal rules governing relations between competitors, suppliers, and customers” (Fligstein
and Dauter, 2007, p. 113). Supportive social spaces and rules are necessary as the initial
competitive advantages of emergent technologies tend to be slight, with low margins and
technological imperfections (Vasseur et al., 2013). Markets of new renewable technologies
usually develop in different phases (Bergek, Jacobsson, Carlsson, Lindmark, et al., 2008).
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Table 3.6 Entrepreneurial activity
Locational relevance and im-
plication from the literature
Indicators of system activity in
Ireland
Indicators of transnational
activity influencing Irish wind
system
This function is inherently social
and spatial as the social ties of en-
trepreneurs are relevant and likely
to be localised
Quantity, capabilities and charac-
teristics of new entrants
Diversification activities of incum-
bents
Certain planning applications
Breadth of technologies used
Local merger and acquisition activ-
ity
Studies, demonstration, field trials
Classifications of national charac-
teristics of entrepreneurial beha-
viour such as NSI based comparat-
ive case studies
Global equipment markets and
market competition
Global technology markets
Transferability and imitability of
foreign technology
Shortcutting typical experimenta-
tion times with mature technology
In early phases, learning spaces and feedback loops between manufacturers and users of
the technology are important (Garud and Karnøe, 2003). However, we have discussed
in the previous chapter the relatively insignificant developmental role manufacturers have
played in Ireland where turnkey generation technology is prevalent and little evidence of
strong feedback learning loops is found. In later ‘bridging’ or ‘mass-market’ stages, pro-
ducers and users have less requirement to be co-located as manufacturers develop global
production networks (Coe et al., 2004). The acquisition of significant US and European
solar PV market share by Chinese manufacturers is a case in point (Tour et al., 2011),
showing that at least in the supply of turnkey RETs, dominant global market positions
may be attained at a distance from many markets. This literature suggests that in fast
follower contexts, the formation of national markets does not play a significant role in the
development of the national RES.
On the other hand, we have noted the existence of electricity market, with high pen-
etration of wind technology, which because of the nature of the electricity network, have
been territorially embedded17. Dewald and Truffer (2011); Dewald and Truffer (2012)
17Embeddedness in this instance refers to a condition where system actors interact and relate to each
other in a context that has a specific historical origin and development, as well as precise spatial coordin-
ates. In other words, firms’ embeddedness refers to their belonging to a certain place. The territorial
embedding of electricity networks is pronounced in the provision of electricity in Europe, which is highly
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argue that in order to sustain market dynamics for new technologies, system actors rely
on critical resources that often are co-located in specific spatial contexts, predominantly
at the sub-national level. New market segments will emerge when the following are in
place:
1. The institutional context is conducive for the establishment of these markets.
2. Consumer groups are available and accepting of new technologies
3. Actors with appropriate capabilities and access to resources
4. Networks supporting innovative actors and their activities exist
The issue of concern according to Mo¨llering is how the market is constructed by the
government and others (2009). Turning to the Irish market we focus on how upstream and
downstream actors have constructed the national market which at one end of the supply
chain features turnkey renewable technology, and at the other - the point of metered
delivery - the homogenous ‘flow of electrons’. Neither of these facets of the supply chain
offer significant scope for market differentiation within the wind sector. The evidence found
in the literature leads us to expect that significant aspects of the market in generating
technologies are formed outside of Ireland. However, electricity supply markets are also
important arenas to study, and how these are constructed by the government and other
actors will influence the functioning of the Irish wind RES.
Empirically we map the creation of national markets through installed capacity and
unit numbers as well as supporting institutional regimes and regulations as outlined in
Table 3.7. Development of the global market for wind plant is mapped through global
investment and technology reports and quantitive assessments of the internal markets of
lead country wind systems are assessed through existing studies.
3.3.7 Legitimising activities
Legitimising functions are complex processes of expectation shaping and institutional
change and are highly inter-related with the system structure and other functions of the
TIS. Legitimisation in the TIS framework is a socio-political process in which the most
commonly described strategy for industry legitimation is to conform to – or ‘align’ with
territorially bound to national markets and more so in the case of island nations and island networks
such as those of Great Britain and Ireland, each of which have relatively low levels of interconnection
with external transmission or delivery networks, significant infrastructural characteristics when adding
intermittent electricity generation such as wind.
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Table 3.7 Market formation
Locational relevance and im-
plication from the literature
Indicators of system activity in
Ireland
Indicators of transnational
activity influencing Irish wind
system
’Producers and users do not have to
be located nearby. The formation
of market transactions relates to
the exchange relationship between
supply and demand for the end-
products. Markets imply social
spaces where ’repeated exchanges’
occur between buyers and sellers
under a set of formal and informal
rules governing relations between
competitors, suppliers, and custom-
ers
Development of new market seg-
ments
Specific tax regimes and regulations
Environmental standards
Activities of lead users and cus-
tomer groups
Installed capacity and unit num-
bers
Global equipment markets and
market competition reports
Global technology markets
Institutional transfer programmes
Share of domestic and foreign com-
panies in the market
– established institutions (Bergek, Jacobsson, and Sande´n, 2008). Firms compete not
only in the market, but also to influence the institutional structure of the system, by, for
example lobbying for feed-in tariffs (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). Given the highly reg-
ulated nature of the electricity market and sector, this competition for influence over the
regulatory framework is a fundamental aspect of the function, which often take the form
of collective expectation shaping. Collective expectations, or supporting visions, motivate
actors to engage in new technologic fields, they guide technology development and contrib-
ute to the coordination of actors by providing a common reference point or by implicitly or
explicitly ascribing roles for different actors (Konrad et al., 2012). Collective expectations
are usually purposefully and strategically set or challenged by actors in order to mobilise
funds or improve the public perception of a technology. Furthermore, a significant aspect
of expectation setting is the framing of opportunities. Wind generation for example has
been framed in terms of resource exploitation and commercialisation to be profited from,
as well as in terms of a “solution” to problems associated with climate change mitigation.
Policy objectives and visions promoting future renewable energy systems play an in-
tegral role in European Union energy policy frameworks, as well as those of individual
member states (Helm, 2014; Lauber, 2007; Mitchell, 2008). As such, we would expect
that changes in the legitimacy of a technology system at one geographic level may affect
the legitimacy of a system at another. For example, the German solar PV sector was
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legitimised by actors distributed across the country including activists and special interest
organisations. Jacobsson and Lauber (2006) showed that many processes of legitimacy
change emanated from subnational level and subsequently influenced the federal political
agenda. Meelen and Farla (2013) emphasise that both legitimation and influence on the
direction of search functions have strong co-dependencies and are strongly oriented to-
wards the context of the TIS. With regards to this research, the strength of these two
functions, and how they influence and are influenced by the structure and context of the
system structure are a signifier of why actors, both based in Ireland and from overseas,
are attracted to enter the system (Bergek, Hekkert, et al., 2014).
Mapping these dynamics involves on the one hand assessing the evolution of the le-
gitimacy of the Irish wind RES from the perspective of relevant actors (e.g. investors,
capital goods suppliers, government). We purposefully consider the perspectives of RES
actors and acknowledge these are not homogenous, and may differ from other stakeholders
such as incumbent electricity firms and publics. On the other hand, we must account for
the activities within the system which may increase (or decrease) this legitimacy. These
activities include lobbying and the formation of coalitions and advocacy groups (see Table
3.8). Policy documents and historic studies of policy processes at European level and in
lead European wind markets provide evidence to assess transnational activity.
Table 3.8 Legitimisation activities
Locational relevance and im-
plication from the literature
Indicators of system activity in
Ireland
Indicators of transnational
activity influencing Irish wind
system
Similar to direction of the search
function, the performance of this
function is closely related to the
emergence of coalitions, interest
groups, networks and intermediar-
ies. These actor groups may be
restricted in their spatial reach or
other may aim at international or
national scales
Rise of interest groups, advocacy
coalition and their lobbying activ-
ity for or against technology
Quantity and characteristics of me-
dia coverage
The appearance of framings in new
arenas, such as parliamentary pro-
ceedings
Recognition of societal benefits of
the technology
Direction of science and technology
policy
Regulatory and fiscal instruments
(e.g. REFIT)
International environmental re-
gimes
Global industry platforms and
environmental groups
Domestic policy vs. international
trade regimes (WTO, EU)
International technology growth
and legitimation
71
3.3.8 Mobilising resources
Financial, human and physical capital resources are necessary inputs for innovation pro-
cesses. Mobilising, attaining and putting to use these resource within an innovation sys-
tem is an important function. Karltorp (2014) outlines three major resource constraints
technological innovation systems face in up-scaling from an early development phase to
maturity. First with regard to financial resources, emerging technologies are often linked
to high-risk and long pay back periods. Second, infrastructure resources are often a signi-
ficant barrier in the way of development. We have already seen that this has been a major
issue in the Irish wind RES with regard to issues of constraint and curtailment on the grid.
Third, competences and human resources are a major issue. For specific technologies, the
allocation of resources is necessary to create or enhance knowledge production functions
(Hekkert, Suurs, et al., 2007). As such, resource mobilisation is an important antecedent
to the knowledge creation function. Furthermore, there is often a time lag between when
these resource needs are recognised and when suitable staff come into the systems creat-
ing delays and bottlenecks. These perspectives suggest that fast followers may have some
advantages over early emerging nations if lessons can be learned and resources mobilised
for lead systems are accessible.
We have discussed the geographic constraints on knowledge and learning. With regard
to geography and lending conditions Vasseur et al. (2013, p. 208) show how locational
characteristics of actors in the Dutch solar PV industry affected their ability to mobilise
resources. Aside from a small number of financially robust equipment suppliers, the solar
PV sector at the time of the study consisted of a small number of SMEs. The limited
industrial base of the industry was highly vulnerable to changes in investment and subsidy
policy regimes which significantly hampered their ability to raise needed capital. The au-
thors compare this situation with Japan, in which the dominant actors are multi-national
firms, less dependent on exogenous investment environments and so able to raise funds in
a more predictable manner. These studies see also Gosens et al., 2015 suggest that while
the banking and investment industries are highly internationalised, the conditions under
which they lend are influenced by national factors. We have discussed how knowledge
creation capabilities are influenced by location. Where knowledge cannot be generated
locally, a firm or sector may attract specialised professionals from overseas (Saxenian,
2007). However, in Ireland, the literature on national systems of innovation and foreign
direct investment suggests this phenomena is mostly limited to information technology,
pharmacy and the finance sectors, with little national industrial development agency sup-
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port for the electricity sector (Barry and Bradley, 1997; Breznitz, 2007; Carlsson, 2006).
Where the acquisition of human resources is not possible, the capabilities to access extra-
territorial resources becomes crucial. In the 1980s for example, EEC community funding
was acquired for early wind projects in Portugal, and while these helped kick start a na-
tional wind innovation system, resource mobilisation was not fully functioning until new
actors entered the system in the 2000s, bringing with them new capabilities and access to
funding networks (Bento and Fontes, 2014).
Analysing this function involves understanding not only the incentives for entry at
the industry and sectoral level, but also the structural features of the capital market and
the university sector at the NIS level (Bergek, Hekkert, et al., 2014). Furthermore, it
requires knowledge of capabilities of the actors in and entering the system regarding finance
and other resource mobilisation. Mobilisation of financial resources may be measured by
volume of capital and increasing levels of seed and venture capital, where this data is
available. Where not, and additionally, the difficulty of attaining finance is ascertained
through interview methods (see Table 3.9).
Table 3.9 Resource mobilisation
Locational relevance and im-
plication from the literature
Indicators of system activity in
Ireland
Indicators of transnational
activity influencing Irish wind
system
Human capital is likely to come
from local labour markets or edu-
cation institutes though forging en-
trepreneurs and specialised profes-
sionals may also play a role. Finan-
cial resources may be raised locally
or through the global financial sys-
tem (Avdeitchikova, 2012). Small
local firms may be more vulnerable
to changes in investment environ-
ments.
Availability of competence/human
capital
Availability and accessibility of fin-
ancial capital
Changing characteristics of finan-
cial capital and lending require-
ments
Complementary assets for key act-
ors (Binz, Truffer, Li, et al., 2012).
Transnational corporations
Private and institutional financiers
Institutional transfer programmes
Global mobility of skilled personnel
Foreign direct investment, venture
capital, international banking sec-
tor Access to European investment
or demonstration funds
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3.4 System level analysis
3.4.1 Evaluative perspectives on system functionality
The relative strength, or weakness of a TIS function does not on its own account for
system-level change. Rather it is the cumulative and systemic interaction of the functions
that enhances or impedes innovative activity and according to Hekkert et al., creates
virtuous or vicious cycles of functional patterns (2007). This is the core analytic step in
evaluating overall system functionality (step 4 in Figure 3.2). Mapping the configuration
of functions through phases of system development, the ‘functionality’ of the innovation
system is assessed in terms of how it supports firm entry, variety and the formation of
niche markets in the early phases of development, and market expansion and the supply of
resources to exploit that market in the later phases. Bergek (2002) identified two phases
of system development, first a formative phase, perhaps lasting decades, followed by a
growth phase characterised by positive feedback loops and increasing returns to adoption.
Subsequent studies have further refined these concepts and suggested further phases such
as a take-off phase and an acceleration phase which correspond, approximately, to later
stages of diffusion of the system (Suurs and Hekkert, 2012). This step is central to the
explanatory power of the TIS functions approach which posits that through processes of
cumulative causation, combinations of functions reinforce each other positively fulfilling
innovation processes within a developing system.
Based on analysis of multiple cases, Suurs and Hekkert (2012) have proposed a small
typology of reinforcing dynamics, or ‘motors of innovation18’ (Ven et al., 2000; Poole
et al., 2000): A science and technology push motor in which knowledge creation and diffu-
sion functions are dominant; an entrepreneurial motor in which opportunities increasingly
influence system change; a system building motor in which structural conditions attract
exogenous actors into the system; and finally a market motor – the formation of the
market. Suurs and Hekkert (ibid.) are careful to note that while these motors are not
predictive, they contribute to our understanding of possible mechanisms that underlie long
term system development. A number of similar functional patterns have been found in
case studies relevant to this thesis. The case of wind energy in Portugal was character-
ised by two dynamic cycles; a knowledge development cycle and an implementation cycle
(Bento and Fontes, 2014, p. 171). The knowledge development cycle was triggered by
legitimisation which influenced the direction of search, in turn influencing the mobilising
18The underlying causal explanation of these ‘motors’ is in turn based on finding from the influential
Minnesota Innovation Research Program (Poole et al., 2000).
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of resources for the research and development of nationally contextualised knowledge and
entrepreneurial experimentation. The implementation cycle began in parallel, and was
triggered by regulatory changes that established a goal-orientated feed-in tariff (legitima-
tion and direction of the search) which attracted new actors and brought more resources
to the industry resulting in new internal markets and exports. This in turn strengthened
the ability of wind actors to influence policy debates. These findings share characteristics
with findings of wind in Denmark (Kamp, 2008a) and solar PV in Japan (Vasseur et al.,
2013). Furthermore, whilst not detailing functional cycles in depth, Tigabu et al. (2013)
found that in Kenya and Rwanda, the accumulation of bio-digestion system functions was
triggered by the direction of the search function. These findings suggest some degree of
consistency in the empirical literature, albeit from an extremely limited sample of cases.
However, they provide a useful evaluative context from which to progress our analysis.
We assess the overall system functionality for insight into what societal and policy sup-
port the Irish wind RES attained and explanations for what innovation activities happened
within Ireland, and how they were supported. First, for each period identified we analyse
the functional pattern against analytically assessed system goals. That is, what struc-
turally and functionally the Irish wind RES required during a specific period, for further
development. Our knowledge of the TIS function activity for each period is based on
information synthesised from the literature is explicitly labelled in the analysis. We then
compare how each functional pattern gets close to this (that is, how the functions are
performed and strengthened, can be analysed with respect to the requirements of each
period.)
The second task is the internal comparison between transnational and Irish influenced
functions. We have added geographic indicators to both structural and function analysis.
This allows us, for each period of development, to assess the relative contribution of the
domestic RES and links to exogenous systems. This is a crucial step in assessing why
innovation happened in Ireland. For further analytic robustness, we compare the results
from the analysis of the Irish wind RES to TIS functionality observed in different locations.
In this case, we have used findings from historic studies of the renewable energy systems.
Because of sometimes substantial differences in methodology, system boundary definitions
and data sources, the comparison of system patterns is of limited value, however, general
findings were contextualised and utilised to test internal robustness.
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3.4.2 Locating inducement and blocking mechanisms
The final set of analytic tasks is to identify inducement and blocking mechanisms. These
may be the result of actor strategies, exogenous or endogenous to the focal system. For
example, there are numerous reasons why exogenous interests would seek to block the de-
velopment of an emergent innovation system. These may include competition for markets,
resources or political favour. A common trigger for virtuous cycles can be found in the
analysis of the direction of the search and the legitimation functions where, for example,
we examine evidence of proponents of the innovation system lobbying powerful actors for
institutional support (Hekkert, Suurs, et al., 2007), provided for through legislation or
technology support instruments. Conversely, experimentation may lead to vicious cycles;
failures of public trials for example may lead to collective disappointment in technolo-
gies which may negatively impact further research activities or the availability of financial
capital from lenders or investors. Similarly, with regard to the Irish wind RES, we have
already discussed how the recession impacted investment from Irish lending institutions.
A simplistic mapping of this exogenous event would suggest that the crash, a geographic-
ally proximate but exogenous event to the Irish wind RES, may have triggered a vicious
cycle of decreased resource mobilisation. Using the geographically specified indicators, we
can identify locational factors in the inducement and blocking of system level function
patterns.
It is the evaluation of cycles – or motors – of functions that allows us assess the overall
system. This functional pattern is likely to differ from innovation system to system, or
location to location, and will change over time as the system develops. Given there are
seven functions defined, many patterns of interaction are theoretically possible, however
evidence from historic case studies suggest that there may be some common starting
points, in particular guidance of the search function has been shown to be central to
positively influencing other system functions ( ibid. ). Furthermore, the literature has
shown some consistency in the temporal ordering of cycles in a number of cases as outlined
in the preceding section. However, it may be the case that in a fast follower context, an
emergent follower system may skip certain functional patterns of development, or have
its own unique starting point, which might in part explain the rapid nature of some fast
follower roll-outs activity.
Empirical cases aimed at policy makers have often sought to first identify and then
make efforts to mitigate against blocking mechanisms, whilst at the same time enhancing
inducement mechanisms. In this case we focus on producing an historic analysis of the
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development of the wind RES, rather than a policy orientated guide for future interven-
tions. Whilst not strictly a goal of this thesis, producing policy recommendations for each
period of the wind RES allows us to ‘test’ research findings against policy proscriptions
that were, in fact, made as that period transpired in reality, during the development of
the system. This is useful in testing counterfactual explanations of industry development
against the technological innovation system framework.
We now return to the build-up and touchdown heuristic introduced in Section 2.4.
Build-up is concerned with context in Ireland, the consideration of the territoriality of
technological development and change. As such, this is an umbrella term which groups
together the RES components which have originated from Irish contexts, and TIS func-
tions which are enacted or influenced by Irish actors and institutions. Touchdown on
the other hand places a great explanatory emphasis on the geography of trans-national
inter-organisational linkages in order to understand the emergence of the Irish wind RES.
The heuristic construct encompasses the TIS functions, flows of resources and other RES
components which have substantive transnational aspects. These include coalitions and
industry associations, the turnkey technology and finance organisations and overseas de-
velopers as well as European policy agendas. This locational heuristic is a useful discursive
and descriptive device as it indicates not only the locational origin of a system component
or function, but also allow us to consider the systemic and contextual influences. For
example, we may expect that Irish informal institutions such as attitudes to industrial
development strategies to influence build-up in a manner different to how it might influ-
ence touchdown. To be clear, heuristically, build-up and touchdown are umbrella terms
bringing together the activities and processes of ‘doing’. In summary, we have drawn from
the literature approaches to assessing the influence and location of distributed functions
and the structural context of the RES.
3.4.3 A framework for research and thesis hypotheses
We have integrated into the core TIS framework a number of analytic approaches with
which to explain the speed and nature of the emergence of a wind renewable energy system
in Ireland.
First the framework was underpinned with a robust and geographically focussed struc-
tural analysis. The nature and geographic location of actors and networks were important
inputs for both the institutional analysis and the functional analysis. Second, a framework
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for geographic, institutional explanation was presented. This incorporated institutions en-
dogenous and exogenous to the focal system and accounted for how these institutions were
aligned and re-aligned with the goals of the Irish wind RES. Third we accounted for sys-
tem functions focussed on the Irish case but distributed transnationally, describing and
adding explanatory power to transnational function mapping.
Although the definition of functions is static, their operation is not. Changes in func-
tions such as articulation and elaboration are referred to generically as ‘function activity.’
Indicators of function activity have been identified which explicitly account for system-
build up in Ireland as well as transnational activity and flows of resources. I summarise
the framework and relate it to the case in Table 3.10.
The framework has explicitly drawn on work examining other technological innovation
systems and previous studies of Irish actors, institutions and networks. Critically drawing
on these perspectives, and the introduction to the case discussed in Chapter 2, we make a
number of hypotheses with which to explain the emergence of the system and fast roll-out
of wind technology in Ireland.
This discussion may be summarised in terms of a series of hypotheses. Ireland has
been able to rapidly roll-out its wind energy system because, in this fast-follower con-
text, institutional alignment happens relatively quickly. The reasons for this become the
hypotheses:
H1a: Not all TIS functions needed to be re-produced in Ireland, some system functions
originate in overseas renewable electricity systems, or are produced through transnational
innovation activity.
H1b: TIS Function strength reflects structural components which are exogenous as
well as endogenous to the wind RES at national and European levels.
H1c: Changes in the contextual institutional environment due to market liberalisation
and European climate targets were sufficient for the formation of new electricity sub-sectors
including the wind RES.
H2a: Increases in legitimacy of the technology system, attained through the produc-
tion of visions, policies and regulations at a national level, are powerful drivers of RES
emergence.
H2b: Rapid roll-out of a technology within a RES or an implementation cycle of TIS
functions is preceded by a local cycle of knowledge development functions.
H3: Despite the import of turnkey technologies, national innovation activities were
an important factor in the rapid integration of wind technologies.
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Wrapping up
Summarising, this thesis is based around a claim that wind energy in Ireland, for all its
ostensible utilisation of imported turnkey technologies, required considerable local innov-
ation. This claim is tested and explored using a geographically-sensitised technological
innovation system analytical framework.
This is used for two related tasks, on the one hand to analyse relations between local
and distant processes and elements in the emergence of an Irish wind RES. And on the
other, to identify why and how innovation activities relating to the wind RES happened
in Ireland.
In the next chapter I discuss how the framework is operationalised and introduce
supporting data and evidence. The plausibility of this framework is assessed against
empirical evidence presented in Chapter 5 and analysis presented in chapters six and
seven. Results are discussed in Chapter 8, in which I derive more general findings and
reflect on the theoretical perspective.
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Chapter 4
Research design and analytic
strategy
This chapter outlines how the conceptual perspectives in the research framework are mo-
bilised. This analytic strategy incorporates a research design and scheme of analysis with
which to operationalise the concepts. Rationales for the selection of the case method are
discussed and we outline a specific narrative approach constructed for this thesis. We
discuss how the narrative analysis forms the basis for producing analytic understanding of
the actors and institutions of the Irish wind RES, from which the structural and functional
analysis follows. The research design in Section 4.1, introducing a novel methodological
approach which though built from process theory, foregrounds narrative over events in
its operationalisation. This is a departure from many studies in which TIS is employed,
which utilise an event history analysis approach. The evidence in introduced in Section
4.2, and we discuss how the data was arrived at and the evidence mobilised using the nar-
rative methods. Section 4.3 outlines the how the theoretical framework is operationalised
concluding with an overview of the specific scheme of analysis and details how the analysis
is laid out over the remaining chapters of the thesis.
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4.1 Research design and method
4.1.1 The case method
The main objective of this thesis is to understand the emergence of the Irish wind RES.
Fundamental to this goal is the explanation of the processes of interaction between indi-
genous and overseas actors, institutions and technologies in the development of the wind
electricity sector in Ireland. This includes identifying and analysing firm and other actor
groups. The case study method, by going into great depth enables us to understand
complex dynamics in one setting (Eisenhardt, 1989). Case studies are an appropriate
method of analysis using the TIS framework (Bergek, Jacobsson, Carlsson, Lindmark,
et al., 2008). The historical case method meets the research aims of this thesis in facil-
itating rigorous discussion on substantive contexts in which technological developments
emerged in the Irish wind industry. The nature of the case study is explanatory, and
the core empirical issue to explain the comparatively rapid rise of wind generation per
capita in Ireland. In Chapter 3 we elaborated why it is appropriate to understand this as
a case of innovation system emergence and growth in a new location. However, we also
seek instrumental explanation, that is we seek explanations of the Irish case that may be
generalisable to other cases, such as other fast-follower countries. According to George
and Bennett (2005, p. 5) the case study approach is suitable for this purpose as a “detailed
examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations
that may be generalisable to other events”.
This is a problem focussed research agenda, we started with the requirement to explain
the empirical case of wind technology growth in Ireland. Through reviewing the literat-
ure discussed in Chapter 3 we ‘diagnosed’ the empirical case as that of a fast-follower
emergent wind technological innovation system. Furthermore, this is a ‘most likely’ to
case (Flyvbjerg, 2006), where given Ireland’s natural resource endowments, open market
economy and global flows of knowledge and finance, we might expect global and localised
innovation system activity to take place under the right conditions.1
The case is defined as ‘a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context’
(Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 25). The case is, they state, ‘your unit of analysis’ (ibid.).
According to the TIS framework, the unit of analysis is the system. The framework incor-
porates instrumental explanation through explaining systemic change in terms of system
functions and structure, and the empirical wind RES gives us a template with which to
1Of course, this ‘most-likely’ perspective is somewhat limited and does not account for why Ireland
did not earlier lead in development when similar sized country (e.g. Denmark) did, so the thesis is tested.
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bind the case temporally, sectorally and geographically. In order to understand the sys-
tem, and how change happens in the system we must account for the components and
processes. This we do in terms of time, 1990 to 20142, and geography, we have already
specified our focal system is that of Ireland3. We also bind the case in terms of industry
sector, electricity, and political level, in this case subnational, national and European
policy relating to the Irish wind RES.
4.1.2 Process theory and narrative methods
Analysis using the TIS framework is accomplished using process theory4. Process theories
according to (Poole et al., 2000, p. 12) “indicate how the process unfolds over time”.
Reality is not assumed to be a steady state (Pettigrew, 1997, p. 338) rather, it consists
a developmental event sequence, in other words, a ‘process’ (Sminia, 2009; Langley,
1999). According to (Pedriana, 2005, p. 352), “causality, process, and explanation are
located in the timing and sequential ordering of actions and events”. Thus process theories
account for historical influences and explanations of change in context and are useful when
examining ongoing processes in which no end-point is clear, such as the roll-out of new and
still-developing technological systems. In process theory typical patterns of events, which
we can understand as variation and selective retention, are core theoretical constructs
(Van De Ven and Poole, 1995). According to Van de Ven and Poole (2005:1384):
“process theories may incorporate several different types of effects into their
explanations, including critical events and turning points, contextual influence,
formative patterns that give overall direction to the change, and causal factors
that influence the sequencing of events.”
2In practise this boundary work is achieved recursively as findings emerge from data gathering.
3While the unit of analysis is the Irish wind RES, as indicated in the discussion of relational geography
in Chapter 3, the distribution spatially and temporally extends beyond the jurisdictional limits of the Irish
border.
4Process theories are one of two fundamental models of explanation which have emerged in the social
sciences. The other, variance theories, typically explain why change happens through methods employing
assumptions of deterministic causation using statistical significance (Poole et al., 2000, p. 29). For example,
the diffusion of wind generation technologies can be explained by capturing available scale economies such
as increased returns to adoption based on increases in size and energy conversion capacity, where sufficient
data is available. As discussed in the previous chapter however, this approach is less suited to explaining
system change, where disaggregating explanations is more difficult in complex systems where there are not
clear outcomes, issues that mitigate against their use in this case.
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Analysis using these theories relies on event sequences, often located in longitudinal
data (Ragin 1997, George and Bennett 2004, Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). A num-
ber of event-based methodological approaches have been developed, including the ana-
lysis of event chains, narratives, analytical chronology, statistical analysis of event data
(Turnheim, 2012; Pettigrew, 1997; Langley, 1999; Sminia, 2009).
The analysis of narratives is a suitable process method with which to investigate both
structural and functional aspects of the Irish wind energy system. Narrative analysis
allows us to identify the generative structures that enable and constrain system processes,
or functions, by which we can account for explanatory factors that sequencing events on
their own cannot (Pentland, 1999, p. 722). Process explanations that draw on narrative
data are particularly “close” to the phenomena they purport to explain, according to
Pentland (1999, p. 721) who suggest that “actors do not just observe events, they focalise
them and create stories to explain them”. Narratives are versions of underlying ‘analytic
stories’ told from a specific point of view (Pedriana, 2005). These analytic stories are
generic descriptions of an event or set of events and their relationships. Narratives are not
simply aggregations of one event after another, but consist of subplots of themes which
guide the narrative. Narratives then are both stories – with a beginning, middle and end
with often recognisable styles of storytelling – and patterns of events; they are both data
and analytic constructs (Roe, 1994). In other words, narratives are the representation of
social action, created and promoted by actors networks and institutions to reshape future
patterns of social action (Smith and Raven, 2012).
We locate narratives in ‘texts’ which include written documents such as policies, green
papers and newspaper reports. Of course, texts such as policy papers or research articles
both incorporate narrative and in turn may be incorporated into future narratives in the
domain or industry. Take for example an energy policy document which outlines renew-
able energy production targets to be met by the year 2020. The text of the policy may
incorporate narratives such as the dangers of the effects of climate change. In turn, this
policy may become part of a future narrative giving confidence to investors in renewable
technologies. By analysing narratives, we gain insight into the structure and functions of
the Irish wind energy system in a number of ways. We identify narrative voice, evaluative
context and other indicators of locational context in the narratives and underlying ana-
lytic story. Often these occur acts of framing and reframing, where individual actors or
coalitions evoke common “schemata of interpretation” (Goffman, 1974, p. 21) in order to
strategically render certain meanings to events or occurrences (Benford and Snow, 2000).
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These in turn, and in aggregate, give us a rich qualitative perspective of generating mech-
anisms. These levels of analysis are summarised with examples in Table 4.1. Furthermore,
narratives aid our inquiry into the locational characteristics of the system. Narratives are
created by actors in locations using a societal and often sectoral repository of language
and myth with which society exercises consensus understood by other actors (Roe, 1994).
One aspect of the analysis then is identifying how narratives are created, re-framed and
performed to suit the emergent location of the system. Thus our analysis begins with the
identification of relevant texts, in which narratives are located.
Table 4.1 Levels of narrative analysis
Level Definition Example Locational and other rel-
evant narrative charac-
teristics
Text Particular telling of a
story by a specific
narrator.
“Well put it like this the reason
why wind has become so important
is because private developers are
driving it. If the private developers
could drive private heat or
transport I bet you it would be a
lot further along but they are much
more reliant on government policy
to some extent or other. There was
a big district heating project
turned down by An Bord Pleana´la
recently just down the road here...”
-Interview 130503
The actor and their location
is identified. Wind framed
as a sector driven by private
developer.
Narrative Version of an analytic
story from a specific
point of view
Private developers are the primary
actor-group responsible for the
growth of the wind industry
National government policy
is and has negatively in-
fluenced the growth of
wind technologies. Local
planning decisions are
preventing technological
growth and diffusion
Analytic
Story
Generic description of a
particular set of events
and their relationships.
Different actor groups influence to
the emergence and growth of the
wind RES in Ireland.
Events and relations are of-
ten located in a specific
place
Generating
mechanisms
Underlying structures
that enable or constrain
the analytic story.
The entrepreneurial activity
function contributes to the
emergence of the wind system in
Ireland
National and local govern-
ment, firms, publics influ-
ence system processes
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4.1.3 Narratives and system activity
Through narrative analysis we gain analytic insight on how actors and networks influence
and are influenced by events, from which the structural and functional analysis can then
proceed. The goal of the narrative method is to identify the underlying generative mech-
anisms which produce the analytic stories of which the narratives are representative. In
this task we follow (Pentland, 1999, p. 721) who suggests:
“First, we need to pay attention to all aspects of narrative-not just sequence.
Although event-sequence data are central to process, they are insufficient to
tell a whole story. Other aspects of narrative, such as focal actors, narrative
voice, evaluative context, and other indicators of context, are needed. Second,
we need to be aware of the fact that stories may be their own best explanation.
That is, agents may be actively attempting to reproduce particular templates
of action that arise from their culture, their education, or their own experience.
”
Actors and networks or coalitions of actors produced narratives for different audiences
in different contexts for different purposes (Smith and Raven, 2012, p. 15). In other
words, narratives are not objective representations of sequences of events; actors produce
different narratives based on competing interests, in different locations and for specific
purposes. Through the analysis of narratives and their characteristics, created or diffused
by relevant actors, we generate insight on the aspects of the wind energy system located in
Ireland that the actors themselves consider important and endogenous (Garud, Gehman,
and Giuliani, 2014, p. 1185).
Narrative analysis also provides the basis for assessing the institutions of the wind
energy system. Narratives often incorporate a particular framing of a system and its
dynamics, and suggest particular ways in which these should progress to bring about a
desired set of outcomes (Leach et al., 2010, p. 371). According to Smith and Raven (2012)
“discursive strategies for institutional reforms are more likely to involve broader
issues and problem frames, and relating (simplified) representations of the in-
novation in relation to them, as a part of a solution to broader social, envir-
onmental and economic challenges.”
Thus narratives may be deployed by actors to criticise and reframe arguments away from
historical associations. In short to align or dis-align goals, behaviours and attitudes with
the interests of actors in the wind RES. Again, conflicting interests can often be evidenced
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in competing narratives5, located in texts at industry conferences, academic journals, gov-
ernment consultations other events and in policy documents. We pay special attention to
policy narratives, which make claims to tell what will happen if a policy prescription is
followed (Roe, 1994). Accordingly, narrative certainty is often independent of representa-
tional certainty. This means a policy narrative is not debunked through truth, but rather,
through the consideration of a plurality of policy narratives in the analytic story6.
Thus we view policies and policy changes as a succession of new stories which actors
interpret and re-interpret and through narrative analysis of the policy positions we seek to
identify the underlying structures of belief, perception and appreciation which according
to Scho¨n and Rein (1995) are usually tacit and outside of the conscious thought of actors
engaged in policy debates. Following the locating in the texts of narratives relative to the
Irish wind RES, the analysis proceeds with the construction of the case narrative. This
is a form of meta-narrative from which succeeding analysis and evaluation is done (Roe,
1994). The purpose of the narrative explanation is not to explain everything possible, but
rather to distil and capture the explanatory content of the narrative, drawing on points
that are relevant and sidelining those that are not. The case narrative clarifies sequences of
events across geographic levels of analysis and is used to identify causal linkages between
levels. (Pettigrew, 1990, p. 280). Furthermore, the case narrative facilitates analytic
focussing on specific aspects of the case.
The narrative method used in this thesis is summarised in Table 4.2, where it is
contrasted with event history analysis. Event history analysis is often used by TIS analysts
(Negro et al., 2007; Suurs, 2009), and differs in a number of ways from the approach to
narrative analysis outlined above. First, the unit of analysis is the event, rather than the
narrative, where an event is an instance of rapid change with respect to actors, institutions
and/or technology; which is the work of one or more actors; and which carries some public
importance with respect to the system under investigation. Taking this approach results
in some deviations in methodological process and output. For example, in this thesis, the
5Care must be taken with this assessment. Narratives are sometimes powerful when they can incor-
porate or accommodate different interests e.g. narratives of nationalism in relation to labour and capital
for example.
6A critical realist stance is taken in the thesis, which asserts the existence of a reality independent of
our knowing of it (Bhaskar, 1979). The need to convincingly interpret the material reality of others comes
into the analysis. However, following Roe, the causality of interest to our analysis is that of a ‘proximate
nature’, namely the parties to a given controversy take as a given the uncertain and complex nature of the
topics they are debating (1994:10). A ‘better’ analytic story then is one which from the perspective of the
analyst is deliberately methodologically tolerant of a plurality of narratives.
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strength of functions are assessed based on the qualitative nature of the events and how
they are framed in the narrative, rather than through aggregate counts of classified events7.
This approach specifically enables an attribution of causal links across geographic levels
where is may be inappropriate to compare aggregates of events in a lead jurisdiction with
that of a fast follower. Furthermore, events may feature in more than one narrative, and
the cause – as well as the interpretation of its causes and consequences – of these events
may be contested. Indeed, the narratives employed in contesting the events provide useful
information on the actors involved. Crucially for this specific case, event history analysis
backgrounds the role of institutions in the system (Suurs, 2009), whereas the approach
taken in this thesis specifically sets out to investigate the narratives that actors employ
to institutionalise and deinstitutionalise knowledge and activities in the Irish wind RES.
Institutions are at the heart of this analysis.
4.2 The case evidence
4.2.1 Sources and collection of data
The most powerful tool to assess narratives and processes are in-depth interviews and
qualitative context analysis (Sydow et al., 2012; Yin, 2012). Both were employed in this
research8. Initial studies in global wind technology development, the Irish energy sector
and previous studies using the technological innovation system literature led to the creation
of an initial historical timeline, the identification of significant sub-national, national and
transnational events and influential or powerful actors. These acted as initial core data
sets from which we strategically and iteratively accumulated further data. Narratives were
located in texts in, for example, press releases, policy papers, mainstream and industry
media articles and parliamentary records. These sources are summarised in Table 4.3.
Influential or powerful actors do not always commit to text, stories about themselves
or their role in innovation processes. Therefore, semi-structured interviews were conduc-
ted with experts from appropriate wind RES stakeholder groups, with the exception of
the current government whose role was assessed through interviews with policy experts,
retired civil servants, retired politicians and evidence in the academic literature. Inter-
views were in-depth and ascertained personal histories and roles in the development of the
wind RES as well as specific questions about actor strategies and institutional influences.
Interview participants are listed in Table 4.4. Interviews were semi-structured, with core
7See Subsection 4.2.2 for details of how this was achieved.
8See Subsection 4.2.2 for details of how this was achieved.
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Table 4.3 Primary and secondary sources of evidence
Evidence Nature of data Sources
Interviews In-depth, semi structured interviews –
Submissions to regulat-
ory processes
Written submissions to consultations and other reg-
ulatory processes from TIS stakeholders and other
actors
CER website, personal cor-
respondence
Planning data Comprehensive time series data of planning applica-
tions made by wind farm developers
SEAI Statistical Unit
Policy documents Policy documents such as bills, directives, regulations
and consultation process papers
Irish government, European
Commission
Da´il records Full text of relevant parliamentary proceedings in
which wind and electricity sector feature in discus-
sions
Irish parliamentary data-
base
Newspaper reports Full newspaper articles LexisNexis database
Industry websites and
magazines
Industry news, events, workshops, issues and press
releases.
LexisNexis database, in-
dustry yearbooks
Conference proceedings
and agenda
Notable speakers, thematic programming, agendas,
industry news and workshop titles
Industry associations and
websites
Industry reports Attitudes to industry issues, proposed solutions, rel-
evant actors listed
Industry associations and
websites
Operational wind farm
data
Time series data on wind farms, including location,
activation data, owner, developer, turbine specifica-
tions, installed generation capacity
EirGrid, ESB Networks,
IWEA, internet searches
Academic journal art-
icles
Academic articles Bibliographic search using
Scopus
sets of thematic questions addressed to interviewees based on their geographic and sec-
toral location. These were transcribed and analysed using qualitative analysis software.
Subsequent narrative based analytic tasks were carried out on the interview data as fur-
ther themes emerged. Case interviews were conducted over the course of numbers trips
to Ireland and Brussels and further telephone and email conversations took place with a
number of interview participants, the purpose of which was elaboration or clarification of
certain details. The database of interview text was the primary source from which narrat-
ives were analysed. These were checked against the periodicals and other media sources
for additional, confounding or amplifying evidence.
A rich collection of narrative texts was gathered. Research on Irish wind generation
has increased significantly since the first half of the 2000s. Because of this, a rich reposit-
ory of secondary data is available for the second half of the study9. However, while policy,
9Essentially a collection of narratives about narratives,
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Table 4.4 List of case interviewees
Code Role
121201 Energy economist in a university
130102 Senior executive, domestic utility
130103 Senior executive, non-domestic utility
130104 Senior executive, domestic utility
130201 Policy strategist, government quango
130202 Former civil servant
130203 Engineer / practitioner, private practice
130204 Head of Ireland division, turbine manufacturer
130205 Energy consultant
130206 Energy economist in a university
130207 Academic
130208 Engineer / practitioner
130501 Economist in social policy think tank
120502 Energy academic, statistician
130522 Energy academic, engineer
130503 Developer and long-term owner of wind farm
firm
130504 Chair / co-founder wind industry association
130701 CEO system operator
130717 Consultant wind farm developer
130703 Former senior civil servant
130722 CEO indigenous wind farm developer
130705 Planning consultant, academic at a university
130706 Former minister
130707 Energy academic
140714 System operator executive
140801 Energy policy advisor, private consultancy
140802 Energy policy advisor, civil society organisa-
tion, Brussels
150101 CEO, energy market services firm
economic and electrical engineering analysis is prevalent, the evidence suggests that rather
less innovation studies literature exists on the topic. A systematic review of this literat-
ure was carried out. 215 relevant journal papers were identified using Scopus10. Results
10The following is one example of the type of query used: “TITLE-ABS-KEY(“wind“ NEAR “ireland”
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were then exported to a local database and analysed for narratives, concepts, empirical
setting, findings and so on. Furthermore, metadata such as academic affiliation and col-
laborations contributed to our knowledge of research networks and partnerships. These
searches precluded books and book chapters, however, the snowballing method ensured a
sufficient breadth of discovery. Policy documents in addition to formal bills and laws from
the European Union, the Irish government and county councils were integrated into the
case database. These were useful for chronological facts and cross checking, but suscept-
ible to selective deposit and survival. Submissions to regulatory consultations run by the
regulator, the CER, provided useful lists of actor networks and publicly stated positions.
Finally, a full-text database of Irish and international periodicals for the period 1990 -
2013 was assembled using the search tool Lexis Nexis. A list of publications returned is
detailed in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5 Data searches of the Lexis Nexis database
Publication type Date Texts returned
FT, Platts Renewables, newsletters 1990 - 2013 418
Irish mainstream media publications e.g. National
newspapers, business and finance magazines, news
websites.
1990 - 1999 488
Industry reports, Windpower Monthly 1990 - 2007 86
Industry reports, Windpower Monthly 2008 - 2013 17/11 498
Irish mainstream media publications 1990 - 1999 230
Irish mainstream media publications 1990 - 11/11/2013 208
Two sets of non-narrative data was integrated into the analysis. First a database of
operational wind farm data was constructed, sourced from IWEA, SEAI, EirGrid and
ESB Networks. This was a comprehensive ownership and developer information, technical
specifications and connection dates for ∼188 wind farms. Second, a dataset of 983 wind
farm planning applications from 1990 to 2013 was used to assess actor activity at the wind
farm planning stage. Each application contained data on the wind farm developer, the
application date, and the planning decision. In all, an archive of over 900 digital artefacts
AND “electricity”) AND (PUBYEAR = 2005 OR PUBYEAR = 2006 OR PUBYEAR = 2007 OR PUB-
YEAR = 2008 OR PUBYEAR = 2009 OR PUBYEAR = 2010 OR PUBYEAR = 2011 OR PUBYEAR
= 2012 OR PUBYEAR = 2013 OR PUBYEAR = 2014)”.
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was assembled, including maps, photographs, conference proceedings, technical specifica-
tions, newspaper data, and other miscellany. Validation of this data was iteratively carried
out throughout the research process, triangulating through the case narrative, actor nar-
ratives, secondary sources and data.
4.2.2 Locating and constructing narrative
The analysis of the evidence proceeded through steps of textual (or content) analysis,
contextual analysis and through the function analysis of the TIS framework, interpretive
sociological explanation11. The content of the evidentiary texts was assessed for what
was said, the events and actors that were referred to and their relevance to the story of
Irish wind. The analysis of context was pragmatic, the goal was to inquire as to why
and also how (i.e. by what social processes) the narrative text has been produced and for
what purpose (with regard to the Irish wind RES). Texts were interpreted on the basis of
author and focal actor characteristics such as the framing of events, positions, intended
audiences, and the contexts of the text production (or interview situation). Within the
narrative analysis, it was not only important to account for subject positions and intended
audiences, but also for structure positions, whereby the analysis of the narratives revealed
which structural elements were ‘in play’, and what institutions remained fixed (Hajer,
1995, p. 55). Finally, the emergence of new narratives at points in the study may indicate
social or political change.
The findings were assessed for both within-case validity and in comparison with findings
in the literature. Points of uncertainty were returned to and the evidence interrogated
afresh, or new evidence gathered, until we achieved stability in the historical account
of the development of wind generation in the Ireland. Points of departure from expected
findings were returned to for further in-depth analysis. Coding of the texts took two forms,
first open-ended, in which emergent narratives were identified. In parallel, a number of
pre-defined codes were utilised in order to identify theoretical concerns such as system
functions, locations and actor relations. A database of case narratives was constructed
from the analysis. Examples of typical texts and narrative coding are given in Table 4.6.
11In practise, these steps of textual analysis, contextual analysis and interpretation took place simul-
taneously with analysis going back and forth between levels rather than in a linear step-wise pattern.
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4.3 Operationalising the framework
4.3.1 Focusing the analysis
Given the substantial available data, and considerable scope for analysis afforded by the
TIS framework, it is appropriate to focus the analysis on specific aspects of the problem.
Three aspects of the research already discussed inform the focussing strategy. First, actors
in the Irish wind RES in aggregate focalise many of the issue areas we need to analyse
via narratives they construct and re-produce. We have discussed how actors themselves
draw attention to aspects of the system they think important. As such, an important
indicator of analytic depth required is gained from evidence in the narratives of what
actors themselves think is significant. Second, the case narrative consists of empirically
intriguing perspectives which are examined. These perspectives have been introduced in
Chapter 2 and are explicitly stated and discussed further following the detailed narrative
history presented in Chapter 5. Third, the literature review has shown us where docu-
mentation of system development is appropriate, and where there may be contested areas
in which further analytic work is required. These approaches are further informed by the
overarching aims of the thesis, to explain the rapid emergence of the wind RES in Ireland.
In combination, these approaches offer a robust assessment scheme to focus the ana-
lytical efforts. Furthermore, the combinatorial nature of these three approaches allows
assumptions be tested along the way. Thus the analytic requirements of the framework
are met in some cases by documenting aspects of the system development, whilst other
more contentious aspects are analysed in greater detail.
4.3.2 Structural analysis
The core task in analysing the (TIS) structure is evaluating the alignment of institutions
with actors in the Irish wind RES. This entails three tasks, the first of which is con-
structing the ensemble of institutions. The components of the system are identified in the
evidence and an analytic ensemble of institutions is built. To assemble this ensemble, we
compile policies, regulations, values, norms, beliefs relevant to the RES and disaggregated
by geographic levels, in Ireland and Europe. These are mapped over time from 1990 to
2014 and ordered according to geographic level and institutional type, so that we have
three discernible groupings, European regulatory, Irish regulatory and Irish informal insti-
tutions. Second, the shared system goals (or needs) of actors are assessed from narratives,
the underlying analytic stories, and analysis of the case narrative for each phase of de-
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velopment. Third, we assess the influence of the institutional ensemble on actor goals
in order to assess alignment and changes to alignment over time. This analysis gives us
a perspectives on the nature of change in the system structure over time, including the
speed of institutional change, and a whether that change was endogenously or exogenously
directed and influenced by which actors and events. Ultimately this allows us assess the
consistency and inconsistency of institutions at different phases of the history, something
we do not a priori assume to be constant over time and space.
The evidence required for the institutional analysis is found in texts created by actors,
of lobbying of and by policy actors and other policy processes, and through other historical
accounts. As we have discussed, the actors in the Irish wind RES are not a homogenous
group. The required level of institutional analysis necessitates the gathering of details from
the evidence of who these actors are, their capabilities and opportunities they perceive in
the system. In the analysis we delineate this evidence along both sectoral (i.e the wind
industry) and geographic lines; we expect that knowledge of local geographies, cultures and
institutions create certain advantages. Special attention is paid to formal networks such
as industry associations and advocacy coalitions which often have political agendas and
again, indigenous and transnational networks are identified. In summary, the structural
analysis builds on the rich description of the development of the wind RES given in the
case narrative to explain how the institutions of the system changed over time, and how
they aligned with the goals and needs of actors who make up the system.
A set of core analytic stories – the generic description of events and their relationships
– were (analytically) constructed12 as part of the process of analysing the actor narratives
These are summarised in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7 Analytic stories of Ireland’s wind system
Ref. Analytic story Exemplary narrative/text
A-01 The interpretation of Ireland’s
wind resource endowment
ESB research suggests 2.5GW RET possible on Irish grid (S1-315)
12This followed a process of mapping and analysing approximately 150 narratives found in the interview
text and in the database of documentary sources.
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A-02 The influence of EU techno-
logy demonstration and support
schemes
“[The minister] was actually out here. He stood up and he was
promoting how Irish developers should apply for THERMIE grants
and there was money available from EU for these developments and
I stood up then and said “Well, what’s the point of applying for
these grants”, I said “We have these grants now” I said “but we still
can’t build, we can’t get a PPA so what’s the point? It’s just ended
up a waste of our time and the money and stuff going back to the
EU.” (Interview 130717)
A-03 The informal processes of access
to the grid
“The company has accused the state-owned Electricity Supply
Board (ESB) of restricting the development of renewable energy
because of high costs to use its network.” (S1-276)
A-04 The role of turnkey technologies
and the influence of manufactur-
ers
“The farm was built by the German company Thyssen Rheinstalh
Technik, under a turnkey arrangement, with Elsamprojekt as project
managers.” (S1-403)
A-05 Joint ventures with overseas firms Irish Thermie winners are JVs (S1-305)
A-06 The construction of the story of
what the Irish wind industry is
“The reason why wind has become so important is because private
developers are driving it. If the private developers could drive
private heat or transport I bet you it would be a lot further along
but they are much more reliant on government policy to some extent
or other.” (Interview 130503)
A-07 IWEA’s role in the wind industry ”Developer firms shout the loudest at IWEA meetings, have the
most influence, bang fists on tables” (Interview 130204).
A-08 Planning regulations (as barriers) “At the same time, we have spatial planning to the extent of pro-
tecting certain areas, or designated areas through the SAC and SPA
directives. So special areas of conservation are very stringent and
they come directly from Europe.” (Interview 130705)
A-09 National technology support
mechanisms
Airtricity announce they are to start domestic development work
again following the introduction of the REFIT (S1-215)
A-10 The EU market liberalisation
agenda
“We [DCENR] turned the ESB around, we turned its strategic dir-
ection around. It was easier to do that because they were kind of
reading it in a, from a variety of different streams [referring to the
EU].” (Interview 130706)
A-11 The influence of macro economic
growth
“Most experts agree that demand for electricity will far outstrip
supply in the next few years and there have been suggestions of a
700 megawatt gap in supply terms, we are undertaking our activities
against that background.” (S4-37)
A-12 The influence of the RESG “...policy-wise that was the most significant development that took
place and everything that happened derived from that.” (Interview
130501)
A-13 The influence of the moratorium
on the Irish wind sector
“The commission introduced a moratorium on new connection offers
to renewable energy projects in December 2003 following exponen-
tial growth in applications for connections to the national grid, in
particular from wind farm projects.” (s1-221)
A-14 The influence of the CER’s regu-
lation of industry
“The CER was saying ‘Look, I’m not responsible for the law. I’m
following the law here.’ (Interview 130703)
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A-15 The influence of Irish research The influence of the younger people and in particular the PhD. stu-
dents who would have been those of Mark O’ Malley’s, they started
to have a big influence in EirGrid and even though ESB was less
positive [the graduates] were very significant in terms of ’look at
what’s happening, this thing has real potential’...” (Interview)
A-16 European energy policy and pro-
cesses
“...but ultimately the evolution of the sector is being driven by
Europe and European target.” (Interview 130103)
A-17 The grid allocation process Gate 1 selection criteria straightforward, and fair (Leahy, 2010)
A-18 The role of the SEM “The single energy market, there was a political and other commit-
ment and, well, I suppose what began to happen then is that forced
the issue around the different approach to renewable in Ireland and
the UK.” (Interview 130703)
A-19 The impact of the recession “that was pure financial cost of money for banks was just too ex-
pensive and there was no long term money out there or whatever.
Which again, introduced an additional risk factor into the project
finance in that nobody knew what’s going to be there in ten years”
(interview 130722)
A-20 Industry consolidation Headline: “Big boys lead development pack”. (reNews Ireland Fo-
cus, 20 June, 2013)
A-21 Wind as export commodity Wind for export will create jobs according to Mainstream
A-22 The impact of increased intercon-
nection
“It’s critical for our delivery of targets on wind energy ... the levels of
curtailment that ehm would occur to meet our 2020 targets without
the East West Interconnector would be unacceptably high and it
would be infeasible to finance wind farms.” (Interview 130201)
4.3.3 Summarising the analytic strategy
A number of analytic tasks have been discussed in this chapter, the aggregate goal of
which is to produce an understanding of the systemic dynamics of the emergent wind
RES within and between Ireland and transnational players. We bring these together here
in summarising the overall process of analysis employed in the thesis. First, evidence con-
taining narrative texts is gathered from sources. Narratives within the text, which frame
processes relevant to the wind RES in Ireland, are analysed and a range of characteristics
recorded. The narratives contribute to a case database of analytic stories, narratives and
characteristics. Narrative evidence of these processes are collated into a case narrative his-
tory. We now have two analytically constructed sources for our analysis of the structure
and functions of the innovation system. The analysis of the structure of the Irish wind
RES proceeds through the documenting of the activities and goals of the actors and actor
networks and the construction of an analytic ensemble of institutions. I identify when and
under what circumstances and actor strategies the ensemble of institutions is aligned (or
misaligned) to the goals of wind RES actors. The function analysis follows. The strength
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of the functions are assessed through qualitative analysis of the actors’ accounts of sys-
tem events. The Irish and transnational re-production of the functions is dis-aggregated
and the system function mapping is done though following the individual functions in
the narrative history along with other ancillary evidence where required. This functional
pattern is internally compared though the phases of development of the system, and is
externally compared against other studies which have used the technological innovation
system framework. The system level assessment of system functionality, and inducement
and blocking mechanisms is made.
Based on the extended theoretical framework, I present my overarching scheme of
analysis (Figure 4.1). Relevant findings from this analysis are discussed over the course of
the next three chapters. In Chapter 5 we introduce the case narrative, focussing on aspects
of the development of the wind RES in Ireland. In Chapter 6 the actors, networks and
institutions are analysed, focussing on the causes and impacts of institutional alignment
between the wind RES actors and structural and contextual institutions. In Chapter 7
I discuss the function analysis, assessing the distributed nature of the functions and the
result this has on the pace and nature of the development of the wind RES. Throughout
the analysis I make use of the rich case narrative (indicated in the Figure 4.1 by the
circular flow of some processes within the analysis), though this analysis is discussed in a
linear manner to accommodate the material nature of the thesis.
4.3.4 Function analysis and narrative performance
The function analysis builds on the detailed structure analysis. It follows closely the
scheme of analysis presented in the review of the literature. In describing the operational-
ising of the framework we therefore focus on aspects of geography and narrative that are
novel to this research. The first task is identifying and assessing the strength of the system
functions. Evidence for this task is found primarily in the narratives of the actors. Where
this is insufficient, the case narrative is used to draw insight on how a particular function
is performing. I consider the assessment of function strength in detail. The identification
of system processes or related activities in the case narrative or other evidence analytically
guide us to system functions (see the tables presented for each system function in Chapter
3). It is not only the quantity and scale of given events that allow us to assess the strength
of functions in the system but how these events are framed in the narrative. Take for ex-
ample the mobilisation of resources function. A exemplary event indicating the presence
or strengthening of this function is a bank loan. The cumulative number of loans made
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Figure 4.1. The case-specific scheme of analysis
during a given period is therefore an indication of the strength of this function. Qualitative
characteristics of this event also matter. For example, which financial organisations lent
these loans, the conditions of repayment, favourable or negative attitudes of developers to
these loans, characteristics of developers who received loans and those that did not are all
relevant details of the function we might find in the narratives. To determine the strength
of the function, we use an assessment of the framing in the narrative, arrived at in an
iterative and abductive manner. This approach allows for both the documentation and
in-depth analysis of functions where required.
The literature has strongly suggested that emergent locally specific TIS are often de-
pendent on distributed system formation processes. Therefore the geographic distribution
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of the functions are mapped using locational detail produced during the narrative analysis
of the functions and emergent structural analysis. We carry out an internal compar-
ison between Irish and transnational functions, in turn addressing the role of location in
functions and assess which functions are produced locally and which functions must be
produced locally. We also compare function mapping derived from this case with others
TIS-based analysis in the literature in order to provide some indication of why system
development in one location may proceed at a different pace and with different system
characteristics to others. Finally inducement and blocking mechanisms are analysed. The
structural analysis has identified relevant actors and institutions. From the evidence we
identify strategies and motivations for how and why actors engage in these mechanisms
and assess the impact of these mechanisms against the performance of the Irish wind RES.
Finally, since the function analysis is based on narrative analysis, the methodology
can be strengthened by pointing out how narrative matters and performs. The starting
point here is that coalitions form around analytic storylines, bringing with them their own
narratives (Hajer, 1995). If specific narratives mobilised by actors or coalitions consider
a TIS function to be weak, then this may indicate mobilization and activity to address
that function, either to strengthen it, or if the coalition is in opposition, to weaken the
function. By working with the narrative evidence mobilised, we can trace that activity
and see who is doing this. This provides valuable insight into coalition composition, and
crucially, how that composition changes over time. This is useful for example in identifying
when incumbent actors shift, sometimes slowly and in a piecemeal fashion, from positions
of opposition to support Indeed, this is something that an event analysis misses entirely.
Wrapping up
This chapter has explained how how the conceptual perspectives discussed in the research
framework are mobilised in order to address the research task. Process theory is an appro-
priate approach to take, and we discussed at length a suitable form of narrative analysis
with which to carry this out. Indeed, with greater emphasis on actor narratives, the case-
specific methodology proposed brings with it certain advantages over an alternative event
history analysis approach common in many technological innovation system studies, par-
ticularly in studies of later stage innovation processes, such as this. The case evidence was
introduced, locations to find and identify relevant texts, in which narratives are located.
The thesis offered a robust and practical scheme to focus the analytical efforts, in which
the analytic requirements of the framework are met in some cases by documenting aspects
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of the system development, whilst other more contentious aspects are analysed in greater
detail. Approaches to structural analysis and functional analysis were Finally, we docu-
mented the core analytic stories – the generic description of events and their relationships
– which were (analytically) constructed as part of the the process of analysing the actor
narratives.
The scheme of analysis presented here underpins the entire thesis. As discussed above,
the process of discover and analysis was iterative rather than linear. However, for the
purpose of clarity, the processes and findings of these analyses are set out in clear sequential
order over the next three chapters. The narrative history of Chapter 5 highlights actor
narratives and conveys to the reader the salient features of the Irish wind electricity system.
Chapter 6 organises and discusses the structural analysis and Chapter 7 does the same
with the functional analysis. We briefly remark on the utility of the scheme, and the
research framework, when wrapping up in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 5
A narrative history of Ireland’s
wind energy system
This chapter is a narrative historical account of the development of the Irish wind sector.
Through the narrative we discuss the actors, institutions and technology which influenced
the establishment of the wind industry in the 1990s and the rapid roll-out of technologies
through the 2000s. In short, it tells the story of who did what to whom in relation to
the emergence of Irish wind energy system. The focus in telling this story is on the
actors, institutions and technologies in Ireland and influential flows of actors, resources
and knowledge across its borders. Wider social and economic contexts are introduced
and discussed where appropriate. The stories of the case narrative are organised using
a periodisation scheme. This theory-driven periodisation technique is methodologically
common to many innovation systems studies and to narrative histories more generally (e.g.
Hekkert, Suurs, et al. (2007)). I have defined four periods in the study (see Figure 5.1)
through reflexive interpretation of the historical data, and guided by previous empirical
studies and the wider literature.1 This periodisation scheme is further utilised in the
analysis chapters, six and seven, as an heuristic tool with which differentiate phases of
system development, primarily from a structural perspective (i.e. reflecting the actors,
institutions and technologies within the system, rather than system processes), to address
evidence and narratives in historical context.
1 O´ Gallacho´ir, Bazilian, et al. (2010) have provided a useful template in this regard. Their com-
prehensive treatment of early policy instruments aligns with the first three phases of development in this
thesis.
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Figure 5.1. Periods of development used to organise the narrative history of the Irish wind industry.
The case narrative is made up of collated stories located in evidentiary texts and inter-
views. From these we identified the premises and beliefs of actors which in turn provides
analytic evidence about the underlying innovation processes and causal relations within
and influencing the wind sector. Narratives featuring renewable technologies in Ireland
have been located in studies of demonstration projects and nuclear debates of the 1980s
(Staudt, 2000; Hurley Staudt Associates, 1988), the oil crises of the 1970s, and as far
back as Siemens’ work on damming the Shannon river in the 1920s (Shiel, 1984). This
research picks up those narrative strands in the 1990s as Irish actors begin the commer-
cial exploitation of wind. We lead-off each chapter section with a graphic illustrating the
plant diffused during that period. The intention is not to privilege the material over other
aspects of the innovation system, but rather to set the scene before showing the other
components and activities that were brought together.
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Figure 5.2. Scale and location of wind farms built 1992-1999. Source: EirGrid, IWEA, Meithel na
Gaoithe, SEAI.
5.1 Period 1: 1990 - 1999
5.1.1 Demonstration and development
Bellacorrick, Ireland’s first modern wind farm, was connected to the national grid in 1992.2
The project was built on land owned by the state peat utility Bord na Mo´na located close
to an existing thermal plant in the north west of Ireland (illustrated by the most westerly
diamond in Figure 5.2(A). It consisted consisted 20 turbines totalling 6.45MW generating
capacity. The surrounding topography was ideally suited to the construction of masts,
wind speed was excellent and existing network infrastructure made connection to the
national grid affordable3. As both a demonstration and commercial project, Bellacorrick
was regarded as a success by many of the actors in the nascent sector and it forms part
2Source: S1–420
3Existing grid infrastructure was critical to the success of early projects and in this case the site was
co-located with a peat-burning thermal power station which meant connecting to the Transmission Service
Operator (TSO), ESB National Grid, was more straightforward than many subsequent builds, an issue
which was later to become a significant barrier to industry development.
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of a creation story that continues to be told4.
Bellacorrick is noteworthy because it was the first wind farm, and also because within
its narrative we can observe the disparate actors, relations and institutional influences of
a formative innovation network. The project was managed by a trans-national consortium
led by Danish power utility Elsam. The technical and commercial ‘know-how’ for the pro-
ject came from Denmark and Germany; construction was carried out by the German firm
Thyssen Rheinstalh Technik, with Elsam subsidiary Elsamprojekt as project managers.
Danish manufacturer Nordtank supplied the turbines under a turnkey arrangement and
also took an equity stake. Project costs were IR£7.1 million, 55% of which came from the
European Community, which included a VALOREN5 energy demonstration programme
grant (Burke, 1989). The wind farm was originally operated by Renewable Energy Ireland
Ltd, in which Nordtank and Elsamprojekt were the main shareholders with Bord na Mo´na
also taking IR£250,000 of preference shares in the project. Finally, the location of the
project at Bellacorrick was influenced by Ireland’s energy minister Bobby Molloy, who
was perceived by some actors6 as favouring a region close to his own nearby constituency,
East Galway7 (Byrne, 2012; Laffan, 1996). Aspects of the project were explicitly and
implicitly replicated over the course of the decade that followed. Notably joint ventures
with European engineering and wind consultancy firms were common during this time,
and European funding featured in the majority of projects built in the 1990s. Further-
more, in 1994 Nordtank sold their stake in Renewable Energy Ireland – at a profit – to
US developer New Wind Power. In doing so they implicitly demonstrated a development
model of project construction followed by the sale of the fixed asset which a number of
actors attempted to replicate.
The establishment of wind as a significant source of electricity in Ireland had been the
goal of a small number of actors stretching back through the 1970s and 1980s. Amongst
long-time actors in the sector the oil crises of the 1970s was a common reference point for
spurring interest in new low-carbon technologies, as in other locations where formative re-
4In interviews and secondary historical accounts of the industry, Bellacorrick is the single most cited
wind event in the first half of the 1990s, and continues to be used as a narrative event by actors throughout
the study.
5Council Regulation EEC No. 3301/86 27 October 1986. The cumulative European Commission
funding allocated to Ireland under the VALOREN programme (Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3301/86)
was 25 Million European Currency Units (MECU). Ireland’s share represents 6.25% of the total programme
(Burke, 1989).
6Interview 130717.
7It is a characteristic of Irish political culture that localism and clientelism is often perceived in decision
making, whether intended by the political actor or not (Byrne, 2012; Laffan, 1996).
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newable technologies have emerged (Est, 1999). Actors in Ireland were further motivated
by a belief that Ireland’s wind resources were amongst the world’s best (Gibbons, 1979;
IDA, 1978), a powerful analytic story, evidence for which was found throughout the period
of study (an early study of Ireland’s wind resources was presented in a 1978 conference
on renewable resources, page 1 and 27 of the conference programme is shown in 5.3 ). At
the end of the 1980s a small informal network of renewable energy enthusiasts were active
in Ireland (Comhar, 2011). This included a number of US and Danish nationals who
had migrated to Ireland and brought with them formal knowledge of wind technologies
and industry contacts in their home nations8. These were engineers and lay-enthusiasts
some of whom were inspired by ideas such as those of Amory Lovins (1977), and believed
small scale distributed electricity could play a role in Irish industry and society heavily
dependent on imported fossil fuels. Others meanwhile were inspired by commercial and
community level exploitation of wind resources in Denmark.
Figure 5.3. Wind water wave Conference programme. Solar Energy Society of Ireland 1978. Page 1:
front cover. Page 27: mean annual wind speed per second, 1951-1979.
While Bellacorrick was the first commercial scale plant to be built, there were other
8Interview 130707, 130717
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projects in development, also bidding for limited European and domestic demonstration
grants such as ALTENER, VALOREN and THERMIE. Through the early 1990s, these
projects led to an influx of new actors allowed a small informal network to evolve into,
what one interviewee called, a ‘cottage industry’9, with specialisation of roles and special-
ised knowledge such as engineering and grant application writing. While long-time wind
advocates continued to mobilise narratives based on sustainability and Ireland’s wind re-
sources, Bellacorrick was at the heart of new narratives about commercial opportunity
which mirrored contemporary expectations about wider industrial growth in Ireland.
At this time Ireland had little manufacturing base and no energy generation sector
apart from state owned utilities. Wind farm developers came from a variety of sectors
and brought with them a range of capabilities and access to professional networks. For
example, agricultural services firms such as South Western Services (SWS) brought with
them experience and knowledge of generating non-agricultural income from farmland10.
Property development firms such as Treasury Holdings sought opportunity where land
availability and tax incentives could be combined to generate returns.11 Furthermore,
they were capable of lobbying for changes to regulatory arrangements favourable to their
interests. Individually and often in partnership, actors contributed to the developing
sector by travelling between ancillary sectors such as finance, politics and technology in
efforts to acquire the knowledge and finance required for successful projects. Commercial
ambition was a common motivation across the sector, but some actors were also driven by a
motivations of “doing the right thing12”. A report in 1994 accounts for this entrepreneurial
development activity thus:
“An entrepreneur will typically get an option on a wind site, prove sufficient
wind capacity, get planning permission, at least in outline form which is simple
and cheap, interest a local group, probably an agricultural co-op, and a foreign
wind company, probably Nordtank or Vestas, and then sell out the interest.”13
While many actors entering the industry took a long term investment view, shorter term
speculation was also common, referred to in a derogatory manner by one interviewee as a
9Interview 130202
10Interview 130722
11Interview
12Interviewee 120202 made a point that despite reputations as tough deal makers focussed on commercial
success, for some property speculators wind investments were made in part because of environmental or
social concerns.
13Financial Times Energy Newsletters, 12 August 1994
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‘land-grab’14.
The Bellacorrick development model also served as a beacon to other overseas firms
that Ireland’s wind resource endowment was capable of being exploited. The project team
that developed the Tursillagh wind farm in Kerry is illustrative of an emerging transna-
tional partnership model. Tursillagh was a 50/50 joint venture between Kerry-based start-
up firm Saorgus and UK utility Power Gen Renewables. In this case, Saorgus already had
a site located and knew the county planning application process. They required Power
Gen to bring in the project construction and financing knowledge in order to win an Irish
government-backed capital grant. Power Gen also supplied an engineering consultant15
and equity finance as well as bridging finance which was required under some Irish grant
schemes. However experience acquired developing wind farms in other countries did not
guarantee success in Ireland as the following example shows:
“One particular example was a company who were based in the States and had
absolutely no local knowledge so they proposed a wind farm and it got offered
one of these contracts on Slieve na mBan on the mountain in Tipperary, there
were songs written about that mountain, there was no way in hell it was gonna
have a chance. They withdrew the planning application rather than waiting
for the rejection, so it was an interesting dynamic where you had a project
that had secured a contract if you like, if it could get off the ground, but the
planning process happened afterwards you know and this was another thing
that was characteristic of wind energy.”16
This narrative text illustrates the speculative nature of the industry in Ireland. Evid-
ence of prospective commercial activity at this time has been documented in planning
application records.17 In total throughout the 1990s, 48 individual actor groups submit-
ted planning applications to county councils for 68 wind farms18 (see 5.4). Motivations
and drivers of actor behaviour were the perception of successful business models, a favour-
14Interview 130203
15UK firm Wind Prospect were employed as engineering consultants in 47 Irish wind projects through
2014, approximately 25% of all developments.
16Interview 130522a
17A planning application dataset compiled by Sustainable Energy Ireland Statistical Unit was used in
this case.
18The low level of refused applications is notable. County planning boards were reluctant to outright
refuse planning permission, in part because during this time they had no formal guidance as to how to
address wind applications. However stringent conditions of approval were often enough to ensure projects
were financially untenable.
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able economic investment landscape and the belief that there was national and European
funding available to augment or substitute personal investments. Activity was enhanced
by two factors. First, feasibility studies could be funded by the EU’s Leader Programme,19
allowing landowners to explore the commercial viability of projects at a low cost. Second,
the cost of planning applications in many counties was negligible, and in the 1990s, many
councils did not have formal guidelines on where wind could, or could not, be built.
However, by the turn of the millennium, only ten wind farms were operational. Three
dominant barriers to development were found in the evidence; problems attaining plan-
ning permission in sufficient time to enable commercial development, access to the national
transmission grid, and the lack of availability of power purchase agreements.
Figure 5.4. Planning applications submitted to county councils throughout Ireland from 1990 to 1999.
Typically permission for development was not granted outright, but rather “conditional” on given con-
straints or requirements. Source SEAI 2013.
5.1.2 Interests, incumbents and institutions
Developments at the firm level in Ireland took place against a backdrop of large-scale
energy industry and institutional change in Ireland and throughout the European Com-
munity. Liberalisation in the United Kingdom’s energy sector in the late 1980s was ob-
served by Ireland’s state owned monopoly enterprises (Hunt, 2012). They saw aspects of
19LEADER (“Liaison Entre Actions de De´veloppement de l’E´conomie Rurale”, meaning ‘Links between
the rural economy and development actions’) is a local development method which allows local actors to
develop an area by using its endogenous development potential (European Commission, 2007b).
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the UK’s ‘free market’ agenda adopted and integrated into the EC’s single market project,
culminating in 1996 with the Electricity Directive (European Commission, 1996) which
set minimum requirements to open national markets to competition. The rationale for
open national markets was threefold; a) more competitors in a market would result in
greater competition, b) there was a presumption that all new entry to the market by new
firms was beneficial for users and c) the introduction of competition was the best means
of removing economic rents and to achieve real reductions in cost or economic efficiency
(Shuttleworth, 2000). Irish incumbent utilities such as the Electricity Supply Board (ESB)
perceived both threat and opportunity from coming market liberalisation20. Opportunit-
ies came in the form of foreign expansion into Northern Ireland, and ultimately overseas
into markets in Spain and Poland. Threats came from new competitors at home, from
renewable based generators on one hand and from new combined cycle gas turbine plant
operators on the other.
This competitive context and the liberalisation agenda forms the backdrop of formal
and informal negotiation21 between the Department for Communications, Energy and
Natural Resources22 (DCENR) and the ESB in the mid–1990s. For historical reasons
linked to their role and one of the state’s largest employers and monopoly position in
an industry without independent regulation, the ESB exerted, according to Hastings, “a
collaborative leverage against the political system” (Hastings, 2003, p. 39). In discussions
on Ireland’s energy future, the ESB – both management and unions – asserted a level of
capture over the department, countering calls for increased wind generation in the early
1990s. The utility asserted a high level of influence over both price setting and the course
that market liberalisation processes would take in Ireland. The ESB was a powerful
incumbent actor, who perceived little strategic advantage to be gained from emergent
generation technologies. As such, strategically addressing threats or opportunities from
advocates of wind energy was not a priority of the ESB senior management. However,
significant levels of wind development could not proceed without some level of buy-in
from the ESB. In a vertically integrated industry where they managed the distribution
20This view was substantiated in a number of interviews and informal conversations.
21Following a 1992 McKinsey report commissioned by themselves, the ESB consolidated internal opera-
tions into five distinct, wholly owned business units. This was followed by a contested three year cost and
competitiveness review from 1996 to 1999. This forms part of a wider national narrative of state sector
renegotiation as the wider economy went through unprecedented growth.
22The government department charged with responsibility for energy has had a number of name changes
throughout the period of study. For clarity and consistency, I refer throughout to the department name
at the end of 2013, the Department for Communications, Energy and Natural Resources (DCENR).
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and transmission networks and customer relationships, the ESB were responsible for all
new grid connections and power purchase agreements, two of the three significant barriers
faced by the industry.
The ESB’s reticence to connect new generators was manifested in contestation over
wind integration targets between the DCENR and the utility. These arguments were a
feature of policy debate over the course of the decade23 as the ESB mobilised narrative
frames suggesting the integration of commercial levels of wind power was a ‘technological
impossibility24’ (E.O’Dwyer et al., 1990). The DCENR persisted in challenging these
narratives, driven by three factors. First, increasing economic growth through the 1990s
drove electricity demand. Second, the European market, energy and environmental policy
all pointed to a need to increase the share of renewably generated electricity in the national
energy mix. Third, the Irish wind lobby, which was growing in size and voice, presented
wind as an indigenous solution to these policy problems.
A group of wind farm developers founded the Irish Wind Energy Association (IWEA)
in 1992, encouraged by the material existence of Bellacorrick, but frustrated by the slow
progress of their own projects. Through the 1990s the association was run from the homes
of members, initially on a voluntary basis and became a location for knowledge sharing,
coalition building and political lobbying25. IWEA was also a conduit for network activity
between Ireland and other European countries. In 1994 they joined the European Wind
Energy Association (EWEA), and in 1997 hosted the EWEA annual conference in Dublin
Castle, generating political and media interest at the time. IWEA welcomed new actors
into the sector and their annual conferences became a location the public declaration
of ambitions by developers, and announcement platform for policy by successive energy
ministers.
In 1993, at IWEA’s inaugural annual meeting26, energy minister Noel Tracey an-
nounced the Alternative Energy Requirement (AER), the first in a series of competitive
23Interview 130522
24The ESB utilised their own expert engineering knowledge to contest optimistic wind visions and de-
legitimise the actor groups in favour of wind technology expansion - Interview 150101 and E.O’Dwyer et al.
(1990).
25IWEA have successfully cultivated their own history (IWEA, 2013) which has become part of their
lobbying work. I have paid particular attention to triangulating this through the interview process.
26This took place in Hayden’s Hotel, Ballinasloe.
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grant schemes27 similar to the UK’s Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation28 (Huber et al., 2007;
Pearson et al., 2010; Mitchell and Connor, 2004). The first AER scheme was effective as a
signal from the DCENR to the ESB that renewable energy technologies were going to be a
part of Ireland’s future electricity generation mix. However, although 70MW of a targeted
75MW was eventually delivered under AER I, the scheme, and subsequent capital grant
schemes were criticised by IWEA and other proponents of wind technology. The nature
of these criticisms focussed on the perceived advantage given to overseas firms, who had
experience writing technical briefs and demonstrable project experience were successful in
winning the majority of AER I bids (seven of ten), but in order to win, they bid low and
subsequently could not deliver commercial projects. Only half of the ten AER I projects
were built, all of them delayed significantly. AER III29 was launched in 1997 with in-
creased targets, yet only 38MW of 90MW was installed by the end of the programme, the
deadline of which was extended a year because of slow delivery30 (O´ Gallacho´ir, Bazilian,
et al., 2010). Despite the perception of failure that continues to exist, the AER schemes
influenced the subsequent nature of development in the industry rather than the early pace
of technological deployment. First, they influenced who got to build wind farms in Ireland.
By initially imposing a minimum project scale at one megawatt, developers of small scale
projects were not supported. Second, the AER competitions encouraged formative de-
velopment activities such as the undertaking of assessments and planning applications31,
which increased indigenous knowledge in the industry, even amongst actor-groups who did
not win grants. Although increased industry activity did not result in a significant rise in
completed projects at this time, crucially, the AER process demonstrated the commercial
potential of the Irish wind industry to the DCENR and the ESB.
This demonstration of activity and potential in turn explains the considerable scaling
27The AER’s emphasis on capital grants was related to AC19m available through the European Regional
Development Fund for renewable energy projects under Ireland’s Economic Infrastructure Operational
Programme 1994–1999 (O´ Gallacho´ir, Bazilian, et al., 2010).
28Developers taking part in the AER bid for a variable capital grant and a guaranteed fixed price
(IR£0.04) 15-year power purchase agreement from ESB Customer Supply (Huber et al., 2007). The
structure of the NFFO was critiqued for its unsuccessful diffusion of renewable technology (Pearson et al.,
2010; Mitchell and Connor, 2004).
29AER II was exclusively for biofuels
30Further industry support was granted in the 1998 Finance Act made provision for capital gains tax
relief on wind farm investments (Government of Ireland, 1998) yet problems with planning applications,
the availability of grid connections and acquiring power purchase agreements remained unresolved.
31While it has not been possible to comprehensively identify failed project bids, evidence from interviews
suggest that there were approximately 100 applications under AER I and 140 applications under AER III.
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up in targets (see Figure 5.5) outlined in the 1999 Sustainable Energy Green Paper (O´
Gallacho´ir, Bazilian, et al., 2010; Government of Ireland, 1999). Despite low numbers of
successful installation, DCENR used the nascent sectoral activity to negotiate with the
ESB and defend a large increase in targets, an additional 500MW of installed capacity to
be delivered over five years. This indigenous activity was further supported by European
policies at the time. As part of the Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1997, EU members were
instructed to write and implement a National Climate Change Strategy (Department of
Communications Energy and Natural Resources, 2000; FitzGerald, 2004). The govern-
ment’s plan had two main parts, the closure of Moneypoint, a coal-fired power plant in
favour of natural gas and an additional 500MW of wind generated capacity (O´ Gallacho´ir,
Guidi, et al., 2007). Here the interests and ambitions of wind developers came up against
the incumbent barriers and institutionally framed targets. The ESB had previous con-
ceded installing 50MW of wind annually on the grid over a decade was feasible32. The
DCENR’s did not have the technical knowledge to argue the cumulative ambition, but
they did have the negotiating skills to convince the ESB halve the delivery timeframe.
Furthermore, the DCENR estimated from the level of development activity33 prompted
by AER III in 1997, that collectively, the private sector had the commercial ambition and
capabilities to develop the requisite plant.
Figure 5.5. Installed capacity of wind farms (solid red line) and policy targets (dashed blue line) 1990
to 1999 in cumulative installed capacity (MW). Source: author’s combined data.
32Interviews 130501, 130522
33The submission process received 279 expressions of interest representing a potential if improbable
1,680 MW of installed capacity. Projects totalling 155 MW had planning permission, a further 167 MW
had applications within the planning process and 217 MW declared themselves at an advanced stage of
preparation for a planning application.
114
By the end of the 1990s, Ireland had 71MW installed capacity nationally and 10 wind
farms were supplying electricity to the national grid. The DCENR faced a considerable
challenge in establishing the conditions under which the country’s 500MW wind target
could be met by 2005. It did not have the technical staff or resources to internally create
and drive a sectoral strategy to meet its own regulatory targets. However, a combination
of the submissions to AER III, the large number of planning applications, and internal
ESB research34 made a strong case that there was sufficient levels of interest and activity
in the sector to support the government targets. IWEA was active in advancing positive
claims of the capability of its members, framing demand increases as a problem for which
its members had answers35. Policy makers gained confidence that developers already had
or could put in place the project pipelines in place36 to meet these targets. Faced with
privatisation and marketisation, internal advocates for renewable technologies, and its
own research, the ESB had begun to soften its stance toward wind, and engaged in several
joint ventures with smaller firms to explore both onshore and offshore developments. The
barrier was deployment of plant. To get the wind generation technologies on the hills,
developers required a power purchase agreement, a grid connection offer and planning
permission. The ESB were the gatekeepers of the first two barriers, the complexity of
Ireland’s planning regime the third. The department’s solution was to convene a cross-
industry stakeholder forum, the Renewable Energy Strategy Group which convened for
the first time at the end of 1999.
34The Irish Times of Wednesday, June 3, 1998 reported the delayed release of a report commissioned by
ESB International, which concluded that Ireland had had sufficient renewable resources to operate 2,500
MW of installed capacity.
35For example, a 1998 report in the Financial Times Energy Newsletter (December 11th 1998) reports
IWEA’s opinion that “the Irish government could alleviate the Electricity Supply Board’s (ESB) urgent
need for more power by giving the green light to a series of wind farms which already have planning
permission”.
36Interview 130522
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5.2 Period 2: 2000 - 2004
5.2.1 The Renewable Energy Strategy Group
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Figure 5.6. Scale and location of wind farms built 1992-2004. Source: EirGrid, IWEA, Meithel na
Gaoithe, SEAI
“To me that was the turning point . . . because at that, there was an increased
understanding of the problems and there was a collective sense that ok we
are going for this, this is real and that was quite, as I would say, policy-wise
that was the most significant development that took place and everything that
happened derived from that.”
— Interviewee discusses the impact of the RESG37.
Given the relatively weak position of the DCENR within the wider energy industry38,
the minister could not mandate action on wind development unilaterally. Instead a stake-
holder approach was taken, convening a cross-industry group charged with collaboratively
authoring a strategy to deliver significantly increased installed renewable capacity to the
national grid. The Renewable Energy Strategy Group group was chaired by John Fitz
37Interview 130501
38Interview 130703
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Gerald of the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), a stakeholder from outside
the three key stakeholder groups, the ESB, the government and private industry. The
Group brought together many of the actor-groups already discussed, with a stated goal to
address barriers to further diffusion of wind technology in Ireland39 (Fitz Gerald, 2000).
The format of the group was designed to facilitate participant’s understanding of sectoral
issues which in turn were identified collectively. Systemic barriers to wind roll-out were
identified, and then a series of meetings were held. Topics included market mechanisms,
trading issues, grid connection, capacity acceptance, spatial planning (ibid.). Over six
months, report chapters on each of these barriers were written up and tested at following
meetings, quickly triangulating and consolidating knowledge developed.40 The process by
which the RESG operated was an important aspect of its success41, which was the creation
and diffusion of solution orientated knowledge relevant to specific sectoral barriers. New
wind farms commissioned during this period are illustrated in 5.6.
This example of how the RESG addressed planning regulations is illustrative of barri-
ers and solutions the RESG discussed. Planning applications for wind farm construction
were considered at the level of county councils42. Planning controversies at county level
can be seen in contemporary reports of opposition to wind farm developments. In refusing
planning permission to two wind farms in 2001, Clare County Council reiterated concerns
of resident groups stating:
“The proposed development would be seriously injurious to the amenities and
depreciate the value of properties in the vicinity of the wind farm and would
be contrary to the proper planning and development of the area.”43
In responding to the decision the developer’s consultant for the promoters of the Kilmaley
plan, one of those effected, drew attention to the role of county level policy:
39Three of the ESB’s five business units were represented, three government departments, the Irish
Planning Institute and the City and County Managers Association. Private firms were represented and
IWEA was also invited to contribute (Fitz Gerald, 2000)
40Interview 130501, 130522
41Interview 130501, 130522
42The Republic of Ireland is made up of 26 counties. The planning regime at county level can be
classed as discretionary, were an application’s success is dependant on a series of guidelines as well at the
contextual interpretation of the local planner. This contrasts with regulatory regimes in Denmark and
much of Germany where an application, if it meets set requirements, has a high likelihood of being granted
permission.
43Media source S1-271
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“It would seem on the basis of policies contained within the County Develop-
ment Plan that the council does not want wind farms in the country.”44
This is an example of how planners were confronted with novel challenges in assessing
landscape character in areas which had never been considered for industrial use previously.
Guidelines published by the Department of Environment and Local Government in 1996
were not uniformly adapted at the county level and many county planners had neither
the tools nor training required to implement these45 plans. However, despite sometimes
strong opposition to specific developments at county level, throughout the evolution of
the industry, the attitudes of the public to wind farms and the wind industry had been
generally positive (Comhar, 2011). Anecdotal evidence gathered in interviews suggests
that formally organised opposition movements were rare, though events such as the bog
burst and collapse of installed plant at Derrybrien and the siting of wind the wind farm at
Slievenamon led to localised opposition to individual projects46 (SEI, 2003a). Indeed, in
a major survey of attitudes to wind power in Ireland, little evidence of a ‘Not In My Back
Yard’ effect was found, while there was a clear preference for larger turbines in smaller
numbers over smaller turbines in larger numbers47 (ibid.).
As a result of the rapid growth of development in the industry, coupled with this dis-
cretion related uncertainty, backlogs of applications were building up in country council
offices. The RESG did not have the mandate or the political capital required to imple-
ment a regulatory planning change. However, they suggested a three phase ‘traffic light’
guidance system to guide developers but leave discretionary decision making powers with
county planners. According to an Irish planning expert familiar with the process,
“this is really Irish, the zoning system of red, orange and green doesn’t actually
mean definitely yes or no, it just gives a clue to the developer”48
These ‘clues’ for the first time linked national electricity targets to county planning
processes in a decision making framework that could be used by both developers and
planners. Ultimately planners in the group took this guidance and diffused it through the
Irish Planning Institute and County Planners associations and through the subsequent
Planning Act (Government of Ireland, 2000).
44Media source S1-271
45Interiview 130705
46Interview 130503
47These findings were endorsed by (Warren et al., 2005); who found that in location in Ireland studied,
local people become more favourable towards windfarms after construction and that the NIMBY effect did
not adequately explain variations in public attitudes.
48Interview 130705
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The Renewable Energy Strategy Group overcame disagreement and barriers, building
consensus where it could and distributing new knowledge and processes through existing
institutional structures, of which participants were already a part. The group presen-
ted its conclusions and recommendations in 2000, which suggested: “three key elements,
Electricity Market, Electricity Network and Spatial Planning, need to be integrated into
a plan led approach to wind energy deployment” (Fitz Gerald, 2000, p. 5). The group
favoured large scale developments over micro scale wind and stand-alone turbine install-
ations (unsurprising given the dominance of utilities and larger developers in the group)
and suggested an iterative process for identifying suitable development areas to take place
at county level. In addition, it suggested investor uncertainty be addressed with guidance
to offer 15 year power purchase agreements to all development projects which met a set
of minimum requirements. However, despite some progress on individual barriers to in-
dustry development such as planning, and its recommendations on the formation of a new
national electricity market, the suggestion of an integrated long-term plan-led approach
was not enacted in the years that followed.
Through the RESG process the 1999 Green Paper targets were endorsed by actors
across the energy industry, further legitimising the activity of those developers already
active and giving some assurance to investors through policy recommendations and le-
gitimising and normalising industry targets. This activity took place within a broader
institutional context of rapid regulatory change in the Irish energy domain (see Figure 5.7
for an illustrated timeline of relevant European and Irish policies and policy instruments).
The 1999 Electricity Regulation Act transposed the 1996 EC Directive on internal en-
ergy markets into Irish law liberalising the energy sector in Ireland. Marketisation was
the dominant form of liberalisation and the act established an independent regulator, the
CER who over-saw a four-year consultancy and design49 process from which the Single
Electricity Market (SEM) would eventually emerge50. Further to the creation of the SEM,
the operation of the transmission system was unbundled from the ESB and independ-
ent ESB National Grid was ultimately rebranded EirGrid. The Sustainable Energy Act
of 2002 transposed to national law the EC Renewable Energy Directive (2001/77/EC),
which set a 13.2% target for renewable contribution to gross energy production by 201051,
49See discussion on SEM design in Chapter 2.
50The design of the SEM bore some consideration for wind generators in deliberately not reproducing the
UK’s NETA market structure, because suggests (Kee, 2004, p. 55) “it may not provide timely incentives
for new generation in a shortage situation; it has separate spill and top-up prices that are seen as a
disincentive to renewables and small generators”.
51This equates to approximately 1,400 MW installed capacity of wind generation, a target that was
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in line with the aim of the RESG’s recommendations.
The influence of the ESB decreased somewhat throughout this time as new players
emerged in the electricity domain. For example, under the status quo prior to the cre-
ation of the Single Electricity Market, potential generators had to strike bilateral contracts
and agree to a balancing process that depended heavily on buy-in from the ESB. Following
the launch of the SEM this was no longer the case, as a new market role was created, that
of supplier to the centralised market. Yet despite changes in the power structure in the
industry, and influenced by uncertainty created by them, the ESB prompted a regulator
enforced moratorium on further grid connection in the industry in 2003.
5.2.2 A moratorium on development
On December 1st 2003, ESB National Grid, wrote to the CER expressing concern regarding
levels of wind generation connecting to the Irish grid52. ESBNG explicitly stated concern
for the stability of the transmission and distribution systems (Leahy, 2010), they had
significant engineering issues to overcome in order to maintain security of supply, and
they recommended a moratorium on all new grid connection applications from wind farms.
The regulator agreed and no further consideration was given to new applications until the
end of 2004. Many of the concerns53 raised by ESBNG were not new, indeed, some
had been subject to discussion at the RESG. The challenge was not that the total wind
capacity committed to was large by European standards54 (see Table 5.1), rather it was
the capacity related to the power system that must accommodate it (O´ Gallacho´ir and
McKeogh, 2005). However, if the legislative targets endorsed by participants in the RESG
were to be met, by 2005, 7% of Ireland’s electricity would be produced by wind, up from
1% in 2000. These numbers significantly exceeded the British and NORDEL systems with
met.
52 Commission for Energy Regulation (2003) ‘ESB national grid request to CER regarding wind gener-
ation security issues’, CER/03/281
53The most significant technological problem was the absence of dynamic models of wind turbines to
facilitate the assessment of wind power on dynamic performance of the overall system (O´ Gallacho´ir
and McKeogh, 2005). In other words, adding extra wind capacity to a grid dynamically affects the
existing performance of the grid. The system operator needed models for both existing wind turbines and
proposed turbines which would dynamically account for this situation. These did not exist at the start of
the moratorium.
54At this time leading European countries had significantly higher wind capacity than Ireland’s 166MW:
Germany (16,628 MW), Spain (8,263 MW) or Denmark (3,118 MW). Windpower Monthly 2005 Operating
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Figure 5.7. Timeline of European Union and Ireland policies, policy processes and instruments relevant
to Ireland’s wind sector, 1993-2014.
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which developers and manufacturers were most familiar. In terms of the percentage of
wind integrated onto a grid, future targets had committed Ireland to being amongst the
most integrated networks in the world.
Table 5.1 Wind connections, offers of connection and applications for connection in
Ireland at the start of the moratorium. Source Bazilian et al. (2004)
Total
(MW)
Cumulative
(MW)
Connected 166 166
Signed offers 534 700
Live agreements 75 775
Applications in process 422 1197
Applications being checked 98 1295
ESBNG had legitimate technological reasons for their concern (O´ Gallacho´ir and McK-
eogh, 2005). Specific grid codes from wind generators which dynamically model turbine
generation under given climatic conditions are important for reliable generation forecast-
ing, in turn vital in “day-ahead” centralised markets such as the SEM. In part these issues
arose from a global standardisation of turbine technology which did not take account of
specific characteristics of the host electricity system. Some responsibility can be appor-
tioned here to the manufacturers who ultimately did create the dynamic models required
by their end-users in Ireland. However, ESBNG were criticised for not engaging manufac-
turers earlier and not committing enough resources to solve the substantive issues quickly
(O´ Gallacho´ir, Guidi, et al., 2007). A number of interviewees spoke of the moratorium
as a blunt strategy which created lasting damage by reducing trust at a time of rapid
institutional and commercial change in the industry55.
The impact of these activities is visible in records of planning applications, which rose
year-on-year and peaked with over 100 applications in 2003, four times the number of pro-
jects as 1999. Firms were entering the sector at an increased rate and the composition of
the successful applicants for AER V and VI was majority Irish firms. Developers by now
had over a decade of Irish case studies to draw on, and expertise and capabilities in nego-
tiating and building projects had been built-up by domestic consultancies and developers.
Irish firms Saorgus, Hibernian Wind Power (ESB), Eco Wind Power and Ecopower estab-
55Interview 130103, 130503
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lished operational wind farms and used revenues to finance further applications56. The
work of these developers was aided by the creation or strengthening of intermediaries such
as the Sustainable Energy Ireland, formed following the Sustainable Energy Act 2002.
Ireland’s wider economy at this time continued its rapid annual growth which was
coupled with a rapid increase in energy demand. The ESB estimated 1,000MW of addi-
tional generation capacity (an increase of approximately 15%) would be required in the six
years to 2006.57 ‘Keeping the lights on’ at the high-tech manufacturing plants of foreign
direct investment firms such as Intel and Pfizer became powerful narrative drivers for the
government and DCENR and in turn a source of further opportunities for investors.58 The
investment environment was further influenced by readily available credit and a growing
culture of property based speculation59. This wave of activity, combined with technical
constraints, a shifting market, institutional uncertainty as the SEM was being designed,
enhanced the pressure on ESBNG and CER. On the one hand they had to deliver more
generating plant, but on the other, their responsibility was keep the generators that were
already operational spinning.
5.2.3 Research and innovation in Ireland
The majority of research, development and design activities had until the mid–2000s taken
place outside of Ireland. Generation plant had been turnkey and Ireland’s small market
size resulted in Irish actors having relatively little influence in the R&D process of for-
eign manufacturers such as Vestas and Siemens60. Despite this, a number of innovation
activities emerged in Ireland during this period. Three significant national studies were
conducted. The first national wind atlas of Ireland was produced in 2003 (SEI, 2003b).
The same year, (Gardner et al., 2003) concluded that there was no technical limit on the
wind penetration feasible on the island of Ireland, rather costs are the limiting factor for
increased penetration. And in 2007, Meibom et al. (2008) modelled the Irish electricity
grid identifying the effects of large wind-penetrations on the island of Ireland in relation to
overall operation, costs and emissions (Connolly et al., 2011). They concluded that a wind
56Interview 130503
57FT Energy Newsletters, April 7, 2000
58Interview 130104
59Property developer Joe Tiernan described the frenzied activity of Irish lending institutions at the
time as being “like drink at closing time they just wanted more of it. . . There were all sorts of characters
being financed . . . It was a race to the end by the banks to give out money”. Source: The Irish Times,
16th July, 2014
60Interview 130204
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penetration of 42% was feasible on the island of Ireland by 2020 and under that scenario,
overall operation costs would be reduced compared to a status quo scenario (Department
of Communications Energy and Natural Resources, 2008). This ‘All Island Grid Study’
was a significant influence on the imposition of Ireland’s 2020 EU renewable energy targets
which set a 40% renewable electricity goal which in turn drove EirGrid’s ‘Facilitation of
Renewables’ and ‘DS3’ series of grid studies (Mccann, 2014).
Research programmes were developed in Irish universities focussed on nationally con-
textualised aspects of the wind industry and wind technology value chains (IEA, 2013).
Examples of this research include the challenges faced by high wind energy penetration
systems (Bazilian et al., 2004), proposed solutions to these challenges (Gonza´lez et al.,
2004) and reserve demand analysis of these systems (Doherty and O’Malley, 2005). The
Electricity Research Centre at University College Dublin and the Sustainable Energy Re-
search Group at University College Cork established themselves at this time as Ireland’s
two significant wind systems and power systems integration groups. As well as primary
research, these research groups provided a secondary function, training and educating the
future staff of utilities and system operators. In particular their influence on EirGrid was
noted where according to one interviewee, not only did they bring new skills and compet-
encies to a conservative former utility, but also a new problem solving approach61. The
net result of the feasibility studies and focussed primary research was not only solutions to
technological problems, but the increasing of positive expectations across the wind sector.
Innovation also took the form of new business models and the deliberate engineering
of new institutional forms, activities exemplified by wind firm, Airtricity. After failing
to win bids in AER I and III, Airtricity, shifted its strategic focus from winning capital
support grants to searching for and creating market opportunities both within Ireland, and
overseas. Airtricity’s management took advantage as the EU Electricity Directive that was
being transposed to Irish law and successfully lobbied for favourable clauses. This created a
situation where in a newly liberalised market, suppliers of renewable electricity would have
a time-limited privileged and protected position allowing them to sell electricity to small
and medium enterprises before non-renewable new entrants (Kjaer, 2008). Furthermore,
Airtricity pioneered a direct route to market in Ireland, becoming a supplier as well as a
generator in the industry. In an interview in 2001, Eddie O’Connor claimed
“the regulatory regime allows us to build our own connections to the grid; ESB
only has to do the final connecting in. We have pushed for this; at every step
61Interview 130202
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Eirtricity is the innovative force.”62
By the end of 2004, Airtricity63, now rebranded, were the dominant player in the renew-
ables market, accounting for 127MW of 336 MW total installed in the country. They
achieved this largely without the capital grants offered by the AER schemes, or earlier
direct EU support, instead raising venture capital and project finance from institutional
investors based on their ability to access the market directly. Other firms followed this
merchant plant model, and by the end of 2006, 338MW of wind plant had been commis-
sioned without assistance from the AER schemes, 49% of total capacity (O´ Gallacho´ir,
Bazilian, et al., 2010).
Throughout the period of the moratorium, indigenous commercial, research and in-
novation activity continued to build. The moratorium ended in 2004 when dynamic grid
codes were supplied by overseas manufacturers, and mechanisms for addressing the now
substantial queue for grid connectivity had been proposed64. The moratorium undermined
levels of confidence that had built up in the industry at the time of the RESG, although
the nature of long term harm sustained by the industry, aside from an increase in negative
attitudes towards the ESB, is not clear. Whereas in the previous decade, transnational
flows of turnkey technology and tacit knowledge were features of an emergent industry, by
2004 we see indigenous research and innovation activities emerging, against a background
of changing regulatory and economic institutions.
62Source: Financial Times Energy Newsletters January 26 2001
63The brand name Eirtricity was anglicised to Airtricity, which although negating the pun on the word
E´ire, or Ireland, made for a more pronounceable name in English speaking countries.
64Over the course of the moratorium, applications representing over 1,300MW of installed wind capacity
had been submitted to the system operators
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5.3 Period 3: 2005 - 2009
5.3.1 Take-off and the grid allocation processes
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Figure 5.8. Scale and location of wind farms built 1992-2009. Source: EirGrid, IWEA, Meithel na
Gaoithe, SEAI.
Processing the backlog of grid connection applications following the moratorium in
2004 and 2005 was a significant challenge for the regulator. It established the Renewable
Energy Development Group (REDG), based on the RESG, in order to develop a strategy
to accommodate this backlog and simultaneously devise a strategy to meet the state’s
2010 renewable energy targets. The solution proposed was a group allocation process.
Applications for grid connection were collated into a series of groups, each pre-determined
by the size of an upcoming processing ‘gate’ (by cumulative installed capacity). Once the
group capacity had reached the size of the gate, processing would begin and successful
applicants within the gate were guaranteed grid connection in a sequence best suited to
fulfilling a second set of criteria as determined by the regulator.65 For Gate 1, CER
accepted projects cumulatively totalling 370MW of generating capacity, date-ordered by
application. This consisted of all the applications deemed complete by December 2003,
65Interview 140714
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the date of the start of the moratorium (Commission for Energy Regulation, 2004). A
second Gate was opened in 2005 and implemented the following year. This time 1, 687MW
of wind projects were selected on an application date ordered basis beginning December
3rd 2003 (Commission for Energy Regulation, 2005; Commission for Energy Regulation,
2006). However, for Gate 2 a second entry criteria was introduced. Projects totalling
a further 661MW were selected based on “system optimisation” criteria which selected
projects based on geographic location and grid node infrastructure, regardless of when the
application was lodged with the CER (O’Donoghue, 2006). At the end of 2006 system
operators made Gate 2 connection offers to 121 projects totalling 1,348MW, leaving 76
projects (1,668MW) remaining in the queue, outside the allocation processes. New wind
farms commissioned during this period are illustrated in Figure 5.8.
An outcome of this process was to give developers (and their investors and selected
original equipment manufacturers) guarantees backed by the regulator, that projects in
the Gates would at some time in the future be provided grid connections. The allocation
criteria implemented in Gate 2 is the closest the regulator or DCENR came to implement-
ing a long-term plan-led national strategy to wind development, first suggested in 2000 by
the RESG. Furthermore, by implementing a system optimisation criteria, EirGrid66 was
given scope to select development projects based on technical constraints such as existing
grid infrastructure and the position of development relative to grid nodes. However, this
system optimisation approach was short-lived. The group allocation process continued
with Gate 3 which was finalised in 2008 and incorporated step-up in capacity building
ambition. The CER reverted to a simple date allocation criteria (up to 16th November
2007) selected on the basis of a cap of 3,900 MW capacity (see table 5.2). Evidence
suggests the return to this more straightforward selection criteria was predicated by the
long-standing the project-led development67 approach, which while easy to understand
and communicate, did not lead to project delivery outcomes optimised to reduce cost or
technological complexity. Because of the increased scale of technological ambition, fur-
ther criteria internal to the Gate 3 process were implemented in order to determine the
sequencing of new grid nodes which geographically selected project groups would connect
to for each year between 2010 and 2025.
The narratives of the gate processes reveals a number of premises and beliefs of actors
in the wind sector at the time. First, over time the system operators maintained a powerful
66ESB National Grid has been renamed EirGrid by this time and been unbundled from the ESB’s
vertical integration structure.
67Interview 140714
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Table 5.2 Group allocation scheme, Gates 1, 2 and 3. Source CER.
Gate Year Critera Cut-off date Projects Additional
capacity
Gate 1 2004 Application date order 13th Dec. 2003 34 370MW
Gate 2 2006 Application date order
plus system optemisation
17th Oct. 2005 121 1,348MW
Gate 3 2008 Application date order 16th Nov. 2007 158 3,900 MW
gatekeeping position on grid connection, but they could not unilaterally decide the rules
of the game. Through the Gate 2, the SOs had been given remit to process offers in
an order best suited to connecting applications based on existing and planned network
infrastructure. Yet, in returning to a date-ordered group processing criteria in Gate 3,
EirGrid and the CER favoured developers at the expense of optimising grid expansion
along technological and, or, cost criteria (Burke and O’Malley, 2008).
Second, a confluence of economic demand and European and national renewable energy
targets continued to positively influence progress. The speculation was further enhanced
by European policy processes (European Commission, 2007a). As part of the process
which led to the EU’s 2020 targets, the government of Ireland negotiated a national target
of 40% reduction in carbon dioxide (or equivalent) emissions 2020. This became a national
target in the 2007 Energy Strategy White Paper, the national government anticipating EU
regulation ahead of the relevant directives. The influence of these target setting processes
was illustrated at the end of criteria creation process for Gate 3 when the 3,000MW
capacity was increased by 900MW in order to accommodate new emissions targets.
Third, in the context of the project-led culture of infrastructure development we have
discussed already, the rules of the group allocation process were a compromise between
two approaches. On one hand a centralised planning approach, which neither the DCENR
nor the regulator had the agency to conduct. On the other hand a market based solution,
in which the ability of each firm to financially sustain a project through to completion
(between two and fifteen years) acted as a selection mechanism. The Gate process com-
municated to actors in the wind industry that over the next two decades, over 4,000MW
of wind generation was likely to be deployed and as such gave some assurance to those
developers with projects in the queue. Utility players and larger developers who already
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had revenue from installed developments were better positioned to wait out the Gate 3
process than smaller players who could choose not to proceed, or attempt to sell their
project whilst still at the development stage.
Thus, the terms of the group allocation process positively influenced the pace of initial
speculative project development. The advantage for the CER and DCENR were a large
number of potential wind generation projects and sites were identified, and potential
developers incentivised by opportunities in Ireland. The downside of this for both the
system operators, and the citizens of the country who underwrote the process through
taxes, was less certainty for the system operators that projects were viable. This in turn
meant that even though there was now an ordered queue, there remained a significant
scheduling process within the Gate. Furthermore, we see a diversity of applicants decrease
as firms less-able to wait out the processing period were relatively disadvantaged once
inside the Gate 3 process. Indeed, one early, and commercially successful developer noted
the change in characteristics of industry players over time:
“If we were starting off now we would find it much more difficult I think that
is fair to say. As time goes on and it is inexorable since the early 90s it has
become more and more of a big boys game. It is a huge money game, why
wouldn’t it be.”68
So while the structure of the Grid Allocation Process gave long term certainty to some
developers, investors and manufacturers, this was achieved at a cost to some development
firms and consumers.
Gate 3 institutionalised grid allocation processes. However, the problems of alignment
between accessing grid, acquiring power purchase agreements and planning permission
were not yet resolved. IWEA at this time focussed most of its lobbying efforts on calling
for the introduction of a feed-in tariff. In 2005, the AER schemes were scrapped and
the DCENR announced they would be succeeded by a renewable energy feed-in tariff
(REFIT). The tariff came into effect on May 1st 2006 with the goal of supporting 400MW of
renewable generation to fulfil a 1450MW target by 2010. For wind developers, and IWEA
in particular, REFIT has been claimed by themselves as one of their most significant policy
achievements (IWEA, 2013). For the first time, a modern, widely accessible feed-in tariff
was available to Irish developers. It was argued that deficiencies in the support scheme
did not minimise costs to end-use consumers (Doherty and O’Malley, 2011). However the
architecture of a feed in tariff was understood by actors domestically and throughout the
68Interview 130503
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global industry. This further reduced investment risk domestically while in an international
context Ireland was now perceived as a country with serious commitment to renewable
technologies. According to an interviewee:
“it became a serious contender, it deserved serious attention, the policy de-
cisions had been made to. . . invest heavily in renewables, in renewable tech-
nology.”69
5.3.2 Recession and industry consolidation
Throughout the 1990s Irish wind developers and associations played a role informing banks
in Ireland about wind technology and finance through special investor conferences and face
to face meetings. By 2007, the investment arms of Irish banks (e.g. Bank of Ireland, AIB)
had learned to assess risk and the wind developers had learned how to negotiate as this
text illustrates:
“Say if we have a 10 megawatt wind farm you need about 150 million, you just
go to the bank you put together your model, you have to back it up with a FIT
and ehm, that will go in and on top of that you have to include projections
on constraints based on whatever projected, you have to include projections
on any number of different things. You run your model, you have obviously
studies that show the wind factor of the site and then ultimately it comes down
to negotiation.”70
In short, lenders required a 15 year cash flow guidance plan and project costings were
required for each project71 and if they decided to lend, financiers provided letters of credit
and funding for the construction phase. The economic crash of 2008 dramatically changed
this investment landscape. The subsequent recession was severe, long lasting and impacted
every industrial sector in Ireland (O’Hearn, 2014; Leonard and Botetzagias, 2011). In the
context of Irish economic history it was a major event which has had profound implications
for Irish politics, society and the economy (the timing and scale of the crash is illustrated
in using GDP growth percentages in Figure 5.9) (Allen, 2014). With regard to the
Irish wind RES, we consider it a large scale exogenous shock, which affected demand in
Ireland for energy consumption, demand in global industry, and it raised the risk premium
attached to investing in Ireland. Furthermore, according to Fitz Gerald (2011) economic
69Interview 130204
70Interview 130103
71Interview 130717, 130503
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recovery necessitated a substantial reduction in domestic prices relative to international
competitors which in turn meant that environmentally based electricity price premiums
became harder for the government to justify.
Figure 5.9. Ireland annual year-on-year gross domestic product growth rate (%). Source: Irish Central
Statistics Office
With the onset of the recession, the availability of finance decreased. Project debt
financing of up to 85% had been available before the crash, this dropped to 70% afterwards,
and the sourcing of the finance itself became more difficult72. The sources of funding most
affected were Irish banks which “basically shut down” according to evidence introduced
in Section 2.2 . So while the basics of financing a wind project remained constant through
the recession, the ability of actors to access financial resources depended on who they
were, and where the financial institution was located. Equity funding and venture capital
were options for actors who had access to overseas finance networks, or to overseas finance
actors based in Ireland. Utility firms had the option of funding projects from balance
sheets, though for semi-state enterprises this was a controversial strategy due to the nature
of the risk and public service obligations of the firms.
Within two years of the recession, Ireland’s two largest wind developers (by installed
capacity) had exited the industry through sale. Airtricity’s shareholders concluded a
deal with SSE plc for AC1.9 billion in January 2008 (Airtricity, 2008) and SWS was
acquired by Bord Ga´is Energy (BGE) in 2009 for AC500 million.73 By the end of 2007
72Interview 130503, 130722, 130104
73Source: Irish Examiner December 5th 2009
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on the grid there was cumulative installed capacity of 750 MW, yet we see from the
group allocation scheme there was over 4,000 MW of project applications. To get these
projects to market, developers would require financing in the order of AC5-AC10 billion in a
difficult financial environment. Utilities were handed an advantage with regard to resource
mobilising according to one interviewee:
“that was pure financial. . . cost of money for banks [that] was just too expens-
ive and there was no long term money out there or whatever. Which again
introduced an additional risk factor into the project finance in that nobody
knew what’s going to be there in ten years.74”
This rationale is supported by investors in Airtricity at the time. Ecofin, a fund manage-
ment services firm who held 16% of Airtricity’s share capital when it was sold claim that
project finance was becoming an issue in 2007:
“the majority shareholders of Airtricity decided to sell the remaining business
of the company in light of the premium valuations being paid by strategic
buyers at the time and deteriorating conditions in the project finance market
upon which Airtricity depended.”75
The utilities had developed small portfolios of wind farms over the previous decade, but
this represented a dramatic shift in industry ownership, between them, Airtricity (SSE),
BGE and Hibernian Wind Power (ESB) now owned over 60% of cumulative installed
capacity (see Figure 5.10). Ireland’s wind industry was now a sector dominated by utilities.
While there is some evidence to suggest the recession affected the pace of development in
Ireland, it is almost certain that events had an influence on the composition of the sector.
Through the early years of the recession there was record installation activity. A lag
effect due to construction contracts in the industry meant that the rate of new wind
farm building continued to increase through 2008 and 2009 as 199MW and 325MW of
installed capacity were added to the grid. Growth in the industry was further buffered
by the number of connection offers made in the group allocation processes. One further
explanatory factor for this is the increased confidence developers had in the ability to
deliver and the future value of assets. With a REFIT offering a price guarantee in a
new market arrangement and the gate processes signalling an ordered grid expansion and
connection scheme, development pipelines became clearer for those who could afford to
74Interview 130722
75Ecofin (2015)
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Figure 5.10. Cumulative installed capacity of Irish wind farms at the end of 2009. Source: authors data.
finance them. Indeed, the value of development pipelines (in addition to fixed assets
already built) and expected worth of future wind farms was an important aspect in the
sales of firms. This clarity of these pipelines and the demand for wind generation resulted
in manufacturing firms such as Siemens and Gamesa expanding operations and opening
offices in Ireland. An executive for one manufacturer suggested at this time a combination
of Irish and European policy and research created an investment tipping point for their
firm.
“primarily it was the sign posting that happened in the mid-2000’s and 2007,
2008 that had indicated at REFIT 2 and the 2020 policy in Ireland to have 40%
renewable electricity generation was going to come down the road . . . all the
reports that had been done, all the studies had been done, the policymakers
had agreed that we’d need to have an additional four gigawatts of wind in
order to achieve that.”...
“So when when that statement [to expand operation in Ireland] was made
Ireland became an important player in a European context because up until
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that [we] were quite strong across all northern Europe . . . [we had] about two
gigawatts in operation well two and a half gigawatts in operation in wind in
the UK in GB. And they said we could get nearly the same again out of Ireland
if we put our minds to it. So it became a serious contender, it deserved serious
attention.”76
This evidence suggests that despite a recession, manufacturers were confident Ireland’s
wind resources would continue to be exploited, and were now actively competing in the
Irish market to win equipment contracts.
76Interview 130204
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5.4 Period 4: 2010 - 2014
5.4.1 New actors, new visions, new opportunities
Wind farm commissioned during 
current phase
Wind farm commissioned prior 
to current phase
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Figure 5.11. Scale and location of wind farms built 1992-2013. Source: EirGrid, IWEA, Meithel na
Gaoithe, SEAI.
In 2010, Christopher Knowles, head of climate change and environment at the European
Investment Bank addressed IWEA’s Autumn conference with a straightforward message:
Ireland’s resources are good, the ambitions of the industry are positive and that combin-
ation is very attractive to international investors in renewable energy (IWEA, 2013). In
an industry report the following year, Valerie Lawlor from law firm McCann FitzGerald
reiterated the sentiment that the investment environment for wind developers remained
attractive:
“The only real risks for an investor are regulatory risks; that a scheme such as
REFIT would either be withdrawn or delayed or would be poorly administered
in some way, or sovereign risk, ie, that the entity backing the REFIT scheme
– Ireland in this instance – would itself not be able to perform its obligations.
But those regulatory risks in Ireland are manageable.”77
77From The Green Economy: An Irish Director Report. As reported in Platts Renewable Energy
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The basis for this optimism was the institutional stability, provided by the Single Electri-
city Market, and the regulator, the CER, who administered the REFIT. Mr. Knowles and
Ms. Lawlor’s messages was prescient. The ongoing expansion of the industry in the years
that followed is notable for the entry of new European and North American firms into the
sector. New wind farms commissioned during this period are illustrated in Figure 5.11.
New actors in the industry included ABO-Wind, global asset management firm Black-
Rock, and in 2014 Canadian firm Brookfield Renewables who purchased the renewable
assets of Bord Ga´is Energy as part of the financing of the utility’s sale to UK utility
Centrica Plc. These new actors performed a range of activities. BlackRock Renewable
Power Fund was managed from Dublin and headed by the former chief executive of NTR,
Airtricity’s largest shareholder. In 2012 it was reported that it closed its first round of
funding having taken in approximately $400 million78, to be invested in Ireland and over-
seas. This is indicative of the nature of the finance capabilities and skills which had built
up in the industry in Ireland. ABO-Wind meanwhile took a hands-on approach. In 2009
the Gortahile project they were contracted to provide turnkey construction on failed be-
cause of financing difficulties. ABO purchased the project assets outright and arranged
financing with German banks Commerzbank and NordLB79. ABO subsequently sold the
completed development to an investment fund managed by BNP Paribas Clean Energy
Partners. In this case, we note the role of transnational commercial relations take place
without significant financial involvement of firms in Ireland.
Two Irish firms, Mainstream Renewable Power and Element Power were established to
innovate and take advantage of new revenue models in the Irish and global wind sectors.
They were founded by Airtricity’s Eddie O’Connor and Tim Cowhig of SWS Energy
respectively, who brought with them senior staff, investors and experience from their
former firms. Element business model was identifying wind projects at various stages of
development, acquiring them and ‘tidying them up’, which consisted of activities such as
acquiring 15 year finance, planning permission and grid access80. They completed their
first two projects and sold them on to equity investors over the course of 2012. Mainstream
Renewables also considered institutional investors as an integral aspect of their commercial
strategy and in 2013 announced plans for a AC3 billion investment fund aimed at pension
funds81. These firms now had four distinct revenue streams:
Report, July 11 2011.
78Source: The Sunday Business Post, August 5 2012
79Source: Platts Renewable Energy Report: January 11 2010
80Interview 130722
81Bloomberg http://www.naturalcapitalnews.com/mainstream-plans-new-fund-to-access-cheaper-
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• the project management of the construction phase
• ongoing operation and maintenance
• the sale of fixed assets to equity investors
• negotiated a share of ongoing generational revenue
The market for these services was global, Irish firms were venturing further afield. While
the Mainstream management had experience in overseas development activity from their
time at Airtricity82, both Mainstream and Element took a more globally orientated view
evidenced by Mainstream’s activity in South Africa (Baker and Phillips, 2011; Baker,
2015) and Chile (Mainstream Renewable Power, 2016).
Element and Mainstream’s most ambitious domestic projects were focussed on very large-
scale electricity export schemes based in the Irish midlands. Element’s Greenwire project
and Mainstream’s Energy Bridge both sought to generate electricity in Ireland for export
via interconnection under the Irish Sea to Great Britain (see Figure 5.12). The scale of
both proposals was thousands of megawatts, targets that would mean a substantial in-
crease in Ireland’s installed wind capacity. These projects were predicated on using Irish
wind resources generated in a low-populated part of the country, where wind had not pre-
viously been exploited due to wind resources which were low in Irish terms, but still high
in comparison to many other European regions. These commercially and technologically
ambitious projects were underpinned by three narratives. The first narrative made the
claim that Ireland’s large endowment of wind resources could be commercially exploited at
a national scale. The underlying imperative was the opportunity electricity export offered
to assist with the large national debt burden placed on the post-recession economy83 (Gov-
ernment of Ireland, 2011). The second narrative was a story about firms in the Irish wind
sector having the technical capabilities and know-how to exploit this situation.The third
narrative was one of job creation84 which had been constructed and mobilised by act-
ors in the industry over previous years. In 2009 Deloitte, funded by IWEA, released an
investment/#sthash.rpUMlO27.dpuf
82Most notably investing in offshore projects in the UK and onshore in Chile as well as a number of US
ventures.
83The link between renewable electricity and economic recovery had been explicitly made in 2009 by
DCENR minister Eamon Ryan when he envoked a “green investment” frame to justify increasing Ireland’s
2020 renewable electricity targets from a 33% share of generation mix, to over 40% (Department Energy
Communications and Natural Resources, 2009).
84Historically, short term job creation was a leading driver of industrial development strategy in Ireland,
at times at the expense of sustainable long term industrial development (Breznitz, 2007).
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industry report suggesting Ireland’s wind industry could generate approximately 10,000
jobs85 (Deloitte, 2009).
Figure 5.12. Mainstream Renewable Power advertisement, Energy Ireland Yearbook 2013.
These projects were implicitly legitimised in 2013 by DCENR Minister Pat Rabbitte
who evoked these narratives when the Irish and UK governments signed a memorandum of
understanding committing resources to feasibility studies of increased electricity trading
between the two countries:
“Ireland has the potential to generate far more wind energy than we could
consume domestically. The opportunity to export this green power presents
an opportunity for employment growth and export earnings which we must
seize if we can.”86
These visions focussed on wind as an export commodity and on opportunities to deliver
85It is possible to debate the veracity of these figures, however, the goal of this discussion to to examine
the narrative role they played in the story of Irish wind development. The evidence suggests IWEA succeed
in getting them into the sectoral discourse on Irish energy, evidenced in later years as job numbers were
referenced in mainstream or business media as fact, rather than as scenario-based outcomes (for example,
see “5bn set to be invested in onshore wind energy projects” in Irish Examiner, October 3, 2013).
86As reported in PA Newswire: Ireland, “Wind energy sale set to boost jobs” January 24, 2013
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renewable electricity into a market where the generation of that electricity in England
and Wales was a contentious political issue (Devine-Wright, 2011; Devine-Wright, 2005),
where the Conservative-majority government in the United Kingdom would not, for polit-
ical reasons, allow further onshore wind farms be built. Although both the Irish and
British parties to the memorandum conceded in 2014 that the project would not proceed
at governmental level due to commercial, technical and political reasons, the episode illus-
trates premisses and beliefs held by actors in the industry at the time. In the 1990s and
2000s actors in the wind sector had sought financial and regulatory support and offered in
return solutions to initially environmental concerns followed by diversity in markets. Now,
with confidence gained from having established an industry in Ireland, the wind sector was
drawing on visions and proposing solutions to relevant to the recession, job creation and
industrial export.
5.4.2 New challenges: innovation and opposition
During this period problems of curtailment came about as the installed capacity of wind
generation on the grid increased which according to CER (2012a, p. 4) occurs:
“when there is not sufficient demand in the SEM, when taking into account
system operational restrictions for security of supply, i.e. a combination of low
demand, excess wind production and technical minima of plants which can
result in system security issues.”
Problems of increased curtailment were causing both technological and investment risk
for wind farm developers and owners in the RES. This had potentially different implica-
tions for older wind generators compared with new entrants, again explained by (CER,
2012a, p. 5):
“Curtailment can be seen as being driven by the marginal wind generator in
the dispatch stack, i.e. the last wind generator on the system causes the cur-
tailment event. Under this viewpoint, a causer pays approach can be taken to
solve the curtailment event, effectively a last-on, first off approach. This ap-
proach has been termed ’grandfathering’, in that existing plant have different
rights to new plant, under certain circumstances.
An alternative view is that curtailment is a system wide problem; with each
individual wind generator contributing partially to the overall problem and
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therefore each should make a contribution to solving the problem. This ap-
proach is termed ’pro-rata’ as each generator contributes to solving the problem
in proportion to their availability.”
Over the course of 2012 and 2013 the Commission for Energy Regulation and the Single
Electricity Market Committee worked with industry actors to ultimately agree to a pro-
rata solution to the question of grandfathering, which likely favoured future development
by allocating revenue risk amongst wind generators.
Independent of large scale, private energy export projects, interconnection of Ireland
and Great Britain’s grids had been proposed by advocates of the wind sector for techno-
logical and market based reasons. On the one hand it was argued that interconnection
offered a technological solution to the increased levels of curtailment due to increases in
intermittent generation capacity on the grid. Interconnection is not based on radical tech-
nological innovation but on Ireland’s small-island network it was believed by proponents
of the wind industry to bring about a technological step change required for further integ-
ration of intermittent generation, as this statement from a policy strategist illustrates:
“It it’s critical for our delivery of targets on wind energy because it reduces
the level of curtailment of wind energy that would occur by at least 50% so,
so it’s significant in reducing the cost of wind energy integration.
...the levels of curtailment that would occur to meet our 2020 targets without
the east west interconnector would be unacceptably high and it would be in-
feasible to finance wind farms with levels of curtailment that would be in excess
of 10%.”87
On the other hand, interconnection was an ensemble of material technologies with
which to join Ireland and Great Britain’s disparate electricity markets, a goal of Europe’s
single energy market agenda. In 2009 the ESB acquired approximately AC500 million of
funding from the European Investment Bank to construct the East-West interconnector,
connecting Ireland’s east coast to north Wales88. The 260 km, 500 MW, 200 kV high
voltage DC transmission link was commissioned in 2012.
Yet the case being made for increased interconnection in the research emerging from
Irish university departments was not straightforward. It was found that Great Britain
would be better able to balance its wind resource by spatially distributing wind production
87Interview 130201
88This loan also included financing for wind farms to be constructed by the ESB, a source of funding
accessible to large scale utilities. Source: European Investment Bank
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within the country, rather than through interconnection (Foley, Leahy, et al., 2009).
While increased interconnection would likely result in the reduction of average prices
in the Irish electricity market, resultant displacement of greenhouse gas emissions from
Ireland to the UK would lead to a close to zero net emissions reduction between the
two systems89 (Denny et al., 2010). Furthermore, there would be a resultant reduction in
Ireland of excess wind generation. Diffney et al. (2009, p. 485) suggest that when modelled
as a perfect arbitrageur, “allowing electricity to flow from the low price to the high price
jurisdiction”, increased wind generation and interconnection would lead to cost reductions
in the wholesale price of electricity. But they warn that interconnection is not likely to
operate optimally, and thus “a much larger infrastructure investment could be needed to
obtain the same effect, possibly causing the high wind scenario to become too expensive”
(ibid.). In a later study examining interconnection throughout the EU, (Lynch et al.,
2012, p. 616) argued that
“current interconnection capacities are therefore sufficient for the current gen-
eration mix and new interconnections are only warranted by EU mandates for
renewable generation.”
This episode is an example of the wind sector and wider electricity industry mobilising
favourable wind narratives, to legitimise industrial activity on the one hand. On the other,
we see in the resolution of the grandfathering issue, the ability of the regulator and market
operator to mediate and regulate diverse and contentious issues within the RES.
“All political parties have bought into [wind power]”90
This was the message from Minister for Communications, Energy and Natural Re-
sources Eamon Ryan to the Irish Wind Energy Association annual meeting in Dublin in
March 2009. Presciently he added that the biggest hurdle faced in achieving Ireland’s
its renewable targets was expanding and upgrading the nation’s electric grid a significant
constraint being the engineering and financial limits on putting new transmission under-
ground. In a 2013 address to IWEA’s annual conference, Andrew Garrad, president of
the European Wind Energy Association, was reported as telling the audience that public
89The price lowering effect was due to pricing efficiencies gained from operating the interconnectors
intra-day, whereby “the day-ahead prices are reduced slightly while the intra-day prices in Ireland are
significantly decreased. This is due to being able to use the interconnectors instead of more expensive
peaking units to make up for wind power forecast errors, or unit outages.” (Denny et al., 2010, p. 6952)
90Media source S1-88
141
acceptability was now the main challenge to a ‘jobs-rich export industry’ being estab-
lished in Ireland.91 Mr. Garrad’s views were informed by new opposition activity to wind
farms, in particular the midlands schemes. This opposition was not only to the turbines,
towers and access routes required for constructions and maintenance, but also to the new
grid infrastructure under construction as part of EirGrid’s multi-decade infrastructure
scheme, Grid 25. The presence of these narratives in the evidence is illustrative of two
aspects of recent activity in the sector. First, the increased scale and new location of pro-
posed grid infrastructure and wind plant installation mattered. Second, the development
strategies employed by EirGrid, Mainstream and Element Power initially underestimated
the strength of antipathy their projects would encounter at a county level. These episodes
highlight emergent tensions between stories of wind technology as a solution to economic
difficulties at a national and international level, and sub-national and national level or-
ganised opposition to the construction of turbines and towers, roads and high-voltage
transmission infrastructure.
In the ten years between take-off in construction of wind farms in 2003 and proposals
for energy export projects, the scale of individual wind projects had remained remark-
ably stable (see Figure 5.13). Over time, turnkey generating plant increased in capacity
coinciding with steady annual increases in the hub height, rotor diameter and full load
hours recorded (Duffy and Cleary, 2015, p. 92). Yet average recorded wind speed at new
locations decreased, suggesting wind farms were being constructed in areas with lower
wind speed, as the best sites had been developed earlier. Duffy and Cleary (2015, p. 85)
conclude
“that although wind projects are increasingly using lower wind resource loc-
ations, average capacity factors for projects built in 2011 and 2012 remained
high. This would suggest that the larger wind turbines with increased rotor
diameters and hub heights are successful in achieving a viable energy yield
from these locations.”
We can draw two conclusions, First advances in turnkey technology achieved in research
labs overseas have supported the commercial viability of project development in an increas-
ing number of locations throughout Ireland. Second, although indigenous tacit knowledge
of building wind farms in the industry has increased, and consolidation is occurring, the
size of new wind farms being deployed has remained remarkably stable. Developers such
as Mainstream and Element were getting better at rolling out wind farms, but they were
91Source: Irish Examiner, March 28, 2013
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not, at the mean and median, constructing substantially bigger wind farms (illustrated by
the linear trend of mean wind farm size in Figure 5.13).
Figure 5.13. Scale-up of new wind farms in Ireland. A box and whiskers format is used to represent the
distribution and range in sizes of newly completed wind farms for each year. Vertical lines represent the
cumulative installed wind capacity per year. The boxes represent descriptive statistics on individual wind
farms. Chart includes the 25th to 75th percentile (box), median (horizontal line within each box), mean
(diamond), and minimum and maximum wind farm sizes (whiskers). The linear trend of mean wind farm
size is indicated by the diagonal trend-line. Source: data compiled by author from various sources.
The average size of wind farms commissioned in 2013 was 15 MW, but this extended
discussion on the narrative history of wind technologies in Ireland has illustrated that
the scale of development of wind farms is not a given, but influenced by the outcome of
technological, political and social choices made within and outside of the wind sector. An
economist and policy expert made this point with regard to the influence of European
policy on the wind sector in an interview:
“relevant EU targets [matter] yes. . . but Ireland’s solution to those EU targets
is determined by the technological developments. They could be going for wood
boilers in everybody’s house, they didn’t because they could meet the target
cheaply and efficiently through electricity [generated] through this means. And
then there is major uncertainty as to whether there will be a target after 2020
and the paper by Muireann Lynch.”92
The interviewee’s point is that in the electricity system, that policy has mattered, but not
92Lynch et al. (2012) show the influence, and how potentially costly uncertainty is in this regard.
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exclusively. We have discussed at length how the technologies, actors’ beliefs in technolo-
gical opportunity, and their ability to influence policy has also played an important role
in the pace and nature of developments.
Summing up
Garud and Karnøe (2003, p. 282) tell us that “modern wind turbines embody the steady
accretion of inputs from many actors”. The narrative history discussed in this chapter
showed the accretion of inputs does not end with the manufacture of material technologies
but extends along the value chain into new deployment contexts, by boat, by plane and
by PDF.
The case narrative presented was the story of how and why these technologies arrived in
Ireland, and what happened to them and the actors who brought them here once they
arrived.
I found from the very first commercial projects in the 1990s, indigenous developers
worked with overseas technology suppliers and consultancies, often through joint ventures.
Regardless of developer, three dominant barriers to development were found; problems
obtaining planning permission in sufficient time to enable commercial development, access
to the national transmission grid, and the availability of power purchase agreements.
Notable here are two potential impediments that were not widely found in the evidence
– the availability of finance, and learning. While planning regulations were never well-
aligned with the goals of wind RES actors, considerable progress was made on grid access
and power purchase agreements and the reasons for these difficulties are largely explained
as a local competence issue rather than being about organised resistance. I found that
these were addressed through core institutions of the grid queue, the rules of the Single
Electricity Market. These were further bolstered with a series of support payment schemes.
These institutional shifts were influenced on the one hand by policy agendas at EU level,
and on the other by lobbying activities by wind RES actors. The Irish energy department
was relatively unencumbered by ideological drive, rather playing a role accommodating
and corralling an initially reluctant ESB, whose growth strategies were initially focussed
overseas.
Three episodes in the narrative illuminated particularly useful aspects of the system. The
moratorium on grid connections illustrated the agency of actors in Ireland, the ESB and
the asynchronous agency in the relationship they had with turnkey suppliers. The RESG
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illustrated ‘backstage’ processes by which knowledge, stories and agendas were shared
amongst firms, the state and statue utilities. And the recession was a useful focussing
event, allowing us to consider significant changes to the wind RES as the availability of
Irish finance decreased after 2008, and ushered in a period of consolidation within the
industry, new entry of overseas actors, and new industry rhetorics of societal benefits.
In Chapter 6 I focus on analysing the structure of the Irish wind RES. I analyse
how and why European policy agendas have influenced the emergence and growth of the
Irish wind RES. I examine what effect the three major system barrier had, we analyse the
formation and effect of the three core wind RES institutions, and we discuss the alignment
of these and other institutions with the goals of wind RES actors. Chapter 7 details the
function analysis. Two emergent functional themes identified in this chapter are given
special analytic attention, the role of legitimisation discourses and activities in Ireland
and the influences on the direction of the search for new technologies from within Ireland
and from overseas.
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Chapter 6
Analysis of the Irish wind RES
structure
This chapter contributes a structural analysis of the Irish wind electricity system. In doing
so the chapter uses the structural aspects of the research framework outlined theoretically
in Section 3.2, the operationalisation of which was presented in subsection 4.3.2. The
analysis focusses on actors and networks in Ireland, technologies imported and created
within Ireland, and actor networks constituted at least in part within Ireland. These con-
cepts were introduced in Subsection 3.2.3 where I drew the theoretical focus to unevenly
distributed agency within innovation systems and highlighted the role of prime movers.
Furthermore we introduce a geographic perspective in which we might expect indigenous
actors to be locationally advantaged or disadvantaged in certain situation. An ensemble of
European regulatory institutions is constructed to which relevant Irish informal and reg-
ulatory institutions are added. The theoretical background was discussed in Subsection
3.1.1 where I introduced the concept of institutional alignment as a constituent process at
the heart of large-scale transformation processes. In Section 6.3 I show when and under
what circumstances elements of the ensemble are aligned to the goals of various wind RES
actors. Furthermore, I account for how this alignment took place throughout each of the
four analytic periods discussed in the previous chapter.
I address two of the thesis hypotheses relating to institutional change in subsection
6.3.2 and identify three ‘core’ wind RES institutions which played a significant alignment
role.
With this structural perspective assembled, I consider a dynamic perspective on the emer-
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gence of the wind RES, and relevant structural drivers and barriers to attendant system
alignments in section 6.4. Ultimately this allows me assess the consistency and inconsist-
ency of institutions at different phases of the history, something I do not a priori assume
to be constant over time and space. Finally, the extended discussion on contextual insti-
tutions necessitates the introduction of some further detailed evidence on European Union
policy and policy processes, as well as details of national energy policy in Ireland which
were mentioned in passing in Chapters 2 and 5 and is expanded where necessary below.
6.1 Components of the Irish wind RES
6.1.1 Actors, narratives and analytic stories
We begin the technological innovation system analysis by documenting and assessing the
structural components of the system; the actors, networks and institutions.We build on
the discussion of the system components introduced in the previous chapter, however, the
task at hand is to focus on specific activities of the actors and networks and assess the
influence of each on the emergent and evolving Irish wind RES. We assess these activities
through narrative analysis, analysing appropriate stories mobilised by actors endogenous
and exogenous to the system. The case narrative presented in the previous chapter was
made up of actor narratives located initially in the evidence from interviews then extended
and triangulated with periodical and media sources. These narratives mobilised by actors
and coalitions of actors within and around the developing system and in short, accounted
for who did what to whom, when it was done and where it happened. In this chapter,
we discuss the context of the narratives and their underlying analytic storylines1. Thus
the aim of this narrative analysis is threefold. First to account for the role of actors
in the system and how they influenced or were influenced by institutions. Second, we
assess which institutions were “in play” or contested (e.g. through lobbying), and which
remained fixed, or exogenous to the influence of actors within the focal system. Third,
and building on the first two tasks, we assess how well aligned (or not) the actors and
institutions of system are.
We use the set of analytic stories – introduced in section 4.3.2 – to structure the dis-
1Of course, these stories in themselves are accounts often sympathetic to the interests of certain actors.
However, these accounts are illustrative of real world events, processes and interests in the industry and
assessed in aggregate, give us knowledge of the underlying generative structures, or analytic storylines.
Recall from Chapter 4 that the analytic stories are the underlying generative structures or processes of
reality of which narratives are one specific account, framed from a specific point of view.
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cussion on components of the system and activities related to those components. To aid
this, we summarise in Table 6.1 a mapping of the analytic stories relevant to each phase
of development. Furthermore, by way of a simple classification system, the table indicates
whether the narratives representing these analytic stories expressed broadly positive, neg-
ative or indeterminate sentiments with regard to wind energy technologies. These serve
an heuristic purpose, helping guide us through the analysis of actors in the system in
a manner which helps us locate formal and informal networks and coalitions. We thus
systematically identify actor positions, coalitions, strategies and goals.
6.1.2 Wind developers
Wind farm developers typically acquired land through purchase or rental agreements,
acquired planning permission, purchasing turnkey plant, managed project construction,
acquired grid connection and power purchase agreements and managed or sub-contracted
ongoing operations and maintenance. Each of these tasks required competencies and
knowledge which was acquired through a combination of joint ventures with other firms,
the hiring of consultants or skilled employees, learning from previous projects, learning
through industry networks and workshops and professional training. Furthermore, many of
these actors performed additional activities in order to further their own interests and often
to promote the interests of the wider wind industry. These included lobbying for technology
support instruments, competing against other electricity generation technologies for share
of market or for limited investment capital from Irish and overseas financial firms.
The history of the Irish wind industry is told and re-told, often strategically, by de-
velopers themselves and is a central construct in the wider history of the industry (A–06).
Actors cumulatively incorporated episodes such as the construction of Bellacorrick and
other early wind farms to create confidence in the contemporary industry and to build
positive expectations about the future industry. Developers interpreted and framed data
on the country’s wind resources as being ‘Irish’ and amongst ‘the best in Europe’ (A–01).
These resources were in turn framed as commercially exploitable opportunities requiring
government and European support. The wind resource being exploited was framed as
‘Irish’, which gave the industry a strong sense of national identity, despite the consider-
able monetary outflows to turnkey technology providers in Germany, Denmark and later
Spain and engineering consultants in the United Kingdom. Commercial development op-
portunities were often framed as solutions to Irish societal, economic and environmental
problems. The systemic ‘story-of-self’ encapsulated the wind industry not simply as a
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Table 6.1 Analytic stories of the wind RES in Ireland
Development period
Ref. Analytic story P1 P2 P3 P4
A-01 The interpretation of Ireland’s wind resource en-
dowment
o + + +
A-02 The influence of EU technology demonstration and
support schemes
o
A-03 The informal processes of access to the grid o -
A-04 The role of turnkey technologies and the influence
of manufacturers
o - o o
A-05 Joint ventures with overseas firms o o o o
A-06 The construction of the story of what the Irish
wind industry is
o o o o
A-07 IWEA’s role in the wind industry o o o o
A-08 Planning regulations (as barriers) o - - o
A-09 National technology support mechanisms o o + +
A-10 The EU market liberalisation agenda o o o o
A-11 The influence of macro economic growth o +
A-12 The influence of the RESG o
A-13 The influence of the moratorium on the Irish wind
sector
- o
A-14 The influence of the CER’s regulation of industry o o o
A-15 The influence of Irish research o + o
A-16 European energy policy and processes o + o
A-17 The grid allocation process + o
A-18 The role of the SEM o o
A-19 The impact of the recession - o
A-20 Industry consolidation o o
A-21 Wind as export commodity + +
A-22 The impact of increased interconnection + +
Key:
- primarily negative sentiments wrt wind RES.
+ Narratives expressed primarily positive sentiments.
o Inconclusive sentiment or contested narratives
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niche sector which required support and protection from market forces (e.g. from actors
such as the monopoly utilities), but as a system that was able to address wider issues.
First, the issue of climate change, then through the economic boom, ‘keeping Ireland’s
lights on’ (A–11), and finally through the recession, an indigenous industry capable of
supplying jobs, electricity and revenue to the domestic economy (A–21). The narratives
that represent these analytic stories matter, analytically, because as time goes by, we
see them performed by a wider range of actors, including politicians and policy makers
indicating increasing influence and agency in the system.
Despite this collective story-making, wind developers were neither homogenous nor
harmonious. They were a heterogenous group of actors who maintained shared interests
in the growth of the industry, but were also in competition with one another for limited
resources such as finance and skilled labour, and access to markets. In the first two periods
development was carried out mostly by small and medium sized private developers, then by
increasing entry of utilities in the third phase, and a system reconfiguration in the fourth
phase following the recession and merger and acquisition activity. The evidence of activity
in the narrative correlates with actor-types identified in data identifying project activity
obtained from the system operators. Using this data we have classified the developer
firms into categories based on firm scale (utility and non-utility) and origin (domestic and
overseas, or non-domestic).2 From these categories, four sub-types have been identified.
We trace the development and acquisition activity of these four actor groups through
examining ownership of wind farms over time (see Figure 6.1). It is notable that this
categorisation precludes a simplistic (fossil fuel) incumbent versus (renewable) challenger
dichotomisation of the wider electricity sector at the national level. Furthermore, whilst
an incumbent versus challenger division may have been an appropriate analytic lens in
the first decade, from 2004 onwards composition of the sector becomes more complex, as
illustrated.
These developers performed different roles and mobilised several different and some-
times contentious narrative frames in order to further their own interests. In the early
years of the study period, Irish wind farm developers provided knowledge about local land,
2These two categories are based on two rationales. First, the evidence suggests the scale of the firm ma-
terially affected the ability of the firm to raise finance. Utility scale firms typically, though not exclusively,
have direct relationships with electricity buyers and legacy fossil fuel generation revenue streams, allowing
them to generate balance sheet finance. Second, national or transnational origin of the firm influenced its
ability to draw on knowledge and other resources from overseas locations. Where evidence of joint ventures
between different types of firms was found, category assignment was made based on best available evidence
of how the scale and location of the joint venture influenced its activities in the wind system.
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Figure 6.1. Growth and decline of cumulative installed capacity by four firm types, 2000-2014
political institutions and regulations to overseas joint venture partners (A–05). Through
the volume of planning and grant applications they demonstrated commercial potentials
of the system. As the system developed they pioneered new business models in gave of-
ten loud voice to post-recession frames of energy export and ‘green’ jobs (A–21). The
ESB, Ireland’s largest energy utility initially mobilised counter-narratives against the pro-
ponents of wind, the dominant of which suggested Ireland’s grid would never be able to
accept more than 7% wind generated electricity (A–01). However, by 2000 the ESB had
begun exploring commercial opportunities independently and through joint ventures with
overseas firms and local developers, at which point the utility’s wind development actives
began to resemble those of independent Irish developers. Overseas utility firms Scottish
Power (as owner-developers), PowerGen (E-On) and RWE (as joint venture partners) in-
vested in early development projects but ultimately did not pursue further opportunities
in Ireland. However SSE’s acquisition of Airtricity and Energia’s entry into the market
in the late 2000s changed the composition of the industry significantly (A–20). By 2010,
utilities, both domestic and overseas, accounted for the majority of newly commissioned
wind farms annually in Ireland (see Figure 6.2. While Figure 6.1 illustrates ownership in
the industry and indicates mergers, acquisition and consolidation, Figure 6.2 illustrates
which actor type was building new wind farms in each phase of development). Indeed,
this evidence suggests that developers themselves perceived that commercial development
was most clearly associated with large firms as this interview text - which was introduced
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in Chapter 5 - suggests:
“If we were starting off now we would find it much more difficult I think that
is fair to say. As time goes on, and it is inexorable since the early 90s, it has
become more and more of a big boys game. It is a huge money game, why
wouldn’t it be.”3
Figure 6.2. Development of new wind farms in Ireland by firm type (cumulative installed capacity, MW)
6.1.3 Other actors and networks
Utilities, system operators and engineers
Where developers did not have available and affordable competencies within the firm,
external consultants and contractors were used. UK engineering firm Wind Prospect for
example provided consultant engineering services on 46 developments in Ireland between
1998 and 2013, over 25% of all projects built in this period. Whilst some Irish firms
developed competencies in this area over time, overseas consultancies retained significant
market presence competing for tenders. Turbine manufacturers on the other hand played
a less significant role in Ireland. More influential to the industry in Ireland were the
system operators. The system operators for the first half of the study were vertically
integrated as part of the ESB. Although unbundled as part of the 1999 Electricity Act, it
was the mid–2000s, after the moratorium, when the analysis suggests EirGrid’s approach
3Interview 130503
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to the wind industry became more favourable, as new employees, attitudes to problems
and research emerged. Through this period they retained high degrees of agency and
power and played a ‘gatekeeping’ role with regard to grid access. The system operators
worked closely with the regulator which was founded following the 1999 Electricity Act.
The regulator according to a senior department official was reluctant to make policy as
this text suggests:
“The CER was saying ’Look, I’m not responsible for the law. I’m following
the law here.”4
However, in later phases the regulator facilitated processes for changes in market rules
such as alteration of the grid allocation process or changes in the treatment of curtailment
in tie-break situations (A–14) (CER, 2012b) and as such, may be thought of as providing
an institutional space for industry debate and rule-setting.
Government actors and the civil service
The law was made by the civil servants in the Department of Communications, Energy
and Natural Resources, based on government policy. The DCENR budget and headcount
was modest, relative to other government departments, and energy was not a high priority
policy domain. Their approach to policy making was guided on the one hand by Europe,
and on the other by EirGrid and the CER, which according to an interviewer resulted in
a situation where:
“Three agencies overlapping who are independent of each other who don’t
always see eye to eye and question each other so the policy making process
is not as simple as it looks. But I think that each knows that the other will
question them on everything they do so it may slow positions but I think it
has helped to rational decision making.”5
The DCENR did play a co-ordination role by establishing the RESG and REDG processes.
Furthermore, through the setting of national targets the department used the evidence of
firm activity to frame and establish European energy targets and goals in Ireland (A–16).
Research and industry networks
From the early 2000s, we see the emergence of influential indigenous research actors (A–
15). Evidence suggests they worked closely with industry, in particular the system oper-
ators. The analysis suggests that over time researchers in Ireland became more purposeful
4Interview 130703
5Interview 130703
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and ‘political’6 focussing on narrow, more locally specific problem areas. The research
community played a role in the integrating of global turnkey technologies into an Irish
context. Research actors also played a role as carriers of new wind-favourable narrative
frames which represented underlying beliefs and attitudes, bringing them out of the uni-
versities and into modernising organisations such as EirGrid. In turn, utilities and system
operators developed new attitudes to wind as well as acquiring new capabilities. However
Irish wind actors did not make a significant contribution to turbine design, and similarly,
Irish market issues did not significantly influence the development of plant in overseas
research settings.
Specifically there is bibliographic co-authoring evidence of informal knowledge net-
works developing between the significant electricity research centres in University College
Dublin and University College Cork and EirGrid and the intermediary SEAI. The most
significant industry network was that of the industry associations IWEA, and to a lesser
extent, Meithel na Gaoithe (A–07). Through the 1990s and 2000s IWEA’s membership
consisted of a mix of corporate and hobbyist actors and even with changing industry
composition, retained an argumentative and confrontational style of lobbying. Yet ac-
cording to one former DCENR official, they had good engineers and technical skills in the
association which according to one respondent:
“helped because it means the main wind lobby group in that instance is sane
and you can easily trust.”7
IWEA established and maintained transnational links to EWEA and in addition to lob-
bying, conducted knowledge building activities through workshops and conferences and
commissioned research which in turn was mobilised within narratives to lobby for in-
creased support from government. However, as overseas utilities entered the Irish wind
industry in the later periods, Irish actors (in addition to the ESB) joined Brussels based
industry associations and lobbying groups such as Eurelectric which gave Irish firms other
than the state utilities access to policy processes at a European level.
In closing, the analysis of actors shows that wind farm developers played a crucial
role (with regard to the wind innovation system in Ireland) in creating and recognising
opportunities to construct wind farms. However, location, capabilities and access to over-
seas resources were also influential characteristics of actors. Overseas actors brought with
them not only access to financial resources, but relationships with consultancies and other
6Interview 130202
7Interview 130706
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expert groups.
6.2 The ensemble of institutions
6.2.1 Regulatory institutions in Ireland
We begin the analysis of Ireland’s regulatory institutions8 by examining the policy instru-
ments, which were at least nominally designed and deployed to support wind industry
growth (summarised in Table 6.2). The Alternative Energy Requirement (AER) schemes
were created by the Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources in
order to incentivise private firms to establish wind farms in a highly an electricity sector
dominated by the monopoly utility, the ESB. The design logic of the AERs addressed
a perceived misalignment (or simply non-availability) of investment capital to would-be
wind farm developers with a capital grant. In addition to supplying capital, the AERs
signposted to Irish and developers based overseas that commercial opportunities for wind
generation were on their way. Furthermore, the AERs re-enforced and further legitimised
domestic regulatory targets.
However, the narrative analysis shows there were both structural deficiencies and issues
of actor contestation. The design of the AER schemes were on the one hand constrained
by European state-aid rules which dictated how firms in industries could be financially
supported and on the other hand influenced by the ESB, which retained and its vertically
integrated system operator division and ultimately its gatekeeping position over the elec-
tricity sector through the 1990s and early 2000s. The design of the first AER effectively
excluded domestic firms in favour of bids from overseas actors which were ultimately not
commercially viable. Indigenous wind developers criticised the AER schemes as ineffective
in aligning their needs with institutional structures such as planning permission, finance,
grid access and power purchase agreements, the latter two issues influenced by the ESB’s
stated desire to limit the pace and scale of wind RES emergence and growth (O´ Gallacho´ir,
Bazilian, et al., 2010). While some improvements were made in later AER rounds9, the
basic architecture of the ‘bid and build’ format meant that long-term market certainty
in the industry was not enhanced. Developers and their investors simply had little cer-
8A chronological ordering of these polices is illustrated in section 5.2.1.
9AER V and VI adopted a number of lessons learned from the initial schemes. For example, projects
with necessary statutory permits such as planning permission were prioritised. In AER VI there were ac-
celerated upfront payments and AER V projects could resubmit to take advantage of even more favourable
solutions, 15 year PPAs were introduced (O´ Gallacho´ir, Bazilian, et al., 2010).
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Table 6.2 Irish energy policy instruments
Year InstrumentGoal Instrument
type
Target
year
Influence on wind system
1993 AER I + 30 MW installed
wind capacity
Tender scheme 1997 Attracted overseas developers,
half of the 10 awarded schemes
were not constructed.
1997 AER III +90 MW installed
wind capacity
Tender scheme 1999 Attracted 279 expressions of
interest, promoted industry
activity. 42% of target capa-
city built.
1999 PSO Revenue generation
component of sup-
port instruments
Levy on all elec-
trical bills
Ongoing Levy on all electrical bills AC48
per MWh
2001 AER V + 240MW installed
wind capacity
Tender scheme 2005 18% of target capacity built.
2003 AER VI + 433MW installed
wind capacity
Tender scheme 2006 64% of target capacity built
2006 REFIT 1 + 450MW installed
wind capacity
Feed-in tariff 2010 Payment due to supplier, only
if wind farm has a 15 year PPA
further systematising address-
ing of system barriers. Gave
ongoing support to a greater
number of actors than AER
scheme. Was understood by
international investors, legit-
imisng Irish wind system in
global context
2012 REFIT 2 Support for up to
4,000 MW
Feed-in tariff Ongoing Extended duration of REFIT
scheme in Ireland
tainty about when the next competition would be held, or what scale of development it
would support. This uncertainty was one significant factor in Airtricity’s decision in 2003
to withdraw at a late stage from the then current AER round and halt development in
Ireland to focus on what they considered better opportunities overseas, a decision further
exacerbated by the moratorium on grid connection10.
The choice of technology support mechanism was a highly contested issue, with the
Irish Wind Energy Association and other wind advocates strongly favouring, and lobbying
for, the introduction of a feed-in tariff. This lobbying, combined with European institu-
tional pressures described in the next section influenced Irish policy, and the first REFIT
10Interview 130722
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was launched in 2006.
The REFITs addressed some of the deficiencies of the AER schemes by changing support
payments from up-front capital grants to an ongoing supply related tariff. The scheme was
designed to reduce risk involved in long term wind investment by guaranteeing a minimum
revenue when the market price per unit of electricity falls below a given level. Under the
REFIT, generators entered into 15 year power purchase agreements with a market sup-
plier, who typically guaranteed fixed payments over the term (unlike other FIT markets,
in Ireland, suppliers received the actual REFIT payment for onward settlement with their
generator). The suppliers were compensated through the Public Service Obligation, a levy
which appeared on consumers’11 bills12. The REFITs, through the public service oblig-
ation (PSO), were the main source of revenue for generators from their launch in 2006
(Duffy and Cleary, 2015). As such, the REFIT was a powerful signal to developers such
as Airtricity that there was now longer revenue certainty for developers and investors in
wind electricity, and indeed Airtricity returned to development activities in 2006.
However, the design of the REFIT has drawn some criticism from advocates of in-
creased wind generation. The architecture of the market, and the nature of the power
purchase agreement meant that a relatively small number of suppliers, rather than gener-
ators or consumers, capture the revenue upside in the market when there is overproduction
of renewable electricity (Doherty and O’Malley, 2011, p. 4919). The risk this presented,
according to Doherty and O’Malley, was that market revenue intended to incentivise wind
generation went unvalued and made no contribution to encouraging further generation or
investment. Indeed, the long term suitability of the REFIT, as wind penetration levels
rise, has been debated13 (Foley, O´ Gallacho´ir, et al., 2013). However, given their overall
market share and position, market suppliers – typically vertically integrated utilities –
occupied a strong position from which to resist changes to the status quo once the market
11The average wholesale market price during 2013 was AC107/MWh, as compared to the REFIT tariff
of AC69.235/MWh for wind farms larger than 5 MW and AC71.664 /MWh for wind farms smaller than 5
MW, as calculated from the annual sum of 2013 half hourly single electricity market transactions, plus
generation capacity payments, plus dispatch balancing costs, divided by the total generated electricity in
2013 (Duffy and Cleary, 2015)
12The projected cost to consumers of this levy for wind power in 2013–2014 was approximately AC40
million. Public Service Obligation Levy 2013/2014 Decision Paper, July 2013, Commission for Energy
Regulation. (Commission for Energy Regulation, 2013)
13 Farrell and Lyons (2014, p. 2) note that “as more wind power enters the generation mix, a greater
share of each consumer’s electricity bill is made up of the PSO charge as opposed to the energy cost”.
While Irish consumers have traditionally not opposed these charges in significant number, this situation is
not guaranteed into the future.
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architecture around the REFITs had been established.
By the time the REFIT was launched in 2006 there was already considerable commer-
cial activity in the industry. Merchant plant totalling 338MW (49% of total) had been
built, that is, generators with power purchase agreements to the market which had not
received AER funding (O´ Gallacho´ir, Bazilian, et al., 2010). The government no longer
needed to incentivise new development firms to enter the industry, rather, the aim was
to improve the “bankability” of prospective development projects, their ability to return
regular and predictable revenues over a ten to fifteen year period. The REFITs addressed
issues of revenue predictability which had a mitigating impact on risk assessment by lenders
in the favour of developers; the guaranteed price was attractive to investors putting in high
up front capital. The implementation of a feed-in tariff had been a policy demand of IWEA
as it supported a greater number of firms than the AER awards. The REFIT thus sent
a strong, long-term price signal to indigenous firms as well as overseas utilities, investors
and manufacturers who had experience of feed-in tariffs in other markets.
The increasingly powerful position occupied by Airtricity and IWEA was institutionally
embedded via legislation contained in the 1999 Electricity Regulation Act (Government of
Ireland, 1999). The Act preceded the creation of the market and Commission for Energy
Regulation and was instrumental in creating a number of institutional conditions by which
private firms could supply electricity to the national grid. Amongst the functions of the
CER listed in the Act were the following duties, lobbied for by actors in the wind RES:
“(d) to encourage research and development into— (i) methods of generating
electricity using renewable, sustainable and alternative forms of energy and
combined heat and power, and (ii) methods of increasing efficiency in the
use and production of electricity; and (e) to require that the system operator
gives priority to generating stations using renewable, sustainable or alternative
energy sources when selecting generating stations”14
Clause (e) was the basis for market entry rules successfully lobbied for by Airtricity and
IWEA which allowed wind generators privileged access to newly liberalised market seg-
ments. Wind generators and suppliers who offered them PPAs were effectively given a
head-start in acquiring business customers in the new market ahead of fossil fuel generat-
ors. The architecture of the Single Energy Market, launched in 2004 was also important
in this regard. All generators in the market received capacity payments, however wind
generators were also the beneficiaries of dispatch balancing payments, made to compensate
14ibid.: Pt. II, S.9, numbering and lettering as per source text
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for constraint on the network. Several other regulatory institutions were also influenced
the wind sector though to a lesser degree. The 1998 Finance Act which offered cor-
poration tax relief on profits invested in renewable energy projects brought wind energy
technologies into finance and investment conversations in banks and finance practices. The
2000 Planning Act took was somewhat influenced by the Renewable Energy Development
Group, although ultimately did not address adequately, from the perspective of wind farm
developers, systemic barriers related to acquiring planning permission in a timely manner.
Summarising the formal policy landscape in Ireland, we see a progression from no
domestic support, through to a highly uncertain series of ‘bid and build’ capital grant
schemes, ultimately to a feed-in tariff scheme. From the policy analysis alone it is unclear
to what extent these schemes and their associated targets were drivers of the growing
wind energy system, or came about because sectoral growth had legitimised the spending of
public money supporting renewable energy technologies. The influence of these institutions
are summarised in Table 6.3.
6.2.2 Informal institutions in Ireland
Analysis of the case narrative has shown evidence of informal institutions influencing the
emergent Irish wind RES. First, we note the Energy Department’s (DCENR) general style
of policy making, in which they eschew a top-down unilateralist approach in-favour of en-
gagement and consensus with industry actors. This approach of the DCENR to managing
industrial relations with the energy sector fits with a ‘competitive corporatist’ modal15
in which policy is made ‘with’ rather than ‘for’ certain stakeholders. But the strategy is
also practical, given the relatively small size and limited resources of the department16.
This policy approach from the DCENR was influenced the organisational architecture of
the Renewable Energy Strategy Group, the Renewable Energy Development Group, and
the structure of the regulator. In later periods, this industrial culture was evident in the
construction of the group allocation process which sequenced access by developers to the
grid(see Subsection 5.3.1), and in the resolution of the contentious curtailment episode
15See Adshead and Quinn (1996) and Hardiman (2002) for detailed discussions on the evolution of
corporatist-style policy making in Ireland.
16This point is illustrated in this interview text: “. . . having the debate played out in public allows them
to assess the evidence when they are weak on resources. They [the DCENR] have some really good people,
impressive people, but they are under resourced and how do you deal with that by having an open and
transparent debate which they can watch and then assess what the answer is. So it is one way of dealing
with the situation where you don’t have all the expertise in house and it’s like the SEM transparency, if
you can’t be a player then having a transparent situation aids policy making.” Interview 130501
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Table 6.3 Institutions, location and influence on Irish wind energy system: Ireland reg-
ulatory and formal institutions
Institution Influence on Irish wind energy system
(Signposting, stabilising, transmitting
tacit knowledge)
Deviation between case
findings and expectations
Technology
support
instruments: AERs
Support to limited number of actors led to
build up of system activity without
providing systemic solutions to system
barriers. Applications created virtuous cycle
of legitimising government capacity targets
which in turn signposted future expectations
and belief in industry to DCENR
Flaws in instrument design ob-
served in other national cases
such as the UK NFFO scheme
also found in Ireland. However
despite flaws, some system bene-
fits were derived as indicated
Technology
support
instruments:
REFITs
Stabilised the rapidly developing industry.
Signposted future stability of Irish industry
to overseas investors and facilitated roll-out
of proposed developments. Increased
bankability of projects already under
development.
The literature suggests that
all things held equal, mar-
ket support mechanisms such
as FITs disproportionately be-
nefited smaller players. However
in Ireland, we have found that
this is not straightforward.
Electricity market
structure
Protected space between 2000 and 2005 was
crucial given limited availability of capital
grants. Grid codes supplied by
manufacturers embedded industry knowledge
into market
Unexpected, this course of
events seems somewhat unique
to Ireland
Grid allocation
rules
Established an arena for transfer of
knowledge between developers, regulators
and system operators. Stabilised
development processes which signposted to
overseas manufacturers and investors future
market size
Not considered in review of lit-
erature
National and
sub-national
planning
regulations
Changes in planning regulations and culture
was slow to diffuse to regional settings and
remained a significant barrier to
development throughout
Close match
around ‘gradfathering’ versus ‘pro-rata’ merit ordering (see Subsection 5.4.2). Second,
the changing composition of the wind sector meant that the overall professional culture
evolved through the phases of development and was “professionalised” at the end of the
1990s. Finally, attitudes to investment and entrepreneurialism within and exogenous to
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the sector influenced who got financing and ultimately, what kind of actor-groups were
perceived as “typical” wind farm developers.
It is appropriate to extend our discussion of attitudes to investment and entrepreneuri-
alism as approaches to industrial development in Ireland is not apparent from the analysis
of the case narrative alone. The overarching objective of industrial growth policies in Ire-
land since the 1950s has been job creation17 (Breznitz, 2007). This rationale explains the
strategy of the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) and its successor agencies18 of
focussing on export-led foreign direct investment as a means of economic development19.
The focus on achieving high levels of FDI related industrial activity came at the expense
of domestic research and development activities, both private and public. Incoming mul-
tinational firms were historically reluctant to establish research facilities in Ireland while
tertiary eduction was similarly focussed on fulfilling industry knowledge requirements. Fur-
thermore, this structural and sectoral bias favoured product based start-ups over research
and development intensive industries. These institutional arrangements exacerbated ex-
isting mistrust of Irish entrepreneurial activities, indeed, banks in the 1990s and even
2000s were reluctant to lend to businesses unless lending could be secured by property.20
These development issues were addressed by the influential Culliton Report in 1992, which
recommended the state address market failures created by existing conservative financial
bodies reluctant to lend to new businesses (Culliton, 1992). As a result of this report, the
IDA and other development bodies were undergoing a series of institutional restructure as
the Irish wind industry, and wider economy, was beginning to take-off.
This context helps us account for a number of barriers and biases faced by the grow-
ing wind industry in Ireland. There was a structural bias against R&D which was not
addressed until end of the 1990s21. This bias impacted attitudes to assessment of risk,
lending and more generally the approach to entrepreneurial activity. It is one factor in why
17An understandable goal given high historic unemployment figures, typically greater than 10% until
the early 1990s.
18Following the Culliton Report in 1992, the IDA was broken into a number of smaller agencies under
the umbrella of Forbairt, including the Industrial Development Agency and Enterprise Ireland.
19This reached it’s zenith in 2003 when Dell, then a global beamoth in the manufacture of personal
computers, accounted for AC8bn in exports, almost 5% of the annual gross domestic product (Breznitz,
2007).
20Interview 130503 and Breznitz (2007).
21The relatively recent increase in research actives and their reliance on European funding frameworks
such as ESPRIT is significant. Breznitz (2007) in his history of the Irish software industry points out that
as late as 1998, over one-third of the research budget of Trinity College came from these programmes, at
a time when it was Ireland’s leading research university by size of budget.
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Irish entrepreneurs did not initially consider domestic research and development22 a useful
process by which to address systemic barriers. Moreover, the objectives of development
agencies was on securing overseas FDI, or export-led, high employment start-ups. Small to
medium sized domestic businesses which offered low employment opportunities were were
typically excluded from funding programmes, and developing strategic national expertise
in renewable technologies was considered. The influence of these informal institutions are
summarised in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4 Institutions, location and influence on Irish wind energy system: Ireland in-
formal institutions
Institution Influence on Irish wind energy system
(Signposting, stabilising, transmitting
tacit knowledge)
Deviation between case
findings and expectations
Professional
culture
Multiple professional cultures observed as
composition of wind system evolved over
time
Inconclusive
Attitudes to
investment
Low-jobs industries were not prioritised in
industrial development strategies. However,
the analysis suggests this did not
significantly mitigate against wind system
growth. Availability of finance was not a
significant barrier to development in the first
and second phases. Post recession,
availability of finance from Irish investors
influenced who could build new wind farms.
The case findings suggest a com-
plex relationship between the
availability and location of finan-
cial resources and the location of
actors in the wind system
Corporatist modal
of industrial
relations
Influenced RESG which in turn was an
arena for knowledge transfer
Findings illustrated how
DCENR strategically man-
aged relations with private and
state-owned firms
6.2.3 The influence in Ireland of European institutions
Until the 1990s electricity policy in Europe was devolved to member states. Since then,
as in other policy domains, harmonisation and integration of institutions, regulations and
markets across European Union member states – an aspect of Europeanisation – has been
a fundamental aspect of EU energy policy making (Jacquot and Woll, 2003). These policy
22Ireland’s dearth of industrial engineering activity and heavy manufacturing history is also a consid-
erable factor.
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processes take two forms relevant to the story of Irish wind, the first is market liberalisation
and the path towards single markets in goods, services, labour, capital and energy. Market
liberalisation has been a major driver of European energy regulation process and design
since the start of the 1990s (Pollitt, 2012; Lauber, 2007) as this extract from the 1991
green paper on the single energy market illustrates:
“Energy is such an important component of all economic activity in the com-
munity that the completion of the internal market is inconceivable without an
integrated internal energy market”23
The second major plank of European energy regulation has been environmental protection
and the role of climate change (Helm, 2014; Mitchell, 2008; O’Brien and Penna, 1994).
In this subsection I will account for how these sometimes oppositional forces have shaped
European energy policy processes over the past quarter of a century, processes which have
had specific impacts on Irish energy policy.
The EU’s liberalisation agenda was strongly informed by neoliberal approaches to eco-
nomic policy which have been influential at least since Leon Brittan’s time in the DG
Competition and Industry (Lauber, 2007; Stone Sweet et al., 2001). Liberalisation in the
electricity sector has incorporated both privatisation of state owned firms and the creation
of electricity markets. The European Union implemented a series of reform directives in
1996, 2003 and 2009 aimed at forming a cohesive single electricity market (European
Commission, 1996; European Commission, 2003; European Commission, 2009). Two un-
derlying strategic initiatives permeated these directives. First, the vertical and horizontal
unbundling24 of utility assets and services, and second, the establishment of independent
industry regulators at a national level (Pollitt, 2012). While marketisation was been the
dominant form of liberalisation in Ireland, the unbundling of system operators from the
ESB, and privatisation of state assets and enterprises also featured, most notably with the
sale of Bord Ga´is Energy to Centrica. Furthermore, market liberalisation affects both the
institutional structure of the energy sector, as well as the actor constitution. Market lib-
eralisation is accompanied by a wide variety of institutional changes in associated sectors
such as grid access, network pricing, power trading, consumer protection. Associated with
these changes is the entry of new actors into the sector, including new power generators,
traders and financiers.
23European Council (1991, p. 2)
24Vertical unbundling refers to the breaking up of integrated utilities to facilitate access to monopoly
controlled grids and networks while horizontal unbundling is the establishment or strengthening of markets
by the establishment of competitors (Pollitt, 2012)
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The Brundtland Commission of 1987 had a profound effect on environmental policy
in the European Union which was strengthened and accelerated by the UN Conference in
Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and the subsequent Kyoto Protocol in 1995. Given an increasing
awareness of the role energy production had in greenhouse gas emissions, energy policy in
Europe was deeply implicated. By this time Danish and German renewables industries,
predominantly wind, were already world leaders, and some actors within the DG Energy
perceived a chance for Europe to gain competitive advantage by leading the ‘rush to
wind25’.
Policy battles between actors favouring a market liberalisation agenda and proponents
of direct state-industry support have been a recurring feature of the policy process at
a European level. There tensions were evident during the policy process leading to the
Directive on Renewable Energy in 2001 (2001/77/EC). Proponents of further liberalisation
favoured market based instruments such as tradable green certificates26 (TGCs) whilst
those prioritising the development of the renewables industry urged the Commission to
promote feed in tariffs such as those in Denmark and Germany. The final directive was
considerably less market orientated than the 1996 and 1997 Green and White Papers
which marked a victory against the neoliberal orthodoxy (Lauber, 2007). Notably, the
directive proposed the setting of national targets for each member state, including Ireland.
During the policy process leading to the directive, market orientated instruments such as
TGCs had been forcefully and publicly championed. So much so that in 1999, attempting
to gauge the direction of travel in Europe, Denmark’s new right-of-centre government
scrapped their historically effective feed in tariff, in favour of a TGC approach. This
evidence points to the influence not only of the final directive, but of the policy process
itself observed in member states27. The contention over instrument support mechanisms
recommenced in the lead up to the Renewable Energy Directive of 2009 (2009/28/EC) and
Directive on internal market in energy (2009/EC/72). This time the Commission’s support
of TGCs was strengthened, however in the final draft of the directives they remained
implicit (Helm, 2014; Jacobsson, Bergek, et al., 2009).
European energy and environmental policy can be interpreted as an historic process
of contestation embedded in political and economic conflicts at multiple levels; inter-state
25Not withstanding the Californian “wind rush” of the late 1980s, much of which was powered by
European technology (Est, 1999).
26The UK’s choosen support mechanism.
27It may be that the Danish government used the EU process as justification for a switch to a market
based instrument, but the point remains valid that it is the combination of setting of signposts in Brussels
and the interpretation of them locally which counts.
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level, inter-sectoral or inter-organisational level and state level (O’Brien and Penna, 1994).
Instruments favoured by the Commission are not only ideologically or normatively driven
but also favour specific actor groups. In short, ideological battles at European level matter
at national and sectoral levels. Feed-in tariffs and state aid generally have benefitted non-
utility actors such as entrepreneurs and co-operatives, while TGCs in operation have
tended to benefit incumbent industries. Thus renewable associations such as European
Wind Energy Association and environmental NGOs such Greenpeace and Friends of the
Earth have lobbied for FITs, whilst the large industry associations such as Eurelectric
and the Magritte Group of large utility firms (including France’s GDF Suez, Germany’s
E.ON, Spain’s Iberdrola and Italy’s Enel) have formed a powerful coalition in which the
support of TGCs is a central shared objective (Helm, 2014; Szarka, 2010; Jacobsson,
2009, Interview 140802). The evidence suggests Irish NGOs have good relationships with
European counterparts and organisations such as Greenpeace have Brussels-based teams
and specific policy experts who focus on climate and energy domains. These however
are small compared with the size and scale of industry lobbying organisations such as
Eurolectric who represent the interests of domestic utility firms, amongst the most powerful
coalition groups in EU politics.28 The ESB have been long-time members of Eurolectric
though membership in recent years has opened up to a wider range of Irish utility suppliers
such as Viridian and BGE29. Ultimately, Ireland’s influence in each of these three domains,
public, private and civil society, is modest. The influence of these European institutions
are summarised in Table 6.5.
6.2.4 The ensemble of European and Irish institutions
The review of Ireland and Europe’s regulatory regimes shows that while technology sup-
port instruments since the late 1990s have been constructed at national level, targets have
been strongly influenced from Europe, with some scope for national interpretation. In the
domain of energy policy, Irish actor have had relatively little influence on a European level.
Ireland has traditionally targeted its relatively small influence on strategically important
policy domains such as agriculture and competition. Energy has not been a priority.30
However, while Dublin based policy actors did not exert significant influence in Brussels,
they did influence how EU policy was interpreted in Ireland. Policy actors in Ireland be-
28Interview 140801
29Interview 130103
30Private correspondence 140801
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Table 6.5 Institutions, location and influence on Irish wind energy system: European
policy
Institution Influence on Irish wind
energy system
(Signposting, stabilising,
transmitting tacit
knowledge)
Deviation between case
findings and expectations
established in review of the
literature
Renewables directives, ETS
directive, EU 2020 targets,
Roadmap 2050 (inc. state aid
rules)
Signposts future local policy
goals and targets. Stabilises /
de-stabilises local system under
certain conditions
Close match
Market liberalisation agendas
Energy market deregulation,
single energy market directives
EU agendas destabilised local
institutions before re-stabilising.
Local actors drove change by
influencing structure of new
institutional arrangement
Close match, notably we find
that actors with local institu-
tional knowledge influence cre-
ation of new markets, which ul-
timately attracted overseas new
entrants once established and
stabilised
Technology demonstration
instruments including
ALTENER, VALOREN,
THERMIE,
JOULIE-THERMIE
These instruments provided
strong signposting to Irish
developers and policy actors
engaged in energy as well as
regional development domains
Not considered in review of lit-
erature
came expert at anticipating and transposing31 directives (Carswell, 2010). The European
energy agendas were embedded and institutionalised with strong national influence. Fur-
thermore, the European Union was influential in how the DCENR understood their role
in relation to the electricity market, shifting from an operational to strategic role during
the 1990s, in the new market environment becoming a regulator, a shareholder and a
policy maker (Hastings, 2003). However, failures to articulate this changing role led to
nervousness at the utility, manifesting as defensive and reactive behaviour with regard to
long term strategic action, of which the moratorium was one resulting event.
This influence can be seen in number of locations. First, in the adherence to state
31Ireland’s institutional translation, engineering and opportunism was not limited to the policy domain
of energy. More significantly, the period between 1994 and 2002 was exceptional for the fortunes of
Irish industry more widely as firms and the government took advantage of European market changes
with lowering corporation tax rate according to former EU competition advisor and GATT chief Peter
Sutherland (Carswell, 2000).
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aid rules. The timing of the introduction of the REFIT suggests it was influenced by
the ruling of Preussen Elektra v. Schleswag in the European Court of Justice, before
which DG Energy was strongly influencing member states to avoid a feed-in tariff that
would be counter to state aid rules (CJEU, 2001). The introduction of the REFITs
are an example of institutions stabilising and transmitting knowledge across jurisdictions.
The policy design behind REFITs had been developed elsewhere, yet in implementing
them in Ireland, knowledge was stabilised in another European country. We have seen
that the REFIT also was an important ‘institutional signpost’ which gave investors and
manufacturers in Europe long terms confidence in Ireland’s wind market. Finally, the
2020 and 2030 targets indicated how European targets could act as a stabilising force in
sectors, and conversely as a de-stabilising force, when actors within the electricity industry
expected new rules which were not forthcoming.
The European Union, and in particular the Commission and DG Energy played a
role in coordinating and maintaining common frames and goals such as the single market
agenda, which in the national level energy policy domain manifested itself as marketisation
with some privatisation. We have shown how new technological, institutional and organiz-
ational forms have emerged from individual member states, and become solutions to policy
conflicts between interest groups thus shaping subsequent expectations, interactions, and
institutional innovation across the continent. These ongoing interactions between EU or-
ganisations and interest groups are what make up the day-to-day politics at a European
level, and in new institutional arenas they structure and produce rules which are then
transposed in member states, influenced by local interests and institutions.
6.3 Institutional alignment and actor goals
6.3.1 Alignment of institutions and actors’ goals
In the first period of development the Irish development firms were active in the emer-
gent wind electricity system. The narratives they mobilised – of increasing commercial
opportunity and industry formation – were indicative of both positive expectations in the
emergent wind energy system and returns on investment available from winning grants
and other speculative activity. However, sustained growth in commercial activity was
blocked by a number of institutional barriers. The technology support instruments were
misaligned with the project requirements needed to realise actors’ commercial goals (e.g.
obtaining planning permission, grid access and PPAs). Furthermore, these instruments
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were out of alignment with other regulative institutions in Ireland. For example, the actors
who obtained planning permission were not in many cases the same actors who received
grid allocation offers or PPAs. At this time Irish energy legislation was strongly influ-
enced by the EU. The transposing to Irish law of energy liberalisation directives created
the opportunity for wind firms in Ireland to influence the national institutional setting,
ultimately creating protected market segments which gave generators renewable electricity
direct access to the consumer electricity market. On the other hand, EU state-aid rules
in conjunction with opposition from the ESB precluded the DCENR from increasing the
size of AER grants, or implementing feed-in tariffs. Thus, while there was relatively little
commercial deployment of wind technologies, some institutional re-alignment took place
towards the end of the phase.
The establishment of the regulator, the CER, and electricity market was a significant
institutional development for actors in the wind RES, the composition of which through-
out the second phase remained predominantly Irish developer firms. The formal rules
of the new electricity market were well-aligned with the goals of wind generation firms,
and moreover, were constructed with some flexibility which allowed further institutional
changes over the following years. These included the introduction of the REFIT, public
service obligation and curtailment payments which were introduced with the launch of
the SEM in the next phase. While the establishment of the CER brought independent
regulation of the energy sector, the analysis suggests for the duration of the moratorium
it was still strongly influenced by the ESB and the system operators, and was not well-
aligned with the interests of actors in the wind RES. This was illustrated by the CER
and ESB’s shared narrative framings and strategies at this time, which in halting grid
connection offers, reversed some of the progress which had been made through the Renew-
able Energy Strategy Group. Narratives that incorporated positive expectations of the
possible contribution of wind energy to the wider economy and in particular to industrial
energy demand, intensified at this time. These stories were reproduced and performed by
wind actors, aligning the economic needs of the country with potential supply offered by
wind development. Rather than the institutional aligning with the goals of the actors’, in
this case the actors attempted to reframe their goals as mutually aligned with industrial
and economic policy. In these cases, the ESB and other utilities evoked similar narrative
frames to IWEA and independent firms.
Legal cases in Europe which set precedents that were favourable for feed-in tariffs oc-
curred in the second period of development. In Ireland, the influence of these cases were
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seen in new technology support policies in the third phase. With the REFIT, Ireland’s
primary technology support instrument was significantly better aligned with private de-
velopers‘, investors’ and manufacturers’ interests. Furthermore, the EC’s 2020 targets
influenced national policy in Ireland, further aligning it with the wind RES. During this
period the composition of actors in the wind RES changed, influenced by the dynamic
institutional ensemble. While the ability of Irish developers to access financial resources
within Ireland decreased because of the recession, expectations of future growth ultimately
increased, in part due to the institutionalisation of new grid allocation rules, and the intro-
duction of the REFIT, which allowed a greater number of actors participate than within
the AER schemes and which contributed rents to successful applicants. Although the
wind sector was not a priority area in national government R&D spending and indus-
trial development strategies, indigenous research that was carried out at this time was
well-aligned to the needs of commercial actors and system operators, specifically those
seeking technological advances in increasing the penetration of intermittent electricity on
the small island grid. Informal research networks consisting of researchers, system operat-
ors and some firms further enhanced these processes. With the onset of the recession, we
observe consensus amongst wind developers regarding the wind sector’s ability to contrib-
ute to “green growth” through job-creation and energy export schemes. However overseas
firms, such as ABO Wind Ireland, were able to keep developing new projects because they
could access resources located outside of Ireland, whereas there is negative institutional
alignment within Ireland as the Irish financial sector restricted lending.
By the fourth phase of development, core wind RES institutions – the Single Electricity
Market, REFIT and grid allocation process – were well aligned with the needs of inter-
national institutional investors, asset management firms and yeildcos. Irish firms such as
Mainstream and Element created revenue strategies around these rules establishing posi-
tions for themselves in the value chain between the needs of overseas investment-led firms
and development opportunities in Ireland which had opened up due to the availability of
initiated but uncompleted pipeline projects. As the recession continued, two significant
frames were mobilised around the wind RES’s story of self, which have bearing on the
structure analysis. First, firm and policy actors re-framed the opportunities around large
scale interconnection, aligning them with job creation and national energy export goals
and opportunities. In the energy export story, interconnection was primarily about market
access, allowing Ireland’s wind energy firms access to UK markets. This contrasted with
the story of interconnection as a technological fix which would, according to its promoters,
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enable system optimisation and more rapid progress towards national renewable energy
targets. This framing asserted a belief that Ireland’s wind developers as actors who could
assist the economic recovery. Second, the framing of the wind industry exemplified by the
‘wind is now a big boys game’ narrative was reinforced by the misalignment of the Irish
investment landscape with the needs of those smaller actors who did not have access to
international capital. This framing illustrates the relative locational effect of the economic
turbulence following the recession32. Finally, we note the misalignment of European tar-
gets with the goals of all actors in the wind RES. The perception by system actors in
Ireland of delays in the announcement by the Commission of 2030 targets resulted in un-
certainty in Ireland and is an indication of how the the process of target making has itself
become institutionalised, resulting in negative alignment when expected rounds of targets
are delayed. We summarise these alignment positions in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6 Alignment of institutions with system actors’ goals
Level Institution P1 P2 P3 P4
European Energy policy (inc. state aid rules) - -/+ + +
Market liberalisation agendas + + + +
Climate policies and targets o + + +/o
Ireland (formal) Technology support instruments - o + +
Grid allocation - - o o/+
Planning regulations - - o o
Electricity market structure - -/+ + +
Ireland (informal) Professional culture o + + +
Investment environment - + +/- -
Corporatist modal of industrial rela-
tions
o + + o
Demand o + +/- -
Key: ‘-’ negatively aligned with RES, ‘o’ neutral or indeterminate alignment, ‘+’
positive alignment with RES. Two entries in a cell represents a significant change of
alignment during that period.
32IWEA further highlighted this issue when lobbying for special support measures for smaller players
in the REFIT and REFIT 2 who they claimed were especially disadvantaged
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6.3.2 How alignment happened
We hypothesised in Subsection 3.4.3 that in situations where we observe rapid system
growth, we would expect to find examples of pre-existing institutional alignment, in addi-
tion to relatively fast institutional change processes. In the early phases of the system’s
development, Ireland’s formal institutions were not aligned to the needs of wind actors,
although European regulatory institutions and economic growth were more favourable.
However, we have observed fast and favourable institutional change in several parts of
the ensemble. Most notably in the creation of the market structure and the SEM, which
occurred in two stages (over the periods 1999 to 2004 and 2005 to 2007), both of which
brought about greater alignment with the needs of system actors. We also noted rapid
re-alignment following the recession as the negative effects of consumer electricity demand
reduction was somewhat negated by the ability of wind actors to make the case for wind
as an export commodity. On the other hand, the change in alignment between the fol-
lowing institutions and actors’ interests was either slow, or negligible. The allocation of
grid was a significant barrier until the third phase and problems with planning permission
were never comprehensively, nationally or systemically resolved to the satisfaction of wind
project developers. These findings suggest that a high level of development activity – if
not completed projects – was possible without significant alignment between Irish formal
institutions and actors in the system. Indeed, it may be that it was this activity which
in part prompted and supported the gradual Irish regulatory changes which became more
wind-favourable over time.
The analysis shows that EU-led market liberalisation was favourable to the develop-
ment of the wind RES in Ireland. We have discussed how ideological battles within the
EU took place not necessarily over technologies, but over the means by which technolo-
gies would be supported. In other words, over what firms would receive support finance,
and what form this finance would take. Processes of liberalisation then did not directly
benefit the wind industry, rather it created the opportunities for actors to engage and
influence national regulatory change processes. Alignment of market rules and wind RES
actors came about as the result of deliberate and strategic intervention from actors taking
advantage of institutional changes signposted at EU and national level. In other words,
it was not market liberalisation per se that has led to the commercial and technological
opportunities for wind in Ireland, but rather the ability of actors, notably Airtricity33 and
33We have noted that Airtricity had both motive and means, and were at the forefront of lobbying
activity at the turn of the millennium. They and their majority shareholder, NTR plc, were staffed with
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IWEA, to exploit the institutional changes occurring the in an Irish setting, in this case the
electricity market. These actors recognised that the underlying goal of European policy
to be both coherent, and consistent across members states, could be met in a manner that
would satisfy both Brussels and their own commercial interests.
We suggested that some actors will be able to influence and alter institutions through
lobbying and processes of institutional entrepreneurialism34 (see the hypotheses in Sub-
section 3.4.3 ). The analysis confirms this hypothesis, and we see that crucially it was
the combined influence of institutional change at European and national level which cre-
ated the opportunity for actors to lobby for favourable market structures in Ireland. Thus
while the SEM was subject to, and designed to overcome, a series of complex technological
constraints, we also see how it was a socially constructed arena, embedding specific actors,
interests, and rules of engagement. The alignment of the technology support mechanisms
followed a similar path. Here we noted that it was the implementation of the REFIT
that created significant alignment. Two institutional changes that proceeded the REFIT
were also significant. First, the funding of the REFIT via the Public Service Obligation,
which facilitated floor price payments, was possible only after a 2001 European Court of
Justice ruling on state aid (Szarka, 2010). Second, the architecture of the REFIT was
made possible by the implementation of the 1999 Electricity Act which led to the creation
of the Commission for Energy Regulation and subsequently the electricity market. Again,
we have discussed how Airtricity and IWEA were influential in lobbying for the necessary
regulatory conditions.
The creation of the grid allocation processes was somewhat different. This institutional
structure was designed to address the difficulty in obtaining power purchase agreements,
a barrier endogenous to the wind energy system and applicable primarily to wind farm
developers. In this case the alignment was strongly influenced by attitudes to planning,
a corporatist approach to industry and firms in Ireland, and a national perspective on
‘fairness’ and agency in the decision making process though it is notable that concepts of
fairness were prioritised for commercial developers, rather than end users, bill payers, or
citizens who finance the capital expenditure. This was indicative of the group of actors
who were involved in the decision process and from a policy perspective is an important
former utility employees (Eddie O’Connor was former chief executive of Bord na Mo´na, and NTR had
experience lobbying for, financing and building privatised national infrastructure assets since the 1970s.
34This fits well with institutional entrepreneurialism defined as action performed by “actors who have
an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions
or to transform existing ones” (Maguire et al., 2004, p. 657).
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indicator of how the direction of the technological pathway is being set and influenced
during the roll-out phases. The grid allocation process also mitigated some of the negative
effects of the recession. It reduced investment risk by giving overseas actors confidence in
future roll-out targets (e.g. Gate 3 gave assurance that greater than 3,000MW would be
installed on the domestic grid), which in turn lowered risk ratings and interest rates. In
this way it stabilised uncertainty in the industry and backed-up the sign-posting of Irish
and European emissions reduction targets.
A notable aspect of the first phase of development was the rapid rise in activity
coupled with the low levels of alignment. The ESB’s early narratives were incorpor-
ated research which suggested a maximum of seven percent of grid generated electricity
could be sourced from wind due to intermittency issues. In the early 1990s, that meant
an effective upper bound of 400MW on cumulative installed capacity. Certainly installing
that amount of wind generating capacity was relatively unproblematic given the the high
level of development-related activity in the system. Furthermore, we can understand the
ESB’s strategic response as the result of exogenously influenced discontinuity, not to fossil
fuel generation, but rather the threat of a discontinuing of the closed-market, monopolistic
sectoral structure on which it was based. Thus the ESB retained a powerful position in the
market and the analysis shows that, for early emergence of the wind RES in Ireland, a high
degree of institutional alignment was not required. With regard to informal institutions
in Ireland, the investment environment influenced how actors with access to international
resources were advantaged over actors with only Ireland-based network relations. We saw
a substantial influence on the ability of actors to mobilise resources at different stages of
the development. This in itself had an impact on the momentum of the system building
processes and the embedding in external institutions. This concurs with observation by
Wirth et al. (2013b) that informal institutions have a modulating effect on public support
policies.
6.4 The structure of the Irish wind RES
6.4.1 The emergence and growth of the RES structure over time
We illustrate the emergence of significant actors, coalitions, policies and institutions in
the Irish wind RES in Figure 6.3. We use this figure to illustrate our discussion of key
structural drivers and barriers in the next subsection
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Figure 6.3. Periodisation of emerging significant actors, coalitions, policies, institutions and technologies
in the Irish wind electricity system
6.4.2 Structural influences of the emergence of the RES
Ultimately, the alignment of these institutions with the goal of system actors, influences
the opportunity structures for both groups of actors in the system, as well as for potential
entrants. Barriers to system development identified by actors themselves, and corrobor-
ated through the analysis include county-level and national planning regulations, access to
grid and power purchase agreements. Specifically it is the design and implementation of
these regulatory institutions which are barriers to further development of the wind RES.
Further barriers included availability of financial resources – primarily financial capital –
and knowledge resources, both tacit and formal. The structural aspects of these barriers
are less clearly defined. For example, the explanations for difficulties in raising investment
capital in the early phases of development differ significantly from those in the late 2000s.
Furthermore, not only do the causes of these barriers change over time, the distribution of
the effects of these barriers also alters. It is sufficient at this point to note the complexity
of these system barriers, to which we will return during the function analysis in Chapter
7. The moratorium on grid connections was another noted barrier to development, but
again diagnosing the nature of the barrier is not straightforward. While the moratorium
was upheld by regulation and the authority vested in the CER, the cause of the issues
which led to its imposition included insufficient locally appropriate grid codes (formal
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knowledge) on the one hand, and power and a corporate threat perceived by the ESB on
the other. Other structural barriers located in the analysis of the institutional ensemble
included the misalignment of the needs of wind RES actors and Irish policies and policy
instruments; misalignment between Irish and European legal precedents which resulted
in delays to state-aid approval; and competing and conflicting industrial development
strategies within Ireland.
Turning to structural drivers of system emergence and growth, the analysis has shown
that the REFIT technology support instruments, when implemented, were a strong driver
of system activity, subsidising the production of electricity on wind farms over historically
cheaper fossil fuel based generation technologies. Other regulatory drivers included the
formalisation of grid queue acquisition processes and the formal rules embedded within
the Single Electricity Market. In addition, the formation of cross-industry advisory groups
such as the Renewable Energy Development Group and the Renewable Energy Strategy
Groups were drivers for some system emergence. These groups promoted strengthened
actor networks and were the location for knowledge activities such as the diffusion of
formal knowledge created in Ireland to mitigate against grid integration problems, which
was crucial in facilitating an increasing amount of turnkey generation technology on the
grid.
By the fourth period of development, the structure of the wind RES in Ireland in-
cluded three core institutions fundamental to its onward development; the Single Electri-
city Market, the grid allocation process and the REFITs (illustrated in Figure 6.4). The
SEM embedded generators and suppliers of wind electricity within the national electricity
market. The SEM was highly dependent on material properties of the electricity grid such
as level of interconnection and distribution of high voltage transmission lines to windy
parts of the country. And, as we have discussed at length, the design of the SEM and its
transaction rules were significantly shaped by actors with nationally specific knowledge
or Irish institutions who influenced the growth of market segments. The grid allocation
process was a set of formal rules specifying how and when actors would gain access to
the physical grid and thus the market. The existence of these rules offered certainty of
connection that mitigated against the risk of demand reduction following the recession,
as it reduced uncertainty and reinforced the ‘sign-posting’ of Irish and European targets,
which on their own did not explicitly state what mix of technologies and actors would
build new renewable generation plant. The REFIT was an internationally understood
support mechanism which led to increased ‘bankability’ of projects under development.
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While not a novel instrument in an international context, the Irish REFITs incorporated
national design elements (specifically the payment to market suppliers rather than gener-
ators) and played a significant role in stabilising existing developments and reducing risk
levels of proposed projects. Thus we see these core institutions played a role in stabilising
the RES in Ireland by further embedding it in the wider electricity institutions, signpost-
ing future opportunities and expectations to actors within Ireland and to overseas actors,
and transmitting knowledge to actors and through actor networks. This institutional core
was predominantly produced, or re-produced, in Ireland, and was highly influential in the
onward development of the wind energy system. The influence of these core structural
components on system processes are discussed in further detail in Section 7.3.
EU level emissions reduction targets as well as marketisation agendas which had signi-
ficant impact on the Irish wind RES and thus drove system activity. EU policy (narrative)
goals such as EU targets and industry diffusion rates were formalised and embedded in
Irish institutions. National emissions and RET targets in Ireland although instigated by
European policy processes often evolved closely with industry growth in a cycle of in-
creased target ambition, system activity and updated narrative framing for IWEA and
other wind actors in which the wind sector needed support in order to meet government
targets. Given the relative low agency of the Energy Department, the DCENR, where
there were only weak direct signals from the state regarding the state’s ability to impose
long-term infrastructure plans, developers attempted to build legitimacy for wind techno-
logies in other ways such as though the creation of narratives extolling the societal benefit
of wind. In this context, European policy processes provided an important backstop,
from which national targets and regulations would not regress, whilst also providing the
signposting for the future direction.
The results of this structural analysis challenges two explanations for the rapid roll-
out of Ireland’s wind electricity. The first explanation, located in a narrative common
amongst developers, was that ‘Europe drove everything’. The structural analysis shows
that ‘European’ institutional influence is insufficient to explain ‘everything’. We have
seen how the EU, and the Commission specifically, have influenced the Irish wind RES
through long term policy processes, agendas and directives. However this influence was
mediated and systematised in Ireland, through processes of transposing, and through
the cumulative and multi-level influence throughout the ensemble of institutions. An
economist interviewed in the course of the research agreed that Europe was influential,
but offered an additional explanation:
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Figure 6.4. Illustration of the core Irish wind RES institutions
“targets were met because they were achievable cheaply through wind means.”35
This economic policy explanation suggests that the REFIT, and other technology support
instruments explain the build up of wind through a) public subsidy and b) technology costs
which eventually fell to a point where, combined with subsidy, wind became an ‘obvious’
or rational choice. Yet this second rationale does not explain why the public subsidy was
offered prior to a certain efficiency threshold being reached, a matter we address further
through our discussion of the function analysis in Chapter 7.
35Interview 130501
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The analysis has added to the explanations of European policy and Irish subsidy, addi-
tional institutional explanations; the establishment of the regulated electricity market and
the architecture of the SEM, which were significant, as was the design and implementation
of the grid allocation process which was influenced by informal institutions in Ireland. In
both of these processes, the discussion of institutions has precluded an in-depth analysis
of the innovation processes. While the SEM in particular can be thought of a socially
constructed market, embedding actors and interests, it was also subject to considerable
technological constraints. We will address this in the next chapter. We have also identified
that the sequencing of these developments played a role in the final outcome. We have
discussed that the alignment of institutions, it is notable that significant alignment, and
re-alignment of institutions occurred in the the first phase of development in Ireland, which
we suggest is a rule-setting period, which took place from 1999 to 2004. The building and
energising of wind farms took-off towards the end of this phase in what we will refer to as
an implementation phase.
Summing up
In this chapter I have introduced and discussed the results of the structural analysis of the
Irish wind electricity system. Through the analysis I identified structural drivers and bar-
riers of system development. I achieved this by building up a view of national ensembles
of mutually reinforcing sets of institutions and carried out the technological innovation
system analysis by documenting the structural components, the actors, networks and in-
stitutions of the Irish wind RES. Drivers of system development in Ireland included the
establishment of core institutions, contextual influences from the ensemble of institutions,
and several hybrid arenas including the Renewable Energy Strategy Group, Renewable En-
ergy Development Group and the Grid Allocation Process. Outside of Ireland, European
policy processes were found to be influential in setting a direction of technological develop-
ment, and provided a backstop against potential rollback of national policies. Structural
barriers included partial access to system resources, the economic effects of the recession
as well as certain alignments of the institutional ensemble. I detailed the influence of the
core wind RES institutions identified in Chapter 5. These were found to influence the
wind RES by stabilising the RES, signposting future opportunities and expectations to
actors within Ireland and to overseas actors, and transmitting knowledge to actors and
through actor networks. I showed that structural alignment did not come about from the
implementation of technology support instruments alone but rather it came from market
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architecture and activities/composition of industry. This is significant as it indicates that
the REFIT alone does not account for the rapid growth of wind, but rather it was a com-
bination of the core institutions and system activities. Finally, the cumulative industry
activity of actors in periods one and two was a significant influence in bringing about the
institutional changes needed for the acceleration of roll-out of technologies in the third
period, the speed of which was strengthened by the REFIT.
The results of the analysis challenge two explanations for the rapid roll-out of Ireland’s
wind electricity, that Europe was singularly responsible for the direction of Irelands en-
ergy technology pathways, and that the REFIT and other public subsidies were singularly
responsible for the rapid roll-out of RETs. In both cases, the structural analysis has im-
plicated explanations including institutional influence and the corporate political strategy
of actors.
I use these findings to focus the function analysis in the next chapter. I identify the causal
sequences of functions which led to the creation of the core wind energy system institu-
tions and explain the imposition and influence of public subsidies on the development of
the system.
Furthermore, I use the integration of spatial indicators to examine in greater detail the im-
position of direction of the search for new technologies via both European Union political
processes, and national level activities.
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Chapter 7
Function analysis
This chapter contributes a function analysis of the Irish wind RES. It documents the
salient findings of an in-depth analysis of the case narratives for evidence of each of the
TIS functions. The system TIS functions, introduced in Section 3.3 are recapped in Table
7.1. In Section 7.1 the strength of each of the TIS functions is assessed. In parallel, I use
the narrative analysis to assess how key narratives ‘perform’ in the wind RES, building up
a picture of when and around which narratives actors come together to form coalitions.
In Section 7.2 the fulfilment of each of these TIS functions are mapped first through
time, indicating when the emergent RES in Ireland was well-fulfilled by each function.
The functions are then mapped against the build-up and touchdown heuristic, indicating
processes of system construction within Ireland and transnationally. Finally, in Section
7.3, I identify in the analysis two cycles of cumulative function build-up, these are discussed
at length. It is these cycles of positively reinforcing functions that add explanatory heft
to the chapter.
7.1 Analysis of system-building functions
7.1.1 The creation and diffusion of knowledge
Ongoing development of wind generating technology took place almost exclusively outside
of Ireland and was diffused within Ireland as turnkey plant. Yet the processes of build-
ing and integrating these turnkey technologies required, and ultimately generated, tacit
knowledge amongst actors. Actors in Ireland learned through working on joint ventures
with overseas firms and from the ‘doing’ and building of the projects. The creation of
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Table 7.1 Functions of the technological innovation system, adapted from Bergek, Hek-
kert, et al. (2014)
Function... ...is the process of
Knowledge creation technological learning by actors in the system and the
breadth and depth of the knowledge base
Knowledge diffusion the distribution of the knowledge base and how that know-
ledge is utilised in the system
Influence on the direction of the
search
the incentives and/or pressures for actors to enter the sys-
tem. These may come in the form of visions, expectations
of growth potential, regulation, articulation of demand from
leading customers, crises in current business, etc.
Entrepreneurial activity the performance by actors of commercial activities or ex-
perimental projects around a new technology or in a new
location.
Market formation the factors driving the formation of new markets or new
market segments. Factors include the articulation of de-
mand from customers, institutional change, changes in
price/performance.
Legitimation the acceptance and compliance with relevant institutions.
Legitimacy is not given but is formed through conscious ac-
tions by organisations and individuals
Resource mobilisation the extent to which actors within the system are able to mo-
bilize human and financial capital as well as complementary
assets such as network infrastructure.
indigenous formal knowledge through research and development activities gathered pace
in Ireland from the mid–2000s. These activities were predominantly focussed on problems
faced by Irish grid operators, utilities and investors. Resource assessments, grid integ-
ration of renewables, overcoming intermittency problems on high wind penetration grids
and system operation are examples of active research topics in Irish universities through
the mid- to late–2000s. In later years, further engineering and economic and policy based
research was carried out on additional issues such as interconnection and economic growth
and the provision of ‘green’ jobs. Thus the analysis shows that research in Ireland was
predominantly focussed on Irish wind RES development. Supporting this perspective is
evidence of system operator EirGrid’s (formerly ESB National Grid) position as one of
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the top three sites of research activities, the other two being university research groups;
the Electricity Research Centre at University College Dublin and the Sustainable Energy
Research Group at University College Cork1. Moreover, EirGrid built strong links with
these research groups, particularly the ERC, and were an active recruiter of graduates
with advanced degrees.
The importing of plant was the primary transnational knowledge diffusion activity. By
coming relatively late to the global wind industry, Irish developers were importing turbine
technology that had been field tested extensively in Denmark, Germany and elsewhere2.
These activities were supported in the initial development period by joint ventures between
Irish and overseas development actors. So while the analysis confirms that to some extent
codified knowledge was easily transferred as turnkey plant, that was in part because it was
accessed by actors with existing relations to manufacturers and suppliers already estab-
lished. Furthermore, it is notable that while joint ventures were a feature of development
in all periods of system development, the nature of these partnerships changed over time.
In the early periods, tacit knowledge related to project management and electrical engin-
eering was acquired through these commercial arrangements, whereas financing knowledge
and crucially relationships to overseas investors is notable following the recession.
Knowledge diffusion occurred through workshops and conferences organised by in-
dustry bodies such as IWEA who used national conferences as locations in which to bring
overseas experts. Furthermore, the small size of the country and electricity sector pos-
itively enhanced national coordination efforts which were facilitated initially by a small
number of actors working in voluntary capacities. Knowledge in Ireland resided within
and was diffused through several institutional structures closely related to system events.
For example, the Renewable Energy Strategy Group and moratorium on grid connections
catalysed and coordinated aspects of knowledge development by creating shared problem
sets of barriers common to the grid operator and developers. Such institutional spaces, or
arenas, were also the location of diffusion of informal knowledge created through experi-
ence of planning and building projects by developers. From these locations, knowledge was
diffused by participants through institutional organisations such as planning associations
and the planning departments of county councils. Knowledge creation and diffusion activ-
1These research groups, both based in engineering schools, became the main centres for indigenous
research during the mid–2000s growing over the next decade.
2Indeed, on occasion, Irish developers were importing technology that had been deployed elsewhere.
One developer told, and perhaps embellished, a story of sourcing pre-deployed turbines from a Greek island
though it is unclear whether a sale was ultimately agreed.
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ities are summarised in tables 7.2 and 7.3. In summary, tacit knowledge created during
these system activities resided in firms, within industry associations and crucially within
institutions in the form of rules, grid codes, entry requirements.
Table 7.2 Knowledge creation
System activity in Ireland Transnational activity
influencing Irish system
Notable findings
ESB initially challenged wind
actors through counter-narratives
based on their own research. In
later phases they contributed to
positive framing of Ireland’s wind
resources through emergent wind
resource research.
RESG and REDG influenced some
knowledge development through
agenda setting and cross industry
participatory fora.
System integration became a focal
area of engineering R&D activities
within and between universities
and system operators.
R&D activities related to generat-
ing plant are performed almost ex-
clusively outside of Ireland.
Local tacit knowledge important
despite turnkey nature of imported
technology.
Formal knowledge creation activit-
ies in Ireland (system integration)
and overseas (generation plant) are
largely independent.
Irish wind surveys such as the All
Island Grid Survey (Meibom et al.,
2008)
Table 7.3 Knowledge development
System activity in Ireland Transnational activity
influencing Irish system
Notable findings
RESG led to knowledge diffusion
across the electricity sector.
IWEA and other industry asso-
ciations became a repository for
knowledge, and an active actor is
diffusing knowledge.
Material buildup of technology in
Ireland through plant imports.
Tacit knowledge was transferred via
joint ventures and consultancy con-
tracts.
In early periods joint ventures
between Irish and overseas firms
combined local institutional know-
ledge with tacit knowledge of ma-
terial building of wind systems.
In later periods, joint ventures ex-
ploit local and overseas capabilities
and access to resources.
Core wind system institutions
(SEM and grid queue) stabilised
and embedded knowledge (rules,
grid codes, entry requirements).
This knowledge was influential in
legitimising the Irish wind industry
for overseas investors in later
stages.
183
7.1.2 Influence on the direction of the search
The narrative that ‘Europe drives Ireland’s energy system’ was common amongst utility
and private firm actors3. The institutional analysis supported this narrative and showed
how the European Union, and specifically the Commission, influenced the prospective
Irish wind RES through cohesion and structural funding programmes and institutions
incorporating varied domains including habitats, market deregulation, climate change and
specific targets for renewable diffusion (see Figure 5.7, Subsection 5.2.2). In addition
to policy outcomes, policy processes were influential as they facilitated actors in Ireland
anticipating future regulation.4 Furthermore, the manner in which EC directives were
transposed to Irish law created opportunity for local interpretation, giving civil servants
in the Department for Communications, Energy and National Resources some influence
during the processes of transposing European law. The narrative evidence also shows that
the influence of European policy on the direction of search in Ireland of the Irish wind
RES was at times negative, as uncertainty over future targets in Brussels was reproduced
in the Irish wind RES as uncertainty over the direction of development. Thus it is clear
that Europe did indeed play a significant role in driving Ireland’s energy policy in all four
phases of development. European legislation set broad policy direction of development,
both augmenting and influenced by developments and actors in a global wind innovation
system. And while this influence did not directly determine the technology deployed, it
had a profound influence on the institutions and actors in the Irish wind RES.
The analysis indicates three significant aspects to the strengthening of the direction of
the search function in Ireland. First, reports, stories and expectations of the emergence and
growth of wind electricity systems in Denmark, Germany, Spain and to a lesser degree the
USA influenced actors in the Irish system with visions of new energy technologies carried
to Ireland through academic conferences, and a small number of enthusiastic entrepren-
eurs located domestically but with access to international networks5. The characteristics
and capabilities of the incoming actors in Ireland in turn shaped the configuration of the
system, and the nature of the RES emergence. In short, these visions and expectations
3Interview 130104, 130503
4For example, the DCENR anticipated directives such as 2009 RES Directive in advance and waited
until the completion of the European policy process only to adjust final target numbers (Interview 130501).
This influence was almost entirely asynchronous, Ireland had little influence in DG Energy, as a small
member state it choose to concentrate its lobbying influence on a small number of areas such as agriculture.
As such, its voice at the policy table was relatively small.
5For example, the presence of in experts at industry workshops and conferences is a constant from the
early 1990s.
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influenced who was attracted into the developing wind RES, while the issue of (turn-
key) technology selection was comparatively less significant. Second, national technology
support mechanisms such as the REFIT were influential. Supporting policies were ‘co-
produced’ with actors in the industry, and influenced on the one hand by contemporary
wind RES activity and on the other by European directives, policy agendas and targets
for the futures. Third, the new wind and energy fora, institutions and organisations such
as the RESG, the grid allocation process and IWEA were an important location for the
selection and coordination of visions and growing expectations within the system. There-
fore the analysis indicates that the focus on European policy tells only part of the story
of the direction of the emerging system.
This analysis indicates a virtuous sub-cycle of the strengthening of the direction of
the search function through (1) the creation and promotion of new visions, expectations
and regulations which framed commercial opportunities. This led to (2) the influx of new
actors and increased levels of lobbying and commercial activity which in turn led to (3)
the stabilising and embedding in the national context of internal RES institutions such as
the REFIT and single electricity market (see Figure 7.1).
Figure 7.1. Influences on direction of the search function
Following the recession, this sub-cycle continued, though the narrative frames of the
wind industry’s analytic stories shifted from ‘keeping the lights on’ to ‘energy export’
narratives. Favourable and stable institutional architecture attracted large global players
into Ireland while national economic conditions gave them competitive advantage and
ultimately facilitated consolidation in the industry. Summarising, while the direction of
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the search function was influenced at European and Irish levels in each period studied,
we see that its influence is mediated by resource availability (finance) and within Ireland
strongly influences actor selection as summarised in Table 7.4).
Table 7.4 Influence on the direction of search
System activity in Ireland Transnational activity
influencing Irish system
Notable findings
Technology support mechanisms
co-produced with actors in the wind
system Ability to reframe national
visions around wind around live is-
sues, e.g. from ‘Keeping the lights
on’ to ‘energy export’.
Visions and beliefs in Irish wind
system gained in strength signific-
antly over time, attracting large
global players by the end of the
period of study.
Wind system institutional architec-
ture and perceived stability of insti-
tutions provides direction for over-
seas investors.
EU market liberalisation and cli-
mate change targets provide long
term influence on the direction of
the search.
This influence at times exerted neg-
ative influence on local wind system
development.
Political economy of wind in UK
influenced opportunities and de-
cisions within Irish system
Function constitutes influence from
multiple levels.
Resource availability rather than
technological fit (as suggested in
the literature review) drove consol-
idation of indigenous firms.
Local visions influenced who was le-
gitimately active in the wind sys-
tem.
Institutional culture within Ireland
affected DCENR’s ability to set
long-term goals. Rather institu-
tions endogenous to the system
provided the stability after period
three.
7.1.3 Entrepreneurial activity and experimentation
entrepreneurial activity within Ireland peaked in the second period with the arrival of
new entrants – specifically developers – and again in the fourth period when the scale
of ambition of a number of developers was raised following successful exits by Airtricity
and SWS6. In the second phase of development the quantity of entrepreneurial activity
though small in historic terms, was significant to the contemporary system. In addition to
the new capabilities and resources now present, the activity reached a threshold at which
the Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources could use evidence of
‘promising activity’ of the wind RES as a rationale to justify further government policy
support. In addition to transposing European law committing to increased renewable
energy production Irish policy makers had to create an industrial strategy to reach new
targets. This strategy was focussed around new market niches and crucially new market
entrants. And while joint ventures facilitated the entry of overseas firms into the Irish sys-
6As measured quantitively by number of unique development firms.
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tem, local actors played a crucial role interpreting EU and national policy as opportunity
for profit-making ventures. Several of these Irish firms played influential roles lobbying for
the formation of a new market niche for wind and mobilising resources through grants and
joint venture capital funding. In the fourth phase, the nature of entrepreneurial activity
shifted, and was then based around identifying projects already in the grid queue, or in
pre-development stage, and getting these to market. And with this shift in activity, came
consolidation within the industry. Ultimately, while the analysis indicates the presence
of entrepreneurial activity such as new firm creation and new project activity, we found
limited evidence of experimentation – as defined by opportunities and tacit knowledge
developed through testing of new generation technologies – as we might expect to find in
wind energy system in lead jurisdictions.
Where the evidence suggests there was experimentation, it was focussed on institu-
tional settings and business plans rather than on scaling up generation technology efficien-
cies. For example, we have discussed how Airtricity engaged in institutional entrepreneur-
ialism, lobbying government as market liberalisation regulations were being created. They
created and exploited opportunities in globally created institutional setting (liberalisation
of markets) which was unpredictable, though their strategic actions were based on anti-
cipated future outcomes. In this regard, the relational space in which Airtricity inhabited
or had access to (e.g. the policy domain and industrial sector) was more significant than
the geographic context, Ireland. In the previous subsection we discussed how Irish energy
policy was co-produced through industry activity and departmental strategy. In a similar
manner, the development of the market was influenced on the one hand by entrepreneurial
activity, and on the other by regulation which facilitated by new market segments being
opened and renewable generators being granted special protected position. Crucially, this
(institutional) entrepreneurial activity was performed by predominantly indigenous firms
and coalitions of electricity industry actors. By the time overseas firms began to consol-
idate through the purchase of Irish firms and utilities, the major institutional pieces were
in place. Thus in period four, although there was a resurgence of entrepreneurial activ-
ity, it was focussed on building and buying, and new business plans, not on institutional
re-alignment. Finally, evidence from the literature suggested processes of entrepreneurial
experimentation were inherently social, and the networks and relations of entrepreneurs,
or in the case of developers in Ireland, would be for the most part formed in Ireland.
The analysis shows that where there was experimentation in Ireland, it took place in the
middle of the supply chain (between generation and end-consumer delivery). This analysis
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runs counter to some findings in lead nations, where local entrepreneurial experimentation
was crucial to the development of turbines and the wider industry (Garud and Karnøe,
2003), as summarised in Table 7.5.
Table 7.5 Entrepreneurial activity
System activity in Ireland Transnational activity
influencing Irish system
Notable findings
Industry ’stories of self’ central to
this function occurring locally.
Knowledge of how to win grants
important (Initial Thermie winners
were overseas).
Wind becomes a ’big boys game’,
certain types of entrepreneurs and
activity were deemed acceptable in
late stages.
Policy was co-produced, but so was
the market, which was heavily regu-
lated. . . The entrepreneurs can’t do
this unless the govt open up the
space.
Technological experimentation at
play largely occurs at global level.
Relatively strong transnational
activity via overseas firms in
phases one and four.
Joint ventures important source of
knowledge.
Many of the ’big boys’ were from
overseas - brought with them
knowledge.
Entrepreneurial activity, and role
of location in phase two and phase
four different.
Joint ventures at the beginning and
asset sales at the end are signific-
ant.
The actors involved in production
of function matters. At various
times we see the ESB and overseas
players get involved. Some of this
is explained through institutional
shifts.
We did not plan to look at this in
the framework, so it is an addition.
Local re-production of function is
integral part of co-production of
policy.
Domestic entrepreneurial activity
takes place in the middle of the sup-
ply chain.
7.1.4 The formation of markets in Ireland
Evidence of significant market formation processes were evident in three analytic stories.
These were ‘the establishment of the Commission for Energy Regulation’, ‘the creation
of the Single Electricity Market’ and stories of ‘the material expansion and growth of the
wind RES in Ireland’. Antecedents of the formation of the CER were found in stories
conveying the policy processes leading up to the 1999 Electricity Regulation Act which,
as we have discussed, was influenced by European market liberalisation on the one hand,
and lobbying from Airtricity and IWEA on the other. The creation of the independent
regulator, a core institution of the wind RES, was an important step which enabled further
market formation processes to take place in phase two as this quote from a 2001 interview
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with Eddie O’Connor of Airtricity suggests:
“Many of the teething problems we have had with the provision of key inform-
ation by state power company ESB are being resolved and the Commission
for Electricity Regulation (CER) is now fully up and running, which is vi-
tally important in an industry where a clear and fair regulatory framework is
essential.”7
It was the DCENR’s responsibility rather than the CER’s to create a ‘fair regulatory
framework’. However the analysis indicates that over time the regulator fulfilled a role
addressing both technological and market based issues within the system. The CER was
tasked with managing the group allocation process in the third phase, the coordination
of the Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff in periods three and four, and the cross-industry
process to resolve the treatment of curtailment in tie-break situations in the final phase.
As such the CER was a generative component of the institutional architecture under
which market renewable segments could be created, although it did not facilitate the
entrepreneurial activity which was also crucial for the establishment of the market.
While the CER provided regulatory framework within which the wind RES developed,
it was the electricity market, the newly established SEM, which formed the most sig-
nificant institutional context which influenced the emergent renewable market segments
during phase two. The CER was legislatively mandated8 to facilitate the necessary electri-
city market conditions whereby renewable generators and suppliers with requisite power
purchase agreements were given priority access to the emergent electricity market. The
establishment of the CER was the basis for market entry rules successfully lobbied for by
Airtricity and IWEA which allowed wind generators this privileged access to newly liber-
alised market segments. The architecture of the all-island market incorporated wind into
the market architecture from its inception, further strengthening the market position of
wind generators and leading to further institutional embedding, and legitimisation of wind
technologies. The final regulatory instrument that accelerated firm activity and market
transactions was the REFIT. By 2006 wind power in Ireland was a ‘serious contender’ as
this comment indicates:
“[Wind power] became a serious contender, it deserved serious attention. . .
the policy decisions had been made to... invest heavily in renewables, in re-
7Evidence S1-266
8See section 6.2.1 for a discussion on appropriate institutional aspects of the CER and 1999 Electricity
Regulation Act relevant to this analysis.
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newable”9
By the end of the third phase, the Irish wind sector was institutionally and technologically
embedded in the wider electricity market. The establishment in Ireland of sales and
support office by Siemens in 2008 was a further indicator of the strengthening market and
expectations of further growth.
How then did these institutional components feature in the production of the market
formation function? Economic growth and consumer demand was an influential factor in
infrastructure and energy expenditure during the early 2000s, with new combined cyclic gas
turbine (CCGT) projects also given regulatory and financial support from the DCENR.
Consumer demand though was for generic electricity provision, not specifically for re-
newably produced power, and although consumer groups were available and accepting of
new generation technology, little evidence has been found to suggest that end-consumers
significantly influenced the technology choice of generators. Rather we suggest this tech-
nological choice was influenced by other opportunities created and discovered by wind
RES actors. As the structure of the market was being designed in the early 2000s, the
visibility and influence of wind generators was growing. Recall that with the ESB fo-
cussed on growth overseas, opportunities for third party developers were created. These
opportunities encouraged entrepreneurial activity amongst new-entrant firms which fur-
ther worked with market formation processes to legitimise the nascent industry, in turn
attracting more entrepreneurs into the industry. Evidence of firm activity was crucial in
the process which led from the creation of the CER to the launching of the SEM and
ultimately the launch of the REFIT. We have discussed how these opportunities were suf-
ficient to attract the actors with capabilities into the system. And although not all these
actors had sufficient resources to complete projects, the often long, multi-year process of
project building, meant failure, as well as success, took place after several years. Finally,
the literature review suggested networks play an important part in the coordination of
market formation activities. Certainly we see formal networks such as IWEA perform this
role. Again, institutional components of the system were important; they provided arenas
(the RESG, the market) and rules (the grid queue, market rules) which contributed to
coordination within and around the market.
The formation of the Irish wind market segment was not possible without overseas
turnkey technology. Ireland’s early wind developers were end-users in a market of wind
generation technology developed and built almost entirely in Denmark and Germany.
9Interview 130501
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Taking the perspective of the plant manufacturers we can view the growth of Ireland’s
wind RES as an emergent, locationally specific, market segment in a global marketplace.
In this perspective, we would see a system of approximately 80 wind farm development
firms as customers in a global marketplace for wind generation technology. In a global
context these are relatively small numbers, and as suggested in the previous chapter, the
influence of Irish firms on the market, or on research and development of the generation
technology was modest. Once we account for the inward flow of turnkey technology and
the European Union policy landscape, there is little other overseas functional influence
on market formation in the first three periods. In other words, market formation in
Ireland shows a high degree of Irish functional influence and overseas structural influence.
However, in the fourth period the analysis shows that we might consider Ireland’s wind
farms as part of a global market in bankable renewable assets.
One developer commented that by this time the Irish market was “in much better than
Spain or Italy’10’ which taken with the evidence presented so far indicates two findings.
First that Irish developers were competing for finance with other European wind or solar
investors, and winning, at least some of the time. And second, the regulatory setting in
Ireland had become more favourable for developers with the introduction of the REFIT,
a market support mechanism, the mechanics of which were easily understood by investors
at European finance institutions. Irish wind RES components were now aligned with a
transnational system. However, from a systems perspective, we question whether this
is really market formation, or rather market reformation. The overseas firms have been
attracted after all by the existing institutional structure.
market formation was a dominant nationally constitutive TIS function, sub-processes
of which were produced and re-produced throughout all four phases of development. This
discussion on processes of market formation in Ireland has touched on three structural
factors. The formation of the CER, the formation of renewable market niches within
the SEM and the formation of the wider wind and renewables market. These structural
factors were augmented by actors with appropriate capabilities and access to resources.
When access to resources for these actors changed, we see systemic changes to actor com-
positions. Contrary to findings in the literature discussed in Subsection 3.3.6, consumer
groups did not play a significantly influential role in technological selection processes. In-
stead, selection occurred through the rules of the technological support mechanism, the
REFIT, and protected market niche for wind generators. Furthermore, while there is
10Interview 130722
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some transnational activity, in the main, the reproduction of market formation processes
were generated within Ireland. The literature suggested that the formation of markets
would occur in sequence by way of a nurturing, bridging and mass market phase through
processes of the creation of market segments, and an increase in diversity of market trans-
actions. The evidence indicates that in the case Ireland’s wind RES, access and proximity
to financial and knowledge resources was more important than physical proximity to end
users. We suspect that this phenomena is more relevant in product orientated markets
however it is not appropriate for the aims of this thesis to develop this line of inquiry. We
summarise in Table 7.6.
Table 7.6 Market formation
System activity in Ireland Transnational activity
influencing Irish system
Notable findings
Establishment of regulator and the
development of the all-island elec-
tricity market.
The material growth of wind farms
and industry activity ‘visible’ to
policy makers.
Advocacy coalitions, IWEA and
ESB co-contribute to creation of
‘stories of self ’.
Share of foreign firms in the do-
mestic market.
Global manufacturers opening of-
fices in Ireland.
Institutional stability attracts firms
in fourth phase.
Transnational flows of capital into
the system in later stages.
Interconnection and expressions of
confidence and interest by overseas
players further stabilises industry
during recession.
Technology selection not through
intentional adoption by end-users
as suggested in literature review,
but through imposition of market
protection rules and REFIT instru-
ments. The availability of actors
with capabilities and resources was
significant, with location influen-
cing resource access. Networks
supporting market formation activ-
ities was influential – relatively
low costs of coordination in a
small market, thus network size
quickly sufficient aided by local
institutions.
Local market formation
strengthens after institutional
core established, closely associated
with transnational direction of
the search and resource mobilisa-
tion functions. Market formation
processes were strengthened as
transactions were embedded within
institutional structures such as the
SEM.
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7.1.5 Legitimisation of and within the wind RES
The analysis of the legitimation processes in the system incorporates both an assessment
of the legitimacy of the wind energy system for a given phase, and the processes of legit-
imising (and de-legitimising) engaged in by system actors. Four distinct types of activity
were responsible for an increase (or decrease) of this legitimacy. First, legitimisation of
wind technologies in Ireland increased as new actors entered the system from a number
of locations or sectors, such as agricultural services firms, utilities, property and finance
speculation and the civil services11. Actors typically brought with them existing relation-
ships, networks and capabilities required to form cohesive national social networks and
interest groups. Crucially, actors successful in other sectors also conferred legitimacy to
raise capital and run firms. We observe these activities within the ‘story-of-self’, which is
closely interrelated with narratives featuring the increase in material wind technologies in
Ireland. Yet we note that legitimacy is not evenly distributed amongst all actors within
the system. By the third phase of development, the narratives used in publications and
repeated by actors in the industry conveyed the wind industry as a ‘serious contender’.
But by this time it is also a ‘big boys game’, a gendered, scalar and normative framing re-
ferring not only to those who can access resources, but also those who should, legitimately,
be allowed to participate in the RES.
The second set of legitimising activities within the emergent system was the formation
and development of coalitions and interest groups. Formal and informal coalitions were
formed in the nascent industry initially by private individuals and small firms in order to
exert greater influence over national and regional decision makers and incumbent electri-
city suppliers. Groups such as the Irish Wind Energy Association and Meithel na Gaoithe
lobbied political actors and also worked with, lobbied and attempted to impart knowledge
to regional level actors such as planners and county engineers by creating visions of suc-
cessful future wind energy systems. Thus, in addition to being active agents within the
system, some coalitions were generative networks for the development of further visions
and expectations. From the perspective of the Department of Communications, Energy
and Natural Resources and EirGrid, IWEA became a highly legitimate voice of the wind
industry. Furthermore, the membership of IWEA, and influences within the organisa-
tion, evolved along with the composition of the wider system. Thus we see that while
the development of IWEA in particular increased the legitimacy of the wind RES, the
11The entry of actors such as Paddy Teahon from the Taoiseach’s Department and Eddie O’Connor
from Bord na Mo´na are notable examples of powerful individuals entering the industry.
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interests and goals of the association changed over time reflecting both the composition
of the association, and changing system factors.
Lobbying and other corporate political strategies undertaken by actors in the system
contributed to changes in legitimacy within the system. Lobbying typically took the form
of direct approaches to ministers and senior civil servants in the department. However
effective lobbying also took place within institutional group processes such as the RESG,
Renewable Energy Development Group and the Grid Allocation Process as this comment
indicates:
“The lobbying is quite sophisticated. Lots of engineers involved and they bring
a lot to the table when they do lobby. Mixed in with economists they provide
a skilled team.”12
This is a description of codified expert knowledge being used to shape expectations of
technological opportunities and possibilities. Of course, lobbying activities were not ne-
cessarily straightforward battles between wind advocates and entrenched interests; and
wind lobbyists did not always win. Indeed through the 1990s the ESB attempted to de-
legitimise the nascent wind industry, primarily though counter narratives based research
showing limited commercial wind resources in Ireland. Furthermore, by 2000, a binary
description of incumbent and challenger is no longer appropriate, as we see the ESB lobby
with an IWEA coalition against regulatory proposals made by investor and developer
Treasury Holdings.13 The analysis leads us to make two points here. First, by the third
phase of development, the ESB were not longer actively contesting core pro-wind techno-
logy visions and expectations14. Second, simplistic incumbent versus challenger or pro-
and anti- wind technology perspectives are insufficient to explain influence of lobbying
activities. Thus for further explanation we turn to the content of the narratives.
The fourth sub-process identified in the system is the production and reproduction of
system narratives. We have discussed how actors in the early phases of the development
of the Irish wind RES were influenced by energy security narratives which followed the
oil shocks of the 1970s, stories which have been credited with kick-starting technology de-
velopments which ultimately led to the modern wind industry (Staudt, 2000; Est, 1999).
12Interview 130501
13Treasury Holdings lobbied unsuccessfully for combined heat and power generators to be given the same
favourable market access condiitons as ‘real renewable’ generators were being given in the new electricity
market. Source: S1–294
14Indeed, we see little contestation until the rise of organised grassroots opposition movements in the
final phase.
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Yet the overall numbers and influence of these actors was modest with low levels of le-
gitimisation taking place in the first phase. There then occurred a discontinuity between
dominant narratives as new actors entered the system in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Narrative framings promoting societal benefits continued to be reproduced. However in
subsequent phases framings were more often based on national economic growth and con-
traction, rather than globally situated environmental and climate change frames. This
system phenomena is evidenced in industry reports such as Deloitte and IWEA’s 2009
report entitled ‘Jobs and Investment in Irish Wind Energy: Powering Ireland’s Economy’
(Deloitte, 2009, p. 3):
“We are now striving to re-invent our economic model to preserve and continue
improving our standards of living but to do this in a way that is more stable
and that can be sustained... Developing Ireland’s wind energy potential falls
very firmly into this space.”15
These legitimising narratives were endogenously created within the RES, but significantly
influenced by exogenous factors during the economic boom and bust. This economic
framing is in accordance with evidence from literature review which suggested societal
benefits may be important framing devices. However, the findings indicate what kind
of content and framing of the narrative stories mattered. Societal benefits were of an
economic and specifically national Irish kind. These are summarised in Table 7.7.
Finally, contesting these narrative framings of societal benefits were emerging narrat-
ives of contention. Quoted in a news media report of one public opposition meeting in 2013
is this comment, seeking to delegitimise the large scale midlands developments evoking
‘English’ as the colonial other (rather than ‘British’ or ‘foreign’).
“This is an English wind farm you’re looking at,” Duncan told the meeting.
“It will have [more wind energy] than in all of Britain to supply them over
there.”16
15The authors of the report portray Ireland’s wind energy resource as an opportunity for policy makers
to contribute to economic growth, whilst when critically analysed, it publicly re-orientates the narrative
framing of Irish wind behind Ireland’s new economic reality. The 42 page report further legitimises this
re-purposing of the wind industry with claims of job-creation.
16Source: S3-23. The same article goes on to discuss the energy export memorandum of understanding
signed by the UK and Irish governments and comments: “Whether this is a good deal economically,
environmentally, and socially for this country is a question that will dominate debate on the project over
the coming year.”
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These types of narratives contributed to an analytic story of new opposition to wind,
however, it is unclear at the time of writing the impact they have had on the ongoing
development of the RES.
Table 7.7 Legitimisation activities
System activity in Ireland Transnational activity
influencing Irish system
Notable findings
Actors entering the system.
The formation of coalitions and lob-
bying activities e.g. IWEA activity
framed wind as solution to ‘lights
going out’, specific lobbying.
The creation of visions by coalitions
and interest groups.
Industry ‘stories of self ’ (by P3
wind as a ‘serious contender’ was
a powerful driver of legitimacy).
Economic boom provided exogen-
ous legitimacy through local energy
demand narrative framings.
Global environmental and climate
change narratives.
Local institutional setting legitim-
ised inward investment from over-
seas Interconnection and UK mar-
ket / political economy drives de-
mand.
The local interpretation and repro-
duction of global stories through
transposing of EU legislation.
Legitimacy was co-produced by the
DCENR and the emergent wind in-
dustry over time.
Local legitimation processes and
European originating direction of
the search worked in combination.
Crash did not de-legitimise wind,
wind actors successfully re-framed
the societal benefits of wind.
7.1.6 How narratives matter
Following the function analysis, and specifically the analysis of the influence on the direc-
tion of search and legitimacy, we identify analytic stories around which we find evidence of
coalitions formation via the collective performance of narratives. Recall from Subsection
4.3.4 the starting point here is that coalitions form around analytic storylines, producing
and mobilising narratives. The utility with regard to the study is the identification of
specific narratives mobilised by actors or coalitions which consider a TIS function to be
weak. Working with the narrative evidence mobilised, eight analytic stories have been
traced, around which coalition formation has taken place. These are listed in Table 7.8.
Functions that are addressed by these coalitions in Ireland include resource mobilisation,
legitimation and influence of the direction of the search (each in at least four of the eight
analytic stories). Furthermore, these are at times contested indicating controversies and
actor dynamics within the RES not apparent from the identification of historical events
alone. These results inform later discussions on the role of legitimation and direction of
the search in Chapter 8.
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Table 7.8 Performance of narratives
Ref. Analytic story Coalition, narrative performance and functions
A-01 The interpretation of
Ireland’s wind resource
endowment
P1 Contested meanings by ESB and early wind practioners (KD)
P2, P4 Performed by Irish wind RES boosters, factor in ’eduaction of
banks’ and Irish lenders, and later European lenders (RM)
A-06 The construction of the
story of what the Irish wind
industry is
P1-P2 Wind pioneers and DCENR co-produce policy (DOS, EA)
P1-P2 ESB contests viability of wind RES (DOS, LE)
P3-P4 Utility scale and professional services firms shift framings from
’serious contender’ to to ’big boys game’ (LE)
P4 Performance of ’bankablility’ narratives by wind RES boosters in-
fluences overseas investment (RM)
A-07 IWEA’s role in the wind
industry
P2-3 New coalition of ’professionals’, alter identity of IWEA (LE)
P3-4 From utility and SO perspective, IWEA viewed as big tent, with
activist members not afraid to ’bang fists on tables’ (LE)
A-09 National technology
support mechanisms
P1-3 IWEA highlighted deficiencies of AERs, sought institutional re-
alignment via FITs, contested by ESB (P1-2) and CER (P3) (DOS,EA)
P3-4 The REFIT as policy narrative performed by DCENR, wind farm
owners and investors facilitates alignment with overseas actors (MF)
P4 Bankability narratives performed by owners/investors influences
overseas actors (RM)
A-13 The influence of the
moratorium on the Irish
wind sector
P2 Wind developers and CER/system operators/ESB contest viability
of wind RES expansion (LE,MF)
P2 Performance of technological knowledge deficit narratives by system
operators influence creation of dynamic grid codes (KD)
A-16 European energy policy and
processes
P2-P4 Powerful narrative that ’Europe drives everything’ performed
by actors across the wind RES in Ireland (LE)
Actors reproduce and perform in Ireland policy narratives created at
EU level (DOS)
A-21 Wind as export commodity P3-4 Narratives used in Deloitte ’Green Jobs’ report are a site of co-
alition forming (KD,DOS,LE)
Much stronger opinion coming from elsewhere
P4 Site of dissensus: opposition movements use ’export’ narrative to
oppose large scale turbine and infrastructure developments (LE)
A-22 The impact of increased
interconnection
P3-4 Coalition of wind developers and policy experts forms around
interconnection as a technological solution to curtailment (LE, RM)
Researcher narratives on interconnection in general support pro-wind
framing, but are less strident and conditional tones (KD,LE)
Opposition movements use interconnection to evoke negative colonial
framings of wind export (LE)
Key: KC knowledge creation; KD knowledge diffusion; DOS influence on the direction of search;
EA entrepreneurial activity; MF market formation; LE legitimisation; RM resource mobilisation
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7.1.7 The mobilisation of resources
Emerging technologies are often linked to high-risk and long pay back periods which im-
pede the raising of financial resources. This was the case in Ireland in the first two periods.
Both private firm business models, and wind-generation technologies were commercially
unproven in the Irish context. Pay-back terms for borrowed capital were typically fifteen
years, however that period began only when wind farms started generating revenue, often
between five and ten years after project activities were initiated, necessitating bridging
finance in addition to capital finance. Limited funding was available through through
EC THERMIE and VALOREN programmes, or was nationally distributed capital grants
via the AER schemes, themselves recipients of European infrastructure funding. In fact,
through 2000, all connected wind farms were recipients of grant from at least one of these
public funding schemes. The narrative evidence indicates scale-up from public to private
finance occurred as Irish banks became more familiar with wind technologies and com-
mercial business plans. Processes of teaching and learning in the financial sector took
place as private firms and IWEA ran investment roadshows and conferences from the
mid–1990s. These were purposeful strategies designed to influence public, private and
venture capital organisations. By the early 2000s IWEA’s membership included banks,
finance organisations and financial services firms. The introduction of the REFIT in 2006
was then a significant catalyst of financial scale-up by facilitating the underwriting of up-
front private capital lending from indigenous banks via long-term guaranteed operational
payments, raised from pubic levies.
While the REFIT accelerated resource mobilisation, and thus roll-out of generation
plant in the system, it is now clear that the scale-up of financing required for large-scale
commercialisation was significantly influenced by structural and functional aspects of the
wind RES prior to and in addition to the catalysing impact of the REFIT. Regarding
structure, the relationship between developer firms, lending organisations and intermedi-
ating networks such as IWEA were significant. The most significant functional relation
was that between resource mobilisation and entrepreneurial activity either directly as firms
raised finance or through the direction of the search and legitimisation functions as spe-
cial interests lobbied for new regulations and legitimised the technologies which in turn
facilitated the mobilisation of resources at lower interest rates and from a wider range
of lending organisations. In the first three periods of development interviews with Irish
developers indicated the mobilisation of capital was relatively less problematic than other
system barriers, such as the allocation of grid connectivity, power purchase agreements or
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the acquisition of planning permission. Analysis indicates that many successful developers
brought with them into the wind RES, or quickly developed, skills necessary to raise fin-
ance. For these developers in the early periods then, Ireland’s wind RES was the location
of investment opportunity. The narrative evidence and analysis supports this perspective
and firms such as Treasury, SWS and Airtricity had strong in-house finance teams which
were enhanced by the ‘professionalisation’ of IWEA by 2000 and it may be that the op-
portunities that attracted developers into the system, were particularly appealing to those
with existing finance raising skills17. This contrasts with some studies of emergent systems
that have found the sourcing of specialised capabilities and capital has been classified as
a pervasive problem, e.g. (Binz, Truffer, Li, et al., 2012). We account for financial com-
petencies in the Irish wind RES through the capabilities of actors in the system on the
one hand, and the fact that in the fast-follower context of Ireland, from an early point in
the system development, finance was being sought for commercial operations rather than
knowledge creation activities such as research and development; the promised duration of
return on investment was relatively short.
However, the competencies of Irish developers did not mitigate against the effects neg-
ative effects of the recession. After 2008, finance in Ireland was harder to obtain and we
note a reversal of the entrepreneurial activity to resource mobilisation function relation.
We note three significant impacts of the recession to the mobilisation of resources in Ire-
land.
First the tightening of lending conditions in Ireland negatively impacts Irish private de-
velopers as well as mid-supply chain firms such as engineering consultancies indicating a
strong locational impact: non-utility firms highly were susceptible to economic landscape
shocks whereas firms with access to overseas resources, utilities and overseas developers,
were relatively advantaged. Second, visions of wind technology benefits were reframed,
e.g. ‘wind as an export commodity’ was used by firms in Ireland to support arguments
for continued regulatory support. Third, the scale-up in finances continued, but this time
went overseas, with the EIB, German and Nordic banks playing a bigger role in lend-
ing. Ultimately the resource mobilisation function was weakened in Ireland, but due to
reconfigurations in the system structure, and strong institutional core, which included the
REFIT, continued to be strongly fulfilled (findings are summarised in Table 7.9). We have
shown then that in the early stages of the system it was Irish developers who bore much
of the risk early in the system, rather than the government, incumbent utilities or service
17This is one explanation for the remarkable strength of the merchant plant sub-sector in Ireland, the
wind farms constructed and energised without aid of regulatory support instruments such as the REFIT.
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operators. Investing in renewable developments is an inherently risky proposition (Newell
and Paterson, 2010), adding the overseas risk, possibly including currency speculation
makes that an even greater risk. But while developers bore the risk, they played a cru-
cial role in connecting direction of the search functions to market formation and resource
mobilisation functions.
Table 7.9 Resource mobilisation
System activity in Ireland Transnational activity
influencing Irish system
Notable findings
Local non-utility firms highly sus-
ceptible to economic landscape
shocks.
Airtricity back because of REFIT
introduction (links with DOS).
‘Wind as an export commodity’
pushed wind into a financing place.
Irish plays part of international fin-
ance game, based in Dublin, or with
Irish experience. This is where Ir-
ish players enter international value
chain.
Bankable yields (because of institu-
tional stability).
Large flows post recessions.
Big flows in (relatively) in the first,
and then the final phase.
EIB and private capital interested.
Nordic banks replace Irish and Por-
tuguese in debt markets (S1-13).
Differentiated access to funds im-
portant.
Locationally privileged, but also
sectoral issues.
Institutional mix in Ireland married
with narratives provides assurance.
It remains mixes of venture capital
all the way through, not production
capital.
7.2 Mapping of wind RES system functions
7.2.1 Mapping of functions through time
We have presented an account of the production of individual TIS functions and emer-
gence of RES components, noting when, where and how specific RES components have
become embedded in wider innovation and production systems or institutions, and con-
versely which components have been drawn into the emergent wind RES. We now map
the configuration of functions through phases of system development, thus assessing the
‘functionality’ of the Irish wind RES in terms of how it supports firm entry, variety and
the formation of market segments in the early phases of development, and market expan-
sion and the supply of resources to exploit that market in the later phases. We analyse
the cumulative effect of the functions by assessing the functional pattern for each phase,
and evaluating the pattern against analytically assessed system goals (Table 7.10). Recall,
these system goals are analytic constructs, created during the analysis using the struc-
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tural assessment in Section 6.4 along with stated actor system goals found in the narrative
evidence. In other words, they convey structurally and functionally what the Irish wind
RES required during a specific phase, for further development. Using these ‘goals’, we
compare how close each functional pattern gets to a ‘well functioning’ ideal (i.e. how the
functions, or key processes, are performed and improved, can be analysed with respect to
the requirements of each phase.)
The structural analysis indicated the first phase was a crucial period of rule-setting,
both in the electricity sector more broadly, and specifically the creation of protected re-
newable market segments. Despite the fulfilment of the direction of the search function
– essentially the process of setting rules – the analysis shows that the functional pattern
is relatively weak and system goals are not met. There was sporadic system activity in
the first phase, specifically legitimisation, some entrepreneurial activity and discernible
strengthening of the direction of the search function (illustrated in Figure 7.2). While
these system functions influenced the creation of the regulator, it is clear that these pro-
cesses were only one factor in the liberalisation and marketisation of the electricity sector
which was subject to substantial exogenous pressures at both European level and in Ire-
land. In this case we have both European and Irish national policy influence over the
direction of the search, closely intertwined with an accumulation of legitimacy of wind
RES components which in turn is influenced by new actors.
The creation of the Commission for Energy Regulation and subsequently initial market
Knowledge
diffusion
Legitimacy Market formation
Resource
mobilisation
Entrepreneurial
activity
Direction of 
the search
Knowledge
creation
[1] European and Irish national 
policy influence over the 
direction of the search
[2] New actors 
in the system
Figure 7.2. Mapping of significant system function patterns in period 1
rules enabled stronger fulfilment of entrepreneurial activity and market formation in the
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Table 7.10 Requirements for continued system development
Period Characterisation of wind system in
Ireland (based on function mapping)
Idealised structural and functional re-
quirements
1990-
1999
Small number of commercial plants
operational, regulatory support for limited
number of firms, low levels of indigenous
knowledge creation, build-up and diffusion.
Slow build-up of network activity. Privatisation
and marketisation of utilities sign-posted in
policy European agendas.
Market formation required.
Finance required.
Strong knowledge creation and knowledge
diffusion required.
Institutional architecture required for mar-
ket and market access.
Reduction in risk required.
Goals: find partners, acquire knowledge, ex-
ploit opportunities
2000-
2004
Substantial development of new market and
industry regulatory institutions and
frameworks. Irish firms begin to make
commercial break-throughs, carry much of the
risk in the industry. Market niches for wind
created in the developing electricity market in
Ireland. Locally specific knowledge creation
begins to develop. Change in nature of wind
system network activity to include financial
actors, research actors.
Resource mobilisation required Institutional
support required: specific actor demands for
feed-in tariffs and improved planning regu-
lations and allocation of grid access. Know-
ledge functions require fulfilment. While
improved market arrangements were being
created, financial resources remained a bar-
rier.
2005-
2009
Well-fulfilled wind energy system.
Creation of market and rapid increase in
diffusion of generation technology.
Creation of secondary institutional structures
such as grid-queues further de-risk industry.
Creation of feed-in tariffs reduced perceived
system risk, open up support mechanisms to
more actors.
Further structuring of market via SEM and
GAP
Shortages of skilled labour in engineering
fields.
Institutional support required: specific
actor demands for more favourable feed-in
tariffs and planning regulations.
Post-recession, capital finance required by
non utility firms
2010-
2014
Consolidation of wind farm ownership.
New international expectations and investment.
Some de-legitimisation of large-scale project
plans.
Expectations scale-up, certain actors
expectations are privileged Fall in electricity
demand.
Finance required to bring to market planned
projects within the gate queue.
Institutional support required: specific
actor demands for more favourable feed-in
tariffs and planning regulations.
Allocation of grid and further market rules
such as ’tie-break scenarios’ now an internal
system issue for CER to resolve.
Infrastructural, legislative and resource bar-
riers to Irish firms accessing UK market
second phase (illustrated in Figure 7.3 [1]). Cumulative and reinforcing processes of entre-
preneurial activity, market formation and direction of the search indicate for the first time
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a strong, virtuous cycle of system function fulfilment. This activity also influenced the
mobilisation of financial resources as lending and financial services firms in Ireland gained
experience with wind projects and joined industry associations, locations of knowledge
diffusion [2]. As European and national policy frameworks supporting wind technolo-
gies strengthened, the creation of national policies further influenced the direction of the
search which in turn positively influenced knowledge creation and knowledge diffusion, the
accumulation of which was crucial for TIS function performance during the third phase
[3]. The patterns of the TIS functions during period two explains the entry for firms (
entrepreneurial activity) and accounts for the formation of niche markets and improved
market arrangements which further accelerated RES emergence and development.
Knowledge
diffusion
Market 
formation
Resource
mobilisation
Entrepreneurial
activity
Direction of 
the search
Knowledge
creation
Legitimacy
[1] The creation 
of the CER and 
market rules
[2] Local lending and 
financial services 
firms gained 
experience with wind 
projects and joined 
industry associations
[3] Strengthening national 
+ EU policy frameworks
Figure 7.3. Mapping of significant system function patterns in period 2
While the mapping of individual functions shows all were well-fulfilled in the third
phase, aspects of the system in Ireland was still structural and functional influences,
both negative and positive. Increased fulfilment of the resource mobilisation function led
to new or more favourable commercial opportunities (Figure 7.4 [1]) which increased the
legitimacy of the system [2] and the strength of the policy support, culminating the the first
REFIT ( direction of the search) [3]. This virtuous cycle is illustrated by tracing [1–2–3].
This strengthening of the resource mobilisation function was integral to the roll-out of new
generating technologies during this phase. While project planning in Ireland, lobbying and
rule making activities happened, all contributing to system function fulfilment, and often in
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an accumulative fashion over time, without project capital finance available to developers
in Ireland, wind farms simply could not be built. Narrative evidence indicated Ireland was
by this time a ‘serious player’ in the global market for wind turbines indicating high levels
of legitimisation [4]. More pertinently for this study however, increased access to financial
and knowledge resources by firms ( resource mobilisation and entrepreneurial activity)
also enhanced market formation, driving a second strong virtuous cycle (as illustrated by
solid arrows in Figure 7.4 [5]). This functional pattern in the third phase is crucial in
explaining the expansion of the market within Ireland for wind energy.
Knowledge
diffusion
Legitimacy Market formation
Resource
mobilisation
Entrepreneurial
activity
Direction of 
the search
Knowledge
creation
[5] Increased access 
to financial and 
knowledge resources[1] Increase in 
lending
[2] Increased 
policy support
[3] REFIT
[4] ‘Serious player’ 
narratives 
Figure 7.4. Mapping of significant system function patterns in period 3
Increasingly in the fourth period, continued market formation was largely the result
of strengthening (or stabilising) policy instruments such as REFIT 2 and continued firm
activity (as illustrated in Figure 7.5 [1] and [2]). This is in contrast to phases 2 and 3 where
the legitimising work of coalitions played a stronger role in market formation. Notably,
these coalitions do not go away, we continue to see wind industry actors mobilising around
‘energy export’ narratives for example, however we do see the rise of better organised anti-
wind coalitions contesting the legitimacy of the wind RES. In a similar manner, resource
mobilisation is no longer well-fulfilled in Ireland following the recession, the result of the
ending of indigenously sourced finance, rather than a reduction of total finance coming
into the wind RES. Yet, we have discussed in Chapter 5 how the attractiveness of the Irish
wind RES from an international investment perspective is certainly undiminished, if not
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in fact enhanced [4]. For more nuanced analytic perspective on the functional performance
of the system we bring in a locational perspective.
Knowledge
diffusion
Legitimacy Market formation
Resource
mobilisation
Entrepreneurial
activity
Direction of 
the search
Knowledge
creation
[4] Overseas 
ownership firms [2] Firm activity
[1] Strengthening 
of policy: REFIT 2
[3] Decrease in 
availability of Irish finance
Figure 7.5. Mapping of significant system function patterns in period 4
7.2.2 Fulfilment of functions over space and time
As well as mapping influences between functions, we also map the reproduction in Ireland
of functions over time. From the boxed findings in Section 7.1, we illustrate the locational
production of functions in table 7.11.
To aid the discussion on the locational distribution of system functions, we bring
together the mappings illustrated in figures 7.2 to 7.5 and disaggregate Irish and transna-
tional influence functions (see Figure 7.6) using the geographic indicators utilised in the
previous chapters. The mapping illustrates that not all functions are re-produced in Ire-
land. The importing of turnkey generating plant for example is a feature of the system
throughout all four phases and thus a significant amount of technological development (
knowledge creation) takes place overseas. Furthermore, in the first phase, entrepreneurial
activity was influential, however disaggregating using the narrative evidence, we note the
fulfilment of the function was significantly influenced by joint ventures between overseas
and indigenous firms. Focussing the analysis on the functions that were produced and re-
produced in Ireland we concentrate our enquiry on examining the location distribution of
specific influential functions and their influence on the cycles of system change. In partic-
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Table 7.11 Transnational and Irish function fulfilment, periodised
Function Position 1990-
1999
2000-
2004
2005-
2009
2010-
2014
Knowledge creation Transnational + + + +
Irish system +
Knowledge diffusion Transnational +
Irish system + +
Direction of the search Transnational + + + +
Irish system + + + +
Entrepreneurial activity Transnational + +
Irish system + + +
Market formation Transnational +
Irish system + + +
Legitimation Transnational
Irish system + + + +
Resource mobilisation Transnational + +
Irish system +
Key: + indicates well fulfilled function
ular the direction of the search function and legitimisation followed by market formation,
entrepreneurial activity and resource mobilisation.
7.3 System functionality analysis
7.3.1 A system rule-setting cycle
A central explanation for long term systemic change within the technological innovation
system approach is that, through process of cumulative causation, functions strengthen one
another and together lead to a positive, self-reinforcing dynamic allowing the technology-
specific innovation system to develop – e.g. Suurs and Hekkert’s ‘motors of innovation’ (
2012). The structural analysis illustrated the emergence in the second and third periods
of nationally specific, endogenous system institutions which were created or embedded
with specific wind RES components. We interpret from the mapping of the functions
a number of virtuous cycles, the first of which significantly influences the institutional
components of the system. The initial cycle starts in the first period with the fulfilment of
the direction of the search function influenced by European policy agendas and ultimately
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Figure 7.6. Mapping of system functions through four periods of development. Note that these maps
are not static snapshots of the system, but rather represent cumulative functional activity in the system
during a given period
Ireland’s Electricity Act (1999) (Figure 7.7, [1]). This set the conditions for increased
entrepreneurial activity [2], and the actor groups who drove these two functions were
responsible for co-producing Irish policy, which ultimately led to further market rules and
increased firm activity through the 2000s [3, 4]. This initial cycle is illustrated by the thick
dashed lines in Figure 7.7. The cycle continues and gains strength in the third period as
an increasing number of Irish institutions influence on the one hand the mobilisation of
finance from banks and venture funds in Ireland, and on the other the legitimacy of the
Irish wind RES, which in turn increases the availability of finance (the solid lines in Figure
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7.7 [5]. Finally, resource mobilisation was further strengthened by increasing firm activity
in the system and the embedding of wind interests in the market rules (indicated by the
dotted lines in Figure 7.7 [6]. Given the focus on institutional alignment and configuration,
we call this the rule-setting cycle.
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Figure 7.7. The rule-setting cycle
Two primary generative functions are present in the cycle – i.e. the functions that those
that drove the activity – legitimation and direction of the search. Crucially both were well-
fulfilled within Ireland (as per Section 7.1), however in addition, the direction of the search
function is being fulfilled through system activity at multiple locational levels, within
Ireland and at a European policy level. European processes drive the cycle via long running
(multi-decade) policy agenda alongside emissions reduction goals which do not explicitly
express preferences for ‘winning’ technologies. That the European policy processes around
these agenda were somewhat impenetrable to influence from Irish wind and electricity
actors at the time may be interpreted as advantageous for the development locally of the
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RES, and both the Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources and
wind sector coalitions. This had the effect of providing a backstop to potential policy
changes locally; actors in Ireland often presumed that even if national policy agendas
changed, the European policy process was ‘driving’. We illustrate the relevant European
and Irish subprocesses in Figure 7.8. TIS functions at national level drove the cycle through
an influx of actors, who articulated demand and shaped expectations through new visions
and goals which in turn were embedded in nationally constructed policies and institutions.
So while we see the broad direction of the search set at European level (e.g. the provision
of low emissions technology in a liberalised electricity market ), more complex choices of
who influenced the roll-out were decided in Ireland.
Figure 7.8. Location of influences on ’direction of the search’ function within Irish wind RES during
rule-setting cycle
The legitimation function was also influential on the rule-setting cycle. System activ-
ity that led to increases in legitimacy took place predominantly in Ireland. Relevant
national-subprocesses are illustrated in Figure 7.9. Where the direction of the search
function incorporated interests and expectations through European and Irish processes,
the legitimation function drove these interests and the direction embedded in constituent
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narratives through processes of lobbying and expectation setting. Legitimacy was gen-
erated from distributed system activities and was important to the emergence of wind
RES components in Ireland because of the low levels of agency and legitimacy within the
DCENR; the government or civil service could not mandate the roll-out of renewable tech-
nology unilaterally. Hence, the co-production of policies and goals based on firm activity
was important given the powerful state owned interests endorsing the status quo – the
increase in visible firm activity was a considerable factor in the increase in ambition of
policy goal in period two. Notably, legitimation activities, through lobbying by firms and
actor coalitions, influenced the creation of market segments in the second and third peri-
ods. The structural analysis showed how sectoral and geographic proximity facilitated the
formation of networks, and the lobbying of national government. So while the setting of
visions and expectations through stories influenced both direction of the search and legit-
imation, geographical proximity was influential in the creation of wind-supporting actors
coalitions in Ireland which had a profound influence on shaping the internal institutions
of the system.
Figure 7.9. National sub-processes of legitimisation
The rule-setting cycle arose at the end of the 1990s when the structural conditions of
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the system were beginning to facilitate opportunities for actors already within the system,
and also for actors outside the system to enter the Irish electricity sector. These conditions
included first, the rapid rise in system activity at the end of the 1990s. This activity was
coupled with the low levels of alignment between system actors and Ireland’s regulative
environment (see Table 6.6 on alignment). Following the pattern of the rule-setting cycle,
the link between firm activity and direction of the search was a crucial system relation
by which the growing numbers of actors influenced the alignment which ultimately led to
market formation and increased legitimation. This is an example of cyclical, reinforcing
system activity in which actors acted initially based on perceived (exogenous) market
demand and opportunity. Second, the organisation by actors in Ireland themselves into
networks and coalitions with the capabilities and legitimacy to lobby successfully. Third,
the removal of previous structural barriers to electricity customers creating a de-facto
‘institutional void’, filled over time by new rules and regulations (processes coordinated
by the Commission for Energy Regulation who managed the market rule creation process
from the period after the 1999 Electricity Act to the formal launch of the all-island market
in the mid 2000s). Fourth, the EU provided strong and consistent institutional signposts
which prevented institutional ‘backsliding’ within Ireland. Fifth, it allowed the creation
of rules into the system, such as the curtailment payments and rules on ‘grandfathering’
which served to manage contentious issues as the wind RES grew. Finally, the cycle ended
as amongst the actors in the system a perception that the turnkey technology was ‘solved’
began to take hold, and the core institutions began to influence the system, fundamentally
changing how the market formation function was being fulfilled.
The rule-setting cycle took place as the wind RES in Ireland was developing a signific-
ant market segment. However, despite the cycle, several weaknesses inherent to the system
structure persisted as the market and core institutions were established (as indicated by
the institutional alignment summarised in Table 6.6). The substantive issues around plan-
ning permission were mitigated through processual innovations, but never fully overcome
through regulatory change and still existed at the end of the period covered by this study.
Technology support instruments underperformed with regard to the goal of system actors,
though were improving over time. Issues relating to the allocation of grid connections were
addressed only at the end of the cycle. Furthermore, the narrative analysis indicated that
despite improved national institutional alignment during period two18, the CER remained
strategically aligned to the goals of the ESB and not, initially, orientated towards the
18E.g. improving economic conditions during the recession and resultant access to resources
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interests of early wind developers.
The cycle accounts for the formation of a set of core institutions of the wind RES in
Ireland. Of these, the formation of the market rules is a significant feature (the spatial
composition of these processes is illustrated in Figure 7.10). Similarly the creation and
launch of the REFIT was also an important outcome of the cycle. The cycle accounts for
the drawing-in of further actors to the system, who not only contributed to rule making
and other system building activities such as influencing knowledge creation. These ‘new’
actors included the ESB, the primary ‘incumbent’ initially exogenous to the wind RES,
and the system operators, whose attitudes and strategic approach to wind shifted and
ultimately helped drive indigenous knowledge activities. Finally, the cycle accounts for
the strengthening of networks (e.g. the ‘professionalisation’ of IWEA) as an increasing
diversity of actors from other sectors joined the system. Ultimately this rule-setting cycle
explains that European and Irish policy, created or co-produced at EU and national level,
is adapted in Ireland and then evolves discreetly. This is because the direction of the
search functions at multiple levels in the cycle which we have noted in the national stories,
interests and institutions incorporated in the cycle through the function explanation.
7.3.2 An implementation and reconfiguration cycle
The second system cycle explains the acceleration of the roll-out of wind technologies
starting in the mid- to late–2000s. It began in the third phase as the institutional support
for the wind RES increases and finance is acquired by a greater number of developers.
With core wind RES institutions influencing strong national direction of the sesarch pro-
cesses, following the moratorium on grid connection, the cycle began with further market
formation processes (illustrated by the thick dashed lines in Figure 7.11, arrow 1) which
drove firm activity (2) by creating expectations of commercial demand, which resulted in
the mobilisation of finance (3) and significant construction of wind farms and roll-out of
infrastructure technologies. By the end of the third period, market formation processes
were being driven by construction and operational activities through market relations and
transactions, rather than through the legitimisation activity of advocacy coalitions as per
the rule-setting cycle (4). In other words, the operation of the wind energy market, and its
successful embedding within the wider market iteratively strengthened the market from
‘within’. The first part of the cycle is illustrated by the thick dashed lines (2–3–4) in
Figure 7.11.
Following the recession, and with the increased stability and legitimacy of the mar-
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Figure 7.10. Linear illustration of the transnational and national influences on the formation of markets,
including the influences behind the creation of the REFIT
ket, the orientation of the cycle shifts. Exogenously influenced lending conditions worsened
domestically, firm activity was strongly influenced by lending conditions, advantaging util-
ities and firms with access to overseas finance (illustrated by the solid lines in Figure 7.11,
line 5). While conversely, entrepreneurial activity continues to influence the mobilisation
of resources (6), the firms accessing the resource changed due to merger and acquisition
activity in the industry. Despite this, the continued market operations has by this time
‘locked-in’ wind RES interests, resulting in a influence on the direction of the search (7),
a signal for investors with available funds that the Irish wind RES is open for business
(8). As such, ultimately this is a phase of Irish wind RES structural emergence, TIS
functional strengthening and some reconfiguration, thus an implementation and reconfig-
uration cycle. And because the central 2–3–4 cycle continues, we view this as a single
cycle with overlapping processes, rather than two cycles running in serial.
The REFIT, launched in 2006, was the most significant, and powerful, structural driver
during this cycle. As a technology support instrument, it was a mechanism by which gov-
ernment finances – raised directly from electricity consumers – were used to subsidise a
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Figure 7.11. The Implementation and reconfiguration cycle
specific form of generation technology over another. Through guaranteed payments it de-
risked firm investment in new technologies, and – in theory – endogenised the interests of
society, or at least those who lobbied for its implementation. We can now explain the im-
position and structural impact of the REFIT in terms of system functions. Irish advocacy
coalitions had lobbied for a feed-in tariff for some time ( legitimisation) but were initially
blocked by opposition from incumbents (negative legitimisation) and European state aid
rules (negative direction of the search). However, a number of processes led to a change in
the policy support regime in Ireland: increasing evidence ( knowledge creation) suggested
the Alternative Energy Requirements had under-achieved, and critically, that REFIT’s
would be more cost effective (Elliott, 2005; Toke and Lauber, 2007). Furthermore, op-
position to the REFIT diminished as a greater number of actors, including some utilities,
joined the wind RES networks ( legitimisation, the growing actor network behind wind
is discussed in Section 6.1.2 and illustrated in Figure 6.2). The wider system conditions
which facilitated the REFIT were created by the rule-setting cycle discussed above. So
while ultimately the implementation of the REFIT was a political decision announced by
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the DCENR, structural and functional changes in the system account for the timing of its
launch and scope of its implementation.
What about the structural impact of the REFIT and the implementation and reconfig-
uration cycle? The REFIT took the form of a power purchase agreement, a contract which
guaranteed market access and ultimately market transactions, over a 15-year term. By
underwriting potentially loss making transactions and thus investments, it drove powerful
market formation processes. When compared with the preceding instruments, the AERs,
the REFITs supported participation in the market by a greater number of firms19 ( entre-
preneurial activity). And by guaranteeing revenue over a 15 year term, the REFIT was a
catalyst for project financing from banks ( resource mobilisation). Thus the REFIT was a
significant force in accelerating the processes during the implementation cycle (line 2–3–4
in Figure 7.11).
A number of other structural drivers were present during the implementation and re-
configuration cycle. These included the other core institutional drivers established during
the rule-setting cycle; the SEM and Grid Allocation Process which drove the creation of
other rules and processes as well as social spaces in which system actors could create and
diffuse knowledge (as discussed in Section 6.4.2 ). EU policy continued to provide strong
institutional direction, providing a backstop to the domestic direction of the search func-
tion. Finally, the perception of the turnkey generation kit having reached a commercially
suitable threshold , elaborated through the ‘technology is solved’ analytic storyline, was
an important consideration for actors within utilities and firms and thus contributing to
entrepreneurial activity. These functional and structural processes which led to the form-
ation of the Irish wind energy market, and the REFIT within it, are illustrated in Figure
7.10. This shows the REFIT not as an instrument from which a well-functioning wind
energy system has emerged, but as an accelerator of processes which had been building-up
over the proceeding decade.
The implementation and reconfiguration cycle arose when the system was on the brink
of developing a serious market and lasted through the economic tumult of the recession.
Yet despite the REFIT and other structural drivers, barriers inherent to the structure of
the system persisted or arose through the cycle. The institutional tumult that followed
the economic crash of 2008, manifested in issues of national energy demand reduction and
19Totalling 450MW initially, was approx 30% of Ireland’s 2010 target. The evidence shows that the
REFIT attracted new firms into the sector, and also attracted Airtricity back from focussing on overseas
opportunities in the mid–2000s.
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the negative impacts on the Irish investment landscape.20 The system impact of these of
these exogenous barriers are explained through the function cycle in Figure 7.11 where
resource mobilisation function negatively influenced actors in Ireland attempting to access
project finance from Irish banks and are thus unable to continue the development projects
(lines 5 and 6). However, these barriers did not significantly impede all system activity, as
evidenced by the continued growth installed wind farms (see Figure 7.12). Recessionary
barriers were mitigated in part by the increasing reputation of the Irish wind RES due
to its core structures, including the REFIT ( direction of the search, Figure 7.11 line 7),
which by that time had created a signal for overseas investors that the Irish wind sector,
in an open market economy within the Eurozone21, could generate low-risk, guaranteed
returns (8).
Figure 7.12. Annual newly installed wind capacity in Ireland, 2000 - 2014, moving averages used due to
smooth outlier years
7.3.3 The accumulation of nationally-specific knowledge
The structural analysis indicated the importance of knowledge to the developing RES
, however, knowledge functions did not form a significant part of either of the system
innovation cycles of institutional emergence and acceleration. Thus far, we have accoun-
ted for the creation and diffusion of knowledge through function fulfilment of knowledge
creation and knowledge diffusion. Formal knowledge creation activities in Ireland – fo-
cussed on power system integration – were largely independent from those overseas such
20See Subsection 6.3.1 for an extended discussion on these structural issues.
21Shorthand for the block of states using the European single currency
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as generation technology R&D. The generation within Ireland of tacit knowledge was re-
quired despite turnkey nature of imported technologies. This was driven through Irish firm
activity including joint ventures with overseas firms (see Figure 7.13, 1). Significant formal
knowledge creation commenced in Ireland as the scale-up in roll-out started towards the
end of the second period, driven by direction of the search and the formation of markets
(2). Irish research activities led to three notable impacts on the system (3). First they
contributed to the mitigation of grid integration issues. Second, research ‘outputs’ sup-
ported increased targets in regulation as they were embedded within positive framings of
Irish wind resources and maximum resource yields possible. Third, these positive frames
legitimised (and de-legitimised) wind technology vis-a-vis other electricity technologies.
Ultimately knowledge creation in Ireland is instigated by a range of factors and it has
not been possible to identify a strong cyclical cumulative causality amongst the functions.
Rather, we see a progression of distributed activities.
Figure 7.13. Accumulation of knowledge function relations in the Irish wind energy system
217
As with the implementation cycle, significant knowledge activities in Ireland arose
when the wind RES was on the brink of developing a functioning market segment. Struc-
tural drivers included the nascent market and support instruments. The development of
sites of knowledge activity such as the RESG and REDG, formal industry networks, and
regular industry events such as conferences and networks facilitated these activities and
are chronologically and locationally illustrated in Figure 7.14. The SEM and grid queue
not only facilitated knowledge activities, but stabilised and embedded knowledge (rules,
grid codes, entry requirements, Figure 7.13, 3) which in turn was influential in legitim-
ising the Irish wind industry for overseas investors in later stages (4). However, further
technological barriers remained, and indeed emerged as higher levels of intermittent en-
ergy generation was added to the wind. In other words, the inward acquisition of formal
(turnkey) knowledge, created a need for further power system research in order that fur-
ther intermittent generation sources could be added to the grid. We can deduce from this
analysis that knowledge generation was pre-dominantly demand-led rather than following
a science push model of innovation.
Figure 7.14. System processes, institutions and events influencing the creation and diffusion of knowledge
The development of a modest but globally influential power systems research com-
munity in Ireland is one significant spillover effect of the integration of wind in the country.
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However, the implementation of the demand-led knowledge progression was not sufficient
to kick-start a science technology push (STP) cycle, or motor of innovation, which the
literature review told us is often found early in the development technology innovation
system. This is likely because turnkey technology was readily available, little ambition
found in the evidence to instigate an indigenous manufacturing industry, and no signi-
ficant industrial manufacturing base to call upon. Furthermore, in Ireland there were
policy frameworks designed to subsidise the turnkey technology, but not specific research
and development needs, or tacit knowledge generation. The result of this is was discrete
demand-led activities, not powerful enough to sustain a cycle. Rather the development
of wind energy in Ireland consisted of a progression of knowledge activities in addition to
two virtuous system function cycles.
Summing up
This chapter documented the salient findings of an in-depth analysis of each of the sys-
tem functions of the Irish wind RES and, where appropriate, influential functions of a
transnational nature. The chapter’s major contribution was the detailed discussion of the
two system cycles identified through the analysis, with which we explained system changes
with reference to two cycles of system functions. Following strong national and European
direction setting in the first period, the rule-setting system gained momentum in period
two as an increasing number of institutions in Ireland influenced on the one hand the
mobilisation of finance from banks and venture funds, and on the other the legitimacy
of the Irish wind RES, which in turn increased the availability of finance for developers.
System processes at national level drove the cycle through an influx of actors, who articu-
lated demand and shaped expectations through new visions and goals which in turn were
embedded in nationally constructed policies and institutions. While I showed the over-
arching direction of the search was set at European level, more complex political choices,
such as which actors were subsidised to enter the market, were were decided in Ireland.
The rule-setting cycle explains that European and Irish policy, created or co-produced at
multiple levels, was adapted in Ireland and then evolved relatively autonomously.
The implementation and reconfiguration cycle explains the the acceleration of the roll-
out of wind technologies starting in the mid- to late–2000s as institutional support for
wind led to more rapid market formation and increases in entrepreneurial activity. This
shows the REFIT not as an instrument from which a well-functioning wind energy sys-
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tem has emerged, but as an accelerator of processes which had been building-up over the
proceeding decade. Somewhat unexpectedly, I found that knowledge processes did not
form a significant part of either of the system function cycles. I deduced from the ana-
lysis that knowledge generation was pre-dominantly demand-led, instigated by emergent
system barriers, rather than following a science push model of innovation. However, the
development of a modest but globally influential power systems research community in
Ireland is one significant spillover effect of the integration of wind in the country. Finally,
the analysis was clear in showing that during any given phase of development, not all
functions are re-produced at national level.
The identification of the two function cycles are a significant empirical contribution
to the understanding of why wind energy in Ireland was established. In Chapter 8, these
cycles are reviewed against findings in similar cases in other countries. These cycles inform
our final analytic contribution and inform the empirical part of the answer to why given
aspects of the Irish wind energy system needed to be constructed within Ireland.
This question is addressed with reference to the build-up and touchdown heuristic, which
takes as input findings from this chapter, and structural observations from Chapter 6.
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Chapter 8
Discussion and conclusions
This thesis is about the innovation processes that were reproduced to support and develop
the emergence of the wind electricity system in Ireland. This chapter discusses the implic-
ations of the findings from the structural and functional analytic chapters, and synthesises
and interrogates them against the thesis hypothesis, and against findings from empirically
or analytically similar studies found in the literature. First the function cycles identified
in Chapter 7 are evaluated. This discussion leads to the first set of empirical findings
addressing the question of what needed to be constructed in Ireland for the emergence of
the Irish wind RES to happen. These findings are illustrated in timeline, employing the
periodisation used in Chapter 5. Focus then turns to a discussion build-up and touchdown
heuristic, core aspects of which illustrated and discussed using the empirical findings. The
research questions and hypotheses are then directly addressed.
In conclusion I clarify the empirical, theoretical and methodological contributions of the
thesis and make brief recommendations to policy markers and other interested actors based
on these contributions and findings. 7
8.1 The emergence of the Irish wind RES
8.1.1 Comparison of function cycles
The function analysis discussed in Chapter 7 yielded two distinct overlapping function
cycles, it indicated an extended phase of distributed knowledge activities, and no evidence
was found of any significant vicious cycle. The functional mappings of activity in Ireland
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indicate the existence of a pattern of activity that resembles a system building motor in
periods two and three, and a market motor in periods three and four. This compares
with four distinct motors identified in the literature (Suurs and Hekkert, 2012). Of these
motors, there is insufficient evidence to indicate the existence in Ireland of a science and
technology push motor. The knowledge functions were insufficiently fulfilled within the
Irish RES and the evidence is clear that Irish actors did not have significant influence on
generation technology research and design processes at any time throughout the period of
development. Ultimately neither the knowledge functions, nor those they interacted with
were strong enough to sustain a full STP cycle though the demand-led research capab-
ilities within Ireland were significant in themselves for reasons discussed in the previous
chapters. For similar reasons, the functional pattern analysis shows that the relations
between entrepreneurial activities and knowledge generation was insufficient to drive an
entrepreneurial motor . Findings from the case are summarised in Table 8.1.
These findings share a number of similarities with studies which have addressed the
emergence of renewable electricity systems in new locations have suggested, two dynamic
cycles. In the case of Portuguese wind, a knowledge development cycle and an implement-
ation cycle was identified (Bento and Fontes, 2014). Similar cycles were found in the
Danish wind RES and Japanese solar PV system (Kamp, 2008b; Vasseur et al., 2013).
Whilst some form of implementation cycle can be found in all of these cases, the Irish
case is unique amongst them in failing to produce a knowledge cycle, instead featuring
a rule-setting cycle , which shares some attributes with the Suurs and Hekkert’s system
building motor . Ireland’s limited manufacturing base and low levels of heavy engineer-
ing industries mitigate against the development of indigenous turbine industry before and
after Danish and German lead firms had established market presence. Given that we
expected relatively open flows of capital goods, services and designs coupled with low do-
mestic government spending on research and development, the absence of an STP cycle
is not surprising. However, the strength of the rule-setting cycle was, with regard to find-
ings in other cases, unexpected. The Portuguese case suggests that the development of
an indigenous wind RES there was predicated on the assimilation of knowledge spillovers
from abroad, made possible by improved absorptive capacity, which in turn was possible
thanks to the STP motor. Instead of this knowledge based rationale for the development
of the early stages of the wind RES in Ireland, we have a structural explanation. Or
put another way, rather than explaining early system development through the ability to
acquire knowledge, the Irish system was built, in part, through the construction of core
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institutions.
The Bento and Fontes (2014) paper posits that transnational activities play a funda-
mental role in capturing knowledge spillovers, whereas we suggest that in the Irish case,
transnational activities had a structural and institution building influence which mitigated
against the need for an extensive knowledge cycle such as an STP motor . The typical
STP motor according to Suurs involves a sequence consisting of positive expectations and
research outcomes (Suurs and Hekkert, 2012, p. 161). We found that in the Irish case the
core institutions made up for the lack of nationally generated knowledge by embedding
and transmitting formal knowledge; signposting future technological pathway directions
and financial commitments from the government; and stabilising relations and knowledge
within the developing wind RES. In achieving this, they mitigated against short term con-
textual institutional shocks. Indeed, despite being highly localised, the core institutions
provided transnational ‘signposting’ that Ireland’s wind RES was ‘open for business’. As
such, the Irish rule-building cycle combined aspects of the STP motor and system building
motor. In this sense that the rule building incorporated aspects of a knowledge cycle,
but with little concern for where that knowledge came from. The influence of EU policy
processes in the 1990s (a strong direction of the search for new technology/knowledge)
was crucial in instigating this cycle through its destabilisation of the pre-marketised elec-
tricity system. Yet the cycle continued, influenced by firm actors (strong direction of the
search from Ireland) as they joined the system in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This
finding matters as there is a strong generative attribute to the institutions. Where it is not
practical to develop knowledge activities in Ireland, the case has shown how institutional
development can overcome national and transnational TIS structural issues.
A final substantive difference in this case and the others discussed is the multi-level
direction of the search function accounted for above. Several recent studies have shown
that in their case, strong national level policy signposts direction of the search function
tends to be the lead function instigating dynamic cycles in new locations, e.g. Bento and
Fontes (2014); Tigabu et al. (2013). Some of this difference we put down to analytic focus
using event analyis, and in the case of Bento and Fontes (2014) particular methodological
emphasis was put on the processes that enabled (domestic) absorptive capacity. But in
the Irish case, through close analytic attention to actor narratives in addition to events,
we have found multi-level direction of the search , functioning in parallel throughout the
development of the system. At national and sub-national governance level, system build-
ing was built up through a sub-cycle of activities (visions, regulations, incoming firms,
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embedded within institutions, regulations) before being accelerated by the REFIT. EU
governance actors, such as the Commission, could set the direction of travel for future en-
ergy policy, yet had relatively little legitimacy or agency to mandate technological change
on a country by country basis. Ultimately the rule-setting cycle explains how European
and Irish policy is created or co-produced at European level, adapted in a national context
and then evolved discreetly at each level. This is because the direction of the search func-
tions at multiple levels in the cycle which we have noted in the national stories, interests
and institutions incorporated in the cycle through the function explanation. We could
imagine this set of coupled processes performing something of a ’localisation’ function.
In summary, given the stated influence of a diversity of actors in creating and embed-
ding stories and institutions, the creation of the wind RES was not the result of narrow
policy prescription alone, at either European or national level, but rather consistent but
differentiated direction setting at both levels.
8.1.2 What needs to be nationally constructed: system build-up and
touchdown
The analysis of the function cycles brings us to a core concern in the thesis. In the
development of the Irish wind RES, what was reproduced in Ireland and what were the
processes that contributed to the formation of the RES as the technologies emerged from
lead nations and reached new locations? The analyses discussed in chapters six and seven
provide evidence that these phenomena have both domestic and transnational causes,
which are variously connected within the emerging RES. We now return to the empirical
case to offer an explanation of what needed to be nationally constructed through the four
periods of development.
In order to clarify locational aspects of the Irish wind RES, its development processes
and their drivers, barriers and directional influences, we return to the heuristic introduced
in Chapter 2, distinguishing between the touchdown of overseas components, through
transnational flows, or driven by transnational functions; and the build-up of activities and
RES components in Ireland, utilising national resources or driven by enacted TIS functions
in the Irish wind RES. Recall that touchdown is an umbrella term that encompasses the
structures, functions and flows of resources and other RES components which came from
overseas and through inter-organisational linkages and relations. Build-up activities are
the set of RES structure components which have come from or been significantly influenced
by Irish contexts, and TIS functions which are enacted or influenced by Irish actors and
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institutions. We use these terms to elaborate further the explanation for the development
of the Irish wind RES, over the four periods of development, illustrated in Figure 8.1.
In the first period significant events and decisions included the marketisation of the
electricity sector and the creation of market niches for Irish renewable generators, an event
influenced by lobbying activities in Ireland. Build-up activities in Ireland were weak, but
where they existed included coalition building and some diffusion of knowledge through
a small number commercial wind projects. Touchdown activities were influenced by na-
tional capital grant schemes, which were the recipients of European fundings. These in
turn attracted a small number of development joint ventures which enhanced the acquisi-
tion of tacit knowledge within the small wind production network forming. In the second
period crucial events and decisions took place around the moratorium on grid connec-
tions. Processes in Ireland driving the emergence of the wind RES were enhanced by the
distributed agency of firms entering the RES and lobbying the Department of Commu-
nications, Energy and Natural Resources and were facilitated in institutional spaces such
as the Renewable Energy Strategy Group. Touchdown processes included the generation
of dynamic grid codes by overseas manufacturers, increased import of turnkey technology
and European policy targets. These contexts and functions led to a cycle of rule-setting
which significantly influenced the establishment of core RES institutions beginning with
the Single Electricity Market. This cycle continued through the third period as the Re-
newable Energy Feed-In Tariff and the Grid Allocation Process were launched.
Crucial events and decisions in the third period included the widespread economic
recession and the launch of the REFIT which benefited operators and developers of wind
farms, who by now included domestic and overseas utility firms. Furthermore the REFIT
gave long term assurance to lenders, making more affordable the capital costs required to
build plant infrastructure. The REFIT was significant to system build-up by accelerating
development plans and interests which were already present within the system. These
system conditions and functions powered a cycle of implementation and reconfiguration
through the fourth period which facilitated the rapid construction of wind generation
plant and associated infrastrcuture, and consolidation of firms in the sector. Touchdown
processes were less pronounced during the third period of development as domestic actors
and institutions were well-aligned. In the fourth period crucial events and decisions were
the continued difficulty developers had in acquiring project finance in Ireland and the
continued support by the DCENR of the REFIT scheme. Irish wind RES build-up was
driven in part by visions of the societal benefits of wind as an export opportunity and
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Figure 8.1. The development of the Irish wind energy system integrating structure, functions, cycles
and flows. Key to functions: DOS direction of the search, LE legitimisation, MF market formation, KC
knowledge creation, KD knowledge diffusion, RM resource mobilisation, EA entrepreneurial activities
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industry that could provide significant jobs, reconstructed and recreated by firm actors
and special interest groups. Touchdown again became significant, as resource access to
overseas finance, and the entry into the Irish wind RES of overseas actors was a significant
driver of successful development projects. The combination of strong internal institutions
in the Irish wind RES and lack of finance in Ireland created the conditions for a new wave
of joint ventures with overseas firms, and the entry into the Irish market of new utilities
and yieldcos.
8.1.3 Integrating the transnational dimension in the emergence of the
Irish wind RES
From this explanation of the development of the Irish wind RES, the thesis makes a number
of conclusions about build-up and touchdown of the RES. Several kinds of transnational
linkages and activities were important in facilitating touchdown, the dominant functions
and cycles of which are illustrated in Figure 8.2. The flow of capital and ultimately access
to overseas finance – unevenly distributed amongst actors in Ireland – strongly influenced
the ability of domestic and foreign actors to respond to commercial opportunities in Ire-
land. National economic conditions were instrumental in creating the situation where Irish
lenders shut down lending activities. Development firms with financial relations only to
Irish lenders tended to be disproportionately negatively affected and these tended to be
smaller Irish developers. Meanwhile, for the overseas firms considering entering the Irish
market, capital was secured typically with overseas banks they had existing relationships
with. Here then, locational factors included the framing of opportunities, and the ability
of the overseas actors to enter the market through merger and acquisition activity. For
this, pipeline projects (indicating a maturing RES) were needed and a strong institutional
base, which de-risked investment was required. By 2010 these were in place. Access to
turnkey technologies on the other hand was not problematic, however, access to special-
ised formal knowledge required from manufacturers for grid integration did at times create
barriers to development for actors in Ireland. This issue was in part mitigated by the rise
in indigenous specialised knowledge creation activities, discussed below. In the formative
years of the system, sales of turnkey technologies were expedited by charismatic entrepren-
eurial agents based in Ireland and deeply implicated in the emergent (Irish) processional
networks and associations and Ireland’s membership of the Single Market was a minor
contributory factor in the movement of labour, technology and capital.
There was a low level of formal knowledge spillovers in Ireland but there was not the
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Figure 8.2. Touchdown of transnational system functions and components
transplanting of global technology pathways (e.g. anchoring activities a` la Binz, Truffer,
and Coenen (2014)), however local spillovers of tacit knowledge did occur as joint ventures
took place in the early development periods (as evidenced in analytic story A–06 in Table
6.1). In these cases we found the sectoral proximity to larger markets (the UK and
Germany) and the low coordination costs of running a relatively small Irish project were
important in enabling engineering firms to develop Irish projects. The final major form
of transnational linkage was the flow and influence of spatially distinct regulation across
governance levels. While the flow of policy influence has been shown to be bidirectional,
that is the nation influences the superstate and vice versa, the case has shown us that
with regard to energy policy, this direction was highly unidirectional, from the EU to
Ireland. However, policy agendas and directives were mediated, embedded and translated
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by actors at the national level (government and others) and were co-influenced by the
institutional ensemble. Here then TIS structural conditions of the RES were important,
and in Ireland that meant the opening up of institutional opportunities in the 1990s as
the electricity sector was marketised. Furthermore, competencies relating to transposing
European regulation, and taking advantage of European funding had built up during years
of structural cohesion projects, which many of the early (commercial) demonstration wind
projects bore resemblance to. And again, as with the flow of capital, the construction
of strong internal institutions within the wind RES, particularly the REFIT, accelerated
development across the system.
This Ireland-based TIS-structural explanation accounts for a final observation, touch-
down increased in the final period through the greater utilisation and access to overseas
resources (illustrated in Figure 8.1 via wider flow arrows). The analysis showed how further
and greater draw-down of overseas resources and the implication of a greater number of
overseas actors in the Irish wind RES. This indicates a strengthening of relations between
Ireland’s wind RES and transnational markets and innovation systems. Unlike the highly
internationalised ICT and pharmaceutical sectors in Ireland, this is not an export-led re-
lationship. Rather in the wind RES, Ireland-based actors were exporting low quantities of
electricity though interconnection, and a relatively narrow portfolio of knowledge such as
power systems research and through Mainstream and finance actors, some business mod-
els. The REFIT payments, and the increasing difficulty faced by those actors attempting
to raise capital finance combined in Ireland to moderately accelerate RES activity and en-
courage entry and investment by overseas actors. Our findings inform us that the strength
of touchdown activities were contingent on conditions and TIS functions both exogenous
and endogenous to the RES. Here then we see that not only did the relative strength of
touchdown and build-up matter, temporal qualities and sequencing mattered too.
Build-up is the local construction of the innovation system, driven by locally specific
contextual and systemic components, functions and activities within Ireland. The sub-
stantive aspects of what was locally constructed have been discussed in the previous sub-
section (8.1.2). We summarise these build-up processes and cycles, illustrated in Figure
8.3. Where we see the strongest locational influences are
• In the strengthening of the discrete knowledge creation activities within and between
Irish power systems research groups and the system operators. Here both relational
and geographic proximity advantaged actors in Ireland.
• In the legitimation activities, specifically the construction and reconstruction of ’Ir-
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ish’ visions, stories and framings which we have discussed were closely related to the
level at which policy formation took place (direction of the search in Ireland).
• The construction of the strong, nationally specific specific institutional core driven
by the highly localised rule-setting cycle which took place after a significant sectoral
and institutional shift towards marketisation in the electricity sector. Here we see
that national institutional knowledge, often acquired tacitly in ancillary sectors in
Ireland was influential.
• The access to project finance, achieved through the within and between Irish banks,
the Irish financial services sector and wind developers in Ireland.
• The construction of markets and market niches in Ireland. These were geographic-
ally bounded by Ireland’s island grid and relationally bounded by the jurisdictional
limitations of the Single Electricity Market.
In each of these cases, location, played a significant role, and the analysis makes a strong
case against location being treated as a passive background variable.
8.2 Discussing findings and hypotheses
8.2.1 Answering the research questions
This inquiry has yielded a set of complex explanations for the emergence of Ireland’s wind
RES. These are now summarised as we address individually the research questions posed
at the beginning of the thesis.
RQ1: What explains the emergence and growth of the wind electricity
system in Ireland and what does this tell us about why and how renewable
electricity systems emerge in new locations?
The growth of the wind electricity system in Ireland can be explained by a series of
overlapping and mutually constitutive processes. First, from the early 1990s there was
a prolonged, and at times rapid rise in wind energy related commercial activity within
Ireland, encompassing a growth in the number of wind farm developers, construction and
engineering firms, financiers and indigenous researchers. Second, a relatively small popula-
tion and low coordination costs aided the rapid formation of actor coalitions and industry
networks initially by wind developers and then by a wider diversity of sectoral actors.
During the course of the late 1990s, a small number of actors and coalitions successfully
lobbied for favourable regulatory conditions within the newly liberalised energy sector and
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Figure 8.3. Indigenous system build-up
capital grant schemes – through much maligned by wind firms at the time – stoked in-
creasing commercial interest in the sector. Third, factors in the success of this lobbying
include strong signals from European policy debates that energy market liberalisation was
happening, wind actors with experience and capabilities of working for Irish infrastruc-
ture projects and gaining European funding, and the ability of these actors to incorporate
visions of societal benefits into their lobbying activities which addressed contemporary
government concerns about electricity demand in a rapidly expanding domestic economy.
Fourth, the construction – in Ireland – of an energy market with formal rules and payment
structures for wind generators, a formal queuing system for gaining access to the market
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and grid, and a feed-in tariff, to subsidise wind generators were significant developments.
These were crucial institutions which accelerated the roll-out of generating and infrastruc-
tural technologies, and formalised and strengthened relations between actors. This in
turn accelerated learning processes and further legitimised the emergent sector from the
prospective of both domestic actors and overseas players who played an influential role in
supplying experience of delivering projects, and access to finance in later years. We reflect
on these answers and assess what general points can be made in Subsection 8.2.2 .
RQ2: How can the emergence of a wind-based renewable electricity system
in Ireland be explained by the formation and development of technological
innovation system functions?
The thesis found that at no time did a discrete wind energy innovation system exist in
Ireland, autonomous of connections to overseas institutions, actors or resources. Instead,
the emergence over time of a dynamic and partial wind RES in Ireland can be explained
with reference to a complex set of innovation processes and institutional contexts and
influences within, outside of and between Ireland and other countries. The construction
of the substantive aspects of the RES in Ireland was driven by two overlapping cycles of
TIS functions, first a rule-setting cycle , and then an implementation and reconfiguration
cycle . The rule-setting cycle accounts for the multiple processes by which core indigen-
ous institutions were constructed. Dominant functions in this cycle included a strong
direction of the search function constituting transnational and Ireland-based activities,
entrepreneurial activity within Ireland and a shift from legitimising activity to ongoing
market formation functions. The implementation and reconfiguration cycle explains fur-
ther institutional stabilisation as well as significant roll-out of material generation and
grid technologies. Dominant functions in this cycle included transnational resource mobil-
isation , indigenous knowledge creation and the cycle facilitated a shift from indigenous
to transnational entrepreneurial activity , as opportunities for overseas actors to enter
the Irish electricity market were created. Although these cycles foreground explanation
based on innovation processes, the thesis found that aspects of TIS structure and informal
institutions in context mattered too.
This explanation incorporates the alignment of institutions to the goals of system act-
ors though often contested by incumbent firms and interested challengers. Furthermore,
it explains how incumbent monopolistic firms, predominantly the ESB, entered the wind
RES and aligned their own goals and interests with those of actors already present. In
addressing this question the TIS framework has added explanatory value. It has enabled
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us to explain how imported turnkey technology, and European Union policy agendas were
integrated and embedded into the RES at the national level respectively through increased
but discrete advances in research capabilities in Ireland, and through a locationally differ-
entiated direction of the search function.
RQ3: What aspects of the RES are re-produced in the new location and
why?
The answers to research questions one and two have shown that three significant as-
pects of the wind RES were re-produced in Ireland. First, the legitimacy and direction of
the search functions were strongly fulfilled in Ireland through the creation of indigenous
visions and national regulations respectively1. In the case of the former, many of the nar-
ratives that were mobilised for legitimising the wind RES referenced or drew upon existing
parochial visions and perspectives on Irish society, technology and resource endowments.
The direction of the search function fulfilment in Ireland acted along side direction of
the search in other countries and at other levels2. Second, the construction in Ireland of
the core wind RES institutions was crucial. The direction of the search and legitimacy
functions were instrumental in kick-starting the rule-setting cycle which drove the con-
struction of the REFIT, the grid queue and Single Electricity Market. While on its own
the REFIT was influential in accelerating build-up activities, the thesis has shown that
it was the combination of these three locally constructed, institutions that ultimately led
to the RES stabilising through the recession in 2008 by attracting overseas investment
in later periods. Third, in the early periods of development, entrepreneurial activities
within Ireland were significant drivers of direction of the search and market creation ,
specifically the creation of market niches. Importantly these activities were not limited to
development and construction of wind farms, but included the building of actor coalitions,
nascent industry-research links between Irish universities, firms and system operators, and
lobbying activities focussed at Irish government and civil service actors.
RQ4: What is the balance of influence on the RES of indigenous versus
overseas structure and TIS functions in the Irish context?
Using the build-up and touchdown heuristic, we discuss the relative balance between
indigenous and overseas influences on the wind RES, drawing on the extended findings
discussed in Subsection 8.1.2. At a fundamental level, there was a ‘preferential substitu-
tion’ relation. In several episodes in the emergence of the RES, build-up activities were
initiated over touchdown due to reasons of sectoral, cultural or geographic proximity.
1Discussed at length in sections 7.1 and 7.2.
2In doing so, we note this contributes to the answer to RQ4.
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A case in point is reconfiguration activities in the wind RES due to ownership changes
after the 2008 recession, when some Irish wind farms were re-constituted as fixed finan-
cialised assets in a globalised market consisting of new actors such as pension funds and
‘yield cos’. In that case we saw the substitution of lending activities in Ireland for those
overseas, and the influence of an uneven distribution of ‘global’ resources and access to
those resources. However, it should be clear by now that build-up and touchdown activities
were not, in terms of location, mutually exclusive. Indeed some TIS functions were co-
constitutive from national and European levels, in particular direction of the search. With
regard to the influencing of the technological pathway direction of the RES, we found that
European policy agendas set the direction, but within these parameters, the direction was
strongly orientated by actors and institutions in Ireland. Further findings in Subsection
8.1.2 showed that the intensity and timing of touchdown activities were contingent on
structural context and TIS functions both exogenous and endogenous to the Irish wind
RES. In other words, not only was the relative strength and location of touchdown and
build-up influential, temporal qualities and sequencing mattered too. In the most stark
example, the construction of institutions in Ireland was required before overseas investors
entered the RES following the 2008 recession. What is more, the co-constitutive and
sequential properties were additive in the case of the direction of the Irish wind RES.
Specifically we noted how the direction was set through national influences3, whereas the
acceleration of emergence and growth was accounted for through touchdown.
8.2.2 Addressing the hypotheses
Returning to the hypotheses posed at the beginning of this study, it is now possible to draw
a number of conclusions. Hypothesis 1a , 1b and 1c are concerned with the distribution
of TIS functions over space and inter-organisational and transnational linkages.
H1a: Not all TIS functions needed to be re-produced in Ireland, some
system functions originate in overseas renewable electricity systems, or are
produced through transnational innovation activity.
The review of the literature in Chapter 3 showed a number of studies which shared
a common theoretic perspective that emergent nationally specific innovation systems are
often dependent on distributed system formation processes (Gosens et al., 2015; Fornahl
et al., 2012; Lovio and Kivimaa, 2012). The analysis has clearly shown that not all system
3While an overarching direction was set at European level through – on the one hand – regulation,
and – on the other – technical choices made in more developed markets, many complex choices of who
influenced the emergence and growth of the RES were made in Ireland.
235
functions are required to be reproduced in the country in which the RES is emerging (see
Figure 8.1 in Subsection 8.1.2) confirming – in general terms – the findings summarised
in the literature review. A notable addition to the hypothesis was the observation of
the dynamic and systemic nature of shifts in the geographic distribution of TIS functions
through each period of emergence and development of the wind TIS. In Subsection 8.1.3
we discussed how the sequencing of touchdown activities mattered, for example with flows
of finance from overseas influencing the emergent wind RES in different ways in the first
and fourth development periods.
Furthermore, knowledge creation TIS functions (producing turnkey technologies) were
transnational, and Ireland was not the site of a significant knowledge network created as
found in other studies4 e.g. Binz, Truffer, Li, et al. (2012); Binz, Truffer, and Coenen
(2014). Indeed, access to and the influencing of overseas knowledge networks and finance
networks was not evenly distributed amongst actors in the Irish wind RES. Finally, with
regard to the formation of local markets, we note that Dewald and Truffer (2012) showed
that proximity between knowledge producers and end users influenced the formation of
markets. However in this case, we see that proximity was most important to the developers
and operators who sought to form alliances and influence the alignment of institutions,
through corporate political activity. Of course, the difference between markets in renew-
able technologies and markets for the generation and supply of electricity is a significant
factor here. In conclusion, the thesis finds that distributed TIS functions are influential in
the emergence of the RES, access to resources and strength and direction of the emergent
RES are affected by the nature of the distribution.
H1b: TIS Function strength reflects structural components which are exo-
genous as well as endogenous to the wind RES at national and European
levels.
The review of the literature indicated that contextual institutional conditions are an
important influence on the emergent RES (Bergek, Hekkert, et al., 2014). The struc-
ture and function analyses bore this out, illustrating how alignment with an ensemble of
institutions, within and outside of Ireland, influenced the performance of TIS functions rel-
evant to the Irish wind RES. The thesis found legitimation and the direction of the search
were strongly influenced by the exogenous context of the wind RES in Ireland, in accord-
ance with Meelen and Farla (2013). The thesis supported these findings by showing how
legitimisation was strengthened often by deliberate alignment, through the construction
4Not withstanding the creation of nationally focussed knowledge activities aimed at addressing power
systems integration problems.
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of specifically Irish narratives of societal benefit which evolved with changing economic
and informal institutional contexts. Structural components that were endogenous to the
wind TIS included policy instruments, the market arrangements and grid allocation. The
thesis has shown that these internal institutions had a profound influence on the emergent
RES (see Subsection 6.4.2). A notable finding in this instance was the that these indigen-
ous internal RES institutions ultimately strengthened transnational resource mobilisation
activities. TIS function strength was also influenced by European policy agendas and
processes, which we come to next. In conclusion, the influencing direction of the search
function was influential at national and European governance levels in several ways.
H1c: Changes in the contextual institutional environment due to market
liberalisation and European policy push climate targets were sufficient for the
formation of new electricity sub-sectors including the wind RES.
The analysis has shown how the influence of the direction of the search TIS function
was a strong driver of the emergence of the Irish wind RES and the function was itself
influenced though the alignment of actors and institutions at national and transnational
level, and by actors in front-running innovation systems and RES. This is broadly in line
with contributions which have asserted the influence of transnational institutions on tech-
nological innovation systems functions (Gosens et al., 2015). Activity and institutional
alignment which constituted influencing direction of the search was prevalent throughout
the four periods of system development both within Ireland, and in other jurisdictions and
at the level of European Union governance. European Union political agendas and legis-
lation provided forceful impetus and direction to market discontinuities and institutional
turbulence and inconsistencies in Irish electricity supply sector. This was a contribut-
ing condition in the development of distributed, private sector supply of wind electricity.
Europe also provided a policy ‘backstop’ against local political roll-back and allowed the
creation of a strong ‘European’ narrative, effectively deployed by Irish actors. And we
have discussed how important this was in the Irish context given the Department of Com-
munications, Energy and Natural Resources had relatively little agency to drive through
unilateral policies against the interests of incumbent utilities, and existed in a short term
planning culture (see Subsection 6.1.3). However, these institutional contextual influences
were not sufficient on their own to set the pathway direction of the RES development.
Processes of liberalisation did not directly benefit actors in the wind RES, rather they
created the opportunities and the contextual structure for local actors to engage and in-
fluence local regulatory change processes5. In addition to expected findings, we found that
5Furthermore the dominant model of wind generation business to develop in Ireland was a privatised,
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local policy, co-produced by DCENR and interactions with sectoral actors, contributed in-
creasingly favourable technology support instruments. In conclusion the thesis finds that
institutional influence acts not only at national levels, but at European levels through
global energy and environmental regulations.
H2a: Increases in legitimacy of the technology system, attained through the
production of visions, policies and regulations at a national level, are powerful
drivers of RES emergence
Hypothesis 2a and 2b are concerned with the territoriality of the influences on the
emergences and development of the wind RES in new locations. The analysis has confirmed
that increases in legitimacy of the RES at a national level are powerful drivers of virtuous
cycles which strengthened the emergent wind RES (see subsections 7.3.1 and 8.1.2 and
Figure 7.7). These occurred through through virtuous cycles of TIS functions driven by
the mobilisation of resources and influence on the direction of the search. Legitimation
activities such as lobbying, by firms and advocacy coalitions, demonstrably impacted
the creation of market segments in the second and third periods. The co-production
of policies and technology roll-out goals were in part informed by firm activity. This
was important in during the early periods of RES emergence given the powerful state
owned interests endorsing the status quo, post monopoly market structure. However, the
legitimacy was less important during the later stabilisation cycle (see subsections 7.3.2 and
Figure 7.11). By this stage of system development, legitimacy mattered less for market
formation as the market was supported and stabilised by internal formal institutions, and
continuous resource mobilisation. This is in line with findings in the literature, such as
studies by Markard, Wirth, et al. (2016); Suurs and Hekkert (2012). The thesis concludes
that the legitimacy of the Irish wind RES was formalised and embedded within national
energy regulations and market structures, essentially institutionalised. Yet the while the
characteristics of initial legitimation were highly national, this is contrast to the dual
transnational/national influence on direction of the search which like legitimation activities
was also significantly influenced through the production of visions supportive of the RES.
H2b: Rapid roll-out of a technology within a RES or an implementation
cycle of TIS functions is preceded by a local cycle of knowledge development
functions.
The review of the literature indicated that the emergence or initial take-off of a wind
RES would occur in a functionally distinct period from that of acceleration (Bergek, 2002;
for-profit firm, rather than a community or co-operative model.
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Suurs and Hekkert, 2012), and include significant knowledge creation or diffusion activities
(Bento and Fontes, 2014). This is essentially an argument that absorptive capacity6, that is
the capabilities of firms to utilise new technologies (knowledge), must sufficiently increase
before the roll-out of the new technologies might take place (see discussion, Subsection
3.1.5). This perspective on absorptive capacity is complemented by studies such as that
by Kamp (2008b) who found with wind technologies it is especially important for actors
to gain a lot of experience with the technology while it is in use (accumulation of tacit
knowledge), due to the characteristics of the technology such as large number of material
components which work under high-stress conditions However in the Irish case, we found
that institutional alignment and the building of the RES institutional core through a
rule-making cycle was more significant than inward flows and accumulation of knowledge
vis-a-vis TIS functions (see subsections 7.3.1 and 8.1.2). Of course, this is not to say
that the accumulation of knowledge did not matter. Knowledge flowed in and sometimes
out of the country in early development periods through joint ventures and in overseas
firms entering the RES. Yet the TIS analysis has foregrounded the role of institutions,
signposting, stabilising and transmitting knowledge and de-risking investment in the wind
RES (see Subsection 6.4.2). We reflect further on the role of knowledge and institutions
in the thesis and theoretical framework in the next subsection.
H3: Despite the import of turnkey technologies, national innovation activ-
ities were an important factor in the rapid integration of wind technologies.
The thesis has explained how and why significant innovation took place in Ireland, in
part necessitated by local context such as the small island grid, the pace of deployment and
quality of capital and knowledge resources. Indeed, these innovation activities consisted
of not only technological fixes, such as those addressing intermittency and constraints
due to increased wind capacity, but also the institutional embedding of local visions of
societal benefits of wind generation. Where there was knowledge generation in Ireland,
we have shown it was pre-dominantly demand-led rather than following a linear science
and technology push model initiated through the funding of original research in university
labs. In other words, barriers to integration and grid optimisation drove the creation of
knowledge in Irish research institutes and between these institutes and system operators.
6 Cohen and Levinthal (1990, p. 128) defined absorptive capacity as “the ability to evaluate and utilize
outside knowledge. . . . . . largely a function of the level of prior related knowledge. . . . Prior related
knowledge confers an ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to
commercial ends”. It has been noted in the literature that the distribution of absorptive capacity is not
even (Rosenberg and Steinmueller, 1988).
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Several TIS functions re-produced in Ireland played an important role in contributing
to these activities. These were influencing direction of the search , market formation ,
resource mobilisation , and legitimisation (TIS functions were mapped in Subsection 7.2.2)
However, knowledge may likely play a role in direction setting and the ability to change
direction. Recall in Subsection 7.1.2 we discussed how the direction of the search function
was influenced by new actors, institutions and the mobilising of visions.
The finding that national level institutions as well as European policy institutions
influence the direction of the technology has important implications for policy in two
ways. First as a counter to narratives that would strip national government and govern-
ment agencies of agency. This thesis demonstrates that the claim that ‘Europe drives
everything’ is false. Second, if indeed within the Irish wind RES there does exist the
(distributed) agency to set national direction, there is the ability to decide in what dir-
ection, as well as how fast. In conclusion, the thesis finds that build-up and touchdown
activities of the Irish wind RES were not instigated only by uni-directional processes of
learning from front-running nations, but through the cumulative effect of TIS functions
at a national level.
8.3 Outlook
8.3.1 Contributions of the thesis
Using an innovation systems framework, this thesis has contributed an explanation for
the emergence of a renewable electricity system in a new country – Ireland. It has made
clear that – in the Irish case – no single actor group, institution or regulatory instrument
can be apportioned sole responsibility for the emergence of the wind RES. The system
functions of the TIS framework offered a firm analytical grasp when describing advances in
innovative activity in Ireland. The framework supplemented explanations based on market
failures and externalities and broadened the explanation for the strength, direction and
pace of the emergence to include the alignment of institutions in context, the formation of
actor groups and development and diffusion of knowledge. Much of the existing innovation
studies literature on the emergence of innovation systems in new locations uses concepts
such as ‘increasing absorptive capacity’ or ‘better aligning institutions’ for improving the
likelihood of success7 (Gosens et al., 2015). This contribution identified specific local core
7Indeed, ‘success’ itself is often implicitly taken as the development and roll-out of a specific RES, with
little explicit regard for the direction of the technological pathway.
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institutions, such as policy support instruments, and the cumulative and self-reinforcing
cycles of innovation processes. The findings support evidence in the literature that the
emergent system functions may be distributed across space, and found that not all TIS
functions are required to be reproduced at a national level. And although the specific
sequence and mix of functions is likely to change by country and technology system, the
thesis argues that given the distribution of European Union energy policy at multiple levels,
these results matter. The thesis has shown that when describing emergence in follower
contexts, the TIS functions offer an alternative analytical lens when compared with factors
of diffusion, technology transfer or internationalisation. As explanatory processes, the
functions may be thought of as general dilemmas that occur in the emergence of renewable
electricity systems everywhere. The contribution of this thesis is not to assert a specific
general pattern and sequencing – although this was required to establish explanation of
RES emergence in Ireland. Rather the general point to be made is that these TIS functions
and cycles of TIS functions play out differently depending on context, institutions and
cultures.
To this end, in Chapter 3 I discussed the growing body of literature on the distribution
of innovation system functions over space and time. This thesis contributes directly to
the ongoing discussion in the literature such as innovation system development in context,
context fields, anchoring and nested systems (Lovio and Kivimaa, 2012; Binz, Truffer, and
Coenen, 2016; Bergek, Hekkert, et al., 2014; Wieczorek et al., 2013). A major strength
of this contribution is that it avoids a ‘leader-follower’ or ‘core-periphery’ story of tech-
nological diffusion or transfer. Instead, I embedded the explanatory power of the TIS
framework within a custom heuristic, calibrated to assess the sometimes multi-directional
flows and access to resources which are fundamental to the global proliferation of renew-
able electricity systems. Doing this provides analysis of sometimes strategic, opportunistic
and contentious processes of institutional alignment of actors’ goals and system and exo-
genous structure within and across jurisdictional lines. I also contribute this perspective
on sequencing, a useful aspect of a process theory. The assumption in EU member state
policy is that a direction is established (e.g. towards renewable energy futures) and then
incentives are set through the distribution of public finances to those actors most likely to
build the required infrastructure fast. However the heuristic has shown how the direction
is set at multiple levels, and the support instruments, in this case the REFIT, acceler-
ates8. The lesson here is that protective institutional arrangements have to be negotiated
8Indeed, this observation is one advantage of studying the roll-out of technologies via an innovation
system lens rather than an analysis of the policy system, in that we incorporated both leading indicators
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through complex political and social contexts and that the direction of emergent pathways
cannot be simply downloaded from one level to another.
Two contributions arise from operationalising and testing the analytic framework.
First, the build-up and touchdown heuristic was robustly tested in this thesis and is a
novel, and in this case useful approach to organising the explanatory components of the
TIS framework. This approach offers some promise for future research and is, I suggest,
well suited to comparative case analysis where the national and transnational might be
investigated in parallel. Second, in analysing the evidence, I employed a novel analytical
approach, paying specific attention to the generative power of narratives and their under-
lying analytic stories. The narrative methods employed in the analysis was an important
aspect of testing the hypotheses, particularly hypothesis H2a dealing with legitimacy and
direction of the search functions. With these I showed the formation of coalitions to mobil-
ise relevant narratives and sometimes counter-narratives, and as such, evidence of power
and politics was found. For example, this has allowed me to explain that the Irish visions
and policies were, in later stages, mobilised with narratives of economic performance and
strategy, both prior to and after the recession9 (e.g. through narratives such as ‘keeping
the lights on’ and ‘energy export’). This offers a fruitful direction for future research given
our discussion of localised legitimacy and distributed agency within the system and may
present one approach to addressing recent calls for an explicit engagement with politics,
agency and structures in technological innovation systems analysis (Kern, 2015) which is
elaborated upon in the next subsection.
Reflecting further on the role of knowledge in the TIS framework and building on hy-
pothesis 2b, in a study of the roll-out of electric mini-grids in Laos, Blum et al. (2015,
p. 230) suggest extending the definition of the TIS function knowledge diffusion, to know-
ledge absorption, defined as “all processes that influence information flows in networks,
including the acquisition, assimilation (storage and distribution), transformation and ex-
ploitation of knowledge (also in terms of learning by doing, using and interacting)”. There
is merit to this suggestion, coming as it does from a relational geography perspective which
focusses on connectivity and the impact of economic activities in specific locations. How-
ever, this thesis has contributed to this agenda by taking another approach, addressing
the issue through also foregrounding of system activity and institutional context in the
(policy decisions) and lagging indicators (the construction of wind farms).
9This is consistent with findings in the literature which have illustrated strategies combining ecological
goals – e.g. carbon dioxide reduction targets – with narratives of economic competitiveness (Hodson and
Marvin, 2009; Spa¨th and Rohracher, 2010; Hansen and Coenen, 2014).
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given location, rather than by examining interconnected firm activity alone. In the case of
the Irish wind RES, this was explained through the processes of a system building cycle.
This is an important institutional contribution if we are to take seriously the role of the
national institutional ensemble and the possibilities of political change. Furthermore, this
institutional approach taken in the thesis affords us the ability to take into consideration
the variations in institutional consistencies, over space and over time. Here I reflect on a
point made by Bergek, Hekkert, et al. (2014) that nations may exhibit varying coherences
among institutional structures, such as those proposed in the varieties of capitalism lit-
erature (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The degree of institutionalization of elements in these
contexts does differ and may influence the focal RES to a stronger or lesser degree. This
thesis has contributed examples of how coherences among institutional alignment varies
over time as well as place10.
8.3.2 Towards a wider agenda: politics and transitions
The story of the Irish wind sector, and the contributions offered by this thesis fit also
into broader context to which I now open up. The thesis matters to scholars working on
sustainability transitions and specifically technological innovation systems; the theoretical
framework affords several fresh perspectives on the politics and agency of actors within
innovation systems emerging in new locations. Politics is important because sustainabil-
ity is a normative goal. State intervention is often considered essential, and governance
reform may be prescribed as a means to achieve new social or market conditions (Mead-
owcroft, 2011). However, concepts of underlying power and politics have been somewhat
under-theorised in TIS, despite recent contributions in the wider sustainability transitions
literature11 (Geels, 2014; Stirling, 2014). The problem with regard to innovation system
policy approaches according to Flanagan et al. (2011, p. 711) is that a “normative structure
assumes an underlying or achievable rationality and coherence to the ‘system’ as a target
for policy action which is unrealistic”. And yet given that in any given innovation system
we are likely to encounter a diverse range of interests aligning and realigning, Landon
10Which as suggested in the review of the literature, and borne out by the analysis may relate to
established technological directions and trajectories, commonly held beliefs, societal discourses and shared
problem or policy agendas Fuenfschilling and Truffer (2013)
11In the construction of the TIS framework, it is likely that policy concepts were derived somewhat
hastily, leading to at the very least some instances of policy-determinism, and at worst, techno-determinism.
Normative aspects have not been elaborated enough, so that we as researchers sometimes fail to ask in
our analysis what is sustainable in the transition, or question sustainability for whom and under what
conditions.
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Winner’s article title from 1980 “Do artefacts have politics?” remains a relevant question.
Following Winner, choice is central to processes of politics and choices of design, where
implementation effects users and uses of technology (Hess, 2007). We have encountered
technological choice on numerous occasions in the case and the analysis has indicated that
choice, and politics, are fundamental aspects of how fast and in what direction energy
systems emerge, or not.
In evolutionary ontologies such as technological innovation system framework, the
processes and dynamics of politics (beyond simply policy ‘making’) can be conceptualised
within the selection environment and are enacted through selection pressures (Negro, Al-
kemade, et al., 2011). But while typically institutions are viewed as the selection environ-
ment, relatively few studies have explicitly turned the analytic focus to selection processes
in fast follower contexts12. Within the TIS framework, politics and political activities
such as lobbying and public acceptance interventions are usually captured analytically
under the legitimisation function13. Indeed, in this study I have implicitly operationalised
the selection environment and selection pressures though the (contextual) institutions and
functions the framework. In the case, legitimacy came about because of actors entering
the RES, the formation of coalitions, lobbying and corporate political strategy activities
and the reproduction of powerful system narratives. The utility of this approach was the
identification of specific narratives mobilised by actors or coalitions which indicate they
consider a particular TIS function to be weak. Specifically I traced analytic stories around
which coalition formation took place, invariably processes of contention and coordination.
In the main, these were processes of legitimation and direction of the search. This ap-
proach is generalisable, the methodology will allow analysts track closely how narratives
are performed and by whom, revealing a politics of a RES. The approach may be especially
useful for assessing the formation of new incumbencies, and for analysing how system act-
ors adjust to new selection environments and pressures whether that be in new market
spaces or in new institutional settings or within boundary organisations, two arenas which
we have shown play a crucial role in the reproduction of system processes in new locations.
A strengthened perspective on politics – through an enhanced cognisance of the selec-
tion environment and associated selection pressures – is useful also in bringing into focus
12Often implicitly, TIS studies have tended to focus on processes of variation and retention and where
selection has been a focus, it has been of technologies emergent from the lab or workshop. For example,
in a fascinating recent paper, Kukk et al. (2016) show how single powerful actors within a TIS might
significantly influence dominant institutions through processes of institutional entrepreneurship.
13See Bergek, Jacobsson, and Sande´n (2008) for an extended discussion on processes of legitimacy and
TIS.
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aspects of agency, and how it relates to location and context. The thesis gave several
perspectives on the role of agency, location and context regarding the politics of emerging
innovation systems which are generalisable beyond the case. It showed the role location
played in the co-production and institutionalisation of national policy. It showed how over-
arching EU agenda have influenced the restructuring of national institutional ensembles
via long-term processes of market liberalization14 and shorter-term EC directives, ulti-
mately reshaping the selection environment. And it showed that legitimisation processes
changed significantly over time, influenced by context and endogenous system changes, but
crucially, reproduced within a national context. Consider then the relationship between
legitimacy and agency15. Agency with regard to the emergence and reproduction of RES
processes in new locations is important as it is crucial to processes of legitimisation such as
the creation of advocacy coalitions and the reproduction of narratives. Agency has been
understood in the TIS as distributed, yet, as with perspectives on politics, it has been
under-conceptualised in the literature and strategic activities towards coordination and
the integration into the system of complementary actors tend to be overlooked (Musi-
olik, Markard, and Hekkert, 2012; Jacobsson and Jacobsson, 2014). The thesis has found
the agency of system building actors to be locationally influenced, unevenly distributed
throughout the system and dynamic over time.
An analytic and policy innovation resulting from early work on TIS functions was a shift
from prescribing competition as a sole policy driver, to finding mutual interests around
which collaborative development between actors within or between an innovation system
may work together for mutually beneficial system development (Bergek, Jacobsson, and
Sande´n, 2008). This thesis contributes to that agenda through the consideration first of
the space in which collaborative development takes place, and second, of the nature of that
collaboration. The opening-up or construction of space which facilitates the formation of
actor coalitions is vital. These spaces might include organisational boundary space16 where
disparate actors can come together over common issues, or markets or regulatory arenas.
In this observation we go beyond considering the jurisdiction in questioning the location of
14Increased market liberalisation has altered innovation processes in the field of electricity supply
(Markard and Truffer, 2006), primarily because the selection environment has changed in and around the
regulator, influencing the direction of the search for new (renewable) energy technologies and ultimately
the emergence of the new technological system.
15Where agency is the realisation of the capacity of actors to translate their potential for action into
practice (Scott, 2006).
16See for example the work by scholors of Science and Technology Studies on boundary organisations
(Cash, 2001; Guston, 2001).
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the selection environment and selection pressures. This work then might provide a guide
to asking where the selection of future energy pathways takes place, and how locational
context might influence the reproduction of system processes and the ensuing direction of
the technology. This has important implications for governments and other actors who
may want to promote, accelerate or steer the direction of transitions towards sustainable
energy systems. Crucially actors may cross national boundaries. Overseas actors can
influence the institutional arrangement abroad, as well as in the host jurisdiction. Finally,
this line of thought on legitimacy, politics, context and location might justify future work
bringing to bear explicitly relational approaches of inquiry on issues of system agency17.
This is also an important policy consideration I will address next.
8.3.3 Policy recommendations
The empirical findings in this study contribute a new explanation of how and why the
Irish wind electricity system has emerged and developed in the manner it has. While
these research findings are most directly relevant to innovation studies scholars, they also
matter to those working on European and specifically Irish energy matters. The thesis
has contributed a systemic, socio-technical history of a small island grid system, and its
integration of a high percentage of intermittent electricity generation. The findings go
someway to addressing two narratives found amongst actors in the system, that through
policy push processes ‘Europe drives everything’, and that the development of wind can
be explained through the distribution of subsidy, specifically the REFIT. Both of these
rationales are partial, they tell only part of the story, a story which has been elaborated
significantly in this thesis.
This thesis makes policy recommendations on a ‘systemic failure’ basis. In other
words, I argue that government intervention in the energy sector is justified based on
the analysis and diagnosis of system failures (and successes) observed in the study. To
be clear, in Section 1.2 the thesis rejected market failure based interventions on the basis
that neoclassical theory does not adequately consider the complex evolutionary character
17Whilst beyond the remit of this thesis, Garud and Gehman (2012) offer a promising exploration along
this line of thought on which to end in order to discuss agency further. The authors explain selection
environments by contrasting to relational perspectives and mobilise Actor Network Theory; “whereas the
evolutionary perspective considers agency as determined by prior events, selection environments as given,
and the criteria for success as unequivocal, the relational perspective draws attention to the many ways
in which agency is distributed, selection environments are molded, and evaluation criteria are equivocal”
(Garud and Gehman, 2012, p. 984).
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of innovation, and therefore provides an insufficient basis on which to make innovation
policy. The thesis then made the case that nationally mobilised innovation processes are
vital for the emergence of a renewable electricity system. Furthermore, the thesis aligns
with previous findings in the literature and suggests that the problems associated with
market failure, such as societally unacceptable greenhouse gas emissions, cannot be fixed
through the simplistic heuristic of ‘getting the price (incentives) right’. Indeed, a general
recommendation I make is the promotion of systemic failure frameworks in the ongoing
and future analysis of renewable energy policy implementation and decision making.
More specifically, the findings presented have a number of practical implications for
those who seek to make and influence the making of energy policy. I have found the
building-up aspects of a renewable electricity system in a new location requires the pro-
motion of other localised innovation-related activities. Perhaps most obviously from the
perspective of policy makers in the host nation, this calls for specialisation in a global in-
novation system which should be chosen to best match indigenous capabilities or resource
endowments. The contribution of Ireland’s power systems researchers is notable in this
regard. Furthermore, strategic focus should be placed not only on funding the generation
technology needed to meet CO2 reduction targets, but rather on systemic blockages and
drivers, of the type indicated in this thesis. This process approach has serious implications
for policy frameworks; it suggests that in addition to creating price incentives to buy and
build turnkey plant, policy frameworks should focus on instigating and influencing innov-
ation processes in a dynamic and reflexive manner. Dynamic and reflexive approaches
are particularly important when rolling-out emerging technology, in uncertain conditions,
where future societal needs and returns on investment are unknown. In the Irish case,
the thesis has discussed how economic conditions and improvements in globally produced
turnkey technology have altered the fundamental structure under which investment de-
cisions are made. It makes sense then that the structuring of incentives and rents should
be appropriately flexible.
The thesis found that development of a renewable electricity system in new locations
is simultaneously strongly influenced by transnational aspects of system actors relations,
regulatory regimes both national and transnational, and local context such as culture and
other ‘soft’ institutions. In other words, the actors, institutions and resources which influ-
ence the direction of development at a national level are distributed across jurisdictional
boundaries, across sectors and policy domains, and what is more, are likely to fluctuate
over time. This presents both risk and opportunity to those with vested interests in the
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emergence of a local renewable electricity system. The case illustrated how local condi-
tions opened up and closed down opportunities for overseas players in the Irish market,
and furthermore, the thesis showed that these transnational linkages were not stable over
time. Indeed, generally these opportunities may be influenced by intentional strategies of
some actors. The opportunity then is for policy makers at national level to make inter-
ventions not only at national level, but to engage across borders and sectors. However,
the thesis found that transnational linkages are not necessarily aligned to benefit the local
emergent system or actors indicating that we should not expect benefits and gains to be
evenly distributed. In an open market economy, shifts in the balance between national in-
novation processes to processes and firms from overseas may lead to crowding-out of local
firms. This has serious implications for the distribution of benefits after the fact, all the
more so given the position that typically 70% of capital expenditure on wind developments
is exported, a situation that is likely to be prevalent in many follower situations given the
concentration of turbine research, design and manufacturing in Germany, Denmark, China
and the United States. Indeed, whilst certainly some Irish investors have benefited from
access to international markets though returns on investments abroad, it is clear from the
evidence that the trend over the final period of development analysed is that of increased
overseas investment in Ireland relative to indigenous financing.
Two questions arise from these findings, generally relevant to policy aimed at pro-
moting the emergence of renewable electricity systems in new locations. First, how should
policy makers at national level, design, incentivise or steer the emergence of new renewable
energy systems? Second, what is the role of the state in these processes? In addressing
the first question I will use the concept of the direction of the technological pathway emer-
ging in a given new location18. For example, the provision of renewable electricity is a
clear deviation in direction from fossil-fuel based incumbent electricity systems. Often the
roll-out of renewables are framed around narratives of speed, such as how fast can systems
be decarbonised, backgrounding notions of direction. Direction matters because it shapes
the distribution of benefits; certain actor-groups and places gain or lose through lock-in
18We can explain different courses or deviations from a global technological pathway in terms of dir-
ection. Discussions of the direction of technological change have been a feature of innovation debates
for decades (Dosi, 1982). National Systems of Innovation scholars looked towards national institutions,
their incentive structures and their competencies to determine the rate and direction of change generating
activities in a country (Patel and Pavitt, 1994). Bell and Pavitt and later Bell (2009) highlighted the role
of learning and capability building in technology transfer. More recently, there have been calls to integrate
perspectives on direction into theories of socio-technical transitions and transformations (Stirling, 2009;
del R´ıo Gonza´lez, 2009).
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to dominant pathways and because alternative pathways, which meet different needs, may
be obscured (Ely and Bell, 2009). So influencing the direction of emergent technological
system is a crucial role for government to play, all the more-so given the provision of public
subsidy to support the players in emergent renewable electricity markets. In Ireland, in
addition to the provision of subsidy, the government used evidence of distributed system
activity to its advantage, it co-produced policies with industry actors, and crucially it
established state-level boundary organisations and spaces such as new regulatory envir-
onments which influenced both the institutional structure and actor relations within the
renewable electricity system. These were processes which facilitated activity of certain
indigenous and overseas firms and created momentum within and expanding RES shaping
markets and other structural features of the RES in specific directions.
Thus we see in the Irish case, strong evidence that the state not only influenced the emer-
gence of a wind RES through subsidy, but also steered the development of the subsequent
technological pathway.
What then might we generalise from the Irish experience of the steering of an emerging
renewable electricity system? First, direction-setting by government is highly relevant in a
liberalised energy market such as an EU member state, where state-aid rules and an over-
arching liberalisation agenda preclude against a government ‘picking winners’ and where
regulatory and infrastructure decisions may be devolved from departmental responsib-
ilities. The careful consideration of strategies of direction-setting can serve to address
potential constrictions of agency at a national level. We have seen that policy actors play
an important role in constructing the selection environment for new technological systems,
and shaping selection pressures. Thus ‘boundary work’ is important, where rather than
pushing the state’s duties into the private sphere, spaces and processes are co-produced by
the state and other actors to bring together diverse actors, interests and problem agendas.
Following the establishment of such organisations and institutional settings, the state has a
further responsibility in ensuring that they remain free from capture by powerful interests
such as new incumbents. These considerations are generally and specifically relevant in
liberal or non well-planned economies – for example in southern Europe or outside the EU
– where central planning is not a feature of government or industrial culture.
Second, often direction is considered in relation to large shifts in technological path-
ways, for example from fossil fuel based technology systems to renewables19. However, in
a fast-follower context we can expect to encounter a nuanced steering. The direction of
19Again, following from the work by Dosi (1982) on technological paradigms.
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progress is not necessarily orientated between material technology alternatives (e.g. fossil
fuel production vs renewables). Rather, the Irish case has provided an example of ori-
entations which incorporate systemic and structural features. To be clear, direction then
may be assessed against choices between alternative logics in the setting of market rules,
regulatory environments, the distribution of costs, or the selection of which actor-groups
are positioned to accrue benefits or realise opportunities. Thus we see that steering by
government is not only accomplished by creating demand through the provision of incent-
ives.
Third, the findings in this thesis may guide future policy interventions in the consid-
eration of who gets to steer emerging electricity systems. Variously these choices might
include civil society actors and publics, ‘packs’ of entrepreneurs, incumbent generators and
system operators, and indeed the state itself. Crucially, we have seen that with regard to
the reproduction of system processes in a new location, the role of transnational actors is
vital, particularly in relation to knowledge creation and diffusion, learning and access to
resources. Again, policy makers might consider how they can influence spaces in which
these actors might interact – for example at industry events, within stakeholder associ-
ations, within institutional setting, within learning networks – and the conditions under
which transnational relations might be formed or influenced. A strategy the state may use-
fully employ here is that of being attentive to the narratives which are reproduced as part
of these processes. Early in the reproduction of a renewable electricity system in a new
location, proponents might make an effort to shape expectations and normative legitim-
acy by mobilising narratives that deliberately 1) avoid technical specifications, which may
be defeated by counter-narratives of technical impossibility; 2) incorporate sub-narratives
which embed their stories in new locations; 3) evolve narratives to changing contextual
selection criteria – often related to the macro economy. The state might seek at regular
intervals to identify and test such narratives and furthermore, identify which actors are
included and excluded from the making of such narratives. By doing so, the state might
usefully attend to the danger that promises of societal benefits, strategically embedded in
the narratives of national energy futures – narratives we have encountered in this thesis
– are not, or will not be met. Indeed future research might usefully compare the expecta-
tions of technological emergence promised within such narratives, with progress attained,
both in terms of speed, and crucially direction. Collectively, these perspectives indicate
the state has an important role in steering the direction of technological emergence.
In summary then, the thesis has shown that as renewable energy technologies such
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as onshore wind emerge at utility scale in new locations, a wide range of actors have the
opportunity to influence what kind or electricity system is appropriate, not merely how
fast existing systems are decarbonised. The analytic approach offers a framework with
which to address systemic electricity system issues on the one hand, and through nar-
rative analysis, incorporate an understanding of actors, their collective actions and the
innovation processes they reproduce. Policy makers, firms and actors in wider publics
have contributed at times to a rapid and impressive emergence of a new wind RES in Ire-
land. Innovation was systemically driven towards meeting the needs of commercial actors
– both indigenous and those from overseas – while there was a negligible role afforded to
electricity consumers in addressing system needs. Indeed there continues to be an implicit
assumption that centralised wholesaling and distribution of electricity is cheaper because
of economics of scale20. The case presents a useful example for researchers and policy
makers who seek to reproduce innovation processes at other sites and locations, be they
in support of wind or other renewable energy technologies.
Furthermore, maintaining a reflexive position with regard to research and policy assess-
ments is an important societal issue as we attempt to transition and transform our energy
infrastructures, processes which involve large costs and disrupt and reproduce powerful
incumbent interests. Success in this regard should rightly be celebrated.
Yet success must be judged with regard to diverse interests in many locations who have
promoted and borne the costs of renewable electricity systems. Success therefore is un-
likely to be attained through a linear race-like evaluation measured simply by units of
energy production deployed. In this regard, the innovation system approach utilised in
this thesis can contribute toward an assessment of progress.
20A point discussed in Subsection 2.4 and made by Foley, O´ Gallacho´ir, et al. (2013)
251
Bibliography
ABO (2015). About ABO Wind Ltd. url: http : / / www . abo - wind . com / com / the -
company/index.html (visited on 21/07/2015).
Adshead, M. (2005). ‘Europeanization and changing patterns of governance in Ireland’.
In: Public Administration 83.1, pp. 159–178. issn: 1467-9299. doi: 10.1111/j.0033-
3298.2005.00442.x. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0033-3298.2005.
00442.x.
Adshead, M. and B. Quinn (1996). ‘The move from government to governance: Irish de-
velopment policy’s paradigm shift’. In: Policy & Politics 26.2, pp. 209–225.
Agnew and Livingstone, eds. (1995). The Sage Handbook of Geography, pp. 160–164. isbn:
9781412910811.
Airtricity (2008). Press release: Airtricity announces sale to Scottish and Southern Energy
PLC. Tech. rep. Dublin: Airtricity.
Allen, K. (2014). ‘The Irish Political Elite’. In: Are the Irish Different? Ed. by T. Inglis.
Manchester: Manchester University Press. Chap. 6, pp. 54–64.
Arrow, K. (1962). ‘The Economic lmplications of Learning by Doing’. In: Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, pp. 155–173.
Asheim, B. T. and L. Coenen (2006). ‘Contextualising regional innovation systems in a
globalising learning economy: On knowledge bases and institutional frameworks’. In:
Journal of Technology Transfer 31.1, pp. 163–173.
Avdeitchikova, S. (2012). ‘The geographic organization of ‘venture capital’ and ‘business
angles’’. In: Handbook of Research on Venture Capital, vol. 2. Ed. by H. Landstro¨m
and C. Mason. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 175–208.
Baker, L. (2015). ‘The evolving role of finance in South Africa’s renewable energy sector’.
In: Geoforum 64, pp. 146–156. issn: 00167185. doi: 10.1016/j.geoforum.2015.06.
017. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0016718515001669.
Baker, L. and J. Phillips (2011). ‘The Governance of Clean Development Working Paper
Series - Governing electricity in South Africa: wind, coal and power struggles’. Norwich.
252
Barry, F. and J. Bradley (1997). ‘FDI and Trade: The Irish Host-Country Experience’.
In: Royal Economics Society Annual Conference. Vol. 107. 445, pp. 1798–1811. doi:
10.1111/1468-0297.00258. url: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/1468-0297.
00258%20http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.
tb00083.x/full.
Bazilian, M., E. Denny, and M. O’Malley (2004). ‘Challenges of increased wind energy
penetration in Ireland’. In: Wind Engineering 28.1 SPEC. ISS. pp. 43–56.
Belderbos, R. A. (1992). ‘Large multinational enterprises based in a small economy: Ef-
fects on domestic investment’. In: Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 128.3, pp. 543–557.
issn: 1610-2886. doi: 10.1007/BF02707367. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
BF02707367.
Bell, M. (2009). Innovation Capabilities and Directions of Development. Tech. rep. Brighton:
STEPS Centre, p. 69.
Bell, M. and P. N. Figueiredo (2012). ‘Building innovative capabilities in latecomer emer-
ging market firms: some key issues’. In: Innovative firms in emerging market countries.
New York and London. 1ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1, pp. 24–109.
Bell, M. and K. Pavitt (1993). ‘Technological accumulation and industrial growth: Con-
trasts between developed and developing countries’. In: Industrial and Corporate Change
2.1, pp. 157–210. issn: 09606491. doi: 10.1093/icc/2.1.157. url: http://icc.
oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/icc/2.1.157.
Benford, R. and D. Snow (2000). ‘Framing processes and social movements: An overview
and assessment’. In: Annual review of sociology 26.2000, pp. 611–639. url: http:
//www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/223459.
Bento, N. and M. Fontes (2014). ‘The Construction of a New Technological Innovation
System in a Follower Country : Wind Energy in Portugal’. In: Environmental Innova-
tion and Societal Transitions 15, pp. 158–179. issn: 22104224. doi: 10.1016/j.eist.
2014.10.003. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2014.10.003.
Bergek, A. (2002). ‘Shaping and Exploiting Technological Opportunities : The Case of Re-
newable Energy Technology in Sweden Department of Industrial Dynamics’. Doctoral
dissertation. isbn: 9172911441.
Bergek, A., M. Hekkert, S. Jacobsson, J. Markard, and B. Truffer (2014). ‘TIS interactions
with technological , sectorial, political and geographical contexts: some lessons for ana-
lysts’. In: 5th International Conference for Sustainability Transitions (IST). Utrecht,
pp. 1–30.
253
Bergek, A. and S. Jacobsson (2003). ‘The emergence of a growth industry: a comparative
analysis of the German, Dutch and Swedish wind turbine industries.’ In: Change,
Transformation and Development. Ed. by J. Metcalfe and U. Cantner. Heidelberg:
Springer, pp. 197–228.
Bergek, A., S. Jacobsson, B. Carlsson, S. Lindmark, and A. Rickne (2008). ‘Analyzing
the functional dynamics of technological innovation systems: A scheme of analysis’. In:
Research Policy 37, pp. 407–429. issn: 00487333. doi: 10.1016/j.respol.2007.12.
003. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S004873330700248X.
Bergek, A., S. Jacobsson, B. Carlsson, and S. Lindmarki (2005). ‘Analysing the dynam-
ics and functionality of sectoral innovaiton systems - A manual’. In: DRUID Tenth
Anniversary Summer Conference 2005. Copenhagen, pp. 1–34.
Bergek, A., S. Jacobsson, and B. Sande´n (2008). ‘’Legitimation’ and ’development of pos-
itive externalities’: Two key processes in the formation phase of technological innov-
ation systems’. In: Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 5.20, pp. 575–592.
url: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09537320802292768.
Bergh, J. C. van den, B. Truffer, and G. Kallis (2011). ‘Introduction and overview, En-
vironmental Innovation and Societal Transitions’. In: Environmental innovation and
societal transitions 1.1, pp. 1–23.
Bhaskar, R. (1979). The possibility of naturalism: a philosophical critique of the contem-
porary human sciences. English. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press. isbn:
0391008439 9780391008434 0391008447 9780391008441.
Billington, S. and P. Mohr (2014). The value of wind energy to Ireland. A report to Irish
Wind Energy Association. Tech. rep. March. Po¨yry Management Consulting (UK)
Ltd, p. 111. url: http://www.iwea.com/index.cfm/page/industryreports?
twfId=1467.
Binz, C., B. Truffer, and L. Coenen (2014). ‘Why space matters in technological innovation
systems—Mapping global knowledge dynamics of membrane bioreactor technology’. In:
Research Policy 43.1, pp. 138–155. issn: 00487333. doi: 10.1016/j.respol.2013.07.
002. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0048733313001182.
— (2016). ‘Path Creation as a Process of Resource Alignment and Anchoring: Industry
Formation for On-Site Water Recycling in Beijing’. In: Economic Geography ISSN:
92.2, pp. 172–200. issn: 0013-0095. doi: 10.1080/00130095.2015.1103177.
Binz, C., B. Truffer, L. Li, Y. Shi, and Y. Lu (2012). ‘Conceptualizing leapfrogging
with spatially coupled innovation systems: The case of onsite wastewater treatment
254
in China’. In: Technological Forecasting and Social Change 79.1, pp. 155–171. issn:
00401625. doi: 10.1016/j.techfore.2011.08.016. url: http://linkinghub.
elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0040162511001831.
Blum, N. U., C. R. Bening, and T. S. Schmidt (2015). ‘An analysis of remote electric mini-
grids in Laos using the Technological Innovation Systems approach’. In: Technological
Forecasting and Social Change 95, pp. 218–233. issn: 00401625. doi: 10.1016/j.
techfore.2015.02.002. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2015.02.
002.
Breznitz, D. (2007). Innovation and the state: political choice and strategies for growth in
Israel, Taiwan, and Ireland. New Haven: Yale University Press. isbn: 9780300120189
0300120184.
Bulkeley, H., V. C. Broto, M. Hodson, and S. Marvin (2010). Cities and low carbon trans-
itions. London: Routledge. isbn: 1136883274.
Burke, D. and M. O’Malley (2008). CER Gate 3 Consultation Submission. Tech. rep.
August. Dublin: University College Dublin, pp. 1–5.
Burke, R. (1989). ‘Da´il E´ireann Debate’. In: Houses of the Oireachtas. Tithe an Oireach-
tais, Dublin 387.4.
Byrne, E. A. (2012). Political Corruption in Ireland 1922-2010. Manchester: Manchester
University Press.
Byrne, R. (2009). ‘Learning drivers. Rural electrification regime building in Kenya and
Tanzania’. Doctoral dissertation. Brighton: University of Sussex.
Carlsson, B. (2006). ‘Internationalization of innovation systems: a survey of the literature’.
In: Research Policy 35.1, pp. 56–67.
Carlsson, B. and R. Stankiewicz (1991). ‘On the nature, function and composition of tech-
nological systems’. In: Journal of Evolutionary Economics 1.2, pp. 93–118. issn: 0936-
9937. doi: 10.1007/BF01224915. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01224915.
Carlsson, B. (1994). Technological systems and economic performance. Cheltenham UK:
Edward Elgar, pp. 13–24.
— (1997). Technological systems and industrial dynamics. English. Boston: Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers. isbn: 0792399404 9780792399407.
Carlsson, B., S. Jacobsson, M. Holme´n, and A. Rickne (2002). ‘Innovation systems: ana-
lytical and methodological issues’. In: Research Policy 31, pp. 233–245.
Carswell, S. (2010). Peter Sutherland: The ultimate social networker. The Irish Times,
January 30th. Dublin.
255
Cash, D. W. (2001). ‘”In Order to Aid in Diffusing Useful and Practical Information..”:Cross-
scale Boundary Organisations and Agricultural Extension’. In: 26.4, pp. 431–453.
CER (2012a). Single Electricity Market Treatment of Curtailment in Tie- Break situations.
Tech. rep. April. Commission for Energy Regulation.
— (2012b). Single Electricity Market: Treatment of Curtailment in Tie-Break situations
(SEM-12-090).
Cimoli, M., G. Dosi, and J. Stiglitz (2009). Industrial policy and development: The political
economy of capabilities accumulation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. isbn: 0199235279.
CJEU (2001). Case C-379/98: PreussenElektra AG and Schleswag AG.
Clifford, E. and M. Clancy (2011). Impact of Wind Generation on Wholesale Electricity
Costs in 2011. Tech. rep. SEAI, Eirgrid, pp. 1–10.
Coe, N. M., M. Hess, H. W.-c. Yeung, P. Dicken, and J. Henderson (2004). ‘‘Globalizing’
regional development: a global production networks perspective’. In: Transactions of
the Institute of British Geographers 29.4, pp. 468–484. issn: 1475-5661. doi: 10.1111/
j.0020- 2754.2004.00142.x. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-
2754.2004.00142.x.
Coenen, L. and F. J. Dı´az Lo´pez (2010). ‘Comparing systems approaches to innovation
and technological change for sustainable and competitive economies: An explorative
study into conceptual commonalities, differences and complementarities’. In: Journal
of Cleaner Production 18.12, pp. 1149–1160.
Coenen, L., P. Benneworth, and B. Truffer (2012). ‘Towards a spatial perspective on
sustainability transitions’. In: Research Policy 41, pp. 968–979. url: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.respol.2012.02.014.
Coenen, L. and B. Truffer (2012). ‘Editorial: Places and spaces of sustainability transitions:
geographical contributions to an emerging research and policy field’. In: European
Planning Studies.
Cohen, W. and D. Levinthal (1990). ‘Absorbtive capacity: a new perspective on learning
and innovation.’ In: Administrative Science Quarterly 35, pp. 128–152.
Comhar (2011). Community Renewable Energy in Ireland: Status, barriers and potential
options. Tech. rep. November. Dublin: Comhar Sustainable Development Council and
Trinity College Dublin.
Commission for Energy Regulation (2003). CER/03/281 Wind Generator Connection
Policy Direction. Tech. rep. Dublin: Commission for Energy Regulation.
256
Commission for Energy Regulation (2004). Direction on Resuming Connection Offers to
Wind Generators - CER/04/381. Tech. rep. December. Dublin: Commission for Energy
Regulation.
— (2005). Criteria for Gate 2 Renewable Generator Connection Offers - CER/05/225.
Tech. rep. November. Dublin: Commission for Energy Regulation.
— (2006). Gate 2 Connection Offers to Renewable Generators - CER/06/028. Tech. rep.
March. Dublin: Commission for Energy Regulation, pp. 5–7.
— (2013). CER/13/168 Public Service Obligation Levy 2013/2014: Decision Paper. Tech.
rep. Dublin: Commission for Energy Regulation. url: www.cer.ie/docs/000791/
cer13168-%20public-service-obligation-levy-2013-%202014-decision.pdf.
Connolly, D., H. Lund, B. Mathiesen, and M. Leahy (2011). ‘The first step towards a
100% renewable energy-system for Ireland’. In: Applied Energy 88.2, pp. 502–507.
issn: 03062619. doi: 10.1016/j.apenergy.2010.03.006. url: http://linkinghub.
elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S030626191000070X.
Cooke, P., M. Heidenreich, and H. J. Braczyk, eds. (2004). Regional Innovation Systems:
The Role of Governance in a Globalised World. London: Routledge.
Cooke, P. (2013). Transition regions: green innovation and economic development. London:
Springer. isbn: 3642331939.
Correa, C. M. (1994). ‘Trends in technology transfer: Implications for developing coun-
tries’. In: Science and Public Policy 21.6, pp. 369–380. issn: 0302-3427.
Culliton, J. (1992). A time for change: industrial policy for the 1990s. Dublin: Stationery
Office.
del R´ıo Gonza´lez, P. (2009). ‘The empirical analysis of the determinants for environmental
technological change: A research agenda’. In: Ecological Economics 68.3, pp. 861–878.
doi: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.07.004.
Deloitte (2009). Jobs and Investment in Irish Wind Energy: Powering Ireland’s Economy.
Tech. rep. Naas, Kildare: Irish Wind Energy Association, p. 42.
Denny, E., A. Tuohy, P. Meibom, A. Keane, D. Flynn, A. Mullane, and M. O’Malley (2010).
‘The impact of increased interconnection on electricity systems with large penetrations
of wind generation: A case study of Ireland and Great Britain’. In: Energy Policy 38.11,
pp. 6946–6954.
Department Energy Communications and Natural Resources (2009). Developing the Green
Economy in Ireland: Report of the High-Level Group on Green Enterprise. Tech. rep.
November. Dublin: Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment.
257
Department of Communications Energy and Natural Resources (2000). National Climate
Change Strategy Ireland. Dublin.
— (2008). All Island Grid Study. Tech. rep. Dublin: Demartment of Communications,
Energy et al.
Devine Wright, P. (2009). ‘Rethinking NIMBYism: The role of place attachment and place
identity in explaining place-protective action’. In: Journal of Community & Applied
Social Psychology 19.6, pp. 426–441. issn: 1099-1298.
Devine-Wright, P. (2005). ‘Local aspects of UK renewable energy development: exploring
public beliefs and policy implications’. In: Local Environment 10.1, pp. 57–69. url:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1354983042000309315.
Devine-Wright, P. (2011). ‘Public engagement with large-scale renewable energy techno-
logies: breaking the cycle of NIMBYism’. In: Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cli-
mate Change 2.1, pp. 19–26. issn: 17577799. doi: 10.1002/wcc.89. url: http:
//doi.wiley.com/10.1002/wcc.89.
Dewald, U. and B. Truffer (2011). ‘Market Formation in Technological Innovation Sys-
tems—Diffusion of Photovoltaic Applications in Germany’. In: Industry & Innovation
18.3, pp. 285–300. issn: 1366-2716. doi: 10.1080/13662716.2011.561028. url:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13662716.2011.561028.
— (2012). ‘The Local Sources of Market Formation: Explaining Regional Growth Differen-
tials in German Photovoltaic Markets’. In: European Planning Studies 20.3, pp. 397–
420. issn: 0965-4313. doi: 10.1080/09654313.2012.651803. url: http://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09654313.2012.651803.
Di Cosmo, V. and L. Malaguzzi Valeri (2014). ‘The incentive to invest in thermal plants
in the presence of wind generation’. In: Energy Economics 43, pp. 306–315. issn:
01409883. doi: 10 . 1016 / j . eneco . 2014 . 03 . 009. url: http : / / linkinghub .
elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0140988314000565.
Diffney, S., J. F. Gerald, S. Lyons, and L. M. Valeri (2009). ‘Investment in electricity
infrastructure in a small isolated market: The case of Ireland’. In: Oxford Review of
Economic Policy 25.3, pp. 469–487. issn: 0266903X. doi: 10.1093/oxrep/grp022.
Doherty, R. and M. O’Malley (2005). ‘A new approach to quantify reserve demand in sys-
tems with significant installed wind capacity’. In: Power Systems, IEEE Transactions
on 2.20, pp. 587–595.
— (2011). ‘The efficiency of Ireland’s Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff (REFIT) for wind
generation’. In: Energy Policy 39.9, pp. 4911–4919. issn: 03014215. doi: 10.1016/
258
j.enpol.2011.06.024. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/
S0301421511004800.
Dolata, U. (2009). ‘Technological innovations and sectoral change. Transformative capa-
city, adaptability, patterns of change: An analytical framework’. In: Research Policy
38.6, pp. 1066–1076. issn: 00487333. doi: 10.1016/j.respol.2009.03.006. url:
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0048733309000791.
Doom, J. (2015). BlackRock buying stakes in three EDF wind projects. url: http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-19/blackrock-buying-50-stakes-in-
three-edf-wind-projects-in-texas] (visited on 21/06/2015).
Dosi, G. (1982). ‘Technological paradigms and technological trajectories:: A suggested
interpretation of the determinants and directions of technical change’. In: Research
policy 11.3, pp. 147–162. url: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/0048733382900166.
Dosi, G., C. Freeman, R. R. Nelson, G. Silverberg, and L. Soete (1988). Technical change
and economic theory. Ed. by G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R. R. Nelson, G. Silverberg, and
L. Soete. London; New York: Pinter Publishers. isbn: 086187949X 9780861879496
0861872746 9780861872749 0861878949 9780861878949.
Dudurych, I., M. Holly, and M. Power (2006). ‘Integration of wind power generation in the
Irish grid’. In: 2006 IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting. IEEE, 8 pp.
isbn: 1-4244-0493-2. doi: 10.1109/PES.2006.1709436. url: http://ieeexplore.
ieee.org/document/1709436/.
Duffy, A. and B. Cleary (2015). ‘Chapter 3. Wind Energy Development in Ireland’. In:
IEA Wind Task 26 - Wind Technology, Cost, and Performance Trends in Denmark,
Germany, Ireland, Norway, the European Union, and the United States: 2007–2012.
Ed. by M. Hand. Golden, CO: NREL, pp. 75–100.
Ecofin (2015). Selected transactions by Ecofin and its managed funds. url: http://www.
ecofin.co.uk/eco/en/about/trans (visited on 16/02/2015).
Edquist, C., ed. (1997). Systems of innovation: Technologies, institutions and organiza-
tions. London: Pinter Publishers.
Edquist, C. and L. Hommen (2008). Small Country Innovation Systems. Ed. by C. Edquist
and L. Hommen. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 1–6. isbn: 978 1 84542 584 5.
EEA (2009). Europe’s onshore and offshore wind energy potential. Copenhagen: EEA.
isbn: 9789292130008. doi: 10.2800/11373. url: www.eea.europa.eu.
259
EIB (2012). Press release: EIB provides ESB EUR155 for renewables support. url: http:
//www.eib.org/infocentre/press/releases/all/2012/2012-178-ireland-eib-
provides-eur-155m-to-support-renewable-energy-investment.htm (visited on
03/04/2015).
EirGrid (2013). Gate 3 Frequently Asked Questions. url: http://www.eirgrid.com/
media/Gate%203%20FAQs%20Section%203%20-%20FAQs%20and%20ATRs.pdf (visited
on 26/08/2015).
— (2015). EirGrid Grid Code Version 6.0. Tech. rep. May. EirGrid.
EirGrid and Soni (2014). Annual Wind Constraint and Curtailment Report 2013. Tech.
rep. Dublin: EirGrid.
Eisenhardt, K. K. M. (1989). ‘Building Theories from Case Study Research’. In: The
Academy of Management Review 14.4, pp. 532–550. issn: 03637425. url: http://www.
jstor.org/stable/10.2307/258557%20http://www.jstor.org/stable/258557.
Elliott, D. (2005). ‘Feed-in or quota?: Is REFIT better than the RO?’ In: Refocus 6.6,
pp. 53–54.
Ely, A. and M. Bell (2009). ‘The Original ’Sussex Manifesto’: Its Past and Future Rel-
evance’. Brighton. url: http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en%7B%5C&
%7DbtnG=Search%7B%5C&%7Dq=intitle:The+Original+Sussex+Manifesto:+Its+
Past+and+Future+Relevance%7B%5C#%7D0.
E.O’Dwyer, H. Mangan, C.Kelleher, and A. Cooke (1990). ‘The Case for Wind Energy’.
In: CIGRE – 1990 Session.
ERC (2015). ERC historic wind data. url: http://ercrt.ucd.ie/historic.php (visited
on 18/07/2015).
Est, R. van (1999). Winds of Change: A comparative study of the politics of wind energy
innovation in California and Denmark. Utrecht: International Books.
European Commission (1996). Directive on deregulation of internal markets 96/92/EC.
Brussels.
— (2003). ‘Directive 2003/54/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in
electricity’. In: Official Journal of the European Union L 176/37.
— (2007a). ‘COM(2007) 723. Communication from the European Commission: A European
Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-PLAN)’. In: Commission of the European
Communities.
260
European Commission (2007b). LEADER Links between the rural economy and develop-
ment actions. url: http://enrd.ec.europa.eu/enrd-static/leader/en/leader%
7B%5C_%7Den.html (visited on 15/07/2015).
— (2009). ‘Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in
electricity’. In: Official Journal of the European Union L 211/55.
European Council (1991). Proposal for a Council Directive concerning common rules for
the internal market in electricity. COM (91) 548 final. Tech. rep. February. Brussels:
Commission of the European Communities.
Eurostat (2015). Eurostat. url: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat (visited on 22/08/2015).
Fagerberg, J. and M. Godinho (2005). ‘Innovation and Catching-up’. In: The Oxford Hand-
book of Innovation. Ed. by J. Fagerberg, D. Mowery, and R. R. Nelson. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. Chap. Chapter 19.
Farrell, N. and S. Lyons (2014). ‘The distributional impact of the Irish public service
obligation levy on electricity consumption’. Dublin. url: http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/53488/.
Fitz Gerald, J. (2000). Strategy for Intensifying Wind Energy Deployment. Tech. rep.
Dublin: Government of Ireland - Stationary Office. url: http://scholar.google.
com/scholar?hl=en%7B%5C&%7DbtnG=Search%7B%5C&%7Dq=intitle:Strategy+for+
Intensifying+Wind+Energy+Deployment%7B%5C#%7D0.
— (2011). A Review of Irish Energy Policy. Tech. rep. 21. Dublin: Economic and Social
Research Institute.
FitzGerald, J. (2004). ‘Energy Policy in Ireland’. Dublin. url: http://ideas.repec.
org/p/esr/wpaper/wp160.html.
FitzGerald, J., E. Denny, and A. O’Mahoney (2014). “An Enterprising Wind”. An eco-
nomic analysis of the job creation potential of the wind sector in Ireland. Tech. rep.
Dublin: Irish Wind Energy Association, p. 40.
Flanagan, K., E. Uyarra, and M. Laranja (2011). ‘Reconceptualising the ‘policy mix’ for
innovation’. In: Research Policy 40.5, pp. 702–713. issn: 00487333. doi: 10.1016/j.
respol.2011.02.005. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/
S0048733311000345.
Fligstein, N. and L. Dauter (2007). ‘The Sociology of Markets’. In: Annual Review of
Sociology 33.1, pp. 105–128. issn: 0360-0572. doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.
131736. url: http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.soc.
33.040406.131736.
261
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’. In: Qualitat-
ive Inquiry 12.2, p. 219. doi: 10.1177/1077800405284363.
Foley, A. M., P. Leahy, and E. J. McKeogh (2009). ‘Wind energy integration and the
Ireland-Wales interconnector’. In: Sustainable Alternative Energy (SAE), 2009 IEEE
PES/IAS Conference on, pp. 1–6. isbn: VO -.
Foley, A., B. O´ Gallacho´ir, E. McKeogh, D. Milborrow, and P. Leahy (2013). ‘Addressing
the technical and market challenges to high wind power integration in Ireland’. In:
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 19, pp. 692–703. issn: 13640321. doi: 10.
1016/j.rser.2012.11.039. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/
pii/S136403211200651X.
Fornahl, D., R. Hassink, C. Klaerding, I. Mossig, and H. Schro¨der (2012). ‘From the
Old Path of Shipbuilding onto the New Path of Offshore Wind Energy? The Case of
Northern Germany’. In: European Planning Studies 20.5, pp. 835–855. issn: 0965-4313.
doi: 10.1080/09654313.2012.667928. url: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
abs/10.1080/09654313.2012.667928.
Foxon, T. and P. Pearson (2008). ‘Overcoming barriers to innovation and diffusion of
cleaner technologies: some features of a sustainable innovation policy regime’. In:
Journal of Cleaner Production 16.1, S148–S161. issn: 09596526. doi: 10.1016/j.
jclepro.2007.10.011. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/
S095965260700217X.
Freeman, C. (1994). ‘The economics of technical change: Critical survey’. In: The Cam-
bridge Journal of Economics 18.5, pp. 463–514.
Freeman, C. and F. Louc¸a˜ (2001). As Time Goes By: From the Industrial Revolutions
to the Information Revolution: From the Industrial Revolutions to the Information
Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press. isbn: 0191529052.
Freeman, C. and L. Soete (1997). The Economics of Industrial Innovation. London and
New York: Continuum.
Freeman, C. (1987). Technology, policy, and economic performance: lessons from Japan.
English. London; New York: Pinter Publishers. isbn: 0861879287 9780861879281.
Fuenfschilling, L. and B. Truffer (2013). ‘The structuration of socio-technical regimes —
Conceptual foundations from institutional theory’. In: Research Policy. issn: 00487333.
doi: 10.1016/j.respol.2013.10.010. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/
retrieve/pii/S0048733313001893.
262
Gardner, P., S. Mcgoldrick, T. Higgins, and B. O´. Gallacho´ir (2003). ‘The effect of increas-
ing wind penetration on the electricity systems of the Republic of Ireland and Northern
Ireland’. In: Proceedings of the European Wind Energy Conference 2003. Madrid, p. 7.
Garud, R. and J. Gehman (2012). ‘Metatheoretical perspectives on sustainability journeys:
Evolutionary, relational and durational’. In: Research Policy 41.6, pp. 980–995. url:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048733312000662.
Garud, R., J. Gehman, and A. P. Giuliani (2014). ‘Contextualizing entrepreneurial innova-
tion: A narrative perspective’. In: Research Policy 43.7, pp. 1177–1188. issn: 00487333.
doi: 10.1016/j.respol.2014.04.015. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/
retrieve/pii/S0048733314000778.
Garud, R. and P. Karnøe (2003). ‘Bricolage versus breakthrough : distributed and embed-
ded agency in technology entrepreneurship’. In: Research Policy 32, pp. 277–300.
Geels, F. W. (2014). ‘Regime Resistance against Low-Carbon Transitions: Introducing
Politics and Power into the Multi-Level Perspective’. In: Theory, Culture & Society,
pp. 0263276414531627–. issn: 0263-2764. url: http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/
early/2014/06/27/0263276414531627.full.
Geels, F. W. (2004). ‘From sectoral systems of innovation to socio-technical systems In-
sights about dynamics and change from sociology and institutional theory’. In: System
33, pp. 897–920. doi: 10.1016/j.respol.2004.01.015.
— (2005). ‘Co-evolution of technology and society: The transition in water supply and
personal hygiene in the Netherlands 1850-1930 - A case study in multi-level perspect-
ive’. In: Technology in Society 27.3, pp. 363–397.
Geels, F. W. and J. Schot (2007). ‘Typology of sociotechnical transition pathways’. In:
Time, pp. 1–29.
George, A. L. and A. Bennett (2005). Case studies and theory development in the so-
cial sciences. English. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. isbn: 0262072572 9780262072571
0262572222 9780262572224.
Gibbons, T. G. (1979). The potential contribution of wind power to the Irish electricity
grid : a research project carried out for the National Board for Science and Technology
by the Statistics and Operations Research Laboratory, Trinity College Dublin. Dublin:
Trinity College Dublin.
Giddens, A. (2009). The politics of climate change. English. Cambridge; Malden, MA:
Polity. isbn: 0745646921 9780745646923 074564693X 9780745646930.
263
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of the Experience.
New York: Harper Colophon.
Golding, E. W. (1955). ‘Electrical energy from the wind’. In: Proceedings of the IEE-Part
A: Power Engineering 102.6, pp. 677–687. issn: 2054-040X.
Gonza´lez, a., E. McKeogh, and B. Gallacho´ir (2004). ‘The role of hydrogen in high wind
energy penetration electricity systems: The Irish case’. In: Renewable Energy 29.4,
pp. 471–489. issn: 09601481. doi: 10.1016/j.renene.2003.07.006. url: http:
//linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0960148103002799.
Gosens, J., Y. Lu, and L. Coenen (2015). ‘The Role of Transitional Dimensions in Emerging
Economy Technological Innovation Systems for Clean-Tech’. In: Journal of Cleaner
Production 86, pp. 378–388. issn: 09596526. doi: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2014.08.029.
url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0959652614008518.
Government of Ireland (1998). Finance Act, 1998.
— (1999). Green Paper on Sustainable Energy.
— (2000). Planning and Development Act 2000.
— (2011). National Renewable Energy Action Plan. Tech. rep. Dublin: Government of
Ireland.
Gru¨bler, A. (1998). Technology and Global Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
— (2010). ‘The costs of the French nuclear scale-up: a case of negative learning by doing’.
In: Energy Policy 38.9, pp. 5174–5188.
Guston, D. H. D. (2001). ‘Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science:
An Introduction’. In: Science, Technology, & Human Values 26.4, pp. 399–408. url:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/690161.
GWEC (2012). IRENA-GWEC: 30 Years of Policies for Wind Energy. Tech. rep. Global
Wind Energy Council, pp. 98–104.
Hajer, M. A. (1995). The Politics of environmental discourse : ecological modernization and
the policy process. English. Oxford [etc.]: Clarendon. isbn: 0198279698 9780198279693.
Hall, P. A. and D. W. Soskice (2001). Varieties of capitalism: the institutional foundations
of comparative advantage. English. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. isbn:
0199247757 9780199247752 0199247749 9780199247745.
Hansen, T. and L. Coenen (2014). ‘The Geography of Sustainability Transitions: A Liter-
ature Review’. In: International Sustainability Transitions 2014. Utrecht, pp. 1–24.
264
Hardiman, N. (2002). ‘From Conflict to Co-ordination : Economic Governance and Political
Innovation in From Conflict to Co-ordination : Economic Governance and Political
Innovation in Ireland’. In: System November, pp. 37–41.
Hastings, T. (2003). Politics, Management and Industrial Relations. Semi-State Compan-
ies and the Challenges of Marketization. Dublin: Blackhall Publishing.
Heaney, S. (1966). Death of a naturalist. English. London; Boston: Faber and Faber. isbn:
0571090249 9780571090242 0571066658 9780571066650.
Hekkert, M., S. Negro, G. Heimeriks, and R. Harmsen (2011). Technological Innovation
System Analysis. A Manual. Utrecht.
Hekkert, M., R. Suurs, S. Negro, S. Kuhlmann, and R. Smits (2007). ‘Functions of innov-
ation systems: A new approach for analysing technological change’. In: Technological
Forecasting and Social Change 74.4, pp. 413–432. issn: 00401625. doi: 10.1016/j.
techfore.2006.03.002. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/
S0040162506000564.
Helm, D. (2014). ‘The European framework for energy and climate policies’. In: Energy
Policy 64, pp. 29–35. issn: 03014215. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2013.05.063. url:
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0301421513004151.
Hess, D. (2007). ‘Crosscurrents: Social movements and the anthropology of science and
technology’. In: American Anthropologist 109.3, pp. 463–472. doi: 10.1525/AA.2007.
109.3.463.464. url: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1525/aa.2007.
109.3.463/abstract.
Hiteva, R. (2014). EU renewable energy policy: looking beyond leaders, laggards and polit-
ical will. url: http://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/sussexenergygroup/2014/06/02/eu-
renewable-energy-policy-looking-beyond-leaders-laggards-and-political-
will/ (visited on 23/09/2015).
Hodson, M. and S. Marvin (2009). ‘Cities mediating technological transitions: understand-
ing visions, intermediation and consequences’. In: Technology Analysis & Strategic
Management 21.4, pp. 515–534. issn: 0953-7325.
Holttinen, H., P. Meibom, A. Orths, B. Lange, M. O’Malley, and J. Tande (2009). ‘Impacts
of large amounts of wind power on design and operation of power systems results
of IEA collaboration’. In: Proceeding of the 8th International workshop on large-scale
integration of wind power into power systems and on transmission networks of offshore
wind farms,
265
Hoppmann, J., J. Huenteler, and B. Girod (2014). ‘Compulsive policy-making—The evol-
ution of the German feed-in tariff system for solar photovoltaic power’. In: Research
Policy 43.8, pp. 1422–1441. issn: 0048-7333. doi: 10.1016/j.respol.2014.01.014.
url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.01.014.
Howley, M., M. Holland, and D. Dineen (2014). Energy in Ireland. Key Statistics 2014.
Tech. rep. Cork: SEAI.
Huber, C., L. Ryan, B. O´ Gallacho´ir, G. Resch, K. Polaski, and M. Bazilian (2007).
‘Economic modelling of price support mechanisms for renewable energy: Case study
on Ireland’. In: Energy Policy 35.2, pp. 1172–1185. issn: 03014215. doi: 10.1016/
j.enpol.2006.01.025. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/
S030142150600070X.
Hughes, T. P. (1983). Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Hunt, P. (2012). ‘Irish Energy Policy and Regulation : Issues and Challenges’. In: October,
pp. 1–37.
Hurley Staudt Associates (1988). Identification of Wind Energy Rich Sites Best Suited for
Wind Farm Development. Tech. rep.
IDA (1978). ‘Wind, wave, water’. In: Joint one-day conference, Wednesday, April 26th
1978, [held by the] Solar Energy Society of Ireland, Industrial Development Authority,
Institute for Industrial Research and Standards. Dublin.
IEA (2013). IEA Wind Annual Report 2013. Tech. rep. International Energy Authority,
pp. 106–111.
IWEA (2013). ‘Wind Insights’. In: Wind Insights. Magazine of the Irish Wind Energy
Association.
— (2014). IWEA press release, 22nd October 2014. url: http://www.iwea.com/index.
cfm?page=viewNews%7B%5C&%7Did=125 (visited on 18/07/2015).
Jacobsson, S. and A. Bergek (2011). ‘Innovation system analyses and sustainability trans-
itions: Contributions and suggestions for research’. In: Environmental Innovation and
Societal Transitions 1.1, pp. 41–57. issn: 22104224. doi: 10.1016/j.eist.2011.04.
006. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S2210422411000177.
Jacobsson, S., A. Bergek, D. Finon, and V. Lauber (2009). ‘EU renewable energy support
policy: Faith or facts?’ In: Energy policy 37, pp. 2143–2146. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.
2009.02.043. url: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0301421509001347.
266
Jacobsson, S. and A. Johnson (2000). ‘The diffusion of renewable energy technology: an
analytical framework and key issues for research’. In: Energy Policy 28.9, pp. 625–640.
issn: 0301-4215. url: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0301421500000410.
Jacobsson, S. and V. Lauber (2006). ‘The politics and policy of energy system transform-
ation—explaining the German diffusion of renewable energy technology’. In: Energy
Policy 34.3, pp. 256–276. issn: 0301-4215. url: http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S0301421504002393.
Jacobsson, S., B. Sande´n, and L. B˚angens (2004). ‘Transforming the Energy System—the
Evolution of the German Technological System for Solar Cells’. In: Technology Ana-
lysis & Strategic Management 16.1, pp. 3–30. issn: 0953-7325. url: http://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0953732032000199061.
Jacobsson, T. and S. Jacobsson (2014). ‘Conceptual confusion – an analysis of the meaning
of concepts in technological innovation systems and sociological functionalism’. In:
Technology Analysis & Strategic Management March 2014, pp. 1–13. issn: 0953-7325.
doi: 10.1080/09537325.2014.900171. url: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
abs/10.1080/09537325.2014.900171.
Jacquot, S. and C. Woll (2003). ‘Usage of European Integration – Europeanisation from
a Sociological Perspective EIoP : Text 2003-012 : Full Text Contents : 1 . Theorizing
about European Integration’. In: European Integration Online Papers 7.September
2002, pp. 1–18. url: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2003-012a.htm.
Johnson, A. and S. Jacobsson (2000). ‘The emergence of a growth industry - a comparative
analysis of the German , Dutch and Swedish wind turbine industries’. In: Schumpeter
2000: Change, transformation and development. url: http://link.springer.com/
chapter/10.1007/978-3-7908-2720-0%7B%5C_%7D12.
Kamp, L. (2008a). ‘Analyzing the introduction of renewable energy technologies in The
Netherlands with the FIS approach – possibilities , limitations and additions’. In: DIME
International Conference ’Innovation, sustainability and policy’ September, pp. 1–27.
— (2008b). ‘Socio-technical analysis of the introduction of wind power in the Netherlands
and Denmark’. In: International Journal of Environmental Technology and Manage-
ment 9.2/3, pp. 276–293.
Karltorp, K. (2014). ‘SCALING UP The role of resource mobilisation in the growth of
technological innovation systems’. Doctoral dissertation. Chalmers.
267
Kee, E. D. (2004). ‘Margadh Aibhle´ise na hE´ireann: A New Electricity Market For Ire-
land’. In: The Electricity Journal 17.1, pp. 51–60. issn: 1040-6190. url: http://www.
sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1040619003001726.
Kemp, R., J. Schot, and R. Hoogma (1998). ‘Regime shifts to sustainability through pro-
cesses of niche formation: The approach of strategic niche management’. In: Technology
Analysis & Strategic Management 10.2, pp. 175–198. issn: 0953-7325. doi: 10.1080/
09537329808524310. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09537329808524310.
Kern, F. (2015). ‘Engaging with the politics, agency and structures in the technological
innovation systems approach’. In: Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions
16, pp. 67–69. issn: 22104224. doi: 10.1016/j.eist.2015.07.001. url: http:
//linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S2210422415300046.
Kern, F. and A. Smith (2008). ‘Restructuring energy systems for sustainability? Energy
transition policy in the Netherlands’. In: Energy Policy 36.11, pp. 4093–4103. url:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030142150800308X.
Kjaer, C. (2008). ‘Nothing Mainstream About Eddie’. In: Wind People August, pp. 20–23.
Konrad, K., J. Markard, A. Ruef, and B. Truffer (2012). ‘Strategic responses to fuel
cell hype and disappointment’. In: Technological Forecasting and Social Change 79.6,
pp. 1084–1098. issn: 00401625. doi: 10.1016/j.techfore.2011.09.008. url: http:
//linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0040162512000273.
Kukk, P., E. H. Moors, and M. P. Hekkert (2016). ‘Institutional power play in innovation
systems: The case of Herceptin R©’. In: Research Policy 45.8, pp. 1558–1569. doi: 10.
1016/j.respol.2016.01.016.
Laffan, B. and J. O’Mahony (2008). ‘’Bringing politics back in’. Domestic conflict and
the negotiated implementation of EU nature conservation legislation in Ireland’. In:
Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning 10.2, pp. 175–197. issn: 1523908X
(ISSN).
Laffan, B. (1996). ‘Ireland: A region without regions’. In: Cohesion policy and European in-
tegration. Ed. by L. Hooge. Oxford: Oxford university press. Chap. Ireland: A, pp. 320–
340. isbn: 0198280645 9780198280644.
Lall, S. (1992). ‘Technological Capabilities and Industrialisation’. In: World Development
20.2, pp. 165–186.
Langley, A. (1999). ‘Strategies for Theorizing from Process Data’. In: Academy of Manage-
ment review 24.4, pp. 691–710. url: http://amr.aom.org/content/24/4/691.short.
268
Lauber, V. (2007). ‘The politics of European Union policy on support schemes for electri-
city from renewable energy sources’. In: Green Power Markets: Support Schemes, Case
Studies and Perspectives. Brentwood: Multi-Science Publishing, pp. 9–29.
Leach, M., I. Scoones, and A. Stirling (2010). ‘Governing epidemics in an age of complexity:
Narratives, politics and pathways to sustainability’. In: Global Environmental Change
20.3, pp. 369–377. issn: 09593780. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.11.008. url:
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0959378009001034.
Leahy, E. and R. S. J. Tol (2011). ‘An estimate of the value of lost load for Ireland’. In:
Energy Policy 39.3, pp. 1514–1520. issn: 0301-4215. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2010.
12.025. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.12.025.
Leahy, J. (2010). ‘Gate 3 Grid Connection Group Processing Approach - An Analysis’.
Thesis. Dublin Institute of Technology.
Lema, R. and A. Lema (2012). ‘Technology Transfer? The Rise of China and India in
Green Technology Sectors’. In: SSRN Electronic Journal. issn: 1556-5068. doi: 10.
2139/ssrn.2003367. url: http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2003367.
Leonard, L. and I. Botetzagias (2011). Sustainable politics and the crisis of the peripheries:
Ireland and Greece. Ed. by L. Leonard and I. Botetzagias. Bingley: Emerald, p. 225.
Lovins, A. (1977). Soft Energy Paths. London: Penguin.
Lovio, R. and P. Kivimaa (2012). ‘Comparing Alternative Path Creation Frameworks in
the Context of Emerging Biofuel Fields in the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland’.
In: European Planning Studies 20.5, pp. 773–790. issn: 0965-4313. doi: 10.1080/
09654313.2012.667925.
Lundvall, B.-A˚., ed. (1992). National Systems of Innovation - toward a Theory of Innov-
ation and Interactive Learning. London: Pinter Publishers.
Lynch, M. A´., R. S. Tol, and M. J. O’Malley (2012). ‘Optimal interconnection and renew-
able targets for north-west Europe’. In: Energy Policy 51, pp. 605–617. issn: 03014215.
doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2012.09.002. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/
retrieve/pii/S0301421512007604.
Lyons, S., J. Fitz Gerald, N. McCarthy, L. M. Valeri, and R. S. Tol (2007). ‘Preserving
electricity market efficiency while closing Ireland’s capacity gap’. In: ESRI Quaterly
Economic Commentary Autumn, pp. 62–82.
Madsen, E. S., J. O. Riis, and B. V. Waehrens (2008). ‘The knowledge dimension of
manufacturing transfers: A method for identifying hidden knowledge’. In: Strategic
Outsourcing: An International Journal 1.3, pp. 198–209. issn: 1753-8297.
269
Maguire, S., C. Hardy, and T. B. Lawrence (2004). ‘Institutional entrepreneurship in emer-
ging fields: HIV/AIDS treatment advocacy in Canada’. In: Academy of Management
Journal 47.5, pp. 657–679. issn: 00014273. doi: 10.2307/20159610.
Mainstream Renewable Power (2016). Mainstream launches training program in Northern
Chile. url: http://mainstreamrp.com/mainstream-launches-training-program-
in-northern-chile/ (visited on 10/03/2016).
Majidpour, M. (2011). ‘The dynamics of technological catching-up: the case of Iran’s gas
turbine industry. Doctoral thesis.’ Doctoral dissertation. University of Sussex.
Malerba, F. (2002). ‘Sectoral systems of innovation and production’. In: Research Policy
31.2, pp. 247–264. issn: 00487333. doi: 10.1016/S0048- 7333(01)00139- 1. url:
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0048733301001391.
Markard, J., R. Raven, and B. Truffer (2012a). ‘Sustainability transitions: An emerging
field of research and its prospects’. In: Research Policy 41.6, pp. 955–967. url: http:
//www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S004873331200056X.
— (2012b). ‘Sustainability transitions: An emerging field of research and its prospects’. In:
Research Policy 41.6, pp. 955–967. issn: 00487333. doi: 10.1016/j.respol.2012.02.
013. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S004873331200056X.
Markard, J. and B. Truffer (2008a). ‘Technological innovation systems and the multi-level
perspective: Towards an integrated framework’. In: Research Policy 37.4, pp. 596–615.
issn: 00487333 (ISSN).
Markard, J. and B. Truffer (2006). ‘Innovation processes in large technical systems: Market
liberalization as a driver for radical change?’ In: Research Policy 35.5, pp. 609–625.
issn: 0048-7333. url: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0048733306000606.
— (2008b). ‘Actor-oriented analysis of innovation systems: exploring micro–meso level
linkages in the case of stationary fuel cells’. In: Technology Analysis & Strategic Man-
agement 20.4, pp. 443–464. issn: 0953-7325. doi: 10.1080/09537320802141429. url:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09537320802141429.
Markard, J., S. Wirth, and B. Truffer (2016). ‘Institutional dynamics and technology
legitimacy – A framework and a case study on biogas technology 1 Introduction’. In:
Research Policy 45.1, pp. 1–33. issn: 00487333. doi: 10.1016/j.respol.2015.10.009.
url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2015.10.009.
270
Martin, B. R. (2012). ‘The evolution of science policy and innovation studies’. In: Research
Policy 41.7, pp. 1219–1239. issn: 00487333. doi: 10.1016/j.respol.2012.03.012.
url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2012.03.012.
Martin, R. (2000). ‘Institutional approaches in economic geography’. In: A companion to
economic geography. Ed. by E. Sheppard and T. J. Barnes. Oxford: Blackwell Publish-
ers Ltd, pp. 77–94.
Mc Garrigle, E., J. Deane, and P. Leahy (2013). ‘How much wind energy will be curtailed
on the 2020 Irish power system?’ In: Renewable Energy 55, pp. 544–553. issn: 09601481.
doi: 10.1016/j.renene.2013.01.013.
Mccann, J. (2014). ‘The evidence for wind energy’. In: Energy Ireland Yearbook 2014. Ed.
by O. McQuade. Dublin: bmf Business Services. url: http://www.energyireland.
ie/the-evidence-for-wind-energy/.
McCarthy, C. (2003). ‘Corruption in public office in Ireland: policy design as a counter-
measure’. In: ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary. url: http://www.esri.ie/
pdf/QEC1003SA%7B%5C_%7DMcCarthy.pdf.
Meadowcroft, J. (2011). ‘Engaging with the politics of sustainability transitions’. In: En-
vironmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 1.1, pp. 70–75. issn: 22104224. doi:
10.1016/j.eist.2011.02.003. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/
pii/S2210422411000074.
Meelen, T. and J. Farla (2013). ‘Towards an integrated framework for analysing sustainable
innovation policy’. In: Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 25.8, pp. 957–
970. issn: 0953-7325. doi: 10.1080/09537325.2013.823146. url: http://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09537325.2013.823146.
Meibom, P., R. Barth, H. Brand, B. Hasche, H. Ravn, and C. Weber (2008). All-island grid
study: wind variability management studies. Department of Communications Energy
and Natural Resources (Ireland). Tech. rep. Dublin: Department of Communications
Energy and Natural Resources (Ireland). url: http://www.dcenr.gov.ie/Energy/
%20Latest+News/All-Island+Grid+Study+Published.htm.
Miles, M. B. and M. A. Huberman (1994). Qualitative data analysis: An expanded source-
book. Vol. 19. New York: Sage, pp. 106–107. isbn: 0803955405. doi: 10.1016/0149-
7189(96)88232-2.
Mitchell, C. (2008). The political economy of sustainable energy. London: Palgrave Mac-
millan.
271
Mitchell, C. and P. Connor (2004). ‘Renewable energy policy in the UK 1990–2003’. In:
Energy Policy 32.17, pp. 1935–1947. issn: 03014215. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2004.03.
016. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0301421504000710.
Musiolik, J. and J. Markard (2011). ‘Creating and shaping innovation systems: Formal
networks in the innovation system for stationary fuel cells in Germany’. In: Energy
Policy 39.4, pp. 1909–1922. issn: 03014215. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2010.12.052.
url: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421511000115.
Musiolik, J., J. Markard, and M. Hekkert (2012). ‘Networks and network resources in
technological innovation systems: Towards a conceptual framework for system build-
ing’. In: Technological Forecasting and Social Change 79.6, pp. 1032–1048. url: http:
//www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040162512000236.
NC Economy (2014). Better Growth, Better Climate: The New Climate Economy Report:
the Global Report. Tech. rep. The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate.
Negro, S. O., F. Alkemade, and M. P. Hekkert (2011). ‘Why does renewable energy dif-
fuse so slowly? A review of innovation system problems’. In: Renewable and Sustain-
able Energy Reviews. Innovation Studies Utrecht ( ISU ) Working Paper Series 16.6,
pp. 3836–3846. issn: 13640321. doi: 10.1016/j.rser.2012.03.043. url: http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2012.03.043.
Negro, S. O., M. P. Hekkert, and R. E. Smits (2007). ‘Explaining the failure of the Dutch
innovation system for biomass digestion—A functional analysis’. In: Energy Policy
35.2, pp. 925–938. issn: 03014215. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2006.01.027. url: http:
//linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0301421506000723.
Negro, S. O., M. P. Hekkert, and R. E. H. M. Smits (2008). ‘Stimulating Renewable Energy
Technologies by Innovation policy’. Utrecht.
Nelson, R. R. (1994). ‘The Co-evolution of Technology, Industrial Structure, and Support-
ing Institutions’. In: Industrial and Corporate Change 3.1, pp. 47–63. issn: 0960-6491.
doi: 10.1093/icc/3.1.47. url: http://icc.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.
1093/icc/3.1.47.
Newell, P. and M. Paterson (2010). Climate Capitalism. Global Warming and the Trans-
formation of the Global Economy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 223.
isbn: 9780521194853.
Nooteboom, B. (2001). Learning and innovation in organizations and economies. Eng-
lish. Oxford: Oxford University Press. isbn: 0199241007 9780199241002 019924099X
9780199240999.
272
North, D. C. (1990). Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
NREL (2014). Deeper look at yieldco structuring. url: https://financere.nrel.gov/
finance/content/deeper-look-yieldco-structuring (visited on 21/07/2015).
O´ Gallacho´ir, B., M. Bazilian, and E. McKeogh (2010). ‘Wind energy policy development
in Ireland-A critical analysis’. In: Wind Power and Power Politics. Ed. by P. Strachan,
D. Lal, and D. Toke. London: Routledge. Chap. 6, pp. 112–139. isbn: 0415961300. url:
http://www.ucc.ie/academic/civil/staff/brian/SUSDEV.pdf.
O´ Gallacho´ir, B. and E. McKeogh (2005). ‘Wind energy and security of supply. The wind
farm grid connection moratorium in Ireland’. In: ucc.ie June. url: http://www.ucc.
ie/academic/civil/staff/brian/UPEC2005.pdf.
O´ Gallacho´ir, B., G. Guidi, K. Korneyeva, and S. McCarthy (2007). Conflicts Between
Energy Policy Objectives and the National Climate Change Strategy in Ireland. Tech.
rep. Dublin: Environmental Protection Agency.
O’Brien, M. and S. Penna (1994). ‘European policy and the politics of environmental
governance’. In: Policy and Politics 25.2, pp. 185–200. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.
1332/030557397782453363.
O’Donoghue, J. (2006). Final Report by DSO on Eligibility Phase of Gate 2 Group Pro-
cessing Approach for Renewable Generator Connections. Tech. rep.
O’Hearn, D. (2014). ‘Just Another Bubble Economy?’ In: Are the Irish Different? Ed. by
T. Ingis. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Chap. 4, pp. 34–43.
O’Sullivan, J., A. Rogers, and A. Kennedy (2011). ‘Determining and implementing an
approach to system frequency and inertial response in the Ireland and Northern Ireland
power system’. In: 2011 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting. IEEE,
pp. 1–6. isbn: 978-1-4577-1000-1. doi: 10.1109/PES.2011.6039323. url: http:
//ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6039323/.
Patel, P. and K. Pavitt (1994). ‘National Innovation Systems: Why They Are Important,
And How They Might Be Measured And Compared’. In: Economics of Innovation
and New Technology 3.February 2015, pp. 77–95. issn: 1043-8599. doi: 10.1080/
10438599400000004.
Pearson, P., J. Watson, and S. E. Group (2010). UK Energy Policy UK Energy Policy.
isbn: 9781849195805.
273
Pedriana, N. (2005). ‘Rational Choice, Structural Context, and Increasing Returns: A
Strategy for Analytic Narrative in Historical Sociology’. In: Sociological Methods &
Research 33.3, pp. 349–382. issn: 0049-1241. doi: 10.1177/0049124104265996.
Pentland, B. T. (1999). ‘Process theory with narrative: From description to explanation’.
In: The Academy of Management Review 24.4, pp. 711–724.
Pettigrew, A. M. (1990). ‘Longitudinal Field Research on Change: Theory and Practice’.
In: Organization Science 1.3, pp. 267–292. issn: 1047-7039. doi: 10.1287/orsc.1.3.
267. url: http://orgsci.journal.informs.org/cgi/doi/10.1287/orsc.1.3.267.
Pettigrew, A. M. (1997). ‘What is a processual analysis?’ In: Scandinavian Journal of
Management 13, pp. 337–348. issn: 09565221. doi: 10.1016/S0956-5221(97)00020-
1.
Pigou, A. C. (1920). The economics of welfare. English. London: Macmillan.
Pineda, I. and J. Wilkes (2015). Wind in power. 2014 European statistics. Tech. rep.
EWEA.
Pollitt, M. G. (2012). ‘The role of policy in energy transitions: Lessons from the energy
liberalisation era’. In: Energy Policy 50, pp. 128–137. issn: 03014215. doi: 10.1016/
j.enpol.2012.03.004. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/
S0301421512002091.
Poole, M., A. van de Ven, K. Dooley, and M. Holmes (2000). Organizational Change and
Innovation Processes, Theories and Methods for Research. Oxford University Press.
Radosevic, S. (1999). International technology transfer and catch-up in economic develop-
ment. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Randolph, J. J. (2009). ‘A guide to writing the dissertation literature review’. In: Practical
Assessment, Research & Evaluation 14.13, pp. 1–13.
Raven, R. (2004). ‘Implementation of manure digestion and co-combustion in the Dutch
electricity regime: a multi-level analysis of market implementation in the Netherlands’.
In: Energy Policy 32, pp. 29–39. url: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S0301421502002483.
Raven, R., J. Schot, and F. Berkhout (2012). ‘Environmental Innovation and Societal
Transitions Space and scale in socio-technical transitions’. In: Environmental Innova-
tion and Societal Transitions 4, pp. 63–78. issn: 2210-4224. doi: 10.1016/j.eist.
2012.08.001. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2012.08.001.
274
Raven, R. and F. W. Geels (2010). ‘Socio-cognitive evolution in niche development: Com-
parative analysis of biogas development in Denmark and the Netherlands (1973-2004)’.
In: Technovation 30.2, pp. 87–99.
Reddy, M. and L. Zhao (1990). ‘International technology transfer: a review’. In: Research
Policy 19.4, pp. 285–307.
Rip, A. and R. Kemp (1998). ‘Technological change’. In: Human Choice and Climate
Change, Vol. 2. Ed. by S. Rayner and E. L. Malone. Columbus, OH: Battelle Press.
Chap. Technologi, pp. 327–400.
Roe, E. (1994). Narrative policy analysis: theory and practice. Durham, NC: Duke Univer-
sity Press.
Rogers, E. (1983). The Diffusion of Innovation (Third Ed.) New York: Free Press.
Rosenberg, N. and W. E. Steinmueller (1988). ‘Why Are Americans Such Poor Imitators?’
In: The American Economic Review 78.2, p. 229. issn: 00028282. doi: 10.2307/
1818128. url: http://search.proquest.com/docview/233048874?accountid=
28391.
Rotmans, J., R. Kemp, and M. Van Asselt (2001). ‘More evolution than revolution: trans-
ition management in public policy.’ In: Foresight 3.1, pp. 15–31.
Sabatier, P. A. (1998). ‘The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for
Europe’. In: Journal of European public policy 5.1, pp. 98–130. issn: 1350-1763.
Saxenian, A. (1994). Regional advantage : culture and competition in Silicon Valley and
Route 128. English. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. isbn: 0674753399
9780674753396 0674753402 9780674753402.
— (2007). The new argonauts: regional advantage in a global economy. English. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press. isbn: 9780674025660 0674025660.
Scho¨n, D. A. and M. Rein (1995). Frame reflection: Toward the resolution of intractable
policy controversies. Basic Books.
Scott (2006). Sociology – The Key Concepts. London; New York: Routledge.
SEAI (2013). Energy research inventrory. Tech. rep. Dublin: Sustainable Energy Authority
of Ireland.
SEI (2003a). Attitudes Towards The Development of Wind Farms in Ireland. Tech. rep.
Dublin: SEAI, p. 52. url: http://www.seai.ie/Publications/Renewables%7B%5C_
%7DPublications/Wind%7B%5C_%7DPower/.
— (2003b). Republic of Ireland Wind Atlas 2003. Tech. rep. Dublin: Sustainable Energy
Ireland.
275
Seyfang, G., S. Hielscher, T. Hargreaves, M. Martiskainen, and A. Smith (2014). ‘A grass-
roots sustainable energy niche? Reflections on community energy in the UK’. In: En-
vironmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 13, pp. 21–44. issn: 2210-4224.
Shepherd, D. G. (1990). Historical development of the windmill. NASA Contractor Report
4337. DOE/NASA/5266-1. doi: 10.2172/6342767.
Shiel, M. (1984). The quiet revolution: the electrification of rural Ireland1946-1976. Dublin:
O’Brien Press. isbn: 086278056X.
Shove, E. and G. Walker (2010). ‘Governing transitions in the sustainability of everyday
life’. In: Research Policy 39.4, pp. 471–476. issn: 0048-7333. doi: 10.1016/j.respol.
2010.01.019. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2010.01.019.
Shuttleworth, G. (2000). Opening European Electricity and Gas Markets. Tech. rep., pp. 1–
32.
Sidgwick, H. (1883). The principles of political economy. English. London: Macmillan and
Co.
Smil, V. (2008). Energy in Nature and Society: General Energetics of Complex Systems.
Boston: MIT Press.
Sminia, H. (2009). ‘Process research in strategy formation: Theory, methodology and rel-
evance’. In: International Journal of Management Reviews 11.1, pp. 97–215.
Smith, A. (2007). ‘Translating Sustainabilities between Green Niches and Socio-Technical
Regimes’. In: Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 19.4, pp. 427–450. issn:
0953-7325. doi: 10.1080/09537320701403334. url: http://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/abs/10.1080/09537320701403334.
Smith, A. and R. Raven (2012). ‘What is protective space? Reconsidering niches in trans-
itions to sustainability’. Eindhoven. url: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S0048733312000601.
Smits, R. and S. Kuhlmann (2002). ‘Strengthening Interfaces in Innovation Systems: ra-
tionale, concepts and (new) instruments’. In: Science & Technology policies in Europe:
New Challenges and New Responses. Proceedings of the STRATA Consolidating Work-
shop, Brussels April, pp. 300–370.
Spa¨th, P. and H. Rohracher (2010). ‘‘Energy regions’: The transformative power of re-
gional discourses on socio-technical futures’. In: Research Policy 39.4, pp. 449–458.
issn: 00487333. doi: 10.1016/j.respol.2010.01.017. url: http://linkinghub.
elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0048733310000314.
Staudt, L. (2000). Status and Prospects for Wind Energy in Ireland. Tech. rep. 3.
276
Stenzel, T. and A. Frenzel (2008). ‘Regulating technological change—The strategic reac-
tions of utility companies towards subsidy policies in the German, Spanish and UK
electricity markets’. In: Energy Policy 36.7, pp. 2645–2657. issn: 0301-4215. url: http:
//www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421508001341.
Stern, N. H. (2007). The economics of climate change: the Stern Review. English. Cam-
bridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. isbn: 9780521700801 0521700809.
Stirling, A. (2009). ‘Direction, Distribution and Diversity! Pluralising Progress in Innova-
tion, Sustainability and Development’. Sussex. url: http://anewmanifesto.org/wp-
content/uploads/stirling-paper-32.pdf.
— (2014). ‘Transforming power: Social science and the politics of energy choices’. In: En-
ergy Research & Social Science, pp. 1–13. issn: 22146296. doi: 10.1016/j.erss.2014.
02.001. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S2214629614000036.
Stone Sweet, A., W. Sandholtz, and N. Fligstein (2001). The institutionalization of Europe.
Oxford: Oxford University Press. url: http://books.google.com/books?hl=en%7B%
5C&%7Dlr=%7B%5C&%7Did=8qfomGx36ZIC%7B%5C&%7Doi=fnd%7B%5C&%7Dpg=PR9%7B%
5C&%7Ddq=The+Institutionalization+of+Europe%7B%5C&%7Dots=DtXJZ3R0BT%7B%
5C&%7Dsig=0-KraTWIoHNtT1GDfoofVeMkgXw.
Suchman, M. C. M. (1995). ‘Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches’.
In: The Academy of Management Review 20.3, pp. 571–610. url: http://www.jstor.
org/stable/10.2307/258788.
Suurs, R. (2009). ‘Motors of Sustainable Innovation’. Doctoral dissertation. Utrecht: Utrecht
University.
Suurs, R. and M. Hekkert (2012). ‘Motors of Sustainable Innovation’. In: Governing the
energy transition. Ed. by G. Verbong and D. Loorbach. Routledge.
Sydow, J., A. Windeler, G. Mu¨ller-Seitz, and K. Lange (2012). ‘Path Constitution Analysis:
A Methodology for Understanding Path Dependence and Path Creation’. In: BuR -
Business Research 5.2, pp. 155–176. issn: 1866-8658. url: http://nbn-resolving.
de/urn:nbn:de:0009-20-35046.
Szarka, J. (2007). ‘Why is there no wind rush in France?’ In: European Environment 17.5,
pp. 321–333. issn: 1099-0976. doi: 10.1002/eet.460. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.
1002/eet.460.
— (2010). ‘Bringing interests back in: using coalition theories to explain European wind
power policies’. In: Journal of European Public Policy 17.6, pp. 836–853. issn: 1350-
277
1763. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2010.486988. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
13501763.2010.486988.
Tigabu, A. D., F. Berkhout, and P. van Beukering (2013). ‘The diffusion of a renewable en-
ergy technology and innovation system functioning: Comparing bio-digestion in Kenya
and Rwanda’. In: Technological Forecasting and Social Change. issn: 00401625. doi:
10.1016/j.techfore.2013.09.019. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/
retrieve/pii/S0040162513002564.
Toke, D. and V. Lauber (2007). ‘Anglo-Saxon and German approaches to neoliberalism
and environmental policy: The case of financing renewable energy’. In: Geoforum 38.4,
pp. 677–687. issn: 00167185. doi: 10.1016/j.geoforum.2006.11.016. url: http:
//linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0016718506001837.
Tour, A. de la, M. Glachant, and Y. Me´nie`re (2011). ‘Innovation and international tech-
nology transfer: The case of the Chinese photovoltaic industry’. In: Energy Policy
39.2, pp. 761–770. issn: 0301-4215. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.
2010.10.050. url: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0301421510008013.
Truffer, B., J.-P. Voß, and K. Konrad (2008). ‘Mapping expectations for system trans-
formations. Lessons from Sustainability Foresight in German utility sectors’. In: Tech-
nological Forecasting and Social Change 75.9, pp. 1360–1372. issn: 00401625 (ISSN).
Truffer, B. (2008). ‘Society, technology, and region: Contributions from the social study of
technology to economic geography’. In: Environment and Planning A 40.4, pp. 966–
985. issn: 0308518X (ISSN). doi: 10.1068/a39170.
Truffer, B. and L. Coenen (2012). ‘Environmental Innovation and Sustainability Trans-
itions’. In: Regional Studies, pp. 1–61.
Truffer, B., J. Markard, C. Binz, and S. Jacobsson (2013). ‘Energy Innovation Systems:
Structure of an emerging scholarly field and its future research directions’. In: Inter-
national Sustainability Transitions. Zurich, p. 40.
Turnheim, B. (2012). ‘The destabilisation of existing regimes in socio-technical transitions :
Theoretical explorations and in-depth case’. Doctoral dissertation. Brighton: University
of Sussex.
FS-UNEP (2014). Global trends in renewable energy investment. Tech. rep. Frankfurt
School - UNEP Collaborating Centre and Bloomberg New Energy Finance.
United Nations (2015). Adoption of the Paris Agreement. Paris. url: http://unfccc.
int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf.
278
Unruh, G. C. (2002). ‘Escaping carbon lock-in’. In: Energy policy 30.4, pp. 317–325. issn:
0301-4215.
Valeri, L. M. and R. S. J. Tol (2006). ‘Electricity shortages in Ireland: Probability and
consequences’. In: ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary 4.Winter, pp. 1–7.
Van de Ven, A. H. (1993). ‘A community perspective on the emergence of innovations’. In:
Journal of Engineering and Technology Management 10.1-2, pp. 23–51. issn: 09234748.
doi: 10.1016/0923-4748(93)90057-P. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/
retrieve/pii/092347489390057P.
Van De Ven, A. and M. S. Poole (1995). ‘Explaining development and change in organiz-
ations’. In: 20.3, pp. 510–540.
Vasseur, V., L. M. Kamp, and S. O. Negro (2013). ‘A comparative analysis of Photovoltaic
Technological Innovation Systems including international dimensions: The cases of
Japan and the Netherlands’. In: Journal of Cleaner Production 48, pp. 200–210. issn:
09596526. doi: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2013.01.017. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.
1016/j.jclepro.2013.01.017.
Ven, A. van de, H. Angle, and M. Poole (2000). Research on the Management of Innova-
tion: The Minnesota Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. isbn: 0195139763. url:
http://cds.cern.ch/record/1253312.
Vestergaard, O., B. Westman, G. McKay, P. Jones, J. Fitzgerald, and B. Williams (2010).
‘HVDC - enabling the transition to an energy system based on renewables’. In: 9th
IET International Conference on AC and DC Power Transmission (ACDC 2010).
IET, O31–O31. isbn: 978 1 84919 308 5. doi: 10.1049/cp.2010.0970. url: http:
//digital-library.theiet.org/content/conferences/10.1049/cp.2010.0970.
Vitina, A., S. Lu¨ers, A.-K. Wallasch, V. Berkhout, A. Duffy, B. Cleary, L. I. Husabø,
D. E. Weir, R. Lacal-Ara´ntegui, M. Hand, E. Lantz, R. Wiser, M. Bolinger, and B.
Hoen (2015). IEA Wind Task 26: Wind Technology, Cost, and Performance Trends
in Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Norway, the European Union, and the United States:
2007-2012. Tech. rep. International Energy Association.
Warren, C., C. Lumsden, S. O’Dowd, and R. Birnie (2005). ‘’Green On Green’: Public per-
ceptions of wind power in Scotland and Ireland’. In: Journal of Environmental Planning
and Management 48.6, pp. 853–875. issn: 0964-0568. doi: 10.1080/09640560500294376.
Weber, K. M. (2002). ‘Innovation networks and the transformation of large socio-technical
systems: the case of combined heat and power technology’. In: Innovation Networks:
279
Theory and Practice. Ed. by A. Pyka and G. Ku¨ppers. Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar
Publishing, pp. 133–165.
Weber, K. M. and H. Rohracher (2012a). ‘Legitimizing research, technology and innovation
policies for transformative change: Combining insights from innovation systems and
multi-level perspective in a comprehensive ‘failures’ framework’. In: Research Policy
41.6, pp. 1037–1047. issn: 0048-7333.
Weber, K. M. and H. Rohracher (2012b). ‘Legitimizing research, technology and innovation
policies for transformative change: Combining insights from innovation systems and
multi-level perspective in a comprehensive ‘failures’ framework’. In: Research Policy
41.6, pp. 1037–1047. url: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0048733312000613.
Wieczorek, A., S. Negro, R. Harmsen, G. Heimeriks, and M. Hekkert (2013). ‘A Review
of the Western European Offshore Wind Innovation System’. In: Renewable and Sus-
tainable Energy Reviews.
Wilson, C. (2012). ‘Up-scaling, formative phases, and learning in the historical diffusion of
energy technologies’. In: Energy Policy 50, pp. 81–94. issn: 03014215. doi: 10.1016/
j.enpol.2012.04.077. url: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/
S030142151200393X.
Windpower (2015). EIB supports Irish wind connections. (Visited on 03/08/2015).
Wirth, S., J. Markard, B. Truffer, and H. Rohracher (2013a). ‘Informal institutions mat-
ter: Professional culture and the development of biogas technology’. In: Environmental
Innovation and Societal Transitions 8, pp. 20–41. issn: 22104224. url: http : / /
linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S2210422413000439.
— (2013b). ‘Informal institutions matter: Professional culture and the development of
biogas technology’. In: Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 8, pp. 20–
41. issn: 22104224. doi: 10.1016/j.eist.2013.06.002. url: http://linkinghub.
elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S2210422413000439.
Yin, R. K. (2012). Applications of case study research. English. Thousand Oaks, Calif.:
SAGE. isbn: 9781412989169 1412989167.
280
Appendix A
Media sources for narrative data
Ref Headline Publication Date
S4-118 Islanders are forced to defer the great switch on The Irish Times 18/02/1987
S4-6 Mayo wind farm links up with the ESB The Irish Times 24/11/1990
S1-420 Danes in Irish wind farm scheme FT Energy Newsletters 03/05/1991
S1-419 EC-backed windmill project close to collapse FT Energy Newsletters 04/07/1991
S1-418 Ireland favours greater integration of Community en-
ergy policies
FT Energy Newsletters 16/08/1991
S1-416 Regional programme to share Ecu400m for local en-
ergy draws to a close
FT Energy Newsletters 13/09/1991
S1-415 Irish wind farm to take off in 1992 FT Energy Newsletters 26/09/1991
S1-414 News: Power plant plans FT Energy Newsletters 31/10/1991
S1-413 Publications Review: EC’s energy aid & lending facil-
ities:E´
FT Energy Newsletters 17/01/1992
S1-409 Private wind farm planned FT Energy Newsletters 10/04/1992
S4-61 Grants for energy savers The Irish Times 29/07/1992
S1-406 Wind farm on Kilronan mountain FT Energy Newsletters 14/08/1992
S4-178 Wind of change to a greener way of life The Irish Times 20/08/1992
S1-405 Commission analysis suggests 1988 guidelines need de-
veloping
FT Energy Newsletters 11/09/1992
S1-404 Cape Clear wind project problems FT Energy Newsletters 25/09/1992
S1-403 Ireland’s first wind firm coming on line FT Energy Newsletters 09/10/1992
S1-402 Wind power promise for Ireland as 6.5 MW farm comes
on line
FT Energy Newsletters 16/10/1992
S1-400 Wind on Rathlin FT Energy Newsletters 23/10/1992
S4-6 Mayo wind farm links up with the ESB The Irish Times 24/11/1992
S1-399 First Irish wind farm under way FT Energy Newsletters 27/11/1992
S1-397 Position changes on windpower FT Energy Newsletters 12/02/1993
S1-395 Electricity generating venture capital FT Energy Newsletters 07/05/1993
S1-393 Wind farm planned for county Kerry FT Energy Newsletters 16/07/1993
S4-88 ELECTRICITY FOR DONEGAL The Irish Times 20/07/1993
S1-389 High hopes for Thermies results FT Energy Newsletters 04/08/1993
S1-388 Vestas takes stake in Irish wind farm FT Energy Newsletters 13/08/1993
S1-385 Energy Market Report: Electricity FT Energy Newsletters 01/09/1993
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S1-384 New electricity legislation FT Energy Newsletters 10/09/1993
S4-45 WINDMILLS, NOT SHEEP The Irish Times 05/10/1993
S1-382 Proposal by Vestas to build windfarm on Mt Eagle FT Energy Newsletters 22/10/1993
S1-381 Windfarm in county Kerry FT Energy Newsletters 17/12/1993
S3-162 IRISH WIND ENERGY The Irish Times 06/01/1994
S4-55 Danes smell money on the wind after government en-
ergy rethink
The Irish Times 07/02/1994
S1-378 Energy Market Report: Electricity FT Energy Newsletters 01/04/1994
S3-161 Minister announces alternative energy scheme The Irish Times 13/04/1994
S4-100 Minister announces alternative energy scheme The Irish Times 13/04/1994
S1-376 Irish power interests eye BG’s proposed sub-sea gas
pipeline
FT Energy Newsletters 21/04/1994
S1-375 Ireland to encourage development of renewables FT Energy Newsletters 22/04/1994
S1-374 Total electricity production by the EU FT Energy Newsletters 06/05/1994
S4-33 Wind farm gets planning permission The Irish Times 18/05/1994
S1-373 Renewables FT Energy Newsletters 03/06/1994
S1-372 Grants for renewable generating proposals FT Energy Newsletters 15/07/1994
S4-38 Permit for wind powered electricity farm may face con-
stitutional test
The Irish Times 04/08/1994
S4-5 CO KERRY WIND FARM The Irish Times 10/08/1994
S1-370 Wind farm joint venture FT Energy Newsletters 12/08/1994
S1-369 Wind farm being built in county Kerry FT Energy Newsletters 26/08/1994
S1-367 Interconnector between Republic and Northern Ireland
could be restored
FT Energy Newsletters 09/09/1994
S4-13 Wind farms ”benefit to rural areas” The Irish Times 27/09/1994
S4-135 Ireland fails to promote a scientific culture The Irish Times 04/11/1994
S1-365 Irish Wind Energy Association critical of the ESB FT Energy Newsletters 18/11/1994
S4-22 34 alternative energy sources selected for ESB The Irish Times 08/03/1995
S1-360 Results of Ireland’s alternative energy requirement
tender
FT Energy Newsletters 10/03/1995
S4-19 Tipperary wind farm contract The Irish Times 22/03/1995
S1-359 News: Planned wind farm in county Donegal FT Energy Newsletters 07/04/1995
S4-105 Number of wind-energy projects to doubleE´ The Irish Times 27/04/1995
S1-357 Nordtank sells sare in Bellacorrick windfarm FT Energy Newsletters 05/05/1995
S4-4 Institute issues guidelines for siting of wind farms The Irish Times 31/05/1995
S1-353 Wind power making an impact in Spain FT Energy Newsletters 02/06/1995
S1-352 News: Alternative energy development an embarrass-
ment
FT Energy Newsletters 23/06/1995
S4-35 Priest’s charity highlights changing times The Irish Times 14/08/1995
S4-8 North’s first wind farms opened The Irish Times 15/08/1995
S1-350 MEPs investigate cuts in renewable R&D funds FT Energy Newsletters 22/09/1995
S4-30 Tipperary groups to campaign against scheme E´ The Irish Times 27/09/1995
S4-44 Countryside groups vow to foster mutual trust The Irish Times 16/10/1995
S4-53 CONCRETE ACHIEVER From a small farm in Co
Fermanagh E´
The Irish Times 20/10/1995
S4-32 ENERGY FROM WIND HAS ITS SNAGS, TOO The Irish Times 30/10/1995
S4-71 Donegal may get Pounds 13m ’windfarm’ The Irish Times 09/02/1996
S4-109 Blow for clean energy at Donegal wind conference The Irish Times 20/04/1996
S1-345 EIRE’S EUROPEAT PROGRESSES FT Energy Newsletters 30/04/1996
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S1-344 Diversification by Danish electricity market FT Energy Newsletters 31/05/1996
S1-343 Publications Review: European Union: Renewables
report
FT Energy Newsletters 14/06/1996
S1-341 EIB lending boosts energy projects FT Energy Newsletters 12/07/1996
S4-372 Howth group tells developers to ”back off” East Moun-
tain
The Irish Times 15/07/1996
S4-69 UK may get first offshore windfarm The Irish Times 15/08/1996
S4-134 700 new jobs in prospect over five year period The Irish Times 01/10/1996
S4-11 Winds of change blow powerfully Belfast Telegraph 08/10/1996
S1-338 MEPs clear new TENs projects as Maghreb-Europe
gas pipe opens
FT Energy Newsletters 15/11/1996
S1-337 TENS FT Energy Newsletters 13/12/1996
S3-160 ENERGY FROM WIND The Irish Times 06/01/1997
S4-25 ENERGY FROM WIND The Irish Times 06/01/1997
S4-76 USING THE MUSIC OF THE WIND The Irish Times 12/02/1997
S1-335 EU countries agree to cut emissions by an average 10%
by 2010
FT Energy Newsletters 14/03/1997
S1-332 Ireland/Companies-Power Generation - Ex peat boss
mulls gas power
FT Energy Newsletters 04/04/1997
S1-331 New Irish power company planned by former peat
company head
FT Energy Newsletters 11/04/1997
S4-57 Stagg ticks off wind energy experts for ignoring scheme The Irish Times 14/04/1997
S4-216 15 companies interested in new peat plant The Irish Times 21/04/1997
S4-51 Larne firm scoops windfarm contracts Belfast Telegraph 22/04/1997
S4-29 Donegal wind farm will give power to 100,000 The Irish Times 10/05/1997
S1-329 EUROPEAT INTEREST HOTS UP FT Energy Newsletters 27/05/1997
S4-24 Donegal wind farm opened The Irish Times 20/06/1997
S1-326 ENVIRONMENT: IRELAND FT Energy Newsletters 18/07/1997
S1-325 ELECTRICITY SUPPLY BOARD FT Energy Newsletters 23/07/1997
S4-23 Residents oppose wind farm plan The Irish Times 20/08/1997
S3-159 State urged to double power from renewable energy
sources E´
The Irish Times 07/10/1997
S4-14 Wind turbines’ environmental effect defended The Irish Times 07/10/1997
S4-52 State urged to double power from renewable energy
sources E´
The Irish Times 07/10/1997
S4-158 McKenna calls for binding agreement to cut green-
house gas emissions
The Irish Times 02/12/1997
S3-158 Welcome for tax reliefs on energy The Irish Times 04/12/1997
S4-10 Firms compete for wind farm franchises The Irish Times 30/12/1997
S1-321 LINKOHR’S RENEWABLES VISION E´ FT Energy Newsletters 01/01/1998
S4-68 High winds will be welcome down at the farm The Irish Times 05/01/1998
S1-320 NORD NA MONA GETS MORE CASH FT Energy Newsletters 30/01/1998
S4-127 French greens warn on use of incineration Environ-
mentalist points to lesson in closure of incinerators
servicing Lille
The Irish Times 04/02/1998
S1-317 IRISH WINDPOWER PROJECTS INSPIRE IN-
TEREST
FT Energy Newsletters 27/02/1998
S4-7 West Clare residents oppose wind farm The Irish Times 09/03/1998
283
S4-15 Windmills as high as Liberty Hall opposed on south
coast
The Irish Times 25/03/1998
S4-41 ESB faces new controversy over plan for wind farm at
Carnsore site
The Irish Times 26/03/1998
S4-49 Renewable energy plan needs (pounds) 160m The Irish Times 09/04/1998
S4-54 Restaurateur’s wind-farm project could light up Tralee The Irish Times 05/05/1998
S4-9 Minister opens wind farm The Irish Times 16/05/1998
S4-1 Turn aside the winds of change Renewable energyE´ The Irish Times 02/06/1998
S1-315 RENEWABLES: IRELAND FT Energy Newsletters 05/06/1998
S4-48 Wind energy is passing the test Wind is a proven,E´ The Irish Times 11/06/1998
S4-2 No Future For Wind Farms The Irish Times 22/06/1998
S1-312 EUROPE LEADS THE WAY IN WIND GENERA-
TION
FT Energy Newsletters 31/07/1998
S4-79 ESB boosts power The Irish Times 10/08/1998
S1-311 ENERGY EFFICIENCY - EUROPEAN UNION FT Energy Newsletters 31/08/1998
S1-309 COMMISSION TO PROPOSE ’CONVERGENCE’ E´ FT Energy Newsletters 01/10/1998
S4-16 Supporter of wind power site in Galway switches to
opposition
The Irish Times 16/11/1998
S1-306 UNITED IRELAND INITIATIVE TO HARNESS
OFFSHORE WIND
FT Energy Newsletters 27/11/1998
S1-304 WIND COULD SOLVE ELECTICITY SUPPLY
CRISIS
FT Energy Newsletters 11/12/1998
S1-305 IRISH PROJECTS SUPPORTED BY THERMIE
ROUND
FT Energy Newsletters 11/12/1998
S4-36 Animal Act does not meet EU standards, Commission
warns
The Irish Times 21/12/1998
S4-28 Wind Power The Irish Times 05/01/1999
S1-300 THE EU’S YOUNG POWER MARKET - A BIRD’S
EYE VIEW
FT Energy Newsletters 01/02/1999
S4-20 Group plans wind powered project on the Kish bank The Irish Times 09/03/1999
S4-34 Group may build wind farm on Kish bank The Irish Times 09/03/1999
S1-298 250MW OFFSHORE WINDFARM PLANNED IN
IRELAND:E´
FT Energy Newsletters 12/03/1999
S1-297 SAORGUS PROPOSES OFFSHORE IRISH WIND
PARK
FT Energy Newsletters 01/04/1999
S4-50 Galway’s first wind farm opened and blessed on wind-
swept Connemara bog
The Irish Times 07/04/1999
S4-42 Kerry wind farm investors first to avail of tax relief The Irish Times 16/04/1999
S3-157 Call for wind energy The Irish Times 17/04/1999
S1-295 EU BACKS UK-STYLE RENEWABLES SUPPORT FT Energy Newsletters 26/04/1999
S4-37 Treasury plans (pounds) 50m electricity investment The Irish Times 08/05/1999
S4-182 Competitors clash over Bill The Irish Times 14/05/1999
S4-21 Wind farm groups accused of distortion The Irish Times 14/05/1999
S1-294 TREASURY HOLDINGS TO BECOME MAJOR E´ FT Energy Newsletters 21/05/1999
S1-293 CHP DEBATE HEATS UP FT Energy Newsletters 01/06/1999
S4-131 Business On Television The Irish Times 02/07/1999
S1-292 PARLIAMENT RULES CHP IS NON-RENEWABLE FT Energy Newsletters 02/07/1999
S4-46 Project on wind energy with NI The Irish Times 14/07/1999
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S4-31 YARD SIGNS POUNDS 200M WIND POWER
DEAL
Belfast News Letter 15/07/1999
S4-72 Woods sees bright future for energy from waves The Irish Times 15/07/1999
S4-3 Proposal for Co Clare wind farm is rejected by An
Bord Pleanala
The Irish Times 04/08/1999
S4-26 Wind Farms In The West The Irish Times 10/08/1999
S4-143 Energy agency supports proposed Aran windfarm The Irish Times 16/08/1999
S4-17 Debate On Wind-Farms The Irish Times 16/08/1999
S4-59 Development plan for Co Donegal runs into trouble The Irish Times 20/08/1999
S1-288 The dash for gas in Dublin FT Energy Newsletters 13/09/1999
S4-58 ESB bill ’tariff’ set to boost renewable energy E´ The Irish Times 24/09/1999
S4-27 (pounds) 200m wind farm plan for Kish Bank The Irish Times 20/12/1999
S1-284 IRISH PROJECTS MOVE FORWARD FT Energy Newsletters 01/02/2000
S1-283 INDEPENDENT POWER EXCHANGE
LAUNCHESE´
FT Energy Newsletters 24/02/2000
S1-281 POINTS EUROPE FT Energy Newsletters 01/04/2000
S1-277 IRISH PLANNING BOARD FAVOURS SMALL
WIND FARMS
FT Energy Newsletters 07/04/2000
S1-278 EIRTRICITY SECURES EURO 1.27M IN POWER
CONTRACTS
FT Energy Newsletters 07/04/2000
S1-279 ESB WILL IMPORT POWER FROM NORTHERN
IRELAND E´
FT Energy Newsletters 07/04/2000
S1-276 NEW WIND ENERGY BRAND LAUNCHED ON IR-
ISH MARKET
FT Energy Newsletters 21/04/2000
S1-275 Germany Electricity - HEW clinches second emissions
trading deal
FT Energy Newsletters 17/11/2000
S1-273 Ireland Renewables - New ’breed’ of windfarms helps
Republic meet Kyoto targets
FT Energy Newsletters 15/12/2000
S3-156 Objectors welcome council decision to refuse planning
E´
The Irish Times 29/12/2000
S1-270 Ireland: New wind farm helps Republic meet Kyoto
targets
FT Energy Newsletters 05/01/2001
S1-271 Clare maintains stance against wind power FT Energy Newsletters 05/01/2001
S1-268 Ireland: Eirtricity applies for first offshore wind farm FT Energy Newsletters 12/01/2001
S1-266 eirtricity: orchestrating change FT Energy Newsletters 26/01/2001
S1-263 Ireland: Projects awarded EU funding FT Energy Newsletters 31/01/2001
S1-264 Ireland: Eirtricity applies for offshore FT Energy Newsletters 31/01/2001
S1-265 Farm planned for Tipperary FT Energy Newsletters 31/01/2001
S1-258 Vestas and NEG Micon gear up for explosive 2001 FT Energy Newsletters 02/04/2001
S1-260 Ireland - ESB plans farm at Moneypoint FT Energy Newsletters 02/04/2001
S1-261 Clare farm given green light FT Energy Newsletters 02/04/2001
S1-255 Ireland: Eirtricity advises customers to return to ESB FT Energy Newsletters 01/05/2001
S1-256 Ireland: Kish Bank wind farm gets closer FT Energy Newsletters 01/05/2001
S6-6 Government Gives Green Light to World’s Biggest
Wind Farm
IHS Global Insight 15/01/2002
S3-154 Stirring up a storm off shore E´ The Irish Times 29/01/2002
S3-153 Donegal council prepares to decide on EUR63m pro-
ject for three more wind farms
The Irish Times 08/02/2002
S3-152 Wind lobby warns on energy target The Irish Times 04/10/2002
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S3-151 Warning on wind energy shortfall The Irish Times 11/10/2002
S3-150 Wind industry criticises Budget The Irish Times 11/12/2002
S3-149 Green energy contracts to ESB understated The Irish
Times
The Irish Times 12/07/2003
S3-147 Jobs & E2bn industry at risk - Government told by
IWEA;E´
Sunday Tribune 27/07/2003
S3-146 Mayo council gives go-ahead to wind farm The Irish
Times
The Irish Times 31/07/2003
S3-145 IWEA Continuing to Promote Wind Energy; Wind Energy Sunday
Tribune
05/10/2003
S6-5 Eirgrid Temporarily Bans Wind Power Plant Connec-
tion to National Grid
IHS Global Insight 05/01/2004
S1-253 Show me the money: new pledges made to finance
renewable E´
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
01/07/2004
S1-248 Environment agency guidelines seek to foster wind-
farm siting
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
03/09/2004
S1-244 Government gives green light to renewable power ex-
pansion
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
06/10/2004
S1-247 Irish board seeks approval to expand in Basque region Platts Renewable Energy
Report
06/10/2004
S1-241 Three companies request approval to build wind farms
in Scotland
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
03/12/2004
S1-237 RWE, Airtricity join forces on wind complex in Ireland Platts Renewable Energy
Report
10/01/2005
S1-238 Ireland approves 235MW of new renewables capacity Platts Renewable Energy
Report
10/01/2005
S1-236 Airtricity lays plans to add nearly 113MW in capacity Platts Renewable Energy
Report
21/02/2005
S3-144 Smoke Screens Business & Finance
Magazine
24/02/2005
S1-235 Members of IEA panels urge investment in renewable
E´
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
21/03/2005
S1-234 RES secures new funding Platts Renewable Energy
Report
04/04/2005
S6-20 Irish Government Switches to Feed-In Subsidy of
Green Electricity
IHS Global Insight 13/04/2005
S1-231 Energy minister vows renewables will receive continued
support
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
18/04/2005
S1-232 EC sues Ireland for ignoring public after landslide at
wind farm site
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
18/04/2005
S1-233 Gamesa Eolica looks to crash Irish market with new
contract
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
18/04/2005
S6-11 Airtricity Halts Plans to Build Europe’s Largest Off-
shore Wind-Farm
IHS Global Insight 21/04/2005
S6-11a Airtricity Halts Plans to Build Europe’s Largest Off-
shore Wind-Farm
IHS Global Insight 21/04/2005
S1-230 Gamesa continues expansion into American, Irish mar-
kets
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
02/05/2005
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S1-229 Airtricity officials cut ribbon to nation’s largest wind
farm
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
16/05/2005
S6-1 First Offshore Wind Farm Opened in Ireland IHS Global Insight 30/05/2005
S1-228 GE Energy reports progress in developing Arklow
Bank
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
13/06/2005
S6-7 Minister to Unveil New Energy Policy in Ireland IHS Global Insight 15/06/2005
S6-42 Irish Farm Association Offered Discount by Airtricity IHS Global Insight 07/07/2005
S6-25 Ireland, Northern Ireland to Co-Operate on Sustain-
able Energy Policy
IHS Global Insight 26/07/2005
S1-226 Anti-trust agency gives clearance for Trinergy’s wind
acquisitions
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
08/08/2005
S1-227 Airtricity looks to form pool of onshore wind farm con-
tractors
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
08/08/2005
S1-224 Green energy consumption continues to rise in Ireland Platts Renewable Energy
Report
03/10/2005
S1-222 Ministry lays plans to introduce fixed-price tariff for
renewables
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
17/10/2005
S6-19 ESB May Be Excluded from Ireland’s Largest Wind
Power Project
IHS Global Insight 17/10/2005
S1-221 Regulator intends to set limit on new offers to renew-
able projects
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
28/11/2005
S1-216 Ireland remains on course to reach target for renewable
energy, grid operator finds
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
09/01/2006
S1-217 Airtricity signs pact to sell power from Braes of Doune
wind farm
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
09/01/2006
S6-17 Airtricity Plans Installation of 110MW of Irish Wind-
Power Capacity
IHS Global Insight 12/01/2006
S1-215 Airtricity makes plans to again construct domestic
wind farms
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
23/01/2006
S1-214 Gamesa nails down contracts to supply wind farms in
Ireland
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
06/02/2006
S6-2 Wind Farm Denied Access to Irish Grid IHS Global Insight 07/02/2006
S1-213 Airtricity arranges turbine delivery, with option for
more orders
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
20/02/2006
S6-14 Airtricity Withdraws from Residential Power Market IHS Global Insight 20/02/2006
S1-208 European transmission operators set out wish list for
integrating large-scale wind
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
06/03/2006
S1-210 Airtricity makes plans to exit residential market in Ire-
land
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
06/03/2006
S6-36 Irish Regulator Publishes ESB Green Power VPP
Plans
IHS Global Insight 07/03/2006
S1-205 Wind industry looks to profit from oil, gas price spikes
in EU
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
20/03/2006
S3-142 Wind energy to supply 35pc of needs Business World (Digest) 31/03/2006
S3-143 ’Lack of policy’ over wind energy The Irish Times 31/03/2006
S1-203 Irish policy-makers mull bill to speed energy develop-
ment
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
03/04/2006
S3-139 Government may consider nuclear option; Irish News 05/04/2006
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S1-199 Irish energy agency looks to refit support for renew-
ables with electricity feed-in tariff
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
15/05/2006
S1-200 Airtricity seeks to construct European offshore wind
grid
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
15/05/2006
S1-195 Airtricity strikes deal with GE for 500 MW of wind
turbines
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
10/07/2006
S1-193 Irish Republic puts out call for green energy resources Platts Renewable Energy
Report
24/07/2006
S1-188 Airtricity continues to rake in new equity from fun-
draising
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
07/08/2006
S1-184 Irish government renewable-energy strategy E´ Platts Renewable Energy
Report
18/09/2006
S3-138 New power plant ’is vital by winter 2009’ Irish Independent 30/09/2006
S3-137 Oil prices forecast to hit EUR100 next year Sunday Tribune (Ireland) 01/10/2006
S1-180 Energy ministry in Ireland throws support to 55 re-
newables projects
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
16/10/2006
S3-136 Wind energy cheaper Irish News 30/10/2006
S1-177 Ireland proposes to ease planning rules for microgen Platts Renewable Energy
Report
27/11/2006
S6-3 Ireland’s Airtricity Receives Permission for 700-mil.-
Euro Dutch Wind Farm
IHS Global Insight 30/11/2006
S3-135 IWEA welcomes EU boost for wind energy Business World (Digest) 19/12/2006
S1-175 Irish board signs agreement to buy power from Lough
Hill wind farm
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
08/01/2007
S1-170 Ireland’s Energia agrees to supply green power to food
distributor
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
05/02/2007
S6-21 Approval Granted for 500MW U.K. Wind Farm with
Airtricity
IHS Global Insight 20/02/2007
S1-165 European grids would boost renewables, promote
North Africa links: panel
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
05/03/2007
S3-134 Government white paper fails to connect with renew-
able electricity producers
Sunday Tribune (Ireland) 25/03/2007
S1-162 Largest energy storage system in EU set for Irish wind
farm
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
02/04/2007
S3-133 Big In China Business & Finance
Magazine
06/04/2007
S6-12 Airtricity Plans 800-mil.-Euro Wind-Power Invest-
ment in Portugal
IHS Global Insight 20/04/2007
S1-160 Analysts urge industry to adjust to rapidly evolving
markets
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
30/04/2007
S1-153 Irish TSO reports growth in renewable energy hook-
ups
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
11/06/2007
S1-154 UK companies needed to break backlog in offshore
wind: Vestas
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
11/06/2007
S1-155 Irish company requests proposals to supply wind farm
components
Platts Renewable Energy
Report
11/06/2007
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